

# Ethical Champions, Emotions, Framing, and Team Ethical Decision Making

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Research has offered a pessimistic (although limited) view regarding the effectiveness of ethical champions in teams and the social consequences they are likely to experience. To challenge this view, we conducted two multimethod (quantitative/qualitative) experimental studies in the context of entrepreneurial team decision-making to examine whether and how an ethical champion can shape team decision ethicality and whether ethical champions experience interpersonal costs. In Study 1, we found that confederate ethical champions influenced team decisions to be more ethical by increasing team ethical awareness. Focusing on the emotional expressions of ethical champions, we found that sympathetic and angry ethical champions both increased team decision ethicality but that angry ethical champions were more disliked. Analysis of team interaction videos further revealed moral disengagement in team discussions and the emergence of nonconfederate ethical champions who used business frames to argue for the ethical decision. Those emergent phenomena shifted our focus, in Study 2, to how ethical champions framed the issues and the mediating processes involved. We found that ethical champions using ethical frames not only increased team ethical awareness but also consequently reduced team moral disengagement, resulting in more ethical team decisions. Ethical champions using business frames also improved team decision ethicality, but by increasing the perceived business utility of the ethical decision.

*Keywords:* decision frames, emotions, ethical awareness, moral disengagement, team ethical decision making

Understanding ethical decision making in teams is crucial because organizations increasingly rely on teams to make consequential decisions (LePine & Van Dyne, 1998; Podsakoff, Maynes, Whiting, & Podsakoff, 2015). For decisions with ethical implications, organizational reputation and stakeholder well-being may depend on team members who step up to champion an ethical decision in their team (i.e., ethical champions) at the earliest decision stage (Kish-Gephart, Detert, Treviño, & Edmondson, 2009; Morrison, 2014) rather than raising concerns after the fact when it may be too late and harm may already be done. Yet, available research has painted a rather pessimistic picture for potential ethical champions (Oc, Bashshur, & Moore, 2019), sug-

gesting that a lone ethical champion may be unable to influence team decisions in an ethical direction and that the ethical champion can expect to face social sanctions from peers.

First, given the dominance of business logics that emphasize efficiency and profit maximization (Friedman, 1962; Ghoshal, 2005; Sonenshein, 2007), discussing ethical issues is often deemed irrational and distracting in business settings and therefore employees are reluctant to do so (Bird, 1996; Bird & Waters, 1989; Sonenshein, 2006). Given people's general tendency to comply with the numerical majority (Asch, 1955; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Martin & Hewstone, 2008; Moscovici, 1980), it may be quite challenging, if not impossible, for an ethical champion to shift the entire team's decision away from the dominant business perspective. Additionally, research reveals both expected and actual peer negative reactions (e.g., disliking, derogation, and retaliation) to coworkers who report or oppose unethical practices (Kish-Gephart et al., 2009; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003; Treviño & Victor, 1992; Wellman, Mayer, Ong, & DeRue, 2016). This suggests that ethical champions can expect to incur social costs in their teams.

This pessimistic view may discourage potential ethical champions from advocating for ethical decisions, with critical implications for team decision making and ultimately for organizational integrity and reputation. Moreover, this pessimistic view may focus research attention solely on negative outcomes associated with championing ethical issues, resulting in possibly incomplete knowledge and further inhibiting ethical championing in organizations. Therefore, it is important to investigate the actual outcomes associated with ethical championing.

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In this investigation, we ask whether and, if so, how ethical champions can be effective and avoid negative social consequences. First, drawing from the social influence (minority influence) literature (Nemeth, 1986, 2011) and research on ethical awareness (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008), we argue that ethical champions can influence teams in an ethical direction. Minority opinion, if distinctive and salient enough, should attract attention, heighten awareness of additional perspectives, and sway team decisions (Nemeth, 1986). Assuming that ethical champions are likely to use explicit ethical language such as harm, care, responsibility, we argue that over time, ethical champions, despite being outnumbered, can stand out against others who adopt the traditional business logics such as profit maximization and efficiency. To understand why ethical champions raise ethical issues, teams are motivated to search for and consider a wider range of information than they would have otherwise considered and become more aware of the ethical implications of their decisions. Once ethically aware, teams are more likely to take into account the ethical concerns, resulting in more ethical decisions.

Second, drawing from the social influence and dissent literature, we argue that ethical champions may not necessarily experience negative social consequences. Some research suggests that team members are tolerant of minority influencers who seek to create constructive change for the team (Jetten & Hornsey, 2014): Sometimes those members are even liked more than other team members (Allen & Levine, 1969; Asch, 1955; Van Dyne & Saavedra, 1996; Worchel & Brehm, 1971). As noted earlier, research has primarily revealed peer negative reactions to employees reporting or opposing unethical behaviors *after the fact*. However, we argue that compared with those speaking up *after the fact*, ethical champions, who proactively advocate for ethical outcomes *before* decisions are made, may induce more positive evaluations.

Moreover, we argue that the effectiveness of and social consequences experienced by ethical champions further depend on *how* they present their messages. The social influence literature has shown that how opinion minority members present their messages plays a key role in determining the extent to which they can attract the team's attention and influence the team (Martin & Hewstone, 2008; Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974; Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994). In this investigation, we focus on harm-related ethical issues because harm plays a central role in defining an issue as an ethical one (Jones, 1991) and such issues are common in organizations (e.g., human rights, product and employee safety issues). Therefore, harm-related emotional expressions (i.e., moral anger and sympathy) are likely the key alternatives for this type of ethical message presentation. First, this may be because those emotions enable individuals to overcome the natural fear associated with speaking up about ethical issues (Detert & Bruno, 2017; Kish-Gephart et al., 2009; Lebel, 2017). According to deontic justice theory and research (Folger, 2001; Folger, Ganegoda, Rice, Taylor, & Wo, 2013), when anticipating or witnessing harm to a third-party, individuals experience primarily anger and sympathy and are fueled by those emotions to speak up or engage in other behaviors to prevent harm (Haidt, 2003; Hershcovis & Bhatnagar, 2017; O'Reilly & Aquino, 2011; Pfattheicher, Sassenrath, & Keller, 2019). Sympathy involves feelings of concern and sorrow for others' suffering and motivates behaviors to prevent harm (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010; see Eisenberg & Miller, 1987 for

a review). Moral anger or outrage stems from concern about a moral standard violation that harms others and motivates corrective action to change the situation (Hershcovis & Bhatnagar, 2017; Lindebaum & Geddes, 2016; O'Reilly & Aquino, 2011; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Moreover, research suggests that organizational members do explicitly display emotions (Dutton & Ashford, 1993) such as sympathy (Dutton, Worline, Frost, & Lilius, 2006; Frost et al., 2006; Miller, Grimes, McMullen, & Vogus, 2012) and anger (Stickney & Geddes, 2014, 2016) to draw audience attention to others' suffering and prompt prosocial actions. Given that ethical decision making is affect-laden (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Moore & Gino, 2015), ethical champions are likely to express anger or sympathy when attempting to influence ethical decisions.

Based upon the social influence literature and the different functions attributed to anger and sympathy, we argue that the decision and social outcomes are differentially associated with ethical champions who express anger versus sympathy. We propose that anger is more positively associated with team ethical decisions because it signals more certainty about the harm and the ethical violation (Geddes & Callister, 2007; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999) than sympathy and hence makes the ethical issue more salient. However, we also posit that angry champions, but not sympathetic champions, are liked less than other team members because anger implies ethical violation and responsibility (Rozin et al., 1999).

To examine these questions, we employed an experimental design that included a realistic decision-making task, teams of highly engaged entrepreneurship students, trained actor confederates as ethical champions, and systematic coding of video recordings of team processes. We deem experiments well suited to studying low base rate, highly sensitive phenomena such as ethical championing that would be challenging to observe and unethical to manipulate in naturally occurring teams (Igen, 1986; Treviño, 1992). Our research design not only allowed us to test our hypotheses, but it also allowed us to discover, via analysis of team interaction videos, additional team decision processes not initially hypothesized. We also observed naturally emerging, nonconfederate ethical champions, some of whom presented their messages differently. Grounded in these emergent data, we developed more evidence-based hypotheses about ethical champions and designed a second experiment (Study 2) to test them.

## Study 1

### Overview

We designed Study 1 to examine the effect of ethical champions on team decision ethicality and the role of emotional expression in shaping team decision ethicality and social consequences experienced by ethical champions. We first review research on ethical awareness and decision ethicality at the individual level to provide a launching pad for thinking about potential effects of an ethical champion on a *team's* ethical decision. Because business decision-makers are inclined to approach issues narrowly in terms of economic performance, an ethical champion is likely an opinion minority, if not a lone dissenter, in a decision-making team. Therefore, we review the minority influence literature to develop our hypotheses about the likely effect of ethical champions on

team decisions and our hypotheses regarding the effects of angry and sympathetic expression on team decisions and social consequences for ethical champions.

### Importance of Ethical Awareness to Ethical Decision Making in Business Settings

According to Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008), ethical awareness—the recognition that the situation or issue facing individuals contains ethical content and can legitimately be considered from an ethical point of view (Rest, 1986; Reynolds, 2006a)—is the key mechanism underlying ethical decision making in business settings. They argue that individual ethical decision-makers in business may apply two different decision frames (i.e., a knowledge structure that consists of certain cognitive representations about people, objects, and settings, Tannen & Wallat, 1987)—a business frame or ethical frame—to a decision situation, resulting in different decision processes and outcomes. They argue that applying business frames, defined as seeing an issue in financial terms related to profit or shareholder value (Kreps & Monin, 2011), inhibits ethical awareness and subsequent ethical behaviors. When individuals use business frames, narrow profit and self-interest considerations arguably dominate the decision process while the ethical aspects of the situation are overlooked. As a result, ethical awareness is low and unethical decisions increase (Ghoshal, 2005; Greenbaum, Mawritz, & Eissa, 2012; Kelley & Elm, 2003; Sonenshein, 2007; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004).

An ethical frame, by contrast, is defined as seeing an issue or decision in terms of ethical values and principles (e.g., caring, fairness) that go beyond the self-interest of organizations or individuals (Kreps & Monin, 2011; Rozin, 1999; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Sonenshein, 2007, 2009; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). When ethical frames are made salient, individuals' ethics-related knowledge structures are activated (Butterfield, Treviño, & Weaver, 2000; Parmar, 2014; Reynolds, 2006b). Individuals thus become more ethically aware, ethical considerations dominate the decision process, and people are more likely to make an ethical decision (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008).

In business settings, pervasive and salient situational cues suggest that a business frame should predominate whereas an ethical frame should not (Ghoshal, 2005; Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, & Sousa, 2013; Molinsky, Grant, & Margolis, 2012). Ethical frames need to be intentionally prompted by ethical framing—presenting the situation using explicit ethical language (Gunia, Wang, Huang, Wang, & Murnighan, 2012; Sonenshein, 2009) or by ethical symbols (Desai & Kouchaki, 2017). Thus, behavioral ethics scholars have emphasized the importance of activating ethical frames to increase individual ethical awareness and the likelihood of an ethical decision (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). Their effects on *team* ethical decision making have not been investigated.

### Minority Influence, Team Ethical Awareness, and Ethical Decision Making in Teams

As noted earlier, ethical champions are likely the numerical minority in business decision teams due to the prevalence of business frames. Even if some members are ethically aware, they

might hesitate to speak up about ethical issues (Bird, 1996; Sonenshein, 2006) because of an implicit belief that doing so is distracting and jeopardizes efficiency and their own image as rational organizational agents (Bird & Waters, 1989). Moreover, collective decision-making settings diffuse individual responsibility for raising ethical issues (Bandura, 1999; Hussain, Shu, Tangirala, & Ekkirala, 2018). Therefore, we integrate research on ethical awareness and the social influence literature (in particular, the minority influence literature; Latané & Wolf, 1981; Nemeth, 2011; Nemeth, Wachter, & Endicott, 1977) to understand whether and how an ethical champion can shape a team ethical decision in business settings.

The social influence research suggests that individuals are more likely to endorse the majority opinion than the minority opinion (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Latané & Wolf, 1981). The greater the number of team members that support a position, the more likely individuals assume that their position is correct. Especially in ambiguous situations such as those involving ethical issues (Sonenshein, 2006, 2016), individuals rely more on the opinion majority for sensemaking about the situation (Festinger, 1954). Additionally, individuals are more likely to conform to the opinion majority because the majority has more resources and power for social rewards and punishment (Latané & Wolf, 1981). Therefore, given the prevalence of business frames in business organizations, it might be challenging, if not impossible, for a lone ethical champion to influence the team's ethical decision.

However, the social influence literature also suggests that the opinion minority can influence the team's decision when it is salient. Because individuals tend to assume correctness of the majority position and easily dismiss the minority viewpoint, the minority view needs to be “distinctive” in the eyes of the majority, counternormative, or sufficiently salient to attract attention (Martin & Hewstone, 2008; Wood, 2000). A salient minority opinion motivates team members to exert cognitive effort to try to understand the minority view (e.g., “Why does the champion risk endorsing something so different from our typical view?”; Crano & Chen, 1998; Nemeth, 1986). As a result, teams will actively search for and deeply process a wider range of information beyond just the evidence supporting the majority opinion. Team members will acknowledge multiple perspectives on the issue, reconsider their own positions, and become more open to the minority opinion (Latané & Wolf, 1981; Nemeth et al., 1977; Nemeth, 2011; Wood et al., 1994). In contrast, teams without a minority opinion assume that their preferences are correct and tend to limit their consideration and discussion to a narrower set of supportive information (Nemeth, 1986, 2011; Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006).

Following this logic, we argue that an ethical champion is likely to attract attention in teams and raise team ethical awareness. Ethical champions in business settings are especially likely to gain attention because, by using explicit ethical language (e.g., harm, safety, care, responsibility), an ethical champion will stand out in a team that had been using the default business frame. Because other team members are hesitant to speak up about ethical issues, the lone ethical champion is even more salient despite being outnumbered (McLeod, Baron, Marti, & Yoon, 1997; Wood, 2000). Teams are likely to expend attentional and cognitive resources to understand these salient ethical champions. They will carefully search and consider more information relevant to the

ethical aspects of the situation (e.g., harms that the product can have on customers and other stakeholders), rather than focusing solely on profit and bottom-line related information. As a result, we expect an increase in team ethical awareness (which we define as a collective or shared acknowledgment—expressed among team members via their interaction—that a situation involves ethical issues and principles and therefore can legitimately be considered from an ethical viewpoint). Similar to Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe's (2008) view of the important role of individual ethical awareness, we argue that in order for a team to move its decision making in an ethical direction, the *team* needs to become more ethically aware, recognizing and accepting the relevance of ethical issues and principles in its deliberations.

We conceptualize team ethical awareness as a collective phenomenon. The key feature that distinguishes team ethical awareness from individual ethical awareness is its interactional basis. Team states such as team ethical awareness are formed based upon the dynamic interaction within the team (Humphrey & Aime, 2014). As suggested by Morgeson and Hofmann (1999), individual-level cognitions such as ethical awareness typically occur at the intraindividual cognitive level whereas collective states arise from and are expressed via interpersonal interactions (e.g., team discussions). Because individual-level and team-level ethical awareness have different underlying structures and manifest themselves differently, team ethical awareness might be quite different than team members' average individual ethical awareness (Klein & Kozlowski, 2000). Teams with a few members who privately believe that ethical issues are relevant may have moderate levels of individual ethical awareness. Yet, unless those members voice their concerns to the rest of the team and the rest of the team is brought along, the team would have a very low level of *team* ethical awareness. In sum, we view team ethical awareness as an emergent state that arises over time through team interaction (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001).

We argue that team ethical awareness triggers an ethical decision process. Made aware of ethical issues by ethical champions, teams are likely to see the situation in terms of ethical values and principles and incorporate the ethical perspective into decision making, resulting in more ethical decisions. Without an ethical champion, teams are likely to think narrowly in business terms, confirming the priorities of profit and bottom-line factors while remaining unaware of the ethical implications associated with their decision. This results in an amoral decision process leading to less ethical decisions (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008).

*Hypothesis 1:* The presence of an ethical champion is positively associated with a more ethical team decision, compared with the absence of an ethical champion.

*Hypothesis 2:* The positive relationship between the presence of an ethical champion and team decision ethicality is mediated by team ethical awareness.

### Ethical Champions, Emotional Expression, and Decision Outcomes

The minority influence literature suggests that how an opinion minority presents the message (in this case, the emotional expres-

sions of ethical champions) affects how much influence the opinion minority can have on the team decision. An opinion minority can become more salient and have a greater impact by signaling confidence and certainty of the minority position verbally or nonverbally (Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974; Nemeth et al., 1977). The minority needs to stand up to the majority and show that it is certain and committed to the position, not easily swayed by the majority. This way of presenting leads team members to attend more to the minority and conclude that the minority is making a valid point that deserves or even demands consideration. In considering the minority viewpoint, team members also begin questioning their own preoccupation with the majority view, leading to attitude change (Nemeth et al., 1977).

We have argued that, because ethical decision making is an emotional process (Haidt, 2001), ethical champions will likely express moral emotions (i.e., moral anger or sympathy). Based on the different attributes and functions of moral anger and sympathy, we posit that anger and sympathy will differentially shape ethical champions' influence on team decisions. Specifically, we expect angry champions to be more effective than sympathetic champions at focusing team members' attention on ethical issues and influencing the team decision. A central appraisal feature of moral anger (compared with sympathy) is certainty about harm to others (Batson, Chao, & Givens, 2009; Lindebaum & Geddes, 2016). Certainty is signaled to the audience through various high-energy nonverbal cues that accompany anger such as raised voice, pitch, and volume (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Geddes & Callister, 2007). The audience generally believes that the extent to which others express moral anger depends on the certainty and magnitude of harm (Geddes & Callister, 2007). Moreover, compared with sympathy, moral anger signals not only certainty about harm but also certainty about violations of universal moral norms (Rozin et al., 1999). More specifically, moral anger is aroused when someone violates the universal moral code of autonomy by directly harming another or infringing upon his or her rights as an individual (Shweder et al., 1997). Whereas sympathy conveys anticipated stakeholders' suffering without implying ethical violation and responsibility, anger highlights that the act of harming stakeholders is a *violation* of universal ethical principles. Given that perceived harm and violation of ethical norms are two principal factors contributing to awareness of ethical issues (Jones, 1991; Reynolds, 2006a), anger should make ethical aspects of the situation more salient to team members and heighten ethical awareness.

Furthermore, because the expression of anger is generally unwelcome in organizational contexts (Gibson, Schweitzer, Callister, & Gray, 2009), an ethical champion who risks displaying anger even signals more strongly the ethical nature of the issue. Thus, compared with sympathy, anger brings more attention to the ethical concerns, raising ethical awareness and driving changes to address the situation (de Vos, van Zomeren, Gordijn, & Postmes, 2013; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Geddes, Callister, & Gibson, 2018; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011).

*Hypothesis 3:* Compared with sympathetic ethical champions, angry ethical champions are more positively associated with a more ethical team decision.

## Ethical Champions, Emotional Expression, and Social Consequences

Although we expect ethical champions to influence team ethical decisions via team ethical awareness (Hypotheses 1 and 2), with angry champions having a stronger effect (Hypothesis 3), it is less clear how they will fare interpersonally. According to the minority influence and dissent literature, perceived threat to the team and its members might be key to explaining liking and disliking of ethical champions (Festinger, 1950; Jetten & Hornsey, 2014; Monin & O'Connor, 2011). Because team members are motivated to move toward team goals and promote team cohesion, members may socially reject ethical champions when they are perceived to threaten team goal achievement or team harmony (Jetten & Hornsey, 2011). In addition, as people are motivated to maintain a positive self-appraisal, seeing themselves in a positive light and thinking of themselves as ethical (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Festinger, 1954; Goodwin, 2015), team members may feel morally threatened and distance themselves from the ethical champions when they believe that their morality is being questioned or condemned (Monin, 2007; Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008).

However, because ethical champions proactively participate in decision making and aim to achieve constructive changes, they are not necessarily considered a threat to the team and its members and are not necessarily disliked. We argue that team members' liking of ethical champions can be shaped by different emotional expressions of champions because different attributes and social functions of emotions convey different meaning to team members (van Kleef, 2009). Sympathetic champions should be less likely to suffer interpersonally because of sympathy's social-affiliation nature, defined as helping individuals maintain and build cooperative relationships, promoting closeness and harmony (Fischer & Manstead, 2010). Sympathetic expression conveys the expresser's social engaging orientation and signals that the expresser is caring and benevolent. This should help ameliorate perceived threat (if any) to team harmony and cohesiveness.

In contrast, angry ethical champions should be more disliked than nonchampions. Anger is regarded as a social distancing emotion (i.e., increasing separation from others; Fischer & Manstead, 2010), often interpreted as an aggressive move to obtain or regain control (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Koning & van Kleef, 2015). Therefore, angry ethical champions might be deemed as a threat to team cohesiveness and relational stability. Furthermore, expressed moral anger, even if not targeted at team members (but rather at the issue), is a signal of ethical violations (Rozin et al., 1999)—the angry expression implies responsibility for the ethical violation and suggests that others should behave more ethically (Monin et al., 2008). Team members may take it personally and feel threatened. To cope with the perceived threat to team and self, team members may socially reject angry champions.

*Hypothesis 4:* An angry ethical champion will be liked less than other team members.

## Method

**Participants.** This study has been approved by the Pennsylvania State University's Institutional Review Board ("Moral Advocacy and Group Ethical Decision Making in a Business Setting," STUDY00006726). Two hundred thirty undergraduates (81 fe-

male, 148 male, and one sex not reported) who were enrolled in 10 sessions of two entrepreneurship and innovation classes at the College of Business of a large U.S. university participated in this study.

Participation was part of students' course requirement. Entrepreneurship students are motivated to start their own ventures (some of them have already launched their own businesses) and are trained to think like managers, which makes them appropriate participants for this study. Seventy-seven percent of the participants were white, 16% were Asian, 4% were African American, and 3% were Hispanic. The participants were randomly assigned to 70 teams. We based our sample size on previous research on team decision-making studies that typically have 15–30 teams per condition (e.g., Park & DeShon, 2018; Spoelma & Ellis, 2017). With this sample size, we obtain a power of approximately .80 to detect a medium to large-size effect. The size of teams ranged from two to five ( $M = 3.27$ ,  $SD = .70$ ), plus a confederate. Participants in the same teams did not know each other well before the experiment ( $M = 1.21$ ,  $SD = .68$  on a scale ranging from 1 = *I did not know this member at all* to 5 = *I knew this member extremely well*).

**Experimental design.** We tested the hypotheses in the context of an entrepreneurial team decision task because of its relevance to participants' course content and to the focal research topic. Many ethical issues occur in novel and ambiguous business contexts where regulations and social norms are weak or nonexistent (Jones, 1991), which makes entrepreneurial settings an excellent context for the current study. In the task created for this study (with input from course faculty and a medical marijuana start-up expert), each team was asked to make a decision as the founding team of a hypothetical start-up company specializing in medical marijuana processing and retailing. The medical marijuana industry was selected for several reasons. First, it increased relevance and contextual realism of the study because the state where the university is located had recently passed a medical marijuana legalization bill, opening up an opportunity for entrepreneurs. Second, ethics-related controversies exist in the medical marijuana industry, making it an excellent context for examining and observing team ethical decision making. We focused on harm-related issues because harm plays a central role in defining an issue as an ethical one (Jones, 1991) and such issues are common in the medical marijuana industry.

A three-condition between-subjects design was employed to test the hypotheses. The conditions include a control and two experimental conditions (sympathetic ethical champion or angry ethical champion). Trained male confederates were used to carry out the experimental manipulation. Teams were randomly assigned to one of the conditions, with 24 teams in the anger condition, 23 teams in the sympathy condition, and 23 teams in the control condition.

**Procedure.** Participants arrived individually and were randomly assigned to teams. They were informed that team sessions would be video recorded with their consent. Following best practice guidelines (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014), the experimenter increased psychological realism by informing the participants that the founders of a start-up company had recently sought advice from the entrepreneurship center at the College of Business and the center was seeking students' input to inform their recommendation. The participants read background information on the medicinal marijuana start-up and were instructed to work as the founding

team of the company to solve problems and make decisions for their company. They were told that they would continue to work as a team so that they would want to work out appropriate solutions. To reduce pressure to conform to the confederate champions, we emphasized that although they should strive for a decision that is satisfactory to most team members, consensus was not necessary. They were told that they could use any procedures needed (e.g., voting) to finalize their team decision. They were instructed to spend 15–20 min working on each section of the task.

In the first section of the task, participants were asked to create a store name and logo for their medical marijuana dispensary and to design the storefront. This task was a warm-up session designed to familiarize them with each other and to create a sense of company ownership.<sup>1</sup> The second section involved the main decision-making task that was used for hypothesis testing and answering the research questions. Participants were given a written case stating that the company was experiencing financial difficulties due to the low efficiency of an all-natural extraction method (i.e., water extraction) used to process the marijuana. To make it a high-stakes decision, the company was depicted as one that was being pressed by its investors to improve financial performance. Participants were asked to decide what proportion of the production budget (within the range of 0% to 100%) to shift to a more efficient and cost-saving, yet more risky extraction method. The new, riskier method leaves behind chemical residue potentially harmful to vulnerable populations such as children, people with AIDS, and chemotherapy patients, all likely customers. Each participant was asked to think through the problem independently and write down their initial number before discussing it with other team members. Participants then worked together to arrive at a team decision.

In all conditions, the confederates waited for others to speak before speaking. In the control condition, the confederate mentioned that he would shift zero percent of the budget to the new extraction method (to be equivalent to the other experimental conditions) but he did not advocate for that position. Instead, he noted that he was open to other team members' solutions. When asked for his opinion, the control confederate said that he saw the pros and cons of both methods and wanted to hear others' ideas. Thus, confederates in the control condition were noncommittal. They maintained flat facial expressions and an unemotional vocal tone throughout this section of the task, and refrained from advocating for the 0 solution. Having a confederate providing a zero-percent-budget-shift solution in the control condition helps rule out potential anchoring effects. Although one could argue that simply having someone mention the zero solution without championing it may still shift the team decision in that direction, this makes the study a conservative test of the effect of ethical champions on team decisions.

In the experimental conditions, following a script, confederates advocated strongly for the zero percent budget allocation. The script consisted of several segments that could be used sequentially and that centered on harm-based arguments: The chemical residue left behind by the new extraction method would harm vulnerable customers. The words in the script were almost identical for the two emotional expression conditions. Emotions were conveyed by phrases describing emotions at the very beginning and end of each segment of speech (see Appendix A). For example, in the sympathetic expression condition, confederates would say "I'm really

concerned about the potential for harm of this new extraction method," "I don't want to see people hurt." In the angry expression condition, confederates would say "I'm annoyed about the new method because it's gonna harm people," "I would be angry if that happened." Emotions were also conveyed nonverbally through facial expression, vocal tone, and posture following extensive training based upon emotions research (Goetz et al., 2010; Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Juslin & Scherer, 2008; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; see Appendix B). Immediately after the task, participants completed a questionnaire that included items regarding the team decision process and their perceptions of team members. After completing the experiment, participants were debriefed via e-mail.

**Confederates.** Experienced actors were hired as confederates to create the experimental conditions. Five Caucasian male undergraduates who were theater or musical theater majors or student thespians were hired after demonstrating their ability to remember the scripts and express the two emotions. The five confederates did not differ significantly in perceived attractiveness on a 5-point Likert scale ( $M = 2.75$ ,  $SD = 1.03$ ), as reported by participants,  $F(4, 218) = 1.56$ ,  $p = .19$ . All of the confederates were trained extensively and practiced with each other and the researchers over a period of several weeks (see Appendix C for details of the training procedures) until they demonstrated their effectiveness satisfactorily. All performed all three conditions and they were randomly assigned to teams (conditions were balanced for confederates such that each confederate participated in a similar number of teams across conditions).

#### Measures.

**Manipulation check.** Two video-coders blind to the experimental conditions and our hypotheses were trained in coding confederates' emotional expression through facial expressions, body language, and verbal tone. Evidence has supported video-coders' ability to reliably judge and distinguish expressed emotion (e.g., Barsade, 2002; Bartel & Saavedra, 2000). Video-coders watched segments of videos where only the confederate was speaking and rated the extent to which the confederate expressed anger (two items—anger and irritation,  $\alpha = .99$ ) or sympathy (two items—sympathy and compassion,  $\alpha = .99$ ) on a scale ranging from 1 = *not at all* to 5 = *extremely*. The coders independently coded 25 across-condition-randomly selected videos (about 1/3 of the videos). The coders' anger and sympathy scores for these videos were consistent ( $r_{WG(D)} = .99$ ,  $ICC [1] = .99$ ,  $F[24, 24] = 1444.67$ ,  $p < .001$  for anger;  $r_{WG(D)} = .98$ ,  $ICC [1] = .98$ ,  $F[24, 24] = 149.88$ ,  $p < .001$  for sympathy). The rest of the videos were randomly split into two sets and coded by the two coders respectively.

**Ethicality of the team decision.** The measure of team decision ethicality is the proportion of the budget allocated to the new, more harmful method written on the team answer sheet, ranging on a continuum from least ethical (one hundred percent of the budget shifting to the new, efficient but harmful extraction method) to most ethical (zero percent of the budget shifting). To rule out legal concerns that may also drive a low budget allocation decision, the task material emphasized that this new method had been recently

<sup>1</sup> We observed, in video recordings, that participants referred to the company as "we" and "our store" during their discussions, suggesting a sense of ownership.

adopted by several major medicinal marijuana organizations in other states and that the state did not regulate the amount of residual chemical in medicinal marijuana products, nor was it requiring labeling. To rule out financial considerations that may also lead to a low budget allocation decision, the material emphasized that the cost to make the switch was minimal and the chemical solvent was inexpensive and reusable. Our predictions focus on moving the team's decision in a more ethical direction. Therefore, we treated a decision that allocated *fewer* funds to the newer, more harmful extraction method as the more ethical decision because it was less likely to be harmful to customers.

**Social consequences for the ethical champions.** We combined two measures to assess how well ethical champions were received by other team members: overall impression and liking. Each team member was asked to indicate their overall impression and liking of every other team member (including the confederate). Overall impression was measured with a single item ("Your overall impression of this member is") ranging from  $-3 = \textit{very negative}$  to  $+3 = \textit{very positive}$  (Monin et al., 2008). Liking was measured with two items (i.e., "How much do you enjoy working with him/her as a team mate," "how much would you like to work with her/him in the same team in the future") ranging from  $1 = \textit{not at all}$  to  $5 = \textit{extremely}$  (Jehn & Mannix, 2001). This measure demonstrated good reliability ( $\alpha = .92$ ). The correlation between liking and overall impression is  $.71$  ( $p < .001$ ), suggesting that it is appropriate to combine the two measures. Each item was standardized and aggregated to form a liking scale.

**Team ethical awareness.** Evidence has shown that verbal and nonverbal behaviors reflect deeper-level phenomena such as cognitions and affect (Pennebaker & Graybeal, 2001). Therefore, researchers have used behavioral observations or content analyses to assess individual or team-level cognitions or other psychological states. For example, researchers who have studied ethical awareness at the individual level have unobtrusively assessed individual ethical awareness by coding open-ended responses on surveys (Butterfield et al., 2000). Team researchers have also unobtrusively measured team processes and emergent states by rating videos of team interactions and coding verbatim when studying team transactive memory (Ellis, 2006), coalition formation, conflict, team identification (Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010), and commitment (Jehn & Shah, 1997). According to our definition of team ethical awareness (the shared acknowledgment of ethical issues and principles in the team), it should be observable in team interaction. Therefore, we assessed ethical awareness at the team level by coding the videos of team discussions. Following guidelines for video coding and analyses (LeBaron, Jarzabkowski, Pratt, & Fetzer, 2018; Waller & Kaplan, 2018), we hired and trained two coders (two graduate business students) who were blind to the research hypotheses. They watched the second part of the team task and rated the extent to which there is "a *shared* recognition in the team that the team's potential decision or action could affect the interests, welfare, or expectations of others in a fashion that may conflict with one or more ethical standards such as safety, fairness, human rights, honesty, integrity, social responsibility, etc." using a 5-point Likert scale from 1 to 5. The anchors were as follows: 1 *Not at all* represents that there is *no shared recognition*; 3 *Moderately* represents that some but not all members shared this recognition; 5 *Very strongly* represents a strong consensus in the team. We trained the two coders in several sessions. We empha-

sized the importance of sharedness and evaluating the team as a whole (i.e., presence of an extremely aware team member is not equivalent to a strong team consensus on the existence of ethical issues). After watching the video recordings, we also specified behavioral anchors for shared awareness: When some members mentioned that this is an ethical or harm issue, other members nodded, verbally acknowledged (e.g., "yeah," "I get that," "initially I didn't see it that way but now I can see it"), or supported with more arguments; as well as behavioral anchors for not sharing awareness: When some members mentioned this is an ethical or harm issue at hand, other members looked impatient, eyed them warily, verbally denied (e.g., "This is only said by SOME experts," "this is only a likelihood,") changed the conversation, or opposed with more arguments. The two coders coded the videos separately. They demonstrated significant agreement on their ratings across randomly selected 50 videos (about 2/3 of total videos) they both coded:  $ICC(1) = .85$ ,  $ICC(2) = .92$ ,  $F(49, 49) = 12.05$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $r_{WG} = .90$ . They reconciled discrepancies in their ratings after the independent coding.

**Analytical strategies.** Because of the nested nature of the data (i.e., teams were assigned to different confederates; individuals were nested within teams; each rater assessed multiple team members; each team member was rated by multiple raters), we planned to analyze data using multilevel modeling (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). For ethicality of the team decision, we tested two-level models but found that the confederate level explained 0% of the variance. Model comparison indicated that removing confederate-level random effect had negligible effects on model fit,  $\chi^2(1) = .00$ ,  $p = .99$ , suggesting that a simpler OLS modeling sufficed (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Therefore, we conducted OLS regression.

Similarly, for social consequences, we tested models where raters and ratees were cross-nested and they were nested in teams, which were subsequently nested in the confederates. The confederate level explained no variance and the team level explained 1.8% of the variance for liking. Model comparison indicated that removing the confederate-level and team-level random effect had negligible effects on model fit,  $\chi^2(2) = .18$ ,  $p = .91$ . Therefore, we omitted random effects of those two levels. For liking, 19.7% variance is explained by ratees and 30.4% variance is explained by raters, indicating nonindependence of the data. Therefore, for interpersonal outcomes, it is more appropriate to use cross-nested mixed-effect models than OLS.

## Results

**Manipulation check.** Results indicated that the three conditions were significantly different in terms of rated confederate expressed anger,  $F(2, 67) = 27.32$ ,  $p < .001$ . Confederates in the anger condition were rated significantly angrier ( $M = 4.08$ ,  $SD = 1.56$ ,  $ps < .001$ ) compared with the control condition ( $M = 1.43$ ,  $SD = 1.20$ ) and the sympathy condition ( $M = 1.59$ ,  $SD = 1.36$ ). There was no difference in expressed anger scores between the control condition and the sympathy condition.

Results also indicated that the three conditions were significantly different in terms of rated confederate expressed sympathy,  $F(2, 67) = 80.02$ ,  $p < .001$ . Confederates in the sympathy condition were rated significantly more sympathetic ( $M = 4.33$ ,  $SD = 1.41$ ,  $ps < .001$ ) compared with the control condition ( $M = 1.09$ ,

$SD = .29$ ) and the anger condition ( $M = 1.33, SD = .87$ ). There was no difference in the expressed sympathy score between the control condition and the anger condition.

**Ethical champions and ethicality of team decision.** To contrast teams with ethical champions versus teams without (H1) as well as angry versus sympathetic champions (H3), we used Helmert coding. Conditions were represented by two codes  $d_1$  and  $d_2$ :  $d_1$  was coded  $1/3$  for both the sympathetic and the angry condition and  $-2/3$  for the control condition, such that the regression coefficient of  $d_1$  represents the effect of the average of the two ethical champion conditions relative to the control condition (H1).  $d_2$  was coded  $1/2$  for the angry condition,  $-1/2$  for the sympathetic condition, and  $0$  for the control condition, such that the regression coefficient of  $d_2$  represents the effect of the angry condition relative to the sympathetic condition (H3; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). We controlled for team size, team average prediscussion decision, and the standard deviation of team member prediscussion decision which have been shown to affect team decisions (Stasser & Davis, 1981). Correlations are presented in Table 1.

We hypothesized and found that ethical champions would positively influence team decision ethicality (H1). As shown in Table 2, compared with the control condition, the average of the two conditions with ethical champions were negatively related to amount of budget allocated to the more harmful extraction method ( $B = -35.93, t = -7.79, p < .001$ ), with a large amount of variance explained. Further, compared with the control condition, the average of the two conditions with ethical champions was positively related to team ethical awareness ( $B = .98, p < .001$ ).

We used SPSS PROCESS macro Version 3 (Hayes, 2017) to test the mediation effect of team ethical awareness (H2). Bootstrap results with 5,000 samples show a significant indirect effect of ethical champions on decision (un)ethicality via team ethical awareness (point estimate =  $-7.74$ , 95% bootstrapped CI [ $-14.19, -2.82$ ]), supporting H2. Means of decisions and team ethical awareness in each condition can be seen in Table 3. On average, teams with ethical champions expressing either anger ( $M = 14.13$ ) or sympathy ( $M = 17.14$ ) allocated 35.9% less production budget to the harmful new extraction method than teams in the control condition ( $M = 50.40$ ).

We further hypothesized that angry ethical champions would have a more positive effect on decision ethicality than sympathetic ethical champions (H3). Results did not support this hypothesis: the contrast of the angry condition and the sympathetic condition ( $d_2$ ) was not significantly related to team decision (un)ethicality ( $B = -2.04, t = -.40, p = .69$ ).

**Ethical champions and social consequences.** We conducted mixed-effects modeling using R to examine social consequences for ethical champions. Sympathetic and angry expression conditions (relative to the control) were represented by two dummy-coded variables  $c_1$  and  $c_2$ . Ratee type (whether the ratee is a confederate) is represented by a dummy code. We also controlled for mean-centered team size.

Hypothesis 4 proposed that confederate ethical champions would be liked less than other team members in the angry condition but not in the other two conditions. A significant interaction of the angry condition and ratee type would support H4.

As shown in Table 4, and in support of H4, we found a significant interaction of the angry condition and ratee type ( $B = -1.02, p = .005$ ). The interaction of the sympathetic condition and ratee type was not significant ( $B = -.30, p = .41$ ). The interaction explained 4.4% of the ratee-level variance. We further probed the significant interaction using the web utility provided by Preacher, Curran, and Bauer (2006). As shown in Figure 1, the simple effect of ratee type is significant in the angry condition ( $B = -1.21, SE = .48, p = .01$ ), meaning that angry confederates were liked less than other team members. The simple effect of ratee type was not significant in the control condition ( $B = -.18, SE = .26, p = .48$ ), meaning that neutral confederates were not different from other team members. Further, the simple slope of the angry condition was only significant when the ratee was a confederate ( $B = -.86, SE = .35, p = .02$ ), meaning that the angry confederates were liked less than the neutral confederates. Means and standard deviations of the liking index are presented in Table 3.

## Exploratory Analyses and Results

Because ethical championing in team ethical decision making is a novel research topic, and because the video recordings offered a wealth of potential new knowledge, we took an exploratory approach to further understand the team's ethical decision-making processes by systematically analyzing videos of team discussions and proposing new research questions as a result of that analysis. First, and importantly, we observed that, in some teams, ethical champions who were not confederates but who consistently argued for the ethical solution emerged. To further confirm our hypothesized effects of ethical champions on team decision, we tested Hypotheses 1 and 2 with these emergent ethical champions.

This also gave us the opportunity to raise additional research questions about emergent ethical champions. We have proposed that ethical champions are likely to use ethical language and

Table 1  
Correlations Among Variables in Study 1

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5
1. Condition <sup>a</sup>							
2. Team size	4.26	0.71	-.13				
3. Prediscussion team member decision, <i>M</i>	43.72	16.38	.02	.09			
4. Prediscussion team member decision, <i>SD</i>	25.31	12.29	-.16	.18	.09		
5. Team decision ethicality	26.52	24.70	-.58**	.12	.39**	.10	

Note.  $N = 65$ .

<sup>a</sup> Control = 1, sympathetic condition = 2, angry condition = 3.

\*\*  $p < .01$  (2-tailed).



Table 2  
Regression Results for Ethicality of Team Decision in Study 1

Variable	Ethicality of team decision			
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>
Team size	1.81	2.98	.46	2.78
Prediscussion individual decision, <i>M</i>	.59**	.13	.34*	.14
Prediscussion individual decision, <i>SD</i>	-.26	.18	-.10	.17
d1 (Ethical champions vs. Control)	-35.93**	4.65	-28.19**	4.87
d2 (Anger vs. Sympathy)	-2.04	5.07	.98	.21
Team ethical awareness			-7.88**	2.34
$\Delta R^2$ attributable to d1 and d2	.42**			
$\Delta R^2$ attributable to team ethical awareness			.07**	
$R^2$	.59**		.66**	

Note. *N* = 65 (5 of 70 teams have team members who did not indicate their initial individual decision).

\*  $p < .05$  (2-tailed). \*\*  $p < .01$  (2-tailed).

express anger or sympathy and designed our experimental manipulations in Study 1 accordingly. However, it is not clear whether ethical champions in real settings present messages in the same ways as we had proposed. Because business frames are salient in business organizations and individuals have also implicitly assumed that moral talk in business settings is frowned upon, those situational cues may affect emergent champions' selection of frames. For example, Sonenshein (2006) found that individuals used more business language but less ethical language when raising social issues with superiors but, interestingly, he did not find similar results for individuals who raised issues with peers. Additionally, researchers have suggested that employees might remain cool-headed and suppress emotions to effectively influence others (Grant, 2013; Meyerson & Scully, 1995). This might affect ethical champions' emotional expression. Therefore, we posed the following research question:

*Research Question 1:* How will emergent ethical champions present their messages? Will they use ethical language and express anger or sympathy, or not?

Finally, we wondered how emergent ethical champions are received by other members. If they present their messages in different ways than confederate champions did, how did team members react to them interpersonally?

*Research Question 2:* How are emergent ethical champions received by other team members?

**Emergence of ethical champions.** When viewing video of team interactions, the first author noticed that some participants (not confederates) consistently argued for ethical outcomes. The first author and a coder then systematically identified 22 (of 230 nonconfederate participants) as emergent ethical champions following these steps<sup>2</sup>: First, we narrowed our focus to 67 participants whose initial individual decision was a minimal percentage of budget switch (0% to 20%); second, we separately watched videos involving each of those participants and rated whether each individual consistently made arguments for the safer method or not; third, we compared our ratings and reached consensus on the final set of emergent ethical champion.<sup>3</sup> All but one of them argued for the safer method before the confederate initially spoke. Table 5 shows a comparison of demographics, majors, and other basic

information among the champions. The overall sample suggests a similar profile, with one exception: gender. Compared with the overall sample, emergent champions were significantly more likely to be female,  $\chi^2(2) = 6.12, p < .05$ , consistent with findings in the behavioral ethics literature that females are slightly more ethical (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010).

According to the guidelines provided by Waller and Kaplan (2018) for quantitative video-based analysis, it is appropriate to analyze constructs coded on interval metrics using traditional quantitative approaches such as regressions, *t* tests, analysis of variance, and so forth. Therefore, we used those methods to examine research questions related to emergent champions.

**Emergent ethical champions and team decision ethicality.** We tested H1 again with the emergent ethical champions. We regressed team decision ethicality on a dummy-coded variable representing presence of emergent champions in each team and controlled for confederate champions and the same set of covariates we used for hypothesis testing, including team size, team average prediscussion decision, and the standard deviation of team member prediscussion decision. Table 6 shows that the presence of emergent ethical champions was negatively related to team decision (un)ethicality ( $B = -21.54, p < .001$ ), further supporting H1. On average, teams with (a) naturally emerging champion(s) allocated 21.5% less budget to the harmful new extraction method compared with other teams (having a somewhat lesser effect than

<sup>2</sup> We also conducted all the analyses for Hypotheses 1-4 excluding emergent ethical champions. The resulting patterns remained the same. Compared with the control condition, the average of the two conditions with ethical champions is negatively related to amount of budget allocated to the more harmful extraction method ( $B = -40.34, t = -7.61, p < .001$ ), supporting H1. It is also positively related to team ethical awareness ( $B = .71, t = 2.52, p = .02$ ). Team ethical awareness mediates the effect of ethical champions on decision (un)ethicality (95% bootstrapping CI: [-13.03, -1.45], supporting H2. The contrast between angry condition and sympathetic condition is not significant ( $B = -3.42, t = -.61, p = .55$ ), offering no support for H3. In terms of liking, interaction between angry condition and the confederate (vs. non-confederate) is significant ( $B = -.1.10, p < .01$ ) and interaction between sympathetic condition and the confederate is not significant, supporting H4. Full results are available upon request.

<sup>3</sup> There was substantial agreement between ratings of the first author and the coder blind to the purpose ( $\kappa = .76, p < .001$ ). Discrepancies were discussed and reconciled.

Table 3  
*Descriptive Statistics for Ethicality of Team Decision and Social Consequences of Team Members in Study 1*

Variable	Team-level ( $N = 65$ )				Dyad-level ( $N = 689$ )			
	Prediscussion team member decision mean		Team decision		Social consequences of the confederates		Social consequences of other team members	
	$M$	$SD$	$M$	$SD$	$M$	$SD$	$M$	$SD$
Anger	42.82	20.67	14.13	16.09	-0.76	2.20	0.45	1.31
Sympathy	42.36	14.87	17.14	15.51	-0.47	2.24	-0.05	1.82
Control	44.11	15.47	50.40	24.84	0.05	1.64	0.14	1.74
Total	43.06	17.12	26.12	24.73	-0.41	2.08	0.17	1.66

confederate champions). Bootstrap results show a significant indirect effect of emergent champions on team decision (un)ethicality via team ethical awareness (point estimate =  $-8.76$ , 95% bootstrapped CI:  $[-16.50, -2.73]$ ), further supporting H2.

**Emergent ethical champions' message presentation—framing.** The first author watched segments of videos where the emergent champions spoke and confirmed their utilization of ethical framing and a kind of business framing that used business language to argue for the more ethical solution. We operationalized *ethical framing* as the speaker emphasizing the ethical aspect of the situation by appealing to ethical principles (e.g., respect for human life), values, or company responsibility (e.g., caring for people, improving their health); *business framing (for the safer extraction method)* was operationalized as the speaker emphasizing the financial and reputational benefits to the business of the safer method or costs of the riskier method (e.g., organic niche market, high-end product, advantage against competitors). This is a different type of business framing than is typically assumed when ethical and business framing have been pitted against each other in individual-level ethical decision-making research (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008).

Two coders were trained to code framing. Consistent with accepted qualitative research methods, they focused on distinct *thought units* (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Strauss & Corbin, 1994). A thought unit could be one or more sentences representing a distinct, separate, and complete argument. The coders assigned category codes (i.e., ethical framing, business framing, others) to units and noted time stamps for each (Cohen's  $\kappa = .94$ ). Total time for ethical framing and business framing was calculated.

$t$  tests indicated that the length of time emergent ethical champions used this new type of business framing was significantly different from zero,  $t(21) = 5.60$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $M = 33.23$ ,  $SD = 27.85$ , suggesting that emergent champions did not limit themselves to ethical framing and also used business framing to argue for the more ethical decision. A paired sample  $t$  test further indicated that the emergent champions did not prioritize either type of framing,  $t(21) = -.05$ ,  $p = .96$ ; business framing:  $M = 33.23$ ,  $SD = 27.85$ ; ethical framing:  $M = 33.73$ ,  $SD = 32.06$ . The relatively large variance suggests that emergent champions differed considerably from each other in how they framed the issue. The first author watched videos of emergent champions and found four champions who only used ethical frames and six champions who only used business frames. Twelve champions used both frames but the ways they used the frames varied: five champions started with ethical frames but added business frames when team members expressed concerns about the business; five champions started with business frames but also concurred with the confederates, adding ethical frames; only two champions simultaneously used both frames.

**Emergent ethical champions' message presentation—emotional expression.** Using the same coding scheme that was used for confederate emotional expression, one coder watched segments of videos where only the emergent champions were speaking and rated the extent to which each emergent champion expressed anger or sympathy. A paired sample  $t$  test indicated that sympathy scores ( $M = 2.18$ ,  $SD = 1.02$ , min = 1, max = 5) for emergent champions were significantly higher than anger scores ( $M = 1.27$ ,  $SD = .57$ , min = 1, max = 4),  $t(21) = -3.10$ ,  $p = .005$ . Only two

Table 4  
*Mixed-Effects Modeling Results for Social Consequences of Ethical Champions*

Variable	Social consequence	Social consequence with interaction terms
	$B$ ( $SE$ )	$B$ ( $SE$ )
Intercept	.35* (.17)	.24 (.18)
Team size	-.29** (.14)	-.43** (.14)
$c_1$ (Anger vs. Control)	-.11 (.24)	.16 (.25)
$c_2$ (Sympathy vs. Control)	-.36 (.23)	-.29 (.28)
Ratee type (Confederate vs. Other team member)	-.63** (.15)	-.24 (.25)
$c_1 \times$ Ratee type		-1.02** (.36)
$c_2 \times$ Ratee type		-.30 (.36)
Pseudo $R^2$	.09	.04

Note.  $N = 689$  rater-ratee dyads, 221 raters, 292 ratees.  
 \*  $p < .05$  (2-tailed). \*\*  $p < .01$  (2-tailed).




Figure 1. Liking of confederates and other team members by condition in Study 1.

emergent champions appeared somewhat angry whereas nine emergent champions were somewhat to very sympathetic. Emergent champions' self-ratings indicated that they felt a moderate amount of sympathy ( $M = 3.02$ ,  $SD = 1.55$ ,  $\min = 1$ ,  $\max = 5$ ) and little anger ( $M = 1.62$ ,  $SD = 1.07$ ,  $\min = 1$ ,  $\max = 5$ ). This suggests that emergent advocates felt more sympathy than anger, but they were not very emotionally expressive. They also differed in the degree to which they experienced and expressed sympathy or anger.

**Emergent ethical champions' social consequences.** Finally, Research Question 2 asked how emergent champions would be received by team members. We used dummy codes to compare nonchampions ( $a_0 = 1$ ) with emergent champions ( $a_0 = 0$ ), while controlling for confederates. Because of the nested nature of the data, we used mixed-effects modeling to account for nonindependence of raters and ratees. Covariates (i.e., mean-centered team size and dummies of experimental conditions) were included in intercept-as-outcome two-level models.  $a_0$  was treated as rate-level variables. Emergent ethical champions did not significantly differ from team members who were nonchampions in terms of social consequences ( $B = -.15$ ,  $p = .60$ ), meaning that they were not liked less than their teammates.

In sum, emergent champions influenced team decision ethicality via increased team ethical awareness, and they did not suffer negative social consequences. However, the way emergent champions presented their message was different from confederates. In general, they were less emotionally expressive and some of them made a business case for the ethical decision rather than using exclusively ethical arguments.

## Analyses of Team Processes

As a result of our exploratory analysis, we found that emergent champions used both ethical framing and business framing to make the ethical case. Relatedly, we wondered whether there are additional mechanisms other than team ethical awareness heightened by ethical framing that explain why some teams make more ethical decisions than others. Thus, we analyzed video recordings

of team discussions to answer the following research question: How do teams talk about and frame the issue? Do teams that make more or less ethical decisions frame the issue differently?

### Framing used by team members during team discussions.

We watched videos to understand how team members talked about the decision which reflects how they framed the situation. As we did for emergent champions, we focused on thought units. The first author independently watched one half of the videos and labeled units using both language of participants and concepts in the extant literature (e.g., ethical framing, business framing; Kreiner, 2015). This enabled us to better connect our findings to the literature. Codes were assigned to the units and were subsequently compared and aggregated into categories. The first and second authors then watched another subset of the videos and revised the coding dictionary.

Following guidelines for video coding (LeBaron et al., 2018; Waller & Kaplan, 2018), we used two additional coders who were blind to our experimental design and hypotheses. The coders learned the coding dictionary and went through extensive training (13 hr in total) with the authors by coding sample videos, comparing codes, and calibrating their criteria (Waller & Kaplan, 2018). We randomly divided the 70 study videos into two sets of 47 videos, such that 23 videos appeared in both sets. Cohen's Kappa based on the 23 videos they both coded was .92. The two coders discussed and reconciled all discrepancies in coding.

Table 7 defines (and provides examples of) the identified categories. Consistent with Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008) and our propositions were two clear types of framing: business framing in support of the new more harmful extraction method (Business—new-harmful; average % time: 31%) and ethical framing in support of the old safer method (Ethical—old-safer; 29%). Yet, we also found multiple types of framing that went beyond the existing literature. We found evidence for business framing for the old safer method (Business—old-safer; 11%). Additionally, we found ambivalent framing where team members recognized the situation as a dilemma where ethical and business considerations conflict (11%). Finally, we found something else—substantial use of moral disengagement language in team interaction (18%).

As expected, team members used *business* language to support the new more harmful method by emphasizing the company's financial needs and therefore the necessity of switching to the

Table 5  
Profiles of All Participants and Emergent Ethical Champions

Variable	All participants ( $N = 230$ )		Emergent champions ( $N = 22$ )	
	$M$	$SD$	$M$	$SD$
Year in college	3.00	.96	3.05	1.07
Female	.36	.49	.59	.50
White	.78	.41	.77	.43
Business major	.23	.42	.27	.46
Other management-related major	.21	.41	.23	.43
Engineering major	.34	.47	.18	.39
Enrollment in business law/ethics class	.19	.39	.23	.43
$N$ in the control condition	77		10	
$N$ in the anger condition	76		7	
$N$ in the sympathy condition	77		5	

Table 6  
*Effects of Emergent Ethical Champions on Team Decision Ethicality*

Variable	(Un)ethicality of team decisions			
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>
Constant	29.83**	14.17	58.51**	14.82
Team size	2.63	3.02	.71	2.77
Prediscussion team member decision, <i>M</i>	.20	.12	.05	.12
Prediscussion team member decision, <i>SD</i>	.18	.17	.24	.15
Angry condition	-34.15**	5.04	-25.15**	5.15
Sympathetic condition	-33.37**	5.31	-27.23**	5.05
Presence of emergent champions	-21.26**	4.96	-12.56**	5.02
Team ethical awareness			-8.37**	2.19
$\Delta R^2$ attributable to emergent champions	.13**			
$\Delta R^2$ attributable to team ethical awareness			.08**	
$R^2$	.60**		.68**	

Note. *N* = 65.

\*\**p* < .01 (2-tailed).

cost-saving, highly efficient new method. For example, one proponent argued for the urgency and necessity to switch: "I think we should go 100 percent because what we are doing now is not making money. . . . Plus what happens is we are going out of business. . . . At least we'll start to make money back with the new method."

However, they also used moral disengagement language when supporting the new more harmful extraction method. *Moral disengagement* has been defined in terms of a set of eight cognitive mechanisms used by individuals to rationalize and free themselves from guilt or self-condemnation for their unethical behavior (Bandura, 1999). After we observed evidence of moral disengagement language in the teams, we trained our coders to look for these moral disengagement mechanisms in the language used in team interaction. And, our analysis found that moral disengagement mechanisms were harnessed to construe switching to the harmful method as a morally acceptable practice to sway team decisions. For example, one participant placed responsibility on the customers and de-emphasized the harmful effects: "I think many people probably don't care about the chemicals. People know cigarettes are harmful but they still smoke. I mean they'd be willing to take risks if they want to buy those products [attribution of blame]. Also, a lot of things have been said to be potentially harmful but turn out okay. I have smoked for years but haven't felt that bad" [distortion of consequences].

As discussed earlier, ethical champions and some other members emphasized *ethical* aspects of the situation by appealing to ethical principles (e.g., caring, fairness), personal values, and the social responsibility of the company. Moreover, as we emphasized, many proponents of the old, safer method (e.g., emergent ethical champions) used a business frame to emphasize the financial and reputational benefits of the old method. Those proponents often depicted naturally extracted marijuana as an "organic" product that could capture a niche market. For example, "If other people jump on this wagon [the new method], then let them do it. We could potentially go with the angle that we are going the all-natural route. If everyone else is using the new extraction, we can exploit that, use this against them."

We also noticed that teams differed in the time they spent on different types of framing. Time distribution should reflect distri-

bution of the team's attention and what aspects they emphasized. Therefore, we contrasted teams that made the most ethical decisions (the 20 teams that chose not to switch to the harmful method) and teams that made a less ethical decision (the 15 teams that chose to switch the majority of the budget to the harmful method). As shown in Figure 2, the most ethical teams and the least ethical teams clearly differed in terms of time devoted to the different types of framing. Consistent with our assumption, business framing (for the new more harmful method) clearly dominates in the least ethical teams (46%) where ethics was rarely discussed (15%). In contrast, the most ethical teams spent more time with ethical framing (40%; supporting the idea that they were ethically aware) and the different type of business framing—to argue for keeping the old safer method (23%). They spent less time with business framing for switching to the more efficient riskier method (20%). In addition, the more ethical teams spent 2/3 less time using moral disengagement language than the less ethical teams.

In sum, this analysis goes beyond our hypothesis that ethical awareness heightened by ethical champions leads to ethical decisions. It suggests other possible mechanisms underlying team ethical decisions: recognition of the business arguments for the ethical solution and suppression of moral disengagement.

## Discussion of Study 1

Based upon minority influence theory, we argued and found that ethical champions influenced the ethicality of team decisions by elevating team ethical awareness and influencing teams to incorporate ethical concerns in their deliberations. This finding was corroborated by the exploratory analysis of team interactions where we found that teams that made the most ethical decisions spent more than one third of their time framing the issue as an ethical issue whereas teams that made the least ethical decisions spent the same amount of time making the business case for the less ethical decision.

We assumed that ethical champions are motivated by anger or sympathy and express those emotions in championing the ethical outcome. Therefore, we examined how the ethical champion's emotional expression influenced team decisions and social consequences. We found no difference between angry and sympathetic

Table 7  
 Categories of Ways in Which Team Members Talked About the Decision Situation

Category	Definition/Representative quotes	% time (SD)
Business framing for the new harmful method	Arguing for or implying the necessity of improving performance by switching to the efficient, cost-saving new method <i>"I would love to do that [staying with the old method] but based on the information presented, we might not be able to continue staying in business. What I'm saying is we need to keep competitive because apparently our competitors are starting using it. To keep competitive, we might have to tip into it because otherwise we are gonna go out of business."</i> <i>"How is that [advertising the water method] gonna change our cost? It's gonna increase our revenue but it's not gonna change our costs at all. They said our costs are too high because our production level is not enough and the product is too expensive. We've been having negative net profit, meaning that we need to change our costs."</i>	.31 (.17)
Business framing for the old safer method	Arguing for financial or reputational benefit of the pure method <i>"If the patients find out that we knowingly made the decision to switch to this new extraction method that can be harmful to them, then I think we lose the public image that we can never recover from. And if we decide to stay, which I think we should, with the current natural extraction method, we should step up our marketing efforts on that and really market ourselves as the company that does not use this chemical, to gain more potential business. Customers of our competitors could see this ad and be like 'I don't want to put this harmful chemical in my body. Instead I'm gonna go to Cannabis Secure because this drug is 100% natural. They use water in their extraction process'"</i> <i>"This brings up the issue that's kinda going on now that people are against the GMOs and people are buying the organic stuff. So we can market to people who are buying those types of foods and other products because this is something that they will take seriously. So like you said, we can market it that way and I think that could really generate profits. So probably the reason that we are not doing well is because of the way it has been marketed."</i>	.11 (.16)
Moral disengagement	Rationalizing use of the harmful method as morally acceptable practice	.18 (.13)
Moral justification	Justifying use of the harmful method by depicting it as serving a valued social purpose <i>"About the kids. Let's say we don't do anything at all and we go out of the business. They are still buying those products and are going to those other companies who have no interest in finding out all the details of the extraction methods at all. And they are only gonna buy from them. They won't have a healthy product at all unless we switch some to the new method and give us some time to find out . . . maybe a different extraction method."</i>	.09 (.10)
Advantageous comparison	Comparing use of the harmful method to more unethical business practices <i>"It's not that other medicines don't have side effects. It's a common thing that medicines have side effects. Some medicines have much more serious side effects than this."</i>	.00 (.01)
Distorting consequences	Downplaying or obscuring the evidence of harm in the scenario <i>"There are SOME experts saying it is POTENTIALLY harmful. So it is not confirmed. And marijuana itself is something people have been saying is POTENTIALLY harmful. So I don't think that part [in the scenario] gives us something. It just says 'it may cause harm'. Honestly, any food nowadays says it may cause harm."</i>	.06 (.07)
Attributing blame	Displacing responsibility to customers who may choose to buy the harmful product <i>"If we invest a small portion into this method, you will see that people who are actually interested in this may still buy it. Maybe they don't care or they don't believe in the consequences. If people are willing to do that and it's gonna sell, I don't really think it's [bad]. If they are willing to buy it, they are taking their health into their own hands."</i>	.03 (.05)
Ethical framing for the old safer method	Highlighting or implying use of the harmful method is against ethical principles (such as harm), values, or company responsibility and thus it is better not to switch <i>"I thought the nature of our business is to provide medicine to people who need it. And they probably have cancer. The case said the new method can potentially be harmful and lead to death. We also have patients going through chemotherapy to think about. That [switching to the new method] is just very unethical and against what the purpose of our business would be."</i> <i>"The harm really bothers me a lot. The whole point of medical marijuana is providing medical solutions for people and that's what they come there for. You don't want to give medicine that hurts them. It is true that every medicine has side effects. But it doesn't mean that we should [switch to the new method]. If we have the option to reduce the risk, we should take that option."</i>	.29 (.16)
Ambivalent framing	Without explicitly taking a stance, describing the situation as one involving both business and ethical issues <i>"I do understand why it says that this method can generate huge profits for the company, but I don't think it takes into account customer safety by switching. But I do think this method might help . . ."</i> <i>"The most right thing is to not use it at all and we are gonna shut down. Or would we keep some and switch a little [to the new method]?"</i>	.11 (.12)




Figure 2. Percent time devoted to five types of framing in the most ethical (top) and the least ethical teams (bottom).

champions in their influence on team decisions but, importantly, we found that angry but not sympathetic champions were significantly more disliked, paying a social price for expressing their anger about the issue.

Furthermore, the exploratory analysis revealed how naturally emerging (nonconfederate) ethical champions present their messages and important team decision-making processes that were not initially hypothesized. First, in contrast to the confederates who used exclusively ethical language and displayed emotions, some of these emergent champions also made a strong business case for the ethical solution and in general emergent champions tended to not be very emotionally expressive. Second, teams that made more ethical decisions not only used more ethical arguments but also made more business arguments for the ethical solution while engaging less in moral disengagement than teams that made less ethical decisions. These emergent data offer unique and new

insights into how *naturally* emerging ethical champions present their messages and through what mechanisms they influence team decision ethicality. Based on the evidence from the emergent data, we developed a set of hypotheses regarding ethical champions and team decision ethicality and designed a second experiment to test those hypotheses.

## Study 2

### Overview

In Study 2, based on the finding that teams that made more ethical decisions used less moral disengagement language, we conceptualized moral disengagement as a team-level phenomenon and examined whether ethical champions increase team decision ethicality not only by heightening team ethical awareness but by

also reducing team moral disengagement. Second, we incorporated the finding that emergent ethical champions also use business frames to advocate for the ethical solution. We examined whether an ethical champion who uses a business frame can influence team ethical decision making and, importantly, whether the mediating mechanisms are distinct from those for champions using ethical frames. Finally, considering that individuals in the workplace will likely face other ethical issues after the team decision episode, we examined whether ethical (vs. business) framing can influence a team member's subsequent ethical decision to further distinguish effects of ethical and business framing.

### Moral Disengagement

Bandura (1999) grounded his conceptualization of moral disengagement in his social-cognitive theory of self-regulation (Bandura, 1991). According to the theory, most people have internalized societal moral standards and use those standards to regulate their behavior. These internalized standards prevent individuals from engaging in unethical behavior because violating the standards would result in self-condemning reactions such as shame, guilt, or remorse. However, this self-regulation process can be disengaged via multiple cognitive mechanisms. Individuals sometimes (consciously or unconsciously) use those cognitive strategies to fulfill their self-interests while bypassing the self-condemnation that would otherwise result from violating internal standards (Martin, Kish-Gephart, & Detert, 2014). The use of moral disengagement strategies enables individuals to engage in unethical behavior without self-disapproval (Bandura, Caprara, & Zsolnai, 2000; Kish-Gephart, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Martin, 2014). Management scholars have found moral disengagement to be an important mechanism explaining individual unethical behavior in organizations (Moore, 2008; Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 2012).

Although moral disengagement is generally treated as an intrapsychic mechanism and an individual difference, Bandura noted that it can also be applied at the collective level (such as in an organization or a team) and manifests itself in social interactions (Bandura et al., 2000; Bandura, 2005). Our findings in Study 1 support this idea. Therefore, in Study 2, we extend the concept of moral disengagement to the team level. First, we assert that a similar regulation system operates at the team level. As noted by Bandura and colleagues (2000), an organization or team can be viewed as an agentic system capable of making decisions and accomplishing its goals and objectives. There is also a set of shared standards or norms that operates to guide and regulate team behavior and decisions (i.e., self-regulation system at the collective level). As suggested by Bandura, social systems such as teams also engage in moral disengagement reasoning to disengage themselves from the self-regulation system in operation. The initiation of team moral disengagement may be triggered by certain situational features such as potential self-benefiting outcomes (Martin et al., 2014). When behaving unethically can bring financial or other benefit (or prevent loss) to the self or the group, individuals are particularly motivated to morally disengage. Certain team members may first morally disengage individually because some individuals have a greater propensity to do so than others (Moore et al., 2012). When interacting with other team members, those individuals may reframe the situation to minimize the ethical con-

tent and influence other team members in the process. For example, as revealed in Study 1, team members may use moral disengagement language to minimize or distort the harm that may flow from the unethical solution, obscure the team's responsibility for harm by displacing the responsibility to customers, and/or portray the unethical solution as a benign one by comparing it to more reprehensible misconduct. Because peers are susceptible to social influence in the team, moral disengagement reasoning used by team members can spread through team interaction, especially when it remains unquestioned or unrefuted. This may eventually result in *team moral disengagement*, an emergent team state that we define as the extent to which a team shares cognition (represented by moral disengagement mechanisms) that minimize the ethical issues or ethical principles in a given situation. Team moral disengagement should deactivate the team self-regulation system, leading to unethical decisions.

### Ethical Frame, Team Moral Disengagement, and Team Decision Ethicality

We argue that ethical champions using ethical frames should reduce team moral disengagement for several reasons. Using ethical language, ethical champions explicitly or implicitly make ethical standards salient and contradict morally disengaged reasoning. For example, whereas those who morally disengage may attempt to downplay or neutralize the harm (i.e., via distortion of consequences), the ethical champion, using explicit ethical language, reminds the team of the vulnerable customers and the potential harm to them; whereas the moral disengagers may contend that the more unethical solution is necessary to keep the company in business (i.e., moral justification), the ethical champion reminds the team of their responsibility to promote customer well-being. Using ethical language should stimulate the team to think more critically about the morally disengaged arguments. As a result, the team with an ethical champion is unlikely to be as easily swayed by the moral disengagers. By contrast, without ethical champions who make ethical standards salient, the team is more likely to be influenced by the moral disengagement arguments and thus morally disengage as a team. Because we have also argued that team moral disengagement leads to team unethical decisions, we hypothesize:

*Hypothesis 5:* Ethical champions (who use ethical frames) have an indirect effect on team decision ethicality via reduced team moral disengagement.

We argue that ethical champions also attenuate team moral disengagement by heightening team ethical awareness. An important factor that makes teams potentially receptive to moral disengagement is ethical ambiguity of the situation (Martin et al., 2014). As we discussed earlier, ethical situations are often ambiguous where no formal rules or laws provide behavioral guidance. Such situations are open to multiple interpretations, which makes morally disengaged thinking more likely. As a result, it gives moral disengagers greater latitude to frame, shape, and negotiate the team's reality and increases their likelihood of success (Bersoff, 1999; Martin et al., 2014). This would be the case when there is no ethical champion on the team. However, when an ethical champion using an ethical frame increases the team's ethical awareness,

moral disengagement should be less effective. Because of heightened ethical awareness, the ethical nature of the situation—harm and certain ethical principles such as caring—is more evident to the team. Once made highly aware of ethical issues, the related knowledge cannot be easily set aside (Reynolds, Dang, Yam, & Leavitt, 2014). This weakens the accessibility and validity of alternative interpretations of the situation that are more conducive to morally disengaged thinking. Even if some moral disengagers try to sway the team, a team's belief in the relevance of ethical issues makes moral disengagement thinking less persuasive. As a result, the team is unlikely to share the moral disengagement cognitions as a whole. In sum, ethical champions raise team ethical awareness, which should subsequently inhibit team moral disengagement and unethical decisions.

*Hypothesis 6:* Ethical champions (who use ethical frames) have a serial indirect effect on team decision ethicality via heightened team ethical awareness and then reduced team moral disengagement.

### Business Frame for the Ethical Solution and Team Decision Ethicality

The finding that some emergent champions used business frames to advocate for an ethical solution suggests that an ethical frame is not the only means of moving a team's decision making in an ethical direction. Thus, we propose that, in using a business frame to argue for the ethical solution, an ethical champion may increase team decision ethicality but not by heightening ethical awareness or undermining moral disengagement.

We have argued that using an ethical frame to move a team's decision in an ethical direction is effective because the ethical frame is salient given the dominant business logic and hence it attracts attention and heightens ethical awareness. In contrast, a business frame is expected to have a different impact. According to the social influence literature, the congruence between message characteristics such as frames and individual characteristics such as schemas facilitates information processing and can increase the persuasiveness of the message (Druckman & Bolsen, 2011; Kunda, 1990; Lee & Aaker, 2004; Mayer & Tormala, 2010). We therefore argue that team members are likely to be receptive to the business arguments for the ethical solution and are likely to change their opinions after hearing these arguments. Because the business arguments are consistent with the predominant business logic (the way team members naturally think about and approach decision making in business contexts) and are conceptually familiar to team members, individuals feel "right" about the business arguments and find them easier to process (Lee & Aaker, 2004). Moreover, in business organizations, individuals deem business aspects of the issue more relevant and important (than ethical aspects). They are therefore more motivated (Kunda, 1990) to attend to the business arguments and seriously consider them. Those arguments for the ethical decision that are framed in business terms should increase teammates' perceptions of the business utility of the ethical solution being promoted (i.e., the degree to which the ethical solution will be useful for increasing business performance and company profit). We argue that by using business language to explain how an unethical solution could adversely affect the company's customer base, brand, sales, and profits, and how an ethical solution

could positively influence those business outcomes, ethical champions depict the ethical issue as a business issue worth considering and make the ethical solution a desirable and useful solution from a business perspective (Dutton & Ashford, 1993).

In sum, teams exposed to business arguments for the ethical solution should be open to the solution because the arguments fit how they naturally approach decision making in business settings. Once opening their minds to the business arguments for the ethical solution, they are likely to realize that the ethical solution may be more useful for the business than they had previously thought. This makes them favor the ethical solution more than they otherwise would.

*Hypothesis 7:* Ethical champions who use business frames to argue for the ethical solution are positively related to team decision ethicality.

*Hypothesis 8:* Team perception of business utility of the ethical solution mediates the positive relationship between ethical champions who use business frames to argue for the ethical solution and team decision ethicality.

### Framing and Subsequent Ethical Decision Making

In addition, we also examine whether ethical champions' influence persists beyond a single team decision-making occasion and whether this effect is contingent on the way ethical championing is carried out (e.g., framing). The social influence literature suggests that an opinion minority may have persistent impact beyond the immediate influence context (Alvaro & Crano, 1997; Moscovici, 1980). Attitudes on related issues do not exist in isolation but rather are structurally interrelated because the same set of schemas or beliefs (i.e., ethical) underlies those attitudes (Crano & Chen, 1998). Therefore, minority influence may have a persistent impact on subsequent related decisions if the minority shapes the audience's schema (i.e., the frame that the audience uses to approach decisions).

Following this logic, we argue that ethical champions are more likely to influence subsequent decisions involving ethical issues when they use ethical frames but less so when they use business frames. By using ethical language, ethical champions activate the ethical frame for team members, leading team members to rely on it for similar subsequent decisions (thereby increasing subsequent ethicality of decisions). In contrast, by utilizing the business frame, ethical champions align their own arguments with the existing business logics held by team members, activating and reinforcing the business frame that team members routinely use for decision making. When individuals are faced with similar issues later, they are likely to follow a business logic and consider how different solutions relate to the company's bottom line. Given that the business utility of an ethical solution is often not that evident and making the ethical decision can even be costly, we argue that ethical champions who use business frames are less likely to have a positive influence on team members' subsequent ethical decision.

*Hypothesis 9:* Ethical champions who use ethical frames increase the ethicality of team members' subsequent decisions more than ethical champions who use business frames do.



## Method

**Participants.** This study has been approved by the Pennsylvania State University's Institutional Review Board ("Moral Advocacy and Group Ethical Decision Making in a Business Setting [2nd study]," STUDY00011416). Two hundred twelve undergraduates (118 male and 94 female) who were enrolled in 10 sections of two entrepreneurship and innovation classes and one section of a management class at the College of Business of a large U.S. university participated. Seventy-two percent of the participants were white, 20% were Asian, 5% were African American, and 4% were Hispanic. The participants were randomly assigned to 68 teams. The size of teams ranged from two to five ( $M = 3.12$ ,  $SD = .72$ ), plus a confederate.

**Experimental design.** To make Study 1 and 2 comparable and to rule out potential confounds attributable to differences in study designs, we used the same experimental tasks as in Study 1. A three-condition between-subjects design was employed to test the hypotheses. The study included a control condition and two experimental conditions (using ethical frames to champion an ethical solution or using business frames to champion an ethical solution). The teams were randomly assigned to the three conditions, with 23 teams in the ethical frame condition, 23 teams in the business frame condition, and 22 teams in the control condition. Six trained Caucasian male confederates were used to carry out the experimental manipulation. As in Study 1, experienced actors were hired and extensively trained. All of the confederates performed all three conditions and they were randomly assigned to teams (each confederate participated in similar numbers of teams across conditions).

**Procedure.** We administered the experiment in the same way as we did in Study 1. The same control condition was also used. Considering that the emergent champions we observed in Study 1 expressed relatively little emotion, confederates in Study 2 were instructed to express little emotion, including using neutral facial expressions and a consistent normal vocal tone across all conditions. In the ethical frame and business frame conditions, the confederates advocated for the zero percent budget allocation following a script. The script for the ethical frame condition is nearly identical to the script used in Study 1, except that the phrases describing emotions were removed (see Appendix D). The script for the business frame condition was adapted from the business arguments made by the emergent champions in Study 1. As shown in Appendix D, the main point is that using the Ditane method could adversely affect sales and the company brand. The length and structure of the scripts were kept as similar as possible across the two experimental conditions.

### Measures.

**Manipulation check.** Similar to Study 1, two trained video-coders (different from those in Study 1) who were blind to the experimental conditions and our hypotheses watched team discussion videos and evaluated the confederates' segments of speech in each team. Video-coders rated the extent to which the confederate used ethical frames (two items – "the speaker expressed concerns about the potential harm of the Ditane method to vulnerable customers," "The speaker expressed concerns about important ethical principles and values such as caring, compassion, company's responsibility to care for and help patients,"  $\alpha = .99$ ) or business frames (two items – "the speaker expressed concerns

about potential negative impacts of the Ditane method on the business," "the speaker expressed concerns about potential damage of the Ditane method to the business such as losing customers, ruining the brand, affecting the bottom-line, etc.,"  $\alpha = .96$ ) on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = *not at all* to 5 = *very much so*. The coders independently coded 22 across-condition-randomly selected videos (about 1/3 of the videos). The coders' ethical frame and business frame scores for these videos were consistent:  $ICC(1) = .98$ ,  $F(22, 22) = 115.52$ ,  $p < .001$ , for ethical frame items;  $ICC(1) = .92$ ,  $F(22, 22) = 24.16$ ,  $p < .001$  for business frame items. The rest of the videos were randomly split into two sets and coded by the two coders respectively.

**Ethicality of the team decision.** The measure was the same as in Study 1.

**Team ethical awareness.** To demonstrate robustness of our conceptualization of team ethical awareness, we captured team ethical awareness in a different way in Study 2. Instead of having coders watch team discussion videos and rate team ethical awareness, we asked team members to report team ethical awareness via the postdecision survey. Our definition of team ethical awareness—a *shared* acknowledgment of ethical issues and principles in the team—suggests that a consensus composition model (according to the typology developed by Chan (1998), is appropriate to measure team ethical awareness. Consensus models assume that the higher-level construct (team ethical awareness) should be perceived by individuals more or less in the same way. In other words, the consensus models assume that the meaning of team ethical awareness is in the consensus among individuals in the team and therefore can be assessed at the individual level. Based on our video coding measure in Study 1 and the existing measure of individual ethical awareness by Reynolds (2006a), we used two team-referent items to capture team members' assessment of team ethical awareness: "My team, as a whole, agrees that there are important ethical aspects to the situation the company is facing," "My team, as a whole, agrees that one or more principles such as caring, fairness, integrity, social responsibility can be applied to the situation the company is facing." Participants indicated the extent that they agreed with the items on 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 = *strongly disagree* to 5 = *strongly agree*. Those items showed an acceptable level of reliability: Cronbach's alpha = .83. The assumption of within-team agreement is also satisfied:  $r_{WG(1)} = .85$ , suggesting that it is appropriate to aggregate the individual level measure to the team level,  $ICC(1) = .11$ ,  $ICC(2) = .28$ . Although the ICCs are relatively low, we judged this to be reasonable considering the restricted range of the data ( $M = 4.36$ ,  $SD = .65$ ,  $min = 2$ ,  $max = 5$ ). The ICC index represents the proportion of variance due to between-team differences and it is not unusual to have relatively small between-team variance for a variable with a limited range (LeBreton & Senter, 2008).

**Team moral disengagement.** The existing measures of moral disengagement (e.g., Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008; Moore et al., 2012) in the management literature measure a relatively stable individual difference, with very little research examining it as a state or a process. In contrast, Kish-Gephart and colleagues (2014) developed their own task-specific measure of moral disengagement that captured the particular moral disengagement mechanisms evoked by their experimental task. We agree with Kish-Gephart and colleagues (2014) that specific situations evoke the

use of *certain* moral disengagement mechanisms rather than all of them equally. Our video analysis in Study 1 revealed that participants primarily relied on the four moral disengagement mechanisms of moral justification, advantageous comparison, distorting consequences, and attributing blame (see Table 7). Based on our video analysis in Study 1 and the dispositional measures by Detert et al. (2008) and Moore et al. (2012), we derived eight team-referent items to measure team moral disengagement (see Appendix E for items). Participants indicated their extent of agreement with each of the moral disengagement items on 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 = *strongly disagree* to 5 = *strongly agree*. Those items showed an acceptable level of reliability: Cronbach's alpha = .83. We applied a consensus composition model with the assumption that the meaning of team moral disengagement is in the consensus among individuals in the team. The assumption of within-team agreement is satisfied ( $r_{WG(IJ)} = .89$ ) and the ICC values are sufficiently high ( $ICC[1] = .55$ ,  $ICC[2] = .79$ ), suggesting that it is appropriate to aggregate the individual-level measure to the team level.

**Team perceived business utility of the ethical solution.** We used two items to assess team perception of the business utility of the ethical solution (i.e., using the water method): "My team thinks that sticking with the water method is useful for improving the company's performance," "My team thinks that continuing to use the water method can help maintain our business." Participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with each item using 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 = *strongly disagree* to 5 = *strongly agree*. Those items showed acceptable level of reliability: Cronbach's alpha = .78. Within-team agreement  $r_{WG(D)} = .61$ , suggesting moderate within-team consensus. It has been found that  $r_{WG(D)}$  is attenuated when either the number of items or the number of raters is small (LeBreton, James, & Lindell, 2005; LeBreton & Senter, 2008). Given the very small number of items (i.e., two) we used to measure this construct and the small team size in this study, we judge the  $r_{WG(D)}$  value as reasonable. The ICC values are acceptable ( $ICC[1] = .26$ ,  $ICC[2] = .52$ ). Therefore, it is appropriate to aggregate the individual level measure to the team level.

**Individual subsequent decision.** After participants completed the measures above, they read about another decision-making scenario related to the same company and made a decision individually. The company was described as having overcome the crisis and that it was becoming profitable. A local charity that supports and advocates for epileptic children approached the company for donations. It is noted that donating would not have significant reputational benefit because it is a common practice among companies in the industry (5% of profits on average). The participants were asked to indicate the percentage of profits they thought their team should donate to the charity (from 0% to 15%).

**Analytical strategies.** Because the data structure in Study 2 is identical to that in Study 1, we decomposed the variance of ethicality of the team decision to determine whether and what type of multilevel modeling was appropriate. For ethicality of the team decision, we found that the confederate level explained 0% of the variance. Model comparison indicated that removing the confederate-level random effect had negligible effects on model fit,  $\chi^2(1) = .00$ ,  $p = .99$ , suggesting that a simpler OLS modeling sufficed. For individual subsequent decision, the confederate level explained 0% of the variance and the team level explained 2.3% of

the variance. Model comparison indicated that removing the confederate-level and team-level random effect had negligible effects on model fit,  $\chi^2(2) = .14$ ,  $p = .93$ , suggesting a simpler OLS modeling once again sufficed.

## Results

**Manipulation check.** Results indicated that the three conditions were significantly different in terms of confederate ethical frame use,  $F(2, 63) = 192.66$ ,  $p < .001$ . Confederates in the ethical frame condition were rated significantly higher on the ethical frame items ( $M = 4.53$ ,  $SD = .77$ ,  $ps < .001$ ) compared with those in the control condition ( $M = 1.02$ ,  $SD = .11$ ) and the business frame condition ( $M = 1.22$ ,  $SD = .85$ ). There was no difference in ethical frame ratings between the control condition and the business frame condition ( $p = .35$ ).

Results also indicated that the three conditions significantly differed in terms of confederate business frame use,  $F(2, 63) = 299.50$ ,  $p < .001$ . Confederates in the business frame condition were rated significantly higher on the business frame items ( $M = 4.86$ ,  $SD = .45$ ,  $ps < .001$ ) compared with those in the control condition ( $M = 1.19$ ,  $SD = .87$ ) and the ethical frame condition ( $M = 1.11$ ,  $SD = .29$ ). Business frame ratings did not differ between the control condition and the ethical frame condition ( $p = .64$ ), suggesting an effective manipulation.

**Ethical champions and ethicality of team decision.** To test hypotheses in Study 2, we conducted path analyses based on Hayes's (2017) path analytic method. Two dummy codes (d1 and d2) represent the business frame condition (vs. control) and the ethical frame condition (vs. control) respectively. As in Study 1, we controlled for team size, team average prediscussion decision, and the standard deviation of team member prediscussion decision. Correlations of variables are shown in Table 8. We tested the model in R using the Lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) and 5,000 bootstrapped samples.

Results for the path analysis are shown in Figure 3. Bootstrap results are shown in Table 9. Consistent with Study 1, the total effect of ethical frames on budget allocated to the harmful method (i.e., team decision unethicity) is significant ( $B = -23.21$ ,  $SE = 3.56$ ,  $p < .001$ ). In support of Hypothesis 5, we found that ethical frames had a significant indirect effect on team decision (un)ethicality via reduced team moral disengagement ( $B = -3.25$ ,  $SE = 1.73$ , 95% bootstrapped CI [-6.94, -.27]). In support of Hypothesis 6, we found that team ethical awareness and team moral disengagement serially mediated the relationship between ethical frames and team decision (un)ethicality ( $B = -1.49$ ,  $SE = .96$ , 95% bootstrapped CI [-4.63, -.34]).<sup>4</sup> In support of Hypothesis 7, the total effect of business frames on team decision unethicity is significant ( $B = -22.44$ ,  $SE = 3.62$ ,  $p < .001$ ). In support of Hypothesis 8, we found that business frames had a significant indirect effect on team decision (un)ethicality via team perceived business utility of the ethical solution ( $B = -3.17$ ,  $SE = 1.70$ , 95% bootstrapped CI [-7.24, -.33]).

<sup>4</sup> We also tested an alternative model where we reverse the order of team ethical awareness and team moral disengagement. The reversed serial mediation is not significant ( $B = -.41$ ,  $SE = .52$ , 95% bootstrap CI: [-2.13, .25]), supporting our hypothesized serial mediation effect.

Table 8  
Correlations Among Variables in Study 2

Variable	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. d1 <sup>a</sup>											
2. d2 <sup>a</sup>											
3. Team size	4.12	0.72	.10	-.03							
4. Prediscussion team member decision, <i>M</i>	42.80	16.46	-.10	-.02	.00						
5. Prediscussion team member decision, <i>SD</i>	17.70	9.91	.14	-.06	.30*	.12					
6. Team ethical awareness	4.36	0.41	-.11	.31**	-.06	-.28*	.17				
7. Team moral disengagement	2.74	0.65	-.06	-.28*	.21	.20	-.07	-.51**			
8. Team perceived utility of the ethical solution	3.10	0.75	.20	.04	-.14	-.15	.11	.25*	-.62**		
9. Team decision (un)ethicality	26.20	20.32	-.28*	-.29*	.17	.52**	.05	-.43**	.68**	-.60**	

Note. *N* = 68.

<sup>a</sup> d1 = Business frame vs. control, d2 = Ethical frame vs. control.

\* *p* < .05 (2-tailed). \*\* *p* < .01 (2-tailed).

As we expected, business frames and ethical frames influenced team decision ethicality through different mechanisms. Table 9 shows that business frames did not have a significant sequential indirect effect via team ethical awareness and team moral disengagement (*B* = .05, *SE* = .76, 95% bootstrapped CI [-1.41, 1.71]). Neither did ethical frames have a significant indirect effect on team decision ethicality via team perceived business utility of the ethical solution (*B* = -2.05, *SE* = 1.79, 95% bootstrapped CI [-6.25, .93]). However, business frames have an unexpected indirect effect on team decision ethicality via team moral disengagement (*B* = -2.97, *SE* = 1.67, 95% bootstrapped CI [-6.94, -.27]). We will discuss possible explanations in the general discussion section.

**Ethical champions and individual subsequent decisions.**

Two codes (*a*<sub>1</sub> and *a*<sub>2</sub>) represent the contrast between ethical frame (*a*<sub>1</sub> = 0) and control (*a*<sub>1</sub> = -1) and the contrast between ethical

frame (*a*<sub>2</sub> = 0) and business frame (*a*<sub>2</sub> = -1) respectively. Regression results show that on average, individuals are willing to donate 1.2% more company profits to the local charity when champions used ethical frames (*M* = 7.20, *SD* = 3.64) than when there are no ethical champions (*M* = 6.00, *SD* = 2.66, *B* = 1.20, *p* = .02). On average, individuals are willing to donate 1.45% more profits to the local charity when champions use ethical frames than when they use business frames (*M* = 5.74, *SD* = 2.42, *B* = 1.45, *p* = .004), supporting Hypothesis 9.

**Discussion of Study 2**

In this study, we proposed and found that ethical champions using ethical frames increase team decision ethicality by reducing team moral disengagement. We also proposed and found that increased team ethical awareness mediates the effect via reduced




Figure 3. Unstandardized path coefficients in Study 2. \* *p* < .05 (2-tailed), \*\* *p* < .01 (2-tailed), numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

Table 9  
*Bootstrap Results for the Mediation Model in Study 2 (N = 68)*

Indirect effect on team decision (un)ethicality	Independent variable			
	Ethical frames (vs. control)		Business frames (vs. control)	
	Estimate	95% CI	Estimate	95% CI
Via team ethical awareness	-0.77	[-3.83, 0.48]	0.03	[-.86, 1.67]
Via team moral disengagement	-3.25	[-.79, -0.73]	-2.97	[-6.94, -0.27]
Via team perceived business utility of the ethical solution	-2.05	[-6.26, 0.93]	-3.17	[-7.24, -0.33]
Via team ethical awareness and then team moral disengagement	-1.49	[-4.63, -0.34]	0.05	[-1.41, 1.71]
Total indirect	-7.56	[-14.54, -1.91]	-6.07	[-12.62, -0.43]

team moral disengagement. Further, we proposed and found that ethical champions using business frames to support the ethical solution positively affect team decision ethicality. This effect was not mediated by team ethical awareness but rather by increased team perceived business utility of the ethical solution and decreased team moral disengagement. We further showed that ethical frames and business frames have differential effects on subsequent individual decisions involving ethical issues. Ethical frames influenced more ethical *subsequent* decisions than did business frames.

### General Discussion

Prior research has implied that ethical champions are likely to fail in shifting team decisions in an ethical direction and that they are likely to suffer interpersonally for trying. But, we have had little insight into the actual outcomes experienced by ethical champions in teams. In two studies, we challenged this pessimistic view by examining ethical champions in teams, the ways they champion an ethical issue (i.e., via different emotional expression in Study 1 and different framing in Study 2), their impact on teams' ethical decision making, and the mediating processes that explain these influences. In Study 1, we tested our hypotheses and also studied and coded processes discovered from observing videos of team decision making. The informative findings that surfaced from analysis of the video data led to our design of Study 2. In both studies, using multisource data (i.e., video-coding and team member self-reports), we found for the first time that multiple types of ethical champions (angry or sympathetic in Study 1, using ethical frames or business frames in Study 2) can and do influence *team* decisions in an ethical direction. Negative social consequences are suffered only by ethical champions who express anger. We also learned much about the mediating processes. In Study 1, as hypothesized, heightened team ethical awareness mediated the relationship between ethical championing and ethical team decisions. Our observation of team processes led us to propose and find that team moral disengagement was also an important mechanism underlying these effects.

In Study 1, we proposed that ethical champions are likely to express emotions and examined how the ethical champion's emotional expression would affect team decision ethicality and social consequences for the champion. We found that both angry and sympathetic champions can move the team's decision in an ethical direction by increasing team ethical awareness, but only angry champions are disliked. Angry expression, although equally effective in influencing the decision, can backfire socially, perhaps because of its morally threatening nature. For example, in post hoc

exploration of our data, we found that individuals in a team with an angry champion reported feeling more shame and guilt ( $M = 1.95$ ,  $SD = 1.12$ ) compared with those without champions ( $M = 1.40$ ,  $SD = .74$ ,  $p < .01$ ) or those with a sympathetic champion ( $M = 1.62$ ,  $SD = .82$ ,  $p = .07$ ), suggesting that champions who express anger may trigger a threat to team members' moral selves (Monin et al., 2008). Although the angry champions directed their anger at the issue, not at teammates, members appear to have taken it personally. This may also explain why angry expression is not superior to sympathy in shifting team decisions. Future research should explore this idea.

Although we assumed that ethical champions are likely to experience and display emotions, our exploratory findings in Study 1 showed that emergent ethical champions reported *feeling* emotions but they didn't express them. Thus, we learned that felt emotions are a part of the ethical championing experience but expressed emotions may be less so. The exploratory findings further showed that framing, rather than emotional expression may play a more critical role in influencing team decisions.

Informed by Study 1's exploratory findings, we designed Study 2 to examine how ethical champions' framing of the issue affects team decision ethicality and subsequent individual decision ethicality. We found that ethical champions influence team ethical decisions similarly when using either ethical or ethics-promoting business frames. But when champions use an ethics-promoting business frame, the influence does not persist for subsequent ethical decisions, as it does when they use an ethical frame. We did not hypothesize an effect of framing on social consequences in Study 2 but a post hoc analysis supported our expectation of no difference.

We also explored the mediating mechanisms and found that, as expected, business frames (that support the ethical solution) do not operate through ethical awareness (despite their argument for a more ethical solution). Rather, they influence decisions by increasing the perceived business utility of the argument among team members. They also influence decisions by reducing team moral disengagement. It makes sense that ethical champions who use business frames can reduce team moral disengagement. As we argued and found, business frames help frame the ethical solution as a solution that satisfies the goal of increasing profits, resolving the tension between ethics and the company's financial interests. As a result, team members do not need to disengage the moral self-regulation system and rationalize the less ethical solution.

## Contributions of the Research

Our research contributes to multiple literatures. First, our studies offer rare insights into the processes involved in team ethical decision making. Although a few studies compare the result of team ethical decision making with that of individuals (Abdolmohammadi & Reeves, 2003; Nichols & Day, 1982; O'Leary & Pangemanan, 2007) or examine composition of member dispositions as antecedents of team ethical decisions (Dukerich, Nichols, Elm, & Vollrath, 1990; Pearsall & Ellis, 2011), our investigation contributes well beyond existing research on ethical decision making in teams by theorizing and examining *processes* (i.e., team ethical awareness and team moral disengagement) involved in team ethical decision making when an ethical champion is involved. For the first time, we conceptualized *team* ethical awareness and *team* moral disengagement as shared cognitions in teams and we established the reliability of the constructs by capturing them using different methods (video coding and team member self-report). By showing that ethical awareness and moral disengagement (which have been always treated as individual intrapsychic states) can manifest in interpersonal interactions (functioning as team-level states), we extend both the ethical awareness and moral disengagement literatures.

This study also contributes significantly to the behavioral ethics literature on decision frames. Researchers have typically argued that individuals adopt either an ethical frame *or* a traditional business frame when making individual ethical decisions and that the ethical frame leads to more ethical decisions whereas the business frame leads to more unethical decisions (see Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). The business frame assumed in this earlier individual ethical decision-making literature focuses narrowly on business considerations and outcomes leading to less ethical decisions. Our research takes us beyond the individual level and beyond this either/or view. We found that some emergent ethical champions in teams used both ethical framing and a new type of business framing to persuade their teams to make more ethical decisions. We then found support in Study 2 for the efficacy of using this new type of business frame that makes a business case for the ethical decision. This is similar to what Sonenshein (2006) found in studying issue selling to managers. We studied both the outcomes of using these two types of frames as well as the mediating processes involved. Our findings revealed that the two types of frames influence decision ethicality at a similar level but through different mediating mechanisms. In future research, we need to think more broadly and explicitly about the multiple types of business frames available and how the ethics-promoting business frame can be successfully used. These findings provide a more complex view of frames and team ethical decision making and the need to study the use of combination framing and its effects.

In addition, this study contributes more broadly to the domain of minority influence, dissent, and voice. Previous studies on voice, whistle-blowing, and moral rebels show that people believe that speaking up about ethical issues is ineffective and that ethical champions tend to be disliked. Yet, we now offer the knowledge of *when* and *how* individuals proactively advocating for ethical issues in teams can be influential and incur fewer personal costs. Our findings show that ethical champions who present their case with anger about the issue are more disliked but sympathetic champions

who present their case with care for the potential victims of an unethical decision (and the emergent champions who were perceived as moderately sympathetic) are as likable as other team members. These findings suggest that, at least in the context of teams, it may be quite possible to present an ethical case without incurring negative social consequences. This is good news for prospective ethical champions and for the organizations that are trying to encourage them.

Furthermore, we contribute well beyond the current literature that focuses on a single episode of dissent or voice by examining the effects of ethical champion framing on a subsequent ethical decision. Our finding suggests that although making the business case for the ethical solution facilitates the current ethical decision, ethical frames continue to affect subsequent decisions in an ethical direction while business frames do not. Future research should further examine the mechanisms underlying this effect.

Moreover, this research demonstrates the value of a multimethod and multistudy research approach that makes it possible to explore dynamic team ethical decision-making processes and derive and test hypotheses based on the exploratory findings. We hope that other researchers will consider using similar approaches to investigate novel phenomena. Although teams research is challenging because of the number of subjects needed and the complexities involved, we look forward to others building on this work.

## Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions

One of the study's biggest strengths is that the entrepreneurial decision task was engaging and contextually realistic. To document our observation that teams were highly engaged, trained coders coded the teams' level of engagement. On a 5-point Likert scale, mean engagement was coded as 4. Much ethical decision-making research has used short vignettes or cognitive tasks that can fail to engage participants or contextualize ethical decision making in business or organizational contexts (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014). Selecting a real, new industry that had local relevance and matching it with entrepreneurship students who are interested in and learning about starting their own businesses produced a highly engaging experience. Moreover, the experimental situation resembles situations young entrepreneurs face and the participants are in many ways similar to these young entrepreneurs, increasing the study's external validity. Another major strength of the study is its multimethod nature, with multiple indicators generated from different sources (i.e., team member-report, objective decision results, observations of video recordings). We also used qualitative methods to code video recordings of team interactions and examined and captured newly discovered team decision processes.

Yet the study is also limited in that it involved temporary teams. Hierarchical structures are typically established in longer-lasting teams. Therefore, it is not clear how the power and status of ethical champions relative to other team members might affect decisions or social consequences (see Aime, Humphrey, DeRue, & Paul, 2014). It can be argued that the confederates' status is equal to or lower than other team members in the current study because the confederates were told to not contribute much to the warm-up task. We believe that this makes our study a conservative test of the effects of ethical champions because higher status members would likely have had a greater influence on team decisions, according to

the social influence literature. However, it is not clear whether higher status members would get credit or lose their status because of their ethical championing behavior, a question for future research.

In addition, temporary teams do not allow us to examine ethical championing effects over longer time periods. Although ethical championing is generally a low base-rate behavior, it is possible that teams in certain industries (e.g., finance, medicine, law enforcement) face ethical issues more often than others. Future research should consider using longitudinal designs to examine ethical champions in longer-term teams. What are the consequences associated with regular ethical championing versus one-time championing?

Moreover, our research focused on the most typical type of ethical issues: issues involving harm to important stakeholders (in this case, customers). Future research may wish to extend to other types of issues such as fairness and honesty. But, researchers have recently adopted a broader definition of harm—damage caused by an intentional agent to a subject—and they have argued that all ethical issues involve harm, but that the perception of harm may vary depending on issue characteristics such as the type of harm or the psychological distance from the victims of the harm (Jones, 1991; Schein & Gray, 2018). Future research can explore these ideas as well. In addition, the salience and vividness of the arguments may affect perceptions of harm. It would be interesting to examine whether different modes of communication (e.g., written messages communicated in virtual teams) influence ethical champions' effectiveness.

Another potential direction for future research is the different types of framing used by ethical champions. We found that some emergent champions used both ethical frames and ethics-promoting business frames. Given the small number of ethical champions that combined the two types of frames, we were not able to systematically examine this phenomenon. It would be interesting to examine *who* combine frames, *why* they combine frames, *how* they combine the frames (e.g., do they sequence the frames differently, depending on what arguments others are using?), and whether combining the two frames is more effective in increasing team decision ethicality than using either frame alone.

### Implications for Practice

This study offers organizations ideas for interventions to facilitate more ethical team decisions. The crucial role of ethical champions suggests that organizations may consider appointing a member to serve as a champion who is tasked with providing an ethical lens to team decision making. In fact, the appointment of a team member to play the ethical champion role may reduce negative interpersonal consequences, a question for future research. However, ethical issues often emerge spontaneously in teams, making it difficult for organizations to anticipate the need to appoint someone to play this role. The natural emergence of ethical champions in the teams we studied indicates that at least some ethical champions already exist in organizations. Such individuals should be encouraged and supported. Further, the differential outcomes associated with angry and sympathetic champions suggest that organizations should also train potential ethical champions to manage their emotional expression, making sure they express sympathy for those potentially harmed (rather than anger

over the issue), when advocating for an ethical decision. Organizations should also train the champions to control their felt anger to avoid negative social consequences because anger is often felt and perhaps even needed to move individuals to voice an ethical position (Kish-Gephart et al., 2009).

Our research suggests that ethical champions should also attend to how they frame the issues and consider using not just ethics-promoting business frames but also ethical frames, if they want to influence subsequent related decisions. In addition, our results also highlighted the importance of training employees to recognize and debunk moral disengagement arguments in the process of team ethical decision making. Employees should be educated about the moral disengagement mechanisms that can be used as persuasion tactics. This also reemphasizes the importance of having ethical champions in teams because they help rebut those arguments and keep the teams alert to ethical issues.

Our study results may also provide important information to employees who refrain from speaking up about ethical issues because they fear coworker retaliation or expect that speaking up will make no difference. At least within the team context we tested, ethical champions did make a positive difference and, except for angry champions, with little interpersonal cost.

### Conclusion

Our multimethod research advances knowledge by examining a critical yet unexplored construct (i.e., ethical champions in teams). Relying primarily on minority influence theory, we learned that multiple types of ethical champions (sympathetic, angry, emergent; using ethical frames or business frames to support the ethical solution) successfully influenced teams to make more ethical decisions via different mediating mechanisms. Those who used ethical frames increased ethical awareness and decreased moral disengagement. Those who used business frames increased the perceived business utility of the ethical solution. These findings show that ethical champions can influence team decision outcomes and challenge the commonly held employee belief that their voice will not matter. Further, the study shows that angry champions incur an interpersonal cost but sympathetic champions do not, which challenges the belief that speaking up about ethical issues will always backfire on the ethical champion. We also learned that some emergent ethical champions used a combination of ethical and business frames when arguing for an ethical decision, suggesting that these frame types are not mutually exclusive. Finally, we learned that team members used multiple moral disengagement-based arguments in teams that made less ethical decisions. To reduce unethical decisions, organizations should encourage employees to speak up about ethical concerns in their teams and teach them effective methods for doing so based upon these findings.

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## Appendix A

### Confederate Scripts in Study 1

A = anger, S = sympathy.

#### First Time Speaking

**A** – Guys! I really do not think it’s a good idea to invest much, if anything, in this new extraction method. I’m ANGRY that we are asked to think about switching to that method because, according to the case, we have a lot of vulnerable customers (*show them the paragraph in the case mentioning that only people with serious conditions can get the medical marijuana*). We cannot guarantee that the chemical residue left in our product would be safe. I’m annoyed by the idea of switching.

**S** – Guys! I really do not think it’s a good idea to invest much, if anything in this new extraction method. I’m bothered by the potential for harm to people if we make the switch because, according to the case, we have a lot of vulnerable customers (*show them the paragraph in the case mentioning that only people with serious conditions can get the medical marijuana*). We cannot guarantee that the chemical residue left in our product would be safe. I do not want to see people hurt.

#### Second/Third Time

**A** – Again [Yeah], I need to raise the safety issue. For example, what about kids with epilepsy who are going to need large doses of our product every day? They could end up with serious problems. It would be SO unfair to them if our product causes those problems. Personally, I would be ANGRY if that happened.

**S** – Again, I need to need to raise the safety issue. Let’s think about those vulnerable people, for example, kids with epilepsy who are going to need large doses of our product every day. They could end up with serious problems. It would be really sad if our product causes those problems. Personally, I would be upset if that happened.

#### Third/Fourth Time

**A** – Look, I’m just angry at the switching idea. It seems SO obvious to me that the new method is just too risky.

**S** – Look, I’m still worried about vulnerable customers. I think caring about people should come first.

#### Final Question (They Might Ask You How Much You Want to Invest or Push You to Accept a Small Number)

**A** – I would say 0. I’m personally uncomfortable with the idea of investing in something that we know is unsafe.

**S** – I would say 0. I’m personally uncomfortable with the idea of investing in something that we know is going to be harmful to at least some of our customers.

#### Some Additional Arguments to Use if People Ask Some Particular Questions

*[You can say this when some people argue that the likelihood of harm is trivial]*

**A** – The case mentioned there are over 3 hundred thousand potential customers out there. Given this, a tiny likelihood of incident means a lot. I would be upset if that happened to our customers.

**S** – The case mentioned there are over 3 hundred thousand potential customers out there. Given this, even a tiny percentage of harm means a lot. It’s really sad if that happened to our customers.

*[You can say this when people say something like “But, this method is SO much more efficient,” “BUT, others are using this new method. How are we going to compete effectively?”; You can always say this when there is still a lot of time]*

**A** – Again [Yeah], it’s SO obvious in the case the method is too risky. Why are we still weighing efficiency against safety?

**S** – Again, the case suggests the potential for harm is huge. I really think caring customers should come first.

#### The Control Condition

I put down 0. I definitely can see pros and cons for both extraction methods. I want to hear more from you guys. Can you explain to me what you guys think and I’ll go with whatever you guys end up with.

*[What if some team members fight for the number and ask what you think?]*

What you said both made sense to me. I can see both sides. On the one hand, this method is efficient and helps our business [elaborate on this] . . . On the other hand, there is potential risk [elaborate on this]. I do not know.

*[When the team decides the number]*

Yeah I’m okay with that. That’s a good idea.

*(Appendices continue)*

## Appendix B

### Instructions for Nonverbal Display of Anger and Sympathy

The actor confederates were given instructions based on the research findings regarding facial cues of anger and sympathy summarized by Haidt and Keltner (1999), voice cues for anger and love/tenderness recorded by Juslin and Scherer (2008), and postural cues for anger suggested by Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) and sympathy suggested by Goetz et al. (2010).

For the sympathy condition, the confederates were told to have a concerned gaze, raise their inner eyebrows, raise their lower lip and press the lips together; they were told to speak relatively slowly with low pitch and a soothing voice; they were also told to stretch their limbs forward and fold their hands.

For the anger condition, the confederates were told to have wide eyes, lower their eyebrows (furrowed brows), and tighten and press together their lips; they were told to speak relatively fast with high pitch and a loud voice; they were also told to clench their fists and bang their fists on the table.

For both conditions, we emphasized to the confederates that they had to keep the facial and vocal display throughout the second part of the task and avoid smiling or laughing when team members were joking. The confederates practiced the emotions with each other and with the researchers. They were also evaluated by coders and several potential confederates were removed because they were unable to effectively convey the emotions.

## Appendix C

### Confederates Training Procedures

In the first training session, scripts and instructions of emotion display were given to the actors. Each of them practiced. Five of seven actors successfully demonstrated those two emotions and were thus hired.

In the second training session, each confederate performed about 30 s for the two emotion conditions respectively and was rated face-to-face by research assistants on anger and sympathy items. Confederates received personalized feedback from the researchers based on the ratings and the confederates with higher ratings demonstrated the two emotions and shared their tips with fellow confederates.<sup>5</sup>

In the third training session, confederates were divided into teams and performed mock experiments wherein one confederate read the script of an ethical champion while the other confederates agreed with or argued against him. Roles were switched after each round. Based on the mock sessions, we added to the script stock responses to different arguments that could possibly be made by participants.

The final script (see Appendix A) consisted of four required segments of speech about the confederates' proposition and arguments, and stock responses to arguments that might be made against their moral advocacy. Although we created the standardized script, the interactive nature of the experiment required certain degrees of improvisation on the part of the confederates. To increase experimental control, we emphasized to the confederates that they had to deliver as much information in the required segments as possible, if not using the exact same words across teams. We also asked the confederates to

avoid being the first (i.e., holding back until at least two team members expressed their opinions) or the most talkative speaker in their teams, so that the confederates would not be perceived as a task leader in the second section of the experimental task. For the first section, the confederates were instructed to blend into the team and be as natural as possible.

In the fourth and fifth session, we examined whether each confederate had memorized the script and displayed emotions in similar ways. Feedback was given to confederates during the training and they adjusted their performance accordingly.

<sup>5</sup> During the first two sessions, it was planned that confederates use the exact same script for the two emotion conditions as well as an emotionally neutral condition where the confederates were instructed to remain flat and sound rational. Using the same script across different emotion conditions and having an emotionally neutral condition ideally would give greater control and rule out confounds related to content of the script. However, we found that the neutral display had high ratings on the sympathy items and could not be reliably distinguished from the sympathy display, possibly because of the harm-based arguments in the script. In addition, the anger display was interpreted more as sympathy and compassion rather than anger (low ratings on anger items) by the research assistants. To make our manipulation more effective, we dropped the emotionally neutral condition and added phrases conveying sympathy and anger to the script for the two emotion conditions respectively while keeping the length and informational content of the script constant across the two conditions. Therefore, confederates were able to display rich emotions through both verbal and nonverbal channels.

(Appendices continue)

## Appendix D

### Confederate Scripts in Study 2

#### First Time Speaking

**E** – Hey guys! I do not think it's a good idea to invest much, if anything, in this new extraction method. I'm seriously concerned about the potential harm to patient's health if we make the switch. According to the case, we have a lot of vulnerable customers (*give examples of all kinds of patients*). The chemical residue left in our product could do irreversible harm especially to already weakened immune systems.

**B** – Hey Guys! I do not think it's a good idea to invest much, if anything in this new extraction method. I'm seriously concerned about the potential damage to our business if we make the switch. According to the case, customers seem to care about what products they get. We are already facing financial challenges. The Ditane method could cost us more money and we could lose customers and investors.

#### Second/Third Time

**E** – Again, I need to emphasize the harm to people. Think about kids with epilepsy, they are going to need large doses of our product every day. They could end up with serious problems if they use our products. I do not want to see them hurt.

**B** – Again, I want to emphasize the damage to our business. You know a lot of customers prefer organic, or an all-natural product. They could boycott us or sue us and cost us more money and ruin our brand. I do not want to see our business fail.

#### Third/Fourth Time

**E** – Look, I'm still concerned about vulnerable customers. I think it is our responsibility to care about people first.

**B** – Look, I'm still concerned about the impacts on our bottom-line. I think selling an all-natural product can create a competitive advantage for us.

#### Final Question (They Might Ask You How Much You Want to Invest or Push You to Accept a Small Number)

**E** – I would say 0. I do not like the idea of investing in something knowingly harmful to patients.

**B** – I would say 0. I do not like the idea of investing in something bad for our business.

#### Some Additional Arguments to Use if People Ask Some Particular Questions

*[You can say this when some people argue that the likelihood of harm is trivial]*

**E** – The case mentioned there are over 3 hundred thousand potential customers out there. Given this, even a tiny likelihood would cause a lot of harm to customers.

**B** – The case mentioned there are over 3 hundred thousand potential customers out there. Given this, even one adverse reaction case could ruin our brand.

## Appendix E

### Items for Team Moral Disengagement

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. 1 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly agree*.

1. My team thinks that switching to the new method, Ditane, is necessary in order for the company to stay in business.
2. My team thinks that it is all right to switch to the new Ditane method to keep the company out of crisis.
3. My team thinks that customers who would choose the cheaper product produced by the Ditane method should be responsible for the risk they would take.
4. My team thinks that people who would choose the cheaper product produced by the Ditane method do not care that much about their own health.
5. My team thinks that Ditane is okay because the experts quoted in the case based their negative opinion on just A FEW studies.
6. My team thinks that Ditane is probably fine because many other companies are using it and it is not regulated.
7. My team thinks that the potential negative effect of Ditane is no big deal when you consider that a lot of medicines have more serious side effects.
8. My team thinks that compared with other unhealthy products such as cigarettes, marijuana extracted by Ditane isn't worth worrying about.

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