

109

9-28-65

SAC, Albany

REC-34

~~SECRET~~

Director, FBI

[redacted]

(S) (U)

b3  
b7E

**PROGRAM TO DETECT HOMOSEXUALS  
WHO HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED OR  
RECRUITED BY SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES  
(PROHO)**

(S) (U)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Lenihan

The Bureau had noted continuing evidence that the Soviet intelligence services are attempting to compromise and recruit homosexuals who visit the Soviet Union.

[redacted]

b7E

[redacted]

(S) (U)

[redacted]

b7E

[redacted]

the Bureau has instituted a program aimed at identifying homosexuals who have traveled behind the Iron Curtain where they might have been susceptible to compromise and approach by the Soviets or who, while stationed abroad in the U.S. Armed Forces such as Berlin, Germany, may have engaged in activities which enabled the Soviets to attempt their compromise.

(S) (U)

The establishment of the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), Defense Construction Supply Center, Columbus, Ohio, has greatly assisted the Bureau in the implementing of this program. Through arrangements with DISCO, the Cincinnati Office henceforth will receive on a weekly basis information on individuals employed in private industry falling in the following categories:

- (1) Persons currently holding valid industrial clearances who are believed to be homosexuals.
- (2) Persons who are currently being processed for industrial clearances who are believed to be homosexuals.

MAILED 2  
SEP 27 1965  
COMM-FBI

2 + ALL OTHER OFFICES

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

66 OCT 7 1965

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

4-26-96  
CLASSIFIED BY Sp4 bja/inf  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6  
# 359409

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

*Handwritten signatures and notes:*  
Wes  
P  
V.  
7/24  
5/8/65  
Rel

Letter to SAC, Albany

RE: PROGRAM TO DETECT HOMOSEXUALS  
WHO HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED OR  
RECRUITED BY SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES  
(PROHO)

~~(S)~~ (U)

~~SECRET~~

- (3) Persons holding valid industrial clearances who are believed to be homosexuals and who are intending to travel to a Sino-Soviet Bloc country or who are planning to attend a meeting outside the U.S. where someone from a Sino-Soviet Bloc country may attend. ~~(S)~~ (U)

When information is received from the Cincinnati Office or from another office which develops information through its own sources that a homosexual employed in a key or sensitive industry or facility did travel behind the Iron Curtain or was stationed while in the Armed Forces in a country where he could have been compromised by the Soviets, the office covering the residence and employment of such homosexual should conduct a thorough investigation to determine if the homosexual could be acting as a Soviet agent. This will include an identification of his contacts and associates and an analysis of his activities and finances. It should also be determined whether the homosexual travels at regular intervals to a point away from the city where he resides, particularly to New York City or Washington, D.C. where the homosexual could be meeting with Soviet officials in this country. In such instances, consideration should be given to requesting Bureau authority to afford physical surveillance coverage to such homosexual during his trip to determine if he is meeting with a Soviet official in the city visited. ~~(S)~~ (U)

In the event an office develops or receives information that a suspected homosexual is employed in a key or sensitive industry but it is not known whether such individual traveled behind the Iron Curtain or had military service at a place where he may have been susceptible to compromise by the Soviets, the office covering the residence of the homosexual should request the Washington Field Office to check the records of the Passport Office, Department of State and [redacted] to determine if the individual in question has traveled behind the Iron Curtain. In addition, in those instances where the homosexual had previous U.S. military service, the St. Louis Office should be requested to make a check of the homosexual's military service file to determine if the homosexual was ever stationed in a country where he could have been compromised by the Soviets. ~~(S)~~ (U)

b7E

26 FEB 11 11 11 AM '50

DO NOT DISSEMINATE

~~SECRET~~

Letter to SAC, Albany  
RE: PROGRAM TO DETECT HOMOSEXUALS  
WHO HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED OR  
RECRUITED BY SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES  
(PROHO)

~~SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ (U)

During the period an office is investigating a homosexual under this program, dissemination should be withheld from the agency responsible for the security at the plant or establishment where a homosexual is employed until the security risk or informant potential of such individual has been determined. This is necessary to preclude an employer discharging a homosexual until we have fully explored the espionage or informant aspect of the individual. At the conclusion of our investigation regarding each homosexual, dissemination will be made to the interested agency disclosing the fact that the employee is a homosexual. [REDACTED]

b7E

In each such case, the Bureau should be advised and recommendations should be made as to dissemination. The handling of each case will be based upon the merits of the individual case. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Further correspondence in this matter should be captioned "PROHO, [REDACTED] ~~(S)~~ (U)

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~