FDR at Gettysburg: The New Deal and the Rhetoric of Public Memory

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In 1934 and again in 1938, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt presented commemorative speeches on the battlefield at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. FDR, who is perhaps second only to Abraham Lincoln as a canonically eloquent president, redefined the literature of American oratory in a long series of speeches from which passages are still immediately recognizable. Roosevelt’s best known speeches were important policy addresses or occurred at— and defined—dramatic moments in American history in campaign speeches, inaugural addresses, fireside chats, and the declaration of war. Roosevelt’s eloquence is memorable not only for its literary brilliance and homely accessibility, but also for its energetic instrumentality and its sense of dramatic action and personality.

Roosevelt’s speeches at Gettysburg seem to offer an ideal opportunity to hear the resonances between the Great Emancipator and the great New Dealer. But for an American admirer of both Roosevelt and Lincoln, FDR’s two speeches at Gettysburg strike one first as a disappointment, even an
embarrassment. They are also something of a mystery. Why are they as they are? How did they come to be? And how are we to understand them? These speeches, which have been largely forgotten, have much to teach us—as texts and as public actions—about the rhetoric of public memory. An examination of the production, the circumstances, the texts, and the reception of these two speeches reveals how even a single, simple act of public memorializing may, under the lens of rhetorical criticism, disclose itself also as a site of silent contestation, revision, and forgetting. The speeches may also teach us something about our own sentimental evasions. Because I shall argue that it is worthwhile to begin with the theory-in-the text and only then refract it through our own theories and myths, I shall turn immediately to the speeches, placing them before us in their fullness, their detail, their partly forgotten and in some ways startling circumstances, and their sometimes uncomfortable reminders of a former time. If we are to appreciate rather than merely mythologize these speeches we must first subject them to the refining fire of a critical analysis suspicious but not dismissive of the impulses and practices of political power.
“The Selfishness of Sectionalism Has No Place in Our National Life” -- Address at Gettysburg. May 30, 1934

FDR spoke at Gettysburg on Memorial Day in 1934. The brief speech is worth reading as a whole.

Governor Pinchot, Mr. Chairman, my friends:

1. What a glorious day this is! I rejoice in it and I rejoice in this splendid celebration of it.

2. On these hills of Gettysburg two brave armies of Americans once met in contest. Not far from here, in a valley likewise consecrated to American valor, a ragged Continental Army survived a bitter winter to keep alive the expiring hope of a new Nation; and near to this battlefield and that valley stands that invincible city where the Declaration of Independence was born and the Constitution of the United States was written by the fathers. Surely, all this is holy ground.

3. It was in Philadelphia, too, that Washington spoke his solemn, tender, wise words of farewell -- a farewell not alone to his generation, but to the generation of those who laid down their lives here and to our generation and to the America of tomorrow. Perhaps if our fathers and grandfathers had truly heeded those words we should have had no
family quarrel, no battle of Gettysburg, no Appomattox.

4. As a Virginian, President Washington had a natural pride in Virginia; but as an American, in his stately phrase, “the name of American, which belongs to you, in your national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of patriotism, more than any appellation derived from local discrimination.”

5. Recognizing the strength of local and State and sectional prejudices and how strong they might grow to be, and how they might take from the national Government some of the loyalty the citizens owed to it, he made three historic tours during his Presidency. One was through New England in 1789, another through the Northern States in 1790, and still another through the Southern States in 1791. He did this, as he said -- and the words sound good nearly a century and a half later -- “In order to become better acquainted with their principal characters and internal circumstances, as well as to be more accessible to numbers of well-informed persons who might give him useful advices on political subjects.”

6. But Washington did more to stimulate patriotism than merely to travel and mingle with the people. He knew that Nations grow as their commerce and
manufactures and agriculture grow, and that all of these grow as the means of transportation are extended. He sought to knit the sections together by their common interest in these great enterprises; and he projected highways and canals as aids not to sectional, but to national, development.

7. But the Nation expanded geographically after the death of Washington far more rapidly than the Nation's means of inter-communication. The small national area of 1789 grew to the great expanse of the Nation in 1860. Even in terms of the crude transportation of that day, the first thirteen States were still within "driving distance" of each other.

8. With the settling of and the peopling of the Continent to the shores of the Pacific, there developed the problem of self-contained territories because the Nation's expansion exceeded its development of means of transportation, as we learn from our history books. The early building of railroads did not proceed on national lines.

9. Contrary to the belief of some of us Northerners, the South and the West were not laggard in developing this new form of transportation; but, as in the East, most of the railroads were local and sectional. It was a chartless procedure; people were
not thinking in terms of national transportation or national communication. In the days before the Brothers’ War not a single line of railroad was projected from the South to the North; not even one from the South reached to the national capital itself.

10. In those days, it was an inspired prophet of the South who said: “My brethren, if we know one another, we will love one another.” The tragedy of the Nation was that the people did not know one another because they had not the necessary means of visiting one another.

11. Since those days, two subsequent wars, both with foreign Nations, have measurably allayed and softened the ancient passions. It has been left to us of this generation to see the healing made permanent.

12. We are all brothers now, brothers in a new understanding. The grain farmers of the West and in the fertile fields of Pennsylvania do not set themselves up for preference if we seek at the same time to help the cotton farmers of the South; nor do the tobacco growers complain of discrimination if, at the same time, we help the cattle men of the plains and mountains.
13. In our planning to lift industry to normal prosperity, the farmer upholds our efforts. And as we seek to give the farmers of the United States a long-sought equality, the city worker understands and helps. All of us, among all the States, share in whatever of good comes to the average man. We know that we all have a stake -- a partnership in this Government of this, our country.

14. Today, we have many means of knowing each other -- means that at last have sounded the doom of sectionalism. It is, I think, as I survey the picture from every angle, a simple fact that the chief hindrance to progress comes from three elements which, thank God, grow less in importance with the growth of a clearer understanding of our purposes on the part of the overwhelming majority. These groups are those who seek to stir up political animosity or build political advantage by the distortion of facts; those who, by declining to follow the rules of the game, seek to gain an unfair advantage over those who are willing to live up to the rules of the game; and those few who, because they have never been willing to take an interest in their fellow Americans, dwell inside of their own narrow spheres and still represent the selfishness
of sectionalism which has no place in our national life.

15. Washington and Jefferson and Jackson and Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson sought and worked for a consolidated Nation. You and I have it in our power to attain that great ideal within our lifetime. We can do this by following the peaceful methods prescribed under the broad and resilient provisions of the Constitution of the United States.

16. Here, here at Gettysburg, here in the presence of the spirits of those who fell on this ground, we give renewed assurance that the passions of war are moldering in the tombs of Time and the purposes of peace are flowing today in the hearts of a united people.

Most striking for a contemporary reader of the Roosevelt speech, bringing to the text what we might take to be stable and universal memories of Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Gettysburg, is the near absence of Lincoln and Gettysburg from the speech itself. Lincoln himself is mentioned by name only once in the speech, in paragraph 15, along with five other presidents. Gettysburg, although it is mentioned in the first sentence of paragraph 2, is by no means the central subject or image of the speech. Far from being stable or universal, both "Lincoln" and "Gettysburg" were and are contested, contingent rhetorical constructions;
moreover, in this speech even the contingency and contestation are largely effaced.

In trying to account for the near-absence of Lincoln and Gettysburg from Roosevelt’s 1934 speech, we might turn to the circumstances of its composition for a clue to his plans for appropriating and shaping public memory at the Gettysburg site. The Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library at Hyde Park, New York, retains five separate typescripts of the address. (1) A draft of the speech by an unknown author, clipped to a cover memo to Steve Early from “D.J.” asking Early to check a fact in the draft with “Mr. Barbee.” This draft contains source annotations as endnotes. (2) Attached to draft (1) and the memo to Early is another typed draft, based on draft (1) and itself marked up for further revision. (3) A single-spaced press release version of the speech as prepared for delivery, on which H. M. Kannee has recorded in shorthand Roosevelt’s deviations from the prepared text. (4) A large-type reading copy of the speech. (5) A typewritten transcript of the speech identified in a covering memo as having been prepared by the White House stenographer from notes taken during delivery. “Underlining indicates words extemporaneously added to the previously prepared reading copy text. Words in parenthesis are words that were omitted when the speech was delivered, though they appear in the previously prepared reading copy text.” The final copy (6) is that which appears in
Roosevelt’s published papers, and which is transcribed in full here. All five typescripts differ in significant ways from the printed version edited by Rosenman. Although the details of authorship and composition are somewhat murky, the surviving copies of the speech do reveal significant shaping by Roosevelt.

Based on the surviving documents and Roosevelt’s long-standing habits of speech composition, it appears that draft (1) was prepared by a speechwriter. Using draft (1) as a starting point, Roosevelt himself probably dictated draft (2) to a stenographer, after which he made some further revisions in longhand on the resulting typescript, in turn using that amended typescript as the basis for the dictation of a release version for the press, which he further revised just before or during delivery. In preparing Roosevelt’s papers for publication, Roosevelt speechwriter Judge Samuel Rosenman relied on the corrected reading copy (5) but omitted an opening paragraph in which Roosevelt praised Governor Pinchot of Pennsylvania.

Who actually wrote the first draft of the speech? Almost certainly, the first draft of the speech was written by David Rankin Barbee (1874-1958), a Southern journalist who migrated to a job as a feature writer for the Washington Post in 1928 and who took a job as a public relations writer for the Federal Alcohol Administration in 1933. Rankin was well known to Steve Early, Roosevelt’s press secretary, who
had placed public relations writers in several federal agencies; it was Early who was asked to send draft (1) to Barbee for fact-checking, and who may have suggested Barbee as the author of the first draft of the speech.\textsuperscript{5} If Roosevelt’s de-emphasis of Lincoln seems odd, Barbee’s draft for the speech, in comparison, seems astonishing.

But rather than assume that the first draft was written by Barbee, let us examine the evidence. Mechanical evidence is consistent with Barbee as author. The typewriter on which Barbee wrote 11 footnotes to the first draft, headed “Annotations” and sent back to the White House in response to Early’s request, appears to be identical to that used to write the first draft. It is consistent with Barbee’s authorship for the draft to have been sent back to him for fact-checking—why else would Barbee, out of all possible historians, have been chosen for fact checking if he were not the author of the draft itself?

Contextual evidence supports the possibility of Barbee as author or collaborator on the first draft of the speech. Roosevelt sometimes worked from first drafts that had been submitted by various writers in or out of the administration, and so the practice would not have been unusual. Years later, for example, Roosevelt’s undelivered "last speech" was based on a first draft submitted by Josef Berger, a writer at the Democratic National Committee.\textsuperscript{6} Harry Hopkins recalls an informal, after-dinner meeting with
Roosevelt and some others on September 23, 1934, to discuss a radio speech scheduled for September 25. "It was perfectly clear that the President did not know what he was going to talk about... He asked Moley if he had anything, and Moley promptly pulled a manuscript from his pocket -- and the conversation indicated that he had either asked Moley to prepare something or knew that he was doing so... It then developed that Felix Frankfurter and some of his bright boys had prepared Moley's manuscript." Such practices were common for Roosevelt.

Barbee was positioned to help out with the speech. Throughout the New Deal, he kept up a correspondence with Early, the press secretary, and with Marvin McIntyre, the appointments secretary and himself a former campaign press secretary to Roosevelt. He volunteered to write for the White House, and apparently did write for Early on occasion. In December 1933, in a note thanking McIntyre for helping him secure a post as director of public relations in the Federal Alcohol Control Administration, Barbee wrote, "Some day you may need a humble pen to write something for the Administration which you would not care to ask the able pens now at your command to write. If you think mine worthy of that office, command it."

Barbee continued throughout the Roosevelt era to correspond with his apparent protector, Steve Early. As early as December 1933, several months before the first
Gettysburg speech, Barbee stepped into a controversy that had apparently begun when Herbert Hoover's press secretary, Theodore Joslin, charged that the New Deal was trying to control the news by hiring former newspapermen to engage in public relations work in various government agencies. On January 9, 1934, Barbee drafted for Early's use a long memorandum responding to Joslin's charges and including a short history of relations between government and the press. Barbee followed the controversy closely, collecting several file folders of clippings and a mimeographed copy of a press release on which someone, apparently Barbee, has written in red pencil, "This started the d-n controversy." The press release, headed "From CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE, 601 Albee Building, Washington, D.C., Release October 10," claims that "at least 150 ex-newspapermen are holding important posts in the Roosevelt Administration." One of those listed is Barbee. The controversy over the New Deal and the press continued at least through 1935. In January 1935, Congressman Martin Dies (Democrat, Texas), later the chair of the infamous Dies Committee, an early version of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, was proposing a Congressional committee to investigate White House censorship of the news. In June 1935, Barbee delivered the baccalaureate address at Emory and Henry College on the theme, "The New Deal and the Freedom of the Press." Barbee defended the New Deal's employment of public relations
workers and former journalists, and gave a short history of government-press relations. In one passage, Barbee's characteristic hostility to Lincoln and the Republicans emerges directly, when he describes Lincoln's suppression of the Democratic press. "The Democratic press was ruined beyond the power of redemption. To this day it has not recovered what it lost in the first year of Lincoln's Administration."\(^1\)

Barbee cultivated his relation to FDR's speaking on several occasions, at the same time revealing his familiarity with Roosevelt's habits of speech composition. From time to time throughout the Roosevelt presidency, Barbee sent to Early materials that he suggested might be helpful additions to Roosevelt's speech material file.\(^2\)

When, in the summer of 1940, it appeared that Barbee might lose his job because of an agency reorganization, he appealed to Early to help him find another post. In one of a series of letters, he wrote to Early: "When the political campaign begins to warm up, it may be that you will be asked to suggest some writers or researchers to help in the press section. If so, I might fit in there in some capacity. I have written many political speeches and speeches for members of Congress and for Government officials on all sorts of topics, and research is a field in which I have long worked with some degree of success."\(^3\)
Barbee's sense of the relation between public memory and partisan maneuver was highly developed. In March 1940, Barbee suggested to Early that WPA employees be hired to index back years of Democratic newspapers, thereby making them accessible to historians and influencing the writing of history. "Our American history and biography has been written chiefly by Republican authors, using Republican source material."

Though there is no direct documentary evidence to prove that Barbee was the author of the first draft, there is considerable contextual evidence of Barbee's relation to Early, of Barbee's composition of various confidential documents, and, as I will argue in more detail, of Barbee's commitment to the ideas that appear in the first draft of the 1934 speech.

Stylistic evidence strongly suggests that Roosevelt himself was not the author of the first draft. Compare the first full paragraph of draft (1) with the reading copy (draft 4).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Draft of Proposed Address at Gettysburg, May 30, 1934 (draft 1; first paragraph)</th>
<th>Gettysburg Address, May 30, 1934 (draft 4; first paragraph)</th>
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On these beautiful hills of Gettysburg two brave armies of Americans once met in bloody combat. Not far from here, in a valley likewise consecrated to American valor, a ragged Continental Army survived a bitter winter to keep alive the expiring hope of a new Nation; and near to this battlefield and that valley stands that invincible city where the Declaration of Independence was born and the Constitution of the United States was written by the fathers. Surely, all this is holy ground.
Roosevelt kept the structure of Barbee’s paragraph but considerably simplified it, in his characteristic way. He pruned away adjectives. “Great armies of brave, gallant, and chivalrous Americans” becomes “brave Armies of Americans,” omitting in the process those adjectives most closely associated with Southern myths of the Lost Cause. “Starved” changes to “survived,” gaining a more optimistic flavor, but diminishing the force of the original, with its parallel to “expiring,” which is retained in the revision. The stuffy “contiguous” is changed to “near.” Roosevelt worked similar stylistic simplifications throughout his revision of Barbee’s draft.

Roosevelt’s changes, though they retained most of the structure and logic of Barbee’s draft, went far beyond stylistic revision, however, to produce a speech considerably different in its argument. Roosevelt’s draft is much shorter than Barbee’s. The omissions give Roosevelt’s version a compactness and clarity of argument that focuses on the New Deal and its appeal for national unity. Barbee’s draft, on the other hand, clearly wants to re-write the nation’s memory of the Civil War according to his own view—a view that at least partly survives into Roosevelt’s final version.

David Rankin Barbee’s authorship of the first draft is supported not only by circumstantial implications and stylistic resonances, but also by the doctrines he embedded
in the draft. Barbee spent a career actively contributing to the myth of the Southern Lost Cause, which depicted the South as fighting not for slavery but for liberty and which offered, as the grounds for a national reunion, a vision of “the Brothers’ War” between equally heroic and gallant white soldiers of North and South. Although Barbee professed himself to be in some ways an admirer of Lincoln, he complained in An Excursion in Southern History of “the attempt being made by Northern infidels and iconoclasts to destroy Washington in the affections of the American people and to elevate Lincoln to a place next to God.”

The deliberate emphasis in Barbee’s draft on Washington rather than Lincoln—an emphasis largely retained by Roosevelt—is clearly part of Barbee’s attempt to diminish the reputation of Lincoln. Barbee writes that “The more I study the causes of the Civil War, the more I am led to believe that Mr. Lincoln was as much of a hot head as Yancey, as much of a fanatic as many of our Southern people said Jefferson Davis was.”

Barbee held the view shared by some other Southern writers that abolitionist sentiment had been gaining ground as a native movement in the South itself until the beginnings of the Northern abolition movement in 1830, at which point the South, partly as a reaction to Northern hostility and interference, turned away from abolition and to the greater task of preserving its sectional freedoms,
accusing the North of neglecting “the tenderer and gentler side of the relation between master and slave,” in which the slave was Christianized and civilized. Lincoln, according to Barbee, “was no demi-god, but a human being of very coarse fibre, with a great brain and with many ugly spots in his character. His ambition and his vanity were no less causes of the war than the militant hatred of the Northern parsons against the South.” Barbee called for a new generation of historians to write “a correct history of the South. . . . Such a history will teach you that the South was always for Union, and that the War of Secession was no Civil War but a War of Freedom, the South emptying her veins in a futile effort to protect liberty on this continent.”

It might seem that sectional passions would have cooled in the long years from the Civil War to the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. But the passion of David Rankin Barbee to continue rewriting public memory had lost none of its force. David Rankin Barbee was energetically committed to recasting the public memory of the Civil War era. One long article, for example, was devoted to defaming Lincoln’s secretary of war, Edwin M. Stanton, en route to redeeming the reputation of Confederate President Jefferson Davis from the charge that Davis had ultimately been captured by a Union Army detachment that found him fleeing in his wife’s dress. As Barbee tells the story in The Capture of Jefferson Davis, the infamous Stanton, whose bust
greeted any visitor to the War Office through seventy-five years of unhappy memory, had hidden in a safe next to the secretary’s office “a secret of great historic importance, long concealed from the American people.” When, according to Barbee’s account, the safe was finally opened in 1945 under pressure from Barbee, it was found to contain evidence of Stanton’s plot to defame Jefferson Davis: “a waterproof coat and a shawl supposedly worn by Jefferson Davis at the time of his capture in Georgia in May, 1865.” Barbee complained that Stanton’s supposed plot—supported by generations of his successors in office—was meant to conceal the true nobility of Davis, who was, according to Barbee, a “very great man . . . the chiefest in a galaxy of great Americans.” Barbee is particularly outraged that Davis’s reputation suffers when “our Southern newspapers are joining in the foolish idolatry of Lincoln.” On the opening of the safe, Barbee comments: “It was not until we had a President who is the son of a Confederate soldier [Harry Truman] that the truth—the awful truth—of Mr. Davis’ ‘disguise’ is revealed to the public. Even now the public is not permitted to see those garments.”

Barbee’s draft of Roosevelt’s Gettysburg Address contained no “foolish idolatry of Lincoln.” Lincoln’s name appears nowhere in the first draft. Instead, the first draft celebrates Washington, emphasizing his Virginia origins and loyalties and quoting his letter to James
Madison (another Virginian) claiming that "we are all children of the same country." The absence of Lincoln from the first draft is underscored by the presence, astonishing in the circumstances, of Lincoln's rival Stephen A. Douglas. Historians seem to agree that the issues which caused our Brothers' War had their beginnings in 1850. In the decade which followed there was an intense development of our country along many lines, conspicuously in railroads. But it was a haphazard and local development. Only one statesman in that period had caught Washington's vision of the future of America - Stephen A. Douglas. For years he devoted his genius to constructive planning along the lines mapped out by our first President. A New England man, he had, in early manhood, settled in Illinois, among a population drawn from all the sections. By marriage with a daughter of North Carolina, he became the owner of plantations and slaves in that State and in Mississippi. This gave him a surer grasp of the problems of his day than any of his competitors had. In order to develop the Mississippi Valley, and tie in the Northwest with the deep South, he projected a railroad from Chicago to New Orleans and another from Cairo to Mobile. Had these been built; had other North and South lines been built in the older States, connecting New York with Savannah, Philadelphia with Memphis, and
Washington with New Orleans, could there have been a war between the North and the South?

Hence, by implication, it was Douglas, not Lincoln, who could have kept the country on the course of peaceful national development set out by Washington. Lincoln, too contemptible to merit even a mention in this draft for a presidential speech at Gettysburg, and on the very site of the first Gettysburg Address, becomes a sectional fanatic, in contrast to Washington, the Virginian; Douglas, the popular sovereignty Democrat; and Lucius Q. C. Lamar, who is quoted in the speech as "an inspired Prophet of the South who said, 'my brethren, if we know one another, we will love one another.'" Lincoln's incapacity to avoid an unnecessary war is attributed in part to Lincoln's failure to own slaves, hence conceding to Douglas "a surer grasp of the problems of his day."

Barbee's rhetoric may be understood as a tributary of the larger torrent of reunionist sentiment that had begun with the end of Reconstruction and that in the 1930s--and to some extent today--was and is still the reigning public memory of the Civil War. David W. Blight describes how, as early as the 1880s, North and South found grounds for an end to Reconstruction and a rebirth of national sentiment in the myth of the Southern Lost Cause. "The war became essentially a conflict between white men; both sides fought well, Americans against Americans, and there was glory enough to
go around." Blight describes an "inner" Lost Cause myth promoted by belligerent die-hards (including Stephen Early's grandfather, General Jubal Early) and a "national" Lost Cause movement that appealed to the North with sentimental tales such as those of John Esten Cooke, who "found a vast and vulnerable audience for his stories of the genteel and romantic heritage of old Virginia." Blight describes the "inner" Lost Cause as having an "influence" that "persisted until World War I," but it seems clear that Barbee and Early were peddling this more belligerent strain of the Lost Cause myth in the draft they sent to Roosevelt for delivery at Gettysburg.22

The Civil War as a war of gallant white brothers is a part of public memory so widespread as to seem universal, but it is important to notice the rhetorical contingency of such reunionist sentiment as the product of political coalitions and the product, as well, of energetic myth-making over many decades. To be sure, there was some resistance to the reunion, especially from those who pointed out how reunionism swept aside the memory of the Civil War as an ideological conflict precipitated by slavery, and who pointed to reunionism itself as an act of forgetting that stood in the way of racial justice. Frederick Douglass was one of the first and most eloquent resisters of reunionism. W. E. B. DuBois, in his turn, wrote that "of all historic facts there can be none clearer than that for four long and
fearful years the South fought to perpetuate human slavery," even as he laments the imperfect politics of the North. Both Douglass and DuBois warned that forgetting slavery as a cause of the Civil War was a way forgetting civil rights as well.  

A visitor to Gettysburg in the 1930s and in the 1990s would see a commemorative landscape on which is inscribed in myth and monument the history of a gallant battle between brothers. Although there is a statue of Lincoln near the site of the original Gettysburg Address, the battlefield, maintained as a historic site by the National Park Service, seems to have no memory of the causes of the Civil War. This amnesia is a rhetorical construction of considerable complexity that draws in and inspires thousands of tourists every year. In her study of Gettysburg in public memory, Amy Kinsel writes that in remembering the battle and the war, "the nation avoided dealing with the race issue, preferring to concentrate on the battlefield heroism and the growing myth of the South's Lost Cause. . . . Celebrations of American heroism that accepted Southern valor as indistinguishable from northern sacrifice served to exclude from the war's historical legacy the idea that black freedom and equality might be as worthy of commemoration as was the valor of the white soldiers." Kinsel continues, "Battlefield memorialization at Gettysburg confirmed Americans' collective cultural amnesia regarding slavery. . . . The war
to preserve the Union seemed in battlefield commemorations to have little if any connection with the fight to limit or abolish slavery."

The evidence suggesting that Barbee wrote or collaborated with Early in writing the first draft of FDR's 1934 Gettysburg Address is strong. But what does this suggest for rhetorical interpretation? There is a sense in which it may be fair to read FDR's speech backwards to its sources in Barbee's sectionalism, his Lost-Cause reunionism, and his Democratic partisanship. Traces of these elements survive in FDR's speech, and, equally important, a detailed reconstruction of the authorship of the speech helps us to understand the complex ways in which the presidential creation of public memory is itself constructed and negotiated. Hence, it is important for rhetorical scholars to retrace the authorship and the ideological ancestry of speech texts. If presidential speech shapes our public memory, it is surely useful to understand the practices that in their own turn shape presidential speeches.

Roosevelt's 1934 speech was importantly "motivated," in the sense in which that term is employed by Kenneth Burke, by David Rankin Barbee's first draft, which in its own turn had a complex of "motivations." But the speech, even in its first draft, is motivated, too, by the writer's appeal to what he took to be the larger motives of FDR and the New Deal. When FDR undertook his own revision of the speech, his
strategic motives, historical and local, ideological and political, conscious or unconscious, shaped the resulting drafts.

How, then, are we to account for the absence of Lincoln and of the race question from Roosevelt's speech? Partly, such an omission was an example of Roosevelt's complacency about issues of civil rights—a complacency that is likely to strike our own generation as evidence of insensitivity or outright racism on the part of FDR. Kenneth O'Reilly describes Roosevelt as personally "lacking . . . an appreciation of or sympathy for problems of race and racism in America." \(^{26}\)

Whatever his personal habits of mind, in the first years of the New Deal, Roosevelt seems clearly to have subordinated civil liberties and civil rights to larger issues of national and economic recovery, which he took to have more immediate urgency and which he saw as the basis for lasting change. In his account of civil rights in the New Deal era, John Egerton writes that

The great contribution of the New Deal to the cultural and political life of the South was that it turned a mock debate into a real one and offered a genuine alternative to the Old South/New South philosophy. The liberal agenda of Franklin Roosevelt and his administration called for a massive economic reformation to bring higher living standards to all: far-reaching new programs in support of labor,
education, health, housing, and the general welfare; major reforms in agriculture and industry; and an opening of the democratic political process to virtually all adults. . . . Eventually, inevitably, such transforming changes would challenge the continued existence of white supremacy and extreme socioeconomic class stratification.²⁷

Within the Roosevelt administration, according to Patricia Sullivan, black leaders such as Robert C. Weaver and John Preston Davis "determined to obtain a hearing for black workers. . . . The New Deal provided a new opportunity to get federal action that could counter the . . . system that had brutally proscribed the opportunities of black Americans."²⁸ Black American voters, who had many legitimate reasons to be disappointed with administration rhetoric and with such legislative failures as the refusal of FDR to support anti-lynching legislation, nevertheless left the Republican party and turned decisively to the Democrats. In her Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR, Nancy Weiss argues that, "Despite the fact that Roosevelt had done very little for blacks as a racial minority, he had managed to convey to them that they counted and belonged. . . . The simple fact that blacks were not excluded from the New Deal was a sufficient departure from past practice to make Roosevelt look like a benefactor of the race."²⁹ Celeste Condit and John Lucaites argue that
"Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman . . . created the conditions that would invite substantial egalitarian rhetoric. Dramatically reversing the presumption of federal inaction across the board, Roosevelt opened up the possibilities for presidential and congressional action to stamp out state-enforced inequality, even though his own achievements in racial equality were modest." On the other hand, John B. Kirby has argued that even the white "race liberals" of the New Deal supported economic development rather than appeals for changed attitudes, resulting in a "certain dependence" on the part of blacks and, for whites, "an intense loyalty to reform liberalism that encouraged them to work for improvements in black life but not to attack the racial as well as the political patterns of American society which frequently compromised their interracial hopes and their reform goals."

David Rankin Barbee's old-style, un-reconstructed, Lost-Cause sectionalism, and his conditional reunionism, partly account for the words spoken by Franklin Delano Roosevelt at Gettysburg on May 30, 1934. But FDR's speech is not reducible to Barbee's first draft. Roosevelt's listeners did not hear or read Barbee's draft. To understand what FDR's speech might have meant for his audience, and what it might mean for us to recover the speech as part of our own memory of Roosevelt and of Gettysburg, we must take a fresh look at the delivery text and the later published text as
they diverged from Barbee's text and as they might have appeared to hearers and readers. But our own reading of FDR's text, even when it attempts to re-read the speech from the perspective of author and hearers, cannot exhaust the meaning of the speech heard on May 30, 1934, nor is it in turn reducible to that speech.

Serious attention to the origins and dissemination of Roosevelt's 1934 speech throws into question the very notion that we can, with confidence, identify a single text as the text of the speech. FDR's speech is partly the Barbee first draft, but is not reducible to that draft. The speech exists in contrasting but equally authoritative versions as heard and seen by its immediate audience, as heard by a national radio audience, as reprinted in newspapers, as edited for inclusion in Roosevelt's official public papers, as having been forgotten by history, and, perhaps, as having been resurrected here as a many-layered text. The text also, necessarily, exists for us with its intertextual resonances and whatever contextual knowledge we bring to it as audience or as re-constructive historians. Hence, for example, even if, having examined the history of the Barbee draft, we then turn to the delivery text, the Barbee text becomes part of our own memory of the speech, just as Lincoln before it and the Civil Rights movement after it are part of our own memory of Roosevelt's heretofore forgotten speech.

Nevertheless, in an act of imagination aided with some
historical detective work, we can come to understand something more about American rhetoric in the 1930s by imagining ourselves back into the time of the speech, and seeing a world through that speech.

From Barbee's partisan sectionalism, Roosevelt wove an aesthetic and ideological vision of unity. Roosevelt's rhetorical mastery, while it slips at times, is still impressive. He begins the speech by putting aside any echoes of Northern triumphalism or of mourning, calling the day "glorious" and twice using the word "rejoice" in his opening paragraph.

The emotional lift established by "glorious" and "rejoice" become a metaphorically spatial lift in the second paragraph, when the view rises from the "hills of Gettysburg" to a perspective that takes in Valley Forge and Philadelphia. From the spatial height thus metaphorically gained, Roosevelt asserts a spiritual height, closing the second paragraph with the assertion that "all this is holy ground."

The spatial height that permits our taking in of Gettysburg, Valley Forge, and Philadelphia is also a temporal, historical height, since, as the view broadens in space it also lengthens in time, going from 1934 briefly back to the 1860s and quickly beyond to take in the decades of the Revolution, the Declaration, and the Constitution. Hence, from its very first words, what is later to be
announced as the thesis of the speech is already enacted in style, metaphor, and perspective, in the act of rising to a "glorious" height from which we can take in American time and American space, space and time that embrace the civil religion of a "consecrated" valley, an "invincible" city--"holy ground."

In a series of phrases, Roosevelt again links his own audience not only to the Civil War but also to the founding fathers. Washington's "solemn, tender, wise words of farewell" were addressed "not alone to his generation, but to the generation of those who laid down their lives here and to our generation and to the America of tomorrow." Those who came before are "our fathers and grandfathers"--two generations. Roosevelt depicts multiple generations and, in effect, multiple historical epochs as united in time. The unity of time is reinforced by a potential unity of space--both in Roosevelt's sweeping encompassment of the geography of the country and in his appeal to an end to sectionalism. Washington, Roosevelt says in paragraph 4, described himself as both a Virginian and an American. In paragraph 4, Washington is shown speaking as a national and not a sectional patriot. In paragraph 5, Washington is shown moving, making "three historic tours" as president, knitting together the pieces into a Nation. In paragraph 6, Washington is depicted as an agent of national economic development, a precursor of the New Deal.
FDR often spoke of his own wish to achieve Jeffersonian ends by Hamiltonian means. FDR's Washington here becomes a spokesman and an example of the ways in which patriotism, stimulated by material development, leads to improvement of the lot of the individual. Roosevelt's method is, so far, almost entirely narrative and descriptive. Whatever there is of argument seems to flow naturally as interpretation of the narrative rather than as assertion and proof. Rhetorically, the narrative leads the interpretation, rather than subordinating the narrative as proof to a structure of assertions.

In paragraph 7, the fall from grace begins, with a narrative of the causes of sectional conflict that led to the Civil War. As in a sermon, the fall from grace is shown to have been stimulated in a way by success--the nation's rapid geographic expansion. But the success is undermined by a failure not, at least at first, of spirit, but by a failure of materialism. Roosevelt's history lesson is that the failure to plan for a national system of railroads--and attendant lines of communication--led to the growth of a sectionalism that was the cause of the Civil War.

The tale of the fall from grace is deceptively simple; in fact, Roosevelt is negotiating tricky rhetorical territory. In the speech's most direct reference to sectional prejudice so far, Roosevelt ascribes the prejudice to "some of us Northerners" who believe that "the South and
the West were . . . laggard in developing" railroads. In a speech that has already implicitly associated patriotism with civil religion, Roosevelt's confession/accusation in ascribing sectional prejudice to his own section is both a gesture of humility and a politically calculated message to senators and representatives from the solid South upon whose votes the New Deal absolutely depended.

In alleging that the causes of the Civil War were sectional misunderstanding brought about by inadequate regional material development, Roosevelt may lay himself open to the warnings of Frederick Douglass and W. E. B. DuBois about the dangers of forgetting slavery as a cause of the war. At the same time, the appeal to national patriotism, an end to sectional prejudice, and massive federal involvement in economic development may be seen as setting in motion the conditions that made the Civil Rights movement--the next phase of Emancipation--possible. Hence, Roosevelt is offering to the South a new bargain, in which the North agrees to forget slavery as a cause of the Civil War, if the South will agree that the misunderstanding was caused by the absence of precisely what the New Deal proposed to provide--a vastly increased role for the federal government in national life. Roosevelt's bargain is very different from the policy of sectional autonomy that ended Reconstruction in 1877.
Roosevelt ends this section of the speech, in paragraph 10, by quoting, without attribution, Lucius Q. C. Lamar, identified only as "an inspired prophet of the South who said: 'My brethren, if we know one another, we will love one another." Southerners might have identified Lamar's words as quoted from his eulogy of Charles Sumner.\footnote{This passage of the speech repeats a figure of effacement that has occurred at least twice before in the speech. Roosevelt builds an extended narrative of the material causes of the Civil War, but just as he gets to the point of narrating—or even naming—the conflict, he jumps entirely past it, skipping the Civil War and more than fifty years of intervening events. After summing up his narrative of the railroads with an indirect allusion to the war ("The tragedy of the Nation was that the people did not know one another because they had not the necessary means of visiting one another"), Roosevelt skips to the twentieth century: Since those days, two subsequent wars, both with foreign Nations, have measurably allayed and softened the ancient passions. It has been left to us of this generation to see the healing made permanent. (paragraph 11) The passions of those days may have been allayed and softened, but they are still, evidently, so powerful that they can be mentioned only indirectly, as Gettysburg itself is mentioned only very gingerly in the speech. We have seen
how, in paragraph 2, Roosevelt retreats from Gettysburg, returning to it again only briefly at the end of paragraph 3. There runs throughout the speech a peculiar sense that Gettysburg is everywhere in it but as a presence so horrible, so potentially divisive, that it must be treated with caution. This quality of the almost unmentionable danger of Gettysburg serves as an implicit rationale for what might otherwise seem to be the crude opportunism of Roosevelt's turning of the Civil War into a text for the defense of the New Deal. The near absence of the Civil War serves, under the circumstances, to intensify it as a rhetorical presence in the speech. To acknowledge this effect is not necessarily to endorse, from our own greater distance of years from the Civil War, and from the Roosevelt era, the absence of the Civil War, Lincoln, and slavery from the speech. I mean to argue, in fact, that it is our job at least partly to recover Lincoln and slavery in our own reading of the speech, but to do so in a way that accepts the cultural memories of the Roosevelt era as their reality. Merely to reject the Roosevelt era's memories and appeals as incorrect by our own standards could too easily become a way for us to avoid interrogating our own responsibility to remake our own collectively shared memories—which are sure in their turn to seem at least partly blind to our own sons and daughters.
Roosevelt depicts the period after the Civil War with contrasting sections on responses to the New Deal. On the one hand, the common people accept one another as brothers. On the other hand, "three elements" resist the New Deal with precisely the sort of thinking that, by implication, led to the Civil War.

These groups are those who seek to stir up political animosity or build political advantage by the distortion of facts; those who, by declining to follow the rules of the game, seek to gain an unfair advantage over those who are willing to live up to the rules of the game; and those few who, because they have never been willing to take an interest in their fellow Americans, dwell inside of their own narrow spheres and still represent the selfishness of sectionalism which has no place in our national life. (paragraph 14)

Roosevelt's passage on the enemies of the New Deal is remarkably combative in tone, especially for a commemorative speech. Sadly, it may be the extreme statement in the speech of a quality that is latent throughout--the sense that patriotism and national unity require a unanimity of opinion that discredits public deliberation. Whatever the merits of Roosevelt's characterization of his opponents, they are associated with "the passions of war," while his own and the only feasible alternative is presented as
working with great former presidents for "a consolidated Nation" and "a united people."

   Roosevelt's association of his opponents with the "passions of war" is a variation on a strain in early New Deal rhetoric that appealed for unity on the grounds of a national economic emergency that was compared in severity and structure to a state of war.  

   Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 1934 Gettysburg Address is a minor ceremonial address that, when read in context, vividly recalls the conflicted spirit of its day. At the same time, the speech bristles with paradoxes characteristic of the texts of public memory. Roosevelt's text is itself a document under revision both before and after its delivery—even as a literal text, it survives as a multiple text. As a rhetorical text, Roosevelt's speech is even more complex, paradoxical, and many-layered. Roosevelt evoked the awesome power of Gettysburg by rendering it nearly absent from his speech. He advanced the cause of civil rights by mentioning Lincoln only once and slavery never in the course of the speech. He adopted a draft text that was full of Southern sectionalism and in his revisions as well as in his embodiment of the speech, turned it into a strong appeal for an end to sectionalism. He advocated a spiritual renewal brought about by material means. Though evoking presidents of many parties and policies, Roosevelt called for a public unity and brotherhood that would strengthen his partisan
advantage and disparage those who resisted. Instead of praising Lincoln, Roosevelt in effect took his place beside Lincoln, remembered the past by appealing to his fellow citizens to forget old quarrels, and celebrated Memorial Day by looking to the future.

The paradoxes of Roosevelt's speech may be useful for us to recover and reflect upon, but it is useful to remember, too, that the speech did not appear paradoxical to those who heard and read it in 1934.

All but one of the several letters sent by citizens to the White House in the days immediately following the speech were positive. They came from all regions of the country; those from the South often sounded a note of deep appreciation for Roosevelt's conciliatory language. Positive or negative, the letters seemed to agree that the United States was in a time of special peril and that Roosevelt was acting decisively, for good or ill.

Samuel Sinaink of Philadelphia wrote to the president that he had "sounded a new hope and era of emancipation" that was threatened by "the forces of reaction" which "are bitter over the loss of power; they are desperately fighting your regime with a false hope to return to the old days of reaction and special privilege." 34

Donald J. Eaton, depicting himself as a champion of free enterprise, and who attributed to himself the power to bring about the downfall of the administration by a campaign
in the press and radio, sent the only negative letter, expressing his "contempt at hearing the most nauseating repulsive speech it has ever been my misfortune to hear... You are a disgrace to the name of Roosevelt." 35

Dan Stephens sent a radiogram from Nebraska that underscored the hope and turmoil widely felt and characteristically evoked in the rhetoric of the New Deal era:

YOUR GETTYSBURG ADDRESS STIRRED THE COUNTRY
PROFOUNDLY MILLIONS OF OUR PEOPLE OUT HEAR [sic] UNDER BRAZEN SKIES AND WITHERING HEAT ARE SUFFERING FROM DUST STORMS AND DROUGHT THAT IS UNPARALLELED THEY FEEL THAT THEY HAVE A SYMPATHETIC GOVERNMENT AT WASHINGTON AND ARE DEEPLY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR INSPIRING LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT THEY ARE ALSO STIRRED BY INSPIRING DEFENSE OF THE RECOVERY ACT BY YOUR LIEUTENANT HUGH JOHNSON WHO SO ABLY CASTIGATED THE ENEMIES OF THESE REFORM MEASURES IN HIS SPEECH YESTERDAY... 36

B. J. Campbell of Memphis telegraphed that Roosevelt's speech had "touched the heart of the whole American people. It was brim full of patriotism, kindness, affection, good will to the nation regardless of section." 37

Several writers compared Roosevelt's speech favorably with Lincoln's. V. Y. Dallman of the Springfield Illinois State Register called the speech "Lincoln-like." Walter L.
Kirschenbaum of New York "considered your Gettysburg Address next to the one given by Abraham Lincoln."38

Roosevelt's speech was widely reprinted in newspapers around the country, together with descriptions of his 50,000 to 100,000 listeners at the Gettysburg cemetery, and the cheering throngs along the route leading to it.39 Virtually every newspaper report emphasized first Roosevelt's call for national unity, closely followed by an account of his condemnation of--in the condensation offered in a New York Times headline--"Breeders of Political Animosity, Chiselers and Exponents of Sectionalism."40 The Atlanta Constitution, one of many papers that reprinted the speech in full, reported it in sympathetic detail with a lead paragraph sounding the myth of Gettysburg as the high tide of the Confederacy: "Close by the ridge where Lee flung the flower of the south into one desperate charge against northern steel, President Roosevelt today called upon the nation to heal the scars of sectional strife."41

The African American press showed no interest in the speech at Gettysburg, but it was clearly paying close attention to the administration's attitude toward the race question. In its edition of June 2, 1934, the Pittsburgh Courier reported that on May 30, Senators Wagner and Costigan, sponsors of an anti-lynching bill then stalled in the Senate, met with Roosevelt at the White House, "but no word on the anti-lynching measure was given out although it
is known they discussed it thoroughly with the chief executive. They were accompanied to the White House by Walter White, N.A.A.C.P. secretary, but Mr. White did not share in their conference with the President."

Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Gettysburg Address of May 30, 1934, delivered during the rising tide of the first New Deal, appears to have been a highly successful stroke in the formulation of the Roosevelt's progressive coalition. Four years later, Roosevelt delivered a second Gettysburg address, after his landslide 1936 re-election, but at a time when the New Deal coalition had begun to unravel, and when the high tide of the New Deal itself come and gone, though the outcome was not yet clear to political partisans on either side. In July 1938, on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the battle at Gettysburg, Roosevelt returned to dedicate a Peace Memorial on the battlefield at the last great reunion of Civil War veterans.

The original commemorative site at Gettysburg was in the form of the Soldier's National Cemetery, created to bury the Union dead, state by state, and to remember "not only sacrifice, but victory." Throughout the rest of the nineteenth century, Gettysburg was preserved as essentially a Union memorial. In addition to the cemetery itself, the battlefield as a whole was preserved in work that began soon after the battle, and which was conducted by the Gettysburg
Battlefield Memorial Association from 1863 to 1895. Monuments to Union veterans and units were placed about the field of battle. The Soldier's National Cemetery had been sponsored by the Northern states; the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association was a private group, dedicated to preservation and memorialization of the battlefield."

In 1895, the War Department assumed control over the Gettysburg site, managing it until 1933 as the Gettysburg National Military Park. Under War Department management, the park began to include Confederate monuments. "By the time of the grand fiftieth anniversary reunion of the Blue and the Gray in 1913, Gettysburg National Military Park exemplified the theme of reunionism in the United States." The Virginia monument, with its equestrian statue of Robert E. Lee, appeared in 1917, and other Southern monuments were gradually added. After Roosevelt took office in 1933, the Gettysburg site came under the administration of the National Park Service.

The Peace Memorial that Roosevelt dedicated in 1938 at the seventy-fifth reunion had been planned since before the fiftieth reunion in 1913."
“Avoiding War, We Seek Our Ends Through the Peaceful Processes of Popular Government Under the Constitution.”
Address at the Dedication of the Memorial on the Gettysburg Battlefield, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. July 3, 1938

Governor Earle, Veterans of the Blue and the Gray:

1. On behalf of the people of the United States I accept this monument in the spirit of brotherhood and peace.

2. Immortal deeds and immortal words have created here at Gettysburg a shrine of American patriotism. We are encompassed by “The last full measure of devotion” of many men and by the words in which Abraham Lincoln expressed the simple faith for which they died.

3. It seldom helps to wonder how a statesman of one generation would surmount the crisis of another. A statesman deals with concrete difficulties -- with things which must be done from day to day. Not often can he frame conscious patterns for the far off future.

4. But the fullness of the stature of Lincoln’s nature and the fundamental conflict which events forced upon his Presidency invite us ever to turn to him for help.
5. For the issue which he restated here at Gettysburg seventy-five years ago will be the continuing issue before this Nation so far as we cling to the purposes for which the Nation was founded -- to preserve under the changing conditions of each generation a people’s government for the people’s good.

6. The task assumes different shapes at different times. Sometimes the threat to popular government comes from political interests, sometimes from economic interests, sometimes we have to beat off all of them together.

7. But the challenge is always the same -- whether each generation facing its own circumstances can summon the practical devotion to attain and retain that greatest good for the greatest number which this government of the people was created to ensure.

8. Lincoln spoke in solace for all who fought upon this field; and the years have laid their balm upon their wounds. Men who wore the blue and men who wore the gray are here together, a fragment spared by time. They are brought here by the memories of old divided loyalties, but they meet here in united loyalty to a united cause which the unfolding years have made it easier to see.
9. All of them we honor, not asking under which flag they fought then -- thankful that they stand together under one flag now.

10. Lincoln was commander-in-chief in this old battle; he wanted above all things to be commander-in-chief of the new peace. He understood that battle there must be; that when a challenge to constituted government is thrown down, the people must in self-defense take it up; that the fight must be fought through to a decision so clear that it is accepted as being beyond recall.

11. But Lincoln also understood that after such a decision, a democracy should seek peace through a new unity. For a democracy can keep alive only if the settlement of old difficulties clears the ground and transfers energies to face new responsibilities. Never can it have as much ability and purpose as it needs in that striving; the end of battle does not end the infinity of those needs.

12. That is why Lincoln -- commander of a people as well as of an army -- asked that his battle end "with malice toward none, with charity for all."

13. To the hurt of those who came after him, Lincoln’s plea was long denied. A generation passed before the new unity became an accepted fact.
14. In later years new needs arose, and with them new tasks, worldwide in their perplexities, their bitterness and their modes of strife. Here in our land we give thanks that, avoiding war, we seek our ends through the peaceful processes of popular government under the Constitution.

15. It is another conflict, a conflict as fundamental as Lincoln’s, fought not with glint of steel, but with appeals to reason and justice on a thousand fronts -- seeking to save for our common country opportunity and security for citizens in a free society.

16. We are near to winning this battle. In its winning and through the years may we live by the wisdom and the humanity of the heart of Abraham Lincoln.48

How are we to read this speech, to imagine it in its own time and place, and to catch its echo through the years? The 1938 speech shares much with the 1934 address. In doctrine and theme, the two are similar, and yet the 1938 speech appears to have a sadder and more serene music.

Though the speech is clearly meant to be heard by all Americans, it is addressed specifically to the aged Civil War veterans encamped in the summer heat for the seventy-fifth anniversary of the battle at Gettysburg. Roosevelt employs this mode of address to formalize and solemnize his
opening words, adopting a tone that runs throughout the speech.

The tone of Roosevelt's address is both simple and formal. In a few places, the style may strike our own ears as falsely elevated, even trite: "immortal deeds and immortal words" (paragraph 2); "glint of steel" (paragraph 15); and yet even these phrases stick close to Roosevelt's theme, and by every account that we have of Roosevelt's skills in delivery, FDR could sing even a commonplace script into grandeur. The "glint of steel" phrase first appears in draft 3 of the speech, in a handwritten paragraph written as an insert by Roosevelt. In delivery, Roosevelt actually dropped "glint of," though Rosenman overlooked the stenographer's correction and carried the phrase into the Roosevelt papers.49

The themes of the 1934 Gettysburg Address are in many ways repeated in 1938. Roosevelt appeals to patriotism and national unity, urges that particular desires be subordinated to the general good, and describes the current situation as the equivalent to war.

In contrast to the 1934 speech, the 1938 speech is centered on Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln becomes the unifying presence who unites the energetic texture of the address. And yet, though the speech everywhere uses Lincoln as a touchstone and mythic hero, Roosevelt does not merely fall into hero worship. After his reverent invocation of Lincoln
in paragraph 2, Roosevelt reflects in paragraph 3 that "it seldom helps to wonder how a statesman of one generation would surmount the crisis of another." Here Roosevelt introduces a theme common to his rhetoric throughout the New Deal era--we are to be guided by a fundamental faith, and yet we must respond experimentally and flexibly, dealing "with concrete difficulties--with things which must be done from day to day. Not often can [the President] frame conscious patterns for the far off future" (paragraph 3). And yet it is about the future, more than about the past, that Roosevelt speaks. The frequent references to the past of Lincoln are all employed to draw from Lincoln the inspiration to face the challenges of the 1930s.

In the early paragraphs of the speech, Roosevelt alternates between sharing Lincoln's faith and reminding his audience of the need for change and adaptation. This alternating pattern not only states but repeatedly rehearses his hearers in the act of comparison, in effect stimulating and enacting in form the theme he is urging as doctrine.

Alfred Haworth Jones has described the ways in which Roosevelt benefitted, especially in his second-term appeals for his foreign policy in the period immediately preceding World War II, from an explicit identification of himself with Lincoln. Much of the stimulus for the Lincoln-Roosevelt connection came from three popular writers of the period whose works mythologized Lincoln, and who were also liberals
and supporters of Roosevelt—Carl Sandburg, Stephen Vincent Benét, and Robert E. Sherwood. Sherwood, author of *Abe Lincoln in Illinois*—first a stage play and then a popular Hollywood film—later became a Roosevelt speechwriter.

In looking to the future, Roosevelt casts himself in the role of Lincoln. In comparing Lincoln's Gettysburg Address with the Gettysburg speech of Edward Everett and with Pericles's funeral oration, Garry Wills argues that "Lincoln was an artist, not just a scholar. Classicism of Everett's sort looks backward; but the classic artifact sets standards for the future. . . . It was the challenge of the moment that both Pericles and Lincoln addressed." Roosevelt's rhetorical art, his mode of looking forward, of recreating the past for the use of the future, might well be compared with that of Lincoln and Pericles.

By the standards Roosevelt teaches us to apply to this speech, and by the standards of the modernist rhetoric of effect and efficiency characteristic of the period, every element in the speech is designed to constrain the audience's judgment. Such an effect is, in a sort of circularity that is not necessarily illogical, itself a sort of proof, in the sense that Roosevelt's claim to leadership and authority is based partly on his being able to give rhetorical evidence of his ability to command the situation and to control the forces of change. In the same way, though the speech alternates between reverence for the past and
evocation of needs of the moment, the two are united by their appeal for a mode of unified assent--on the one hand to the authority of a Lincolnesque civil religion, and on the other to the exigencies of an economic crisis--the moral equivalent of war--requiring us as listeners to unite in obedience to the tactical experiments of the President. As a rhetorical accomplishment, Roosevelt's uniting of appeals to permanence and change, sentiment and economic efficiency, ancestor worship and tactical experiment, is masterful, and masterfully adapted to the thought of his time. This was a period in which academic rhetoricians were re-reading classical rhetoric and eighteenth-century British parliamentary debate through the lens of a modernism that was summed up in Herbert Wichelns's enduring claim, published in 1925, that rhetoric "is not concerned with permanence, nor yet with beauty. It is concerned with effect."

Roosevelt explicitly compares himself with Lincoln ("It seldom helps to wonder how a statesman of one generation would surmount the crisis of another. A statesman deals with concrete difficulties . . ." (paragraph 3)). He presents himself both as an interpreter of Lincoln and as a successor to Lincoln. Such a comparison surely presents for Roosevelt, as president, problems of decorum that would not apply to other speakers on the occasion. Roosevelt handles the problem of decorum by the appeal to practical necessity and
by an utter avoidance of either false humility or self-promotion. He is in addition supported by the funerary tradition that requires both reverence for the dead and a ritualized burying of the past, a turning to the future. The living must leave the burial place, our rituals seem to tell us, and get on with their lives. 

As an interpreter, Roosevelt depicts Lincoln--and himself--in terms of an ideology that is strikingly explicit in its utilitarianism:

But the challenge is always the same--whether each generation facing its own circumstances can summon the practical devotion to attain and retain that greatest good for the greatest number which this government of the people was created to ensure. (paragraph 7)

The utilitarian philosophy of the greatest good for the greatest number was surely consistent with the rhetoric of the New Deal, which asked various constituencies to postpone their own claims in favor of the greater good. Was it--and was it understood to be--Lincoln's philosophy?

Roosevelt's Lincoln seems partly at odds with the Lincoln of Garry Wills, a Lincoln who is depicted, at Gettysburg, as the champion of equality, re-reading the Consitution, in his own speech at Gettysburg, in terms of the Declaration's claim that "all men are created equal." According to Wills, Lincoln won at Gettysburg the battle over the ideological significance of the Civil War,
purifying the air and re-writing the Constitution, "by appeal from its letter to the spirit."

By implicitly doing this, he performed one of the most daring acts of open-air sleight-of-hand ever witnessed by the unsuspecting. Everyone in that vast throng of thousands was having his or her intellectual pocket picked. The crowd departed with a new thing in its ideological luggage, that new constitution Lincoln had substituted for the one they brought there with them. They walked off, from those curving graves on the hillside, under a changed sky, into a different America.\(^5^6\)

Must we understand Roosevelt as falling short of Lincoln's ideal of equality, or even as interpreting the Constitution in a less progressive way? Possibly. Once again, Roosevelt had come to Gettysburg, and once again he was silent about the fate of African Americans seventy-five years after Emancipation. But Wills reminds us that Lincoln, too, was silent about slavery in the Gettysburg Address. "Slavery is not mentioned, any more than Gettysburg is."\(^5^7\) Instead of mentioning slavery, or Gettysburg, or Emancipation, or the Union, says Wills, "the 'great task' mentioned in the Address is not emancipation but the preservation of self-government."\(^5^8\) If Wills is right in this assessment, then we may reasonably argue that Roosevelt forcibly echoes Lincoln both in doctrine and in strategy.
Perhaps Roosevelt discerned in Lincoln what is observed by Edwin Black, writing on the Gettysburg Address:

> As an actor in history and a force in the world, Lincoln does not hesitate to comprehend history and the world. But he never presumes to cast his mind beyond human dimensions. He does not recite divine intentions; he does not issue cosmic judgments. He knows, to the bottom, what he knows. Of the rest, he is silent.\(^{59}\)

Roosevelt calls for a democratic procedure—"the peaceful processes of popular government under the Constitution" (paragraph 14)—to achieve a fundamental social goal—"seeking to save for our common country opportunity and security for citizens in a free society" (paragraph 15). The appeal to democracy is the fundamental for both Lincoln and Roosevelt; Roosevelt's appeal to economic security becomes an implicit extension of Lincoln's appropriation of Jefferson's "all men are created equal." Lincoln was silent about a system of slavery that his words and actions were designed to abolish. Roosevelt was silent about a continued denial of basic rights that his economic reforms were in part designed to abolish.

Roosevelt's two Gettysburg addresses show a remarkable similarity to the Lincoln depicted by J. David Greenstone in his *The Lincoln Persuasions*. Lincoln, argued Greenstone, achieved his historical success as a coalition builder who united two diverging strains of American liberalism—
reform liberals who respond to the consummatory and perfectionist strain and the humanist liberals who appeal to instrumental rationality. Greenstone sees Lincoln as a master rhetorician, whose "practical humanitarianism achieved coherence and intelligibility--and attracted great popular support--because it drew broadly on beliefs and practices deeply rooted in American culture. That is, whereas the personal humanitarianism of the abolitionists was an expression primarily of the tradition of Protestant separatism and piety, Lincoln's ethic asserted a union of piety with prudential rationality, and of sainthood with citizenship."

Roosevelt's silence about civil rights at Gettysburg was deliberate--a self-conscious appeal to instrumental rationality in the name of a progressive spirit. No clearer evidence can be given of Roosevelt's self-consciousness about the limits of coalition than by examining an anonymous speech draft submitted for the 1938 speech at Gettysburg. Among the various drafts of the Gettysburg speech is an eight-page draft, filed as an "unused draft." Some phrases, and something of the general structure, survive from the "unused draft" into the Roosevelt speech, though Roosevelt radically abbreviated and altered the speech to make of it an entirely new creation, and worked through several drafts to refine and polish what became the final speech. But it is clear that he read it and used it, even where he rejected
it. Furthermore, the draft was itself so artful, so eloquent, that Roosevelt clearly rejected it not only because he favored brevity but also because he thought the time had not yet come for plain speaking about civil rights. The anonymous speechwriter proposed a much more discursive and explicit treatment of America's past and present than Roosevelt adopted. The draft acknowledged the South's complaint about Reconstruction:

But the weight of military victory, uniting the states, was overbalanced by the weight of human shortcomings, driving them once more apart.

So we had the tragedy of Reconstruction. With Lincoln dead at the hand of a half-mad assassin, President Andrew Johnson was overwhelmed by those sinister forces of fanatical reaction that seem to gain power at the end of every war, and the South went through the terrors of economic ruin, social chaos and political exploitation.

Against its extended concession to Southern feelings, the draft balanced a remarkable appeal for racial reconciliation.

Speaking to the people of the South, I say but this: You need not have, nor should you tolerate, a lower level of living than the rest of the country. But to escape from such a level, more is needed than to build up the income of the factory workers in your new
industrial empire. It is impossible, in any commonwealth of men, to have one large group prosperous while pitted against a lower group. The welfare of the white race in the South, the well being of the millions who work in factories and upon southern farms, depends in the last analysis upon the welfare of the Negro race. You may not have, perhaps you will not have for centuries, economic parity between the races, but they will rise together or go down together in any industrial economy based on political democracy and individual freedom.

And just as there can be no sectional prosperity where men and women are stratified in varying levels of poverty, so there can be no national prosperity where one great section is below the national level. By common efforts, the section below that level can be lifted up, but in the unrelieved interplay of competitive forces it will drag the other down.

These astonishing paragraphs, which so many yearned to hear, and which to so many seemed the logical next step for the administration, disappeared into silence. We may, in retrospect, admit that in composing his speech as he did, Roosevelt followed the example of Lincoln, saying and doing what he could to move in the right direction. Nevertheless, it is proper that these unsaid words should be part of our
own memory Roosevelt's speech at Gettysburg. Roosevelt stirs, even when he disappoints, our hopes and expectations.

The hopes and expectations of the African American press often turned to the administration, but as in 1934 Roosevelt's speech was not the story. On July 9, 1938, when it might have taken notice of the president's speech, the Pittsburgh Courier instead described Roosevelt's brief "message of greeting" to the 29th congress of the N.A.A.C.P., meeting in Columbus, Ohio. The Courier story reprints the president's brief letter, in which he wrote to the N.A.A.C.P. what he would not say to a national audience:

I have watched with interest the constructive efforts of your organization, not only on behalf of the Negro people in our nation, but also in behalf of the democratic ideals and principles so dear to the entire nation. For it is evident that no democracy can long survive which does not accept as fundamental to its very existence the recognition of the rights of its minorities.62

In its only story on the Gettysburg reunion, the Courier reported that the oldest Civil War veteran at the Gettysburg encampment was 112-year-old William A. Barnes, "a Negro Union soldier."63 The Philadelphia Afro-American ran a page-one photograph of Roosevelt speaking with the oldest veteran, but Roosevelt's speech went unreported, despite otherwise full coverage, with several photographs of African
American veterans at the Gettysburg reunion. Peyton Gray reported that "All traces of discrimination, both as to racial identity and geographical location, were absent as approximately 58 colored and 1,950 white Civil War veterans gathered here last week to mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg and the final reunion of the Blue and Gray."  

Roosevelt's 1938 speech was broadcast by radio and widely reprinted in Fourth of July editions of the mainstream press, which estimated the immediate audience at 150,000 to 200,000 people. The press stories focused on the tale of the last reunion and on Roosevelt's invocations of Lincoln.  

Franklin Delano Roosevelt's speeches at Gettysburg in 1934 and 1938, especially when read in the context of their times and with close attention to their processes of composition, reveal a president entirely in command of his own views, able to avoid David Rankin Barbee's insinuations of Lost-Cause sectionalism and an anonymous author's temptation to speak out forcefully on civil rights. Roosevelt kept his own attention--and that of his audience--focused on the exigencies as he understood them, appealing for national unity and economic recovery in the name of a renewed memory of the American past.
In retrospect, Roosevelt's silence about civil rights makes us rightly impatient. An abiding theme of American civil rights rhetoric was captured in a short poem by Langston Hughes, who asked, "What happens to a dream deferred?" Years later, writing from Birmingham jail, Martin Luther King, Jr., reminded his readers that "justice too long delayed is justice denied." Roosevelt's silences at Gettysburg ask us to believe that the dream there deferred is not necessarily a dream denied. Roosevelt implicitly claimed that his silence was imposed by political circumstances, and that the dream would be fulfilled by the material improvement of all regions, by the construction of a national economy, and by a patriotism shifted from state and region to the nation.

For us, as for Roosevelt, public memory must always make its own compromise with history--trying to be realistic about historical constraints, but without becoming accomplices in accommodating reaction. We are rightfully uneasy in the presence of these silences and these words from our past. In cultivating our own guilty conscience through a revision of public memory, we, too, may be tempted to use the past as an alibi for postponing the duties to which we are called.
Notes


2 The speech appears in his public papers with the heading shown at the beginning of this section. The clause in quotation marks, used as the title, is adapted from the speech itself. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Random House, 1938) 3: 272-275.
3 FDR Library, Master Speechfile, Box 19, speech #706.

4 The opening paragraph, added by Roosevelt in delivery but dropped by Rosenman in the printed works, reads: “What a glorious day this is. I rejoice in it and I rejoice in this splendid celebration of it. I am especially happy to stand here on the field of Gettysburg at the side of a man, who, through all his life, has so splendidly served the cause of progressive government and the cause of humanity, Gifford Pinchot, Governor of Pennsylvania. (Applause).” FDR Library, Master Speech File, Box 19, Speech #706, [draft 5].

5 FDR biographer Kenneth S. Davis describes Early as a “fiery-tempered southerner who would become White House press secretary and whose white southerner racist attitudes would sometimes clash with Eleanor’s championship of black rights, but whose overall performance would prove of immense value to Roosevelt personally and to the New Deal.” Davis, FDR: The New Deal Years, 1933-1937 (New York: Random House, 1986), 20. Early was a grandson of Confederate general Jubal Early. Based on internal evidence, including the many references to Virginia and the Democratic partisanship, it is possible that Steve Early wrote the first draft, or that he wrote it in collaboration with Barbee.

7 Harry Hopkins, "Harry L. Hopkins memo (handwritten) on FDR speechwriting," Harry L. Hopkins papers (Part III), Box 6, Folder 19, Georgetown University Library, Special Collections.

8 Letter from Barbee to McIntyre, December 9, 1933, David Rankin Barbee Papers, Box 11, Folder 613, Georgetown University, Special Collections.

9 Memo, Barbee to Early, January 9, 1934; Barbee Papers, Box 14, Folder 746. Another memo or draft written by Barbee for Early, now apparently lost, is referred to in a letter from Barbee to Early on August 10, 1937: "Does this hit the spot? If not, send it back to me and I will do it over. I had to type it myself, as I did not want anyone here to know that this memo is being prepared. No carbon was kept, so the original with such corrections as you desire will have to come back to me for typing." Letter, Barbee to Early, August 10, 1937, Barbee Papers, Box 11, Folder 613.

10 Press Release, "From CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE," Barbee Papers, Box 14, Folder 747; see also folders 743, 744, 745. The Congressional Intelligence press release was probably released in October 1933 or October 1934, based on
contextual evidence in the Barbee files, but I have not yet been able to locate the original.

11 The Dies clipping is from the Washington Post, January 19, 1935; Barbee Papers, Box 14, Folder 744; the Barbee speech, "The New Deal and the Freedom of the Press" is in the Barbee Papers, Box 14, Folder 743; the quotation is taken from page 13.

12 See, for example, Letter, Early to Barbee, March 30, 1939, Barbee Papers, Box 11, Folder 613; Letter from Barbee to Early, August 10, 1942, Barbee Papers, Box 11, Folder 613.

13 Letter from Barbee to Early, July 22, 1940, Barbee Papers, Box 11, Folder 613.

14 Letter from Barbee to Early, March 14, 1940, Barbee Papers, Box 11, Folder 613.

15 David Rankin Barbee, An Excursion in Southern History (Richmond, VA: Langbourne M. Williams, 1928), 6. This work is a reprinting of a series of articles that originally appeared in May, 1927 in the Asheville, North Carolina Citizen, of which Barbee was managing editor. The copy I have consulted is in the collection of the libraries of the Pennsylvania State University, catalogued as item 000020060251, marked as the gift of Mrs. A. K. Anderson, to whom it was given by Barbee himself, according to an inscription in Barbee’s hand on the title page. The Penn
State copy is annotated at various places by Barbee. One of the 11 endnotes that Barbee provided in response to Early's request is to Excursion, which provides fairly strong evidence that Barbee was the author of the draft in the first place.

16 Barbee, An Excursion, 7. In another essay, Barbee again attempted to diminish Lincoln's reputation; see David Rankin Barbee, A Lost Incident in Lincoln’s Life, a reprint from Tyler’s Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine (July 1945) as a pamphlet that is bound with others and held at the Columbia University libraries as Abraham Lincoln: Pamphlets, vol. 10 (973.701 Z). In this article, Barbee tells the story of Lincoln’s pardon of a convicted New Bedford, Massachusetts man on a charge of engaging in the slave trade. The pardon had not been certified at the time of Lincoln’s death, and was later granted by President Andrew Johnson. Barbee uses the story to condemn both Johnson and Lincoln of hypocrisy and political expediency. As often with Barbee, the story of hypocrisy is sharpened by a sense of conspiracies. “There were many strange happenings in the life of that strange man [Lincoln], but none was stranger than that he, the emancipator of the slaves and the Northern hero of a war which slavery had so much to do with bringing on, should have, in the final weeks of his life, pardoned a New England slave-runner; and that a clerk in the
Department of Justice should have held up the execution of that order” (1). At the Library of Congress itself, says Barbee, “the Lincoln Collection is kept under lock and key in a special stack of its own,” (1) as if someone had something to hide.

17 Barbee, An Excursion, 27.
18 Barbee, An Excursion, 53.
19 Barbee, An Excursion, 64.
20 David Rankin Barbee, The Capture of Jefferson Davis [a bound offprint, “Reprinted from Tyler’s Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine, July 1947” and presented by Barbee to the library of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill], 1, 2, 36-37. The copy in the University of North Carolina library is inscribed by Barbee: “University of North Carolina with Compliments of David Rankin Barbee” (1).

21 Barbee, The Capture, 4. In 1949, after Truman had appointed Early Under Secretary of Defense, Barbee send a copy of The Capture to Early along with a letter asking Early to get the Department of Defense to release from its archives the coat Davis wore when captured, so that it could be sent to the Confederate Museum in Richmond, VA. He pleaded that Davis's family "wish this to be done," and reminded Early that both Early and the President were
descendants of Confederate soldiers. Letter, Barbee to Early, August 15, 1949, Barbee Papers, Box 11, Folder 613.


24 Amy Kinsel, "'From These Honored Dead': Gettysburg in American Culture, 1863-1938" (Diss. Cornell University, 1992), 550-551. Jim Cullen reports that Civil War reenactors from North and South agree that slavery was not really the cause of the Civil War; see Jim Cullen, The Civil War in Popular Culture: A Reusable Past (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), 197. See also Kirk Savage, "The Politics of Memory: Black Emancipation and the Civil War


32 Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar (1825-1893) was elected to Congress from Mississippi in 1857 and 1859 but resigned to join the Confederacy, drafting the Mississippi secession ordinance, serving in the Confederate army and other posts. After the war, Lamar served in the House of Representatives (1873-1877) and the Senate (1877-1885); as secretary of the interior (1885-1888); and as associate justice of the Supreme Court (1888-1893).

33 The classic statement of this theme is William E. Leuchtenburg, "The New Deal and the Analogue of War," *The


36 Radiogram, Dan V. Stephens to Roosevelt, June 1, 1934, FDR Library, PPF 200B, Box 16, "Public Reaction, May 30, 1934" folder.


39 The estimate of 100,000 is from Dorothy D. Bartlett, "Roosevelt Weary and Unsmiling in Gettysburg


41 "Heal War Scars, President Urges," Atlanta Constitution, 31 May 1934, 1.


43 Kinsel, 94

44 Kinsel argues that the goals of memorialization and preservation were essentially in conflict, since the memorials placed about the battlefield altered its appearance. Kinsel, 160-161.

45 Kinsel, 225.

46 John Bodnar describes how the National Park Service assumed management of all national parks during the New Deal with a self-conscious aim of imposing "a nationalistic framework upon the public's perception of the past in a more systematic way." John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the


48 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Macmillan, 1941) 7: 419-421.

49 FDR Library, FDR Speech File, Folder #1142, "Gettysburg 75th Anniversary," "Speech of the President at Gettysburg," draft #2; July 3, 1938.

Sherwood’s *Abe Lincoln in Illinois* opened on Broadway on October 15, 1938. Sherwood joined the Roosevelt speechwriting team in 1940.


There is a considerable literature in rhetorical studies on presidential crisis management. Such works typically argue that the president uses or even manufactures crises as mode of controlling assent. See, for example, Denise Bostdorff, *The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994); Amos Kiewe (ed.), *The Modern Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994). Most of the rhetorical studies have treated presidents after FDR. It might well be argued that Roosevelt’s entire presidency employed crisis rhetoric from start to finish--first the depression, then World War II.


Donovan Ochs demonstrates how deeply embedded and how double-edged our funeral rituals are in *Consolatory*
Rhetoric (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993).


58 Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg, 90.


61 The "unused draft" is accompanied by a note that until 1957 it had been mistakenly filed among the drafts for a speech of August 11, 1938 at the University of Georgia. FDR Library, FDR Speech File, Folder 1142, "Gettysburg 75th Anniversary," unused draft.

62 "'Minority Rights Must Be Recognized,' Says President Roosevelt," Pittsburgh Courier, 9 July 1938, 4.


For example, Alexander Kendrick, "Roosevelt is Winning His 'Battle,' He Tells 200,000 at Gettysburg; Sun Lights Beacon for Eternity," Philadelphia Inquirer, 4 July 1938, 1; Richard L. Harkness, "Roosevelt Likens Fight to Lincoln's," Philadelphia Inquirer, 4 July 1938, 1; "Roosevelt Calls on People to Fight for Security in Touching off Eternal Light at Gettysburg, . . ." Atlanta Constitution, 4 July 1938, 1; "150,000 on Battlefield as President Calls for Nation United in Peace, . . ." Harrisburg Patriot, 4 July 1938, 1; W. A. MacDonald, "President at Gettysburg Sees Victory Near in Battle 'Fundamental as Lincoln's, . . ." New York Times, 4 July 1938, 1; "President Dedicates Eternal Peace Light at Gettysburg, . . ." Los Angeles Times, 4 July 1938, 1; Marshall Andrews, "Roosevelt at Gettysburg Sees Victory in 'Another Conflict as Fundamental as Lincoln's, . . ." Washington Post, 4 July 1938, 1.

Anthology of African American Literature, 1856. Hughes's poem provides the title for Lorraine Hansberry's play, "A Raisin in the Sun."