I am an assistant professor of Economics at Penn State.
I am a microeconomic theorist (and also a CS theorist). I study mechanism design, information design, and price discrimination.
Selling to a Group [Slides]
with Aditya Kuvalekar and Elliot Lipnowski
Abstract in ACM EC 2021
Pareto Improving Segmentation of Multi-product markets [Slides]
with Ron Siegel
R&R, Journal of Political Economy
Abstract in ACM EC 2019 as Consumer-Optimal Market Segmentation
Sequential Mechanisms with ex-post Individual Rationality
with Itai Ashlagi and Constantinos Daskalakis
R&R, Operations Research
Abstract in ACM EC 2016
A Cooperative Theory of Market Segemntation by Consumers
with Ron Siegel
The Limits of Multi-Product Price Discrimination
with Ron Siegel
American Economic Review: Insights (forthcoming)
How to Sell Hard Information [Slides]
with S. Nageeb Ali, Xiao Lin, and Ron Siegel
Quarterly Journal of Economics 2022
When Is Pure Bundling Optimal? [Slides]
with Jason Hartline
Review of Economic Studies 2021
Full Surplus Extraction from Samples [Slides]
with Hu Fu, Jason Hartline, and Robert Kleinberg
Journal of Economic Theory 2021
Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands
with Nikhil Devanur and Alex Psomas
Games and Economic Behavior 2020
Abstract in ACM EC 2017
Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms
with Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Jason Hartline, and Azarakhsh Malekian
Mathematics of Operations Research 2019
Abstract in ACM EC 2012
Revenue Maximization with Non-excludable Goods
with MohammadHossein Bateni, Balu Sivan, and Morteza Zadimoghaddam
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 2015
Preliminary version in WINE 2013
Optimal Auctions with Positive Network Externalities
with Nicole Immorlica, Vahab Mirrokni, and Kamesh Munagala
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 2013
Abstract in ACM EC 2011
Equilibrium Pricing with Positive Externalities
with Nima Anari, Shayan Ehsani, Mohammad Ghodsi, Nicole Immorlica, Hamid Mahini, and Vahab Mirrokni
Theoretical Computer Science 2013
Preliminary version in WINE 2010
Exchange Market Mechanisms without Money
with Zeinab Abbassi and Vahab Mirrokni
WINE 2015
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions
with Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, and Jason Hartline
FOCS 2013
Optimal Iterative Pricing over Social Networks
with Hessamedin Akhlaghpour, Mohammad Ghodsi, Hamid Mahini, Vahab Mirrokni, and Afshin Nikzad
WINE 2010
Optimal Multi-parameter Auction Design
Northwestern University 2014
Mechanism Design Topics Lecture Notes
I use these notes for my PhD topics class. If you find typos, please email me and let me know.
Week 1: Screening
Week 2: Auctions
Week 3: VCG and implementability
Week 4: Dynamic mechanisms
Week 5: Multi-dimensional screening
Week 6: Robustness and worst case analysis
Week 7: Information design
Week 8: Robust contracts
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