

Popp relies on the travel magazine *Holiday* from the Curtis Publishing Company, publisher of *The Saturday Evening Post* and *Ladies' Home Journal*, as a lens through which to view the travel industry. *Holiday* debuted in 1946 and served as a major mediator between the travel industry and the public. The magazine helped the industry create a "popular geography" for American tourism by presenting the public with "narratives, themes, and images of place and mobility" and developing a "tourist pedagogy" that taught people how to think about "place, leisure, and identity" (p. 7). The American tourism industry tapped into the narrative of an America transformed from a land of the Protestant work ethic to a land of fun and leisure. In this nation, the American "wanderlust" that once brought colonists to new lands and fueled the conquest of the frontier propelled Americans to vacation, and American technological innovations conquered "space and time" (p. 4).

No longer just a privilege of the moneyed, leisure class, vacations became part of American consumer entitlement. Amidst the privatization of American life as people abandoned public transportation for automobiles, relocated to the suburbs, socialized behind fences in private backyards, and otherwise moved away from being a culture based on community leisure, the vacation offered a way to connect to the broader community. Even those of modest means could explore the United States and possibly even visit Europe. Tourism signified a level of equality in leisure afforded to all American citizens, and travel at home and abroad could offer opportunities free of the era's Jim Crow segregation.

On the geopolitical stage, mass tourism and paid vacations projected an image of the United States as a classless, egalitarian society, an image the federal government sought to cultivate in the Cold War battle of ideas. Paid worker vacations and the leisure time to travel demonstrated that the fruits of American capitalism benefitted all Americans. The vacation symbolized the egalitarianism and mobility created by the American free enterprise system, and because of the superiority of the system, vacations were no longer only for the wealthier class. Paid vacation time demonstrated the benevolent way that American corporations treated their workers, and the expectation of paid vacation expanded in the postwar era. By the late 1950s, labor contracts increasingly offered senior workers four weeks paid vacation.

As he concludes, Popp takes a brief look at the demise of these paid vacations and the de-emphasis on American tourism as part of national identity. He attempts to explain why contemporary Americans do not participate in the level of global travel enjoyed by their peers in other wealthy nations. By the 1960s, market segmentation led to an emphasis on unique individual experiences over mass tourism, the State Department changed course and decreased incentives for foreign travel, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower declared 1960 "Visit the United States of America' year" (p.

136). As the American standard of living came to be exclusively equated with commodities and purchasing power, the paid vacation lost its role as part of the American identity. While other nations increasingly codified paid vacations, American corporations conversely slashed the paid vacation time of their workers.

Popp relies primarily on *Holiday* with only a few mentions of other magazines such as *Life*, *Sports Illustrated*, and *Time*. While he makes the case for the importance of Curtis and *Holiday*, which had a circulation of 605,000, the reach of the magazine did not warrant this exclusivity (p. 49). Although Popp effectively constructs his argument, additional evidence from travel advertisements in other magazines and newspapers, and a deeper look at other aspects of the tourism industry would strengthen his case. *The Holiday Makers* could find broader significance if it further explored the use of travel as Cold War cultural diplomacy, the connections between the travel industry and the federal government, and domestic social issues. Topics such as racism and segregation in travel warrant the space devoted to "destination profiles." These issues notwithstanding, Popp weaves a must read that aids our understanding of commercially made American culture, and the rise and fall of the American vacation.

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DOUGLAS M. CHARLES. *The FBI's Obscene File: J. Edgar Hoover and the Bureau's Crusade against Smut*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2012. Pp. x, 171. \$24.95.

Good work on the history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been appearing quite regularly for a long time now. Douglas M. Charles's book on the FBI's obscenity file is a welcome addition to this literature. It expands our knowledge of the Bureau and therefore contributes to our understanding of twentieth-century U.S. history.

The FBI began accumulating physical specimens of obscenity in 1925, but it did not develop a centralized, formal obscene file until 1942. The objects, in Charles's words, were an "intelligence base of specimens used for comparison and identification purposes to locate and identify the sources of smut and its purveyors" (p. 129). Although periodically weeded, the collection grew substantially; its contents were burned in the early 1990s. In 1943, the FBI created an administrative file to oversee the obscene objects. This file, which was not destroyed, is the primary evidentiary basis for Charles's book. It does not contain the case files on individuals and organizations targeted under federal anti-obscenity law. They number, according to the National Archives, more than 100,000 and are located in other classifications. Pursuing these was not "feasible" (p. 5). Charles makes all this clear in his introduction because he understands that his readers need to know precisely the nature of the FBI records he is using. (Another indication that Charles is a knowledgeable researcher of

Bureau files is that he accurately references individual serials within the administrative file so that others can track down the document.) This book, then, as he tells us, is a “primer” (p. 4).

The story of the FBI’s efforts to check the spread of obscenity is not, Charles argues, simple. There not only were competing bureaucracies at work but also differing legal jurisdictions, and changing juridical definitions of obscenity itself. The FBI, moreover, was subject to a variety of pressures from numerous sources. “Cultural containment” (p. 4), finally, might well have been J. Edgar Hoover’s goal when it came to obscenity, but there is little indication that it was a significant part of his overall organizational agenda.

The FBI did not recognize that it had collected a large amount of obscene objects until the 1930s and did not systematize them until World War II, when fears arose that young men in military services would be morally contaminated. At that point, Bureau officials determined that the collection had considerable practical value. After the end of the war, Field Offices submitted increasing numbers of obscene objects to FBI Headquarters in an effort to figure out their sources and distributors. The Crime Lab’s ability to do so, though, decreased over time. During the 1950s, the Bureau apparently focused a good deal of attention on popular music, particularly as rhythm and blues reached more and more white teenagers. From 1957 on, the FBI coped with continuing changes in presidential attitudes toward obscenity as well as the Supreme Court’s definition of it. The Nixon administration, for example, developed a counterattack on what it considered the growing permissiveness in U.S. society, and Hoover “initiated a parallel effort” to “buttress” the plan (p. 75). During the 1970s and 1980s, the Bureau shifted its focus to the connection between organized crime and pornography. It ran four undercover operations, including three previously unknown: FAST PLAY, PORNEX, and, CLEAN STREETS. Here the focus was more on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) than on anti-obscenity laws. The FBI stopped using the Obscene File and pursuing Interstate Transportation of Obscene Matter cases (except child pornography) during the Clinton administration. The brief and temporary revival of such efforts in 2004 and 2005 came to naught. In the spring of 2011, the Attorney General shut down the Justice Department’s Obscenity Prosecution Task Force.

Scholars will not find in this book, as the author acknowledges, an analysis of the FBI’s activity in obscenity issues “through the lens of gender or sexuality” (p. 5). Because of the kind of records he was using and the difficulty of getting at those 100,000 case files, Charles has written an “institutional and bureaucratic history” (p. 5). Sex and gender appear from time to time, but only on a limited basis. Some information about gays wound up in the Obscene File, but most probably went into the Sex Deviates File, which was established in 1951 and destroyed in 1977. Charles’s brief discussion of the FBI investigation of the Mattachine Society and

ONE draws upon his journal article; the Bureau’s 100 classification, “Domestic Security,” contained the relevant files. Similarly, the FBI’s investigation of the song “Louie, Louie” was filed in classification 145, “Interstate Transportation of Obscene Matter.”

This is a good introduction to the FBI’s handling of obscenity. It should, as Charles hopes, “spark further scholarship” (p. 5).

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JOHN SBARDELLATI. *J. Edgar Hoover Goes to the Movies: The FBI and the Origins of Hollywood’s Cold War*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 2012. Pp. viii, 256. \$27.95.

John Sbardellati’s book explores a well-known historical topic—the red scare and the blacklist in Hollywood—yet his close examination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) role offers an important new perspective. By following the “archival turn” in film history and delving deeply into FBI records, Sbardellati uncovers the breadth and impact of the agency’s investigative activities in the motion picture industry from 1942 to 1958. He rejects the idea that FBI director J. Edgar Hoover and his agents were motivated solely by political opportunism or the desire for publicity. Instead, he argues “a sincerely held, if ill-founded, fear of Communist propaganda” spurred the investigation (p. 3). Hoover believed that members of the Communist Party in Hollywood, estimated at about 300 people, had inserted pro-communist messages in movies. Given the ideological power of motion pictures—at the time the dominant form of mass entertainment in the United States—the FBI considered this situation a danger to America’s politics, institutions, and way of life. The most well-known consequence of the bureau’s years of investigation was the blacklist, but Sbardellati emphasizes another: the transformation in film content, as socially conscious filmmaking declined. “It turns out that the red scare in Hollywood was about the movies after all,” he notes (p. 3).

This focused study of the FBI in Hollywood expands our historical understanding of the wider red scare. Hoover emerges as the foremost leader and his bureau a crucial means of anticommunist efforts in the 1940s and 1950s. Sbardellati joins Ellen Schrecker in stating that what we now call “McCarthyism”—smearing targeted Americans with accusations of communist sympathies—would be better understood as “Hooverism.” Attention to Hoover’s career and his key contributions to anticommunism reinforces the concept of the “long” red scare. Hoover joined the Bureau of Investigation in 1917, the same year as the Russian Revolution, and he pursued real and suspected leftists from the start. Named director in 1924, he was aware of independent left filmmakers in the New York-based Labor Film Service and had received reports of “Parlor Bolshevik” groups in Los Angeles. Although these early 1920s film-related activities lapsed, the FBI did not wait until the