KEPLER: Facilitating Control-flow Hijacking Primitive Evaluation for Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities

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Abstract

Automatic exploit generation is a challenging problem. A challenging part of the task is to connect an identified exploitable state (exploit primitive) to trigger execution of code-reuse (e.g., ROP) payload. A control-flow hijacking primitive is one of the most common capabilities for exploitation. However, due to the challenges of widely deployed exploit mitigations, pitfalls along an exploit path, and ill-suited primitives, it is difficult to even manually craft an exploit with a control-flow hijacking primitive for an off-the-shelf modern Linux kernel. We propose KEPLER to facilitate exploit generation by automatically generating a “single-shot” exploitation chain. KEPLER accepts as input a control-flow hijacking primitive and bootstraps any kernel ROP payload by symbolically stitching an exploit chain taking advantage of prevalent kernel coding style and corresponding gadgets. Comparisons with previous automatic exploit generation techniques and previous kernel exploit techniques show KEPLER effectively facilitates evaluation of control-flow hijacking primitives in the Linux kernel.

1 Introduction

Software bugs may have extremely serious consequences, especially for the OS kernel, where they could be fatal to the reliability and security of the entire OS because of the higher privilege that the kernel resides in and the abundance of hardware resources that the kernel has direct control of. Kernel bugs can lead to data leakage, privilege escalation and even persistent attacks [33]. One straightforward solution to minimize consequences of kernel bugs is to immediately patch all of the kernel bugs reported via mail lists and kernel fuzzers [72] [58] [52] [37]. In practice, considering the lack of manpower to patch all bugs timely, vendors typically prioritize their efforts to patch the bugs with more severe security implications after assessing their exploitability. With the deployment of various kernel mitigations, the exploitability of bugs has been obviously weakened but still hard to decide. Despite the undecidability of the general exploitability problem, sometimes a carefully crafted exploit could serve as a constructive proof of exploitability.

Capable of proving exploitability by generating working exploits from a vulnerability Proof-of-Concepts (PoC), automatic exploit generation is a preferred choice for exploitability assessment because its soundness and efficiency [7] [3] [9] [64] [5] [55] [30] [75]. More importantly, automatically generating concrete exploits could not only help exploitability evaluation, but also let a user to gain advantages in adversarial settings (e.g. Capture-The-Flag competitions) by scoring fast. Last but not least, these generated exploits could potentially help defender-side to evaluate the effectiveness of proposals of new kernel mitigation.

The common workflow of automatic exploit generation systems are similar. In general we can divide them into the following two steps: \(\text{exploit primitive identification}\) and \(\text{exploit primitive evaluation}\). In the first step, they search for pre-defined exploit primitive (“exploitable” states) based on the crashing path triggered by a PoC input. In the second step, after pinpointing an exploit primitive, they add exploit constraints and perform constraint solving to generate a concrete input to exercise a predefined exploit technique (e.g., ret2libc attack).

However, in order to generate working exploit for a control-flow hijacking primitive, there remains to be the following three challenges in the process of exploit primitive evaluation which limits the capability of automatic exploit generation techniques to target a complex real-world system such as the Linux kernel.

\(\text{Challenge 1, exploit mitigation}\). Exploit mitigations are designed and introduced to reduce attack surface and raise the bar of exploitation. For a modern Linux kernel, many new hardware features [38] [11], compiler-assisted instrumentation [22] [40], sensitive data objects protection [12] [65] [21] [13] and virtualization-based hypervisor [49] [51] have
been introduced as exploit mitigations. As a consequence, many kernel exploit techniques are no longer effective [36] [61] [41] [39] [77], despite the fact that heavier enforcement such as control-flow integrity (CFI) [2] [16] [79] [78] is still not widely-adopted by major Linux releases perhaps due to performance concerns.

Challenge 2, exploit path pitfall. Side effects of exploit primitives could terminate exploitation in middle. Memory corruption, occurred along with an exploit primitive, can frustrate the attempt to trigger the primitive the second time, because an exploit path could unavoidably contain instructions triggering an unexpected termination of exploitation. Such termination can be a kernel panic of invalid memory access or an infinite loop in a kernel thread.

Challenge 3, ill-suited exploit primitive. Lack of stack pivoting gadget [54] which is a vital step to perform ROP attack and insufficient control over general registers can make an exploit primitive ill-suited. Although some strong primitives have been proven exploitable and even Turing complete [35], there is still a gap between ill-suited exploit primitive and the requirement of mounting a certain exploit technique.

Considering the three challenges, it could be quite difficult to even manually craft an exploit with a control flow hijack primitive. To address the above challenges, we propose KEPLER, an exploit primitive evaluation framework for real-world Linux kernel vulnerabilities. KEPLER employs a novel exploit technique designed for Linux kernel which reduces exploitation of a control-flow hijacking primitive to constructing a classical overflow in kernel stack. The exploit technique exposes less constraints over the quality of an exploit primitive and availability of stack pivoting gadget than previous exploit techniques and could still bypass currently widely deployed kernel mitigations while previous approaches could not. Starting from a possibly ill-suited control-flow hijacking primitive (CFHP), KEPLER overcomes the lack of stack pivoting gadget and manages to build a "single-shot" exploitation chain to bootstrap existing Turing complete exploit techniques such as return oriented programming (ROP) [56], with the ability to bypass mainstream kernel mitigations as well as detouring exploit path pitfalls.

To achieve this, KEPLER leverages a carefully designed code-reuse template for control-flow hijacking primitives to bypass widely-deployed mitigations in Linux kernel. KEPLER first enhances an exploit primitive to satisfy a minimal requirement of controlling dual registers (e.g., rip and rdi for x86-64) at the same time. Starting from the primitive, KEPLER generates an exploit which sequentially executes a chain of five gadgets. The design of the code-reuse template involves several insights about Linux kernel coding style. Specifically, KEPLER reuses those stack-based invocations of kernel I/O channel functions to leak and smash kernel stack of current process and execute arbitrary user-supplied ROP payload. KEPLER leverages blooming gadget to enhance control over necessary registers for a control-flow hijacking primitive.

KEPLER uses a bridging gadget to combine the practice of leaking kernel stack canary and smashing kernel stack into a single shot and thus prevent unexpected kernel panic.

To generate exploits for each CFHP against arbitrary kernel binary, KEPLER operates in the following two phase: first, KEPLER statically analyzes the kernel binary for five categories of candidate gadgets. Then KEPLER starts kernel symbolic execution from the CFHP, and performs a Depth First Search (DFS) based gadget stitching algorithm over candidate gadgets.

Our evaluation of KEPLER shows that it is powerful for exploit primitive evaluation. To highlight the effectiveness of KEPLER, we compare KEPLER with existing exploit hardening/generation tools (e.g., Q [60], fuze [75]) and KEPLER outperforms all of them in terms of generating effective kernel exploits under modern mitigation settings in Linux kernel. This research work makes the following contribution:

- **Kernel single-shot exploitation.** We present a code-reuse exploit technique which converts a single ill-suited control-flow hijacking primitive into arbitrary ROP payload execution under various constraints posed by modern Linux kernel mitigations and the primitive itself. The proposed technique exploits prevalent kernel coding style and corresponding gadgets and thus is hard to defeat. Our approach to calculate exploit chain is automatable because the gadget stitching problem could be cast as a search problem over a search space of reasonable size. In addition, the "single-shot" nature of this technique makes it suitable for the vulnerabilities prone to unexpected termination because it avoids stressing a control-flow hijacking primitive for multiple times.

- **Semi-automatic exploit generator for Linux kernel.** We implement KEPLER using a set of tools including IDA SDK, QEMU/KVM and angr. Starting from a user-supplied control flow hijack primitive, KEPLER analyzes the Linux kernel binary, tracks down useful kernel gadgets, and automatically generates many gadget chains for launching "single-shot" exploitation and bypassing kernel mitigations. It requires no kernel source code and can be applied to stripped kernel images. KEPLER applies to modern Linux kernels; our evaluation uses version 4.15.0 which was the latest as of the time of our evaluation.

- **Practical impacts.** We systematically evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of KEPLER using 16 real-world kernel vulnerabilities and 3 recently-released CTF challenges. Given a kernel control-flow hijacking primitive, we show that KEPLER generally could generate tens of

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1The proposed exploit technique requires a lot of analysis effort, but with respect to the precondition for launching the attack, it requires only a single control-flow hijacking primitive.
thousands of distinct exploitation chains with the ability to bypass kernel mitigations and perform successful exploitation. We show that Kepler can output the first working exploit for a kernel vulnerability in less than about 50 wall-clock minutes.

2 Background and Related Work

Exploit primitives [6] [47] [55] are machine states that violate security policies at various levels and indicate an attacker could get extra capabilities beyond the normal functionality provided by the original program. A control-flow hijacking primitive (CFHP) is a machine state that potentially deviates from the legal control-flow graph. In the context of symbolic analysis, a control-flow hijacking primitive is usually identified by applying a heuristic which queries the backend constraint solver to check whether the number of possible control flow jump target is beyond a threshold when the control flow jump target contains symbolic bytes. An arbitrary memory write primitive is a machine state that an attacker could modify arbitrary kernel memory on his will. Similarly, an arbitrary memory leak primitive is a machine state which allows an attacker to dump data content at arbitrary kernel address. Sometimes the primitive does not allow an attacker to modify/leak data at arbitrary kernel address (e.g., a stack info leak which only dump several bytes on kernel stack [68]), they are referred as restricted memory write/leak primitive.

As is described above, this research work mainly focuses on two aspects – (i) facilitating exploit primitive evaluation for even ill-suited exploit primitives and bypassing widely-deployed kernel mitigation mechanisms by designing a new exploit technique. (ii) developing a tool to automate the newly proposed kernel exploitation approach. As a result, the works most relevant to ours include those pertaining to exploit primitive identification, exploit primitive evaluation and kernel exploit techniques/mitigations. In the following, we describe the existing works in these three directions and discuss their difference from ours.

2.1 Exploit Primitive Identification

To assist the process of finding a useful exploit primitive (e.g., control-flow hijacking primitive and memory write/leak primitive), there is a rich collection of research works. For example, using preconditioned symbolic execution and concolic execution techniques, Brumley et al. develop AEG as well as mayhem to identify control-flow hijacking primitives for further exploitation. [3] [9] [7]. Shoshitaishvili et al. develop a cyber reasoning system Mechanical Phish [62]. It is built on angr [64] [69] [63] and performs fuzzing and symbolic tracing for the PoC to identify exploit primitives. To efficiently explore state space for exploit primitives in Linux kernel, Wu et al. propose an automatic technique that utilizes undercontext fuzzing along with partial symbolic execution to explore CFHP and memory write primitive for UAF bugs [75]. To construct better exploit primitives with the capability of out-of-bound access, Heelan et al. utilize regression tests to obtain the knowledge of how to perform heap layout manipulation [30]. To obtain better exploit primitives for stack Use-Before-Initialization vulnerabilities, Lu et al. propose a deterministic stack spraying approach as well as an exhaustive memory spraying technique [46].

In this work, we do not focus on facilitating primitive identification. Rather, we assume an exploit primitive is already identified and our research endeavor centers around subsequent primitive evaluation phase.

2.2 Exploit Primitive Evaluation

In the primitive evaluation phase, a security analyst or an automatic exploit generation system tries suitable exploit techniques for the seemingly exploitable states identified before.

Initially, without considering Data Execution Prevention, such systems use straightforward techniques such as ret2stack-shellcode and ret2libc with a CFHP [3] [9] [62]. Taking W + X into account, Schwartz et al. propose Q [60] to facilitate exploitation with a CFHP by automatically constructing a ROP chain. Our work addresses the problem of ROP bootstrapping without stack pivoting gadget and is orthogonal to automatic ROP chaining techniques [33] [60] [66] [24] [57] because we do not tackle the problem of ROP payload construction.

With the facilitation of forward and backward taint analysis, Mothe et al. devise a technical approach to craft working exploits for simple vulnerabilities in user-mode applications [48]. Utilizing symbolic execution, Repel et al. craft exploits with single memory write primitive (e.g., unsafe unlink and lookaside list corruption) for those heap overflow vulnerabilities residing in the userland applications [55]. To facilitate primitive evaluation of kernel Use-After-Free exploitation, Xu et al. propose two memory collision mechanisms [77] to unleash CFHPs.

Recently, some research works take CFI into consideration for primitive evaluation [29] [8] [59] [23] [31] [32] [35]. For example, Ispoglou et al. propose block oriented programming (BOP) [35] to facilitate evaluation of repeatable arbitrary memory write primitives by proving the Turing completeness under CFI along with common userspace mitigations. BOP assumes the existence of a dispatcher gadget. BOP also automates exploit generation. As a repeatable arbitrary memory write primitive is almost “god-mode” of kernel exploitation, our work facilitates primitive evaluation for those weaker exploit primitives (e.g., non-repeatable and ill-suited CFHP) in real-world.

In this work, we also develop a tool for facilitating primitive evaluation. However, this research work is fundamentally different from the aforementioned works in at least one of the following aspects. First, without assuming a perfect ex-
exploit primitive (e.g., unlimited number of invocations of an arbitrary memory write primitive), we can facilitate exploit primitive evaluation for those usually ignored exploit primitive (e.g., ill-suited primitives and primitive that can only be triggered once). Second, rather than dealing with applications in the user space, our tool targets the Linux kernel where exploitation typically involves complicated operations and sophisticated security mitigation mechanisms are generally enabled. Third, rather than generating one single exploit for a target vulnerability, our tool automatically explores many possible exploitation chains and output various working exploits.

2.3 Kernel Exploit Techniques/mitigations

Initially, a CFHP in the kernel can directly execute shellcode in user-space because there is no isolation between user and kernel space (e.g., ret2usr). Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMP) [38] prevents kernel from executing userspace code. An attacker can use code-reuse attack. To set stack pointer to controlled payload, she uses the prevalent "pivot-to-userspace" gadget to pivot stack to userspace [44]. With adoption of Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) [11], an attacker can no longer rely on a fake stack in userspace because userspace memory access is forbidden except during I/O channel functions. Because there is usually none intrakernel stack pivoting gadget for a Linux kernel, an attacker usually chooses to disable SMAP by flipping corresponding bits in the cr4 register [41]. However, the "cr4-flipping" attack typically rely on double CFHPs [41] and not suitable for a none re-triggerable CFHP. In addition, a virtualization-based hypervisor can detect cr4 register modification by inspecting a vmexit and thus mitigate such exploitation [49] [51]. Ret2dir [39] attack sprays the physmap region by calling syscall mmap, as the direct mapped physical memory is marked as executable previously, diverting a CFHP to land on physmap led to arbitrary shellcode execution. However, with a kernel patch applied, these physmap pages are no longer executable.

To enforce CFI policy for the kernel, several kernel CFI solutions [16] [70] [26] have been proposed, however, these mitigations are not broadly adopted by major Linux release versions such as CentOS, Ubuntu and Debian.

Data-only kernel exploit techniques directly use a memory write primitive to modify sensitive kernel data objects such as process credentials, page tables and virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) [36]. However, mitigations have been proposed [17] [67] and deployed [40] to prevent these low-hanging fruits.

Note some memory write primitive can be transformed to a control-flow hijacking primitive by overwriting and invoking a code pointer in kernel’s data section or in the heap [19].

Kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR) is widely deployed in order to present the attacker an unpredictable attack surface. However, due to its lack of timely re-randomization and coarse-grained nature (only randomizing section base address), an attacker does not even need an arbitrary read primitive [45] [71] to bypass KASLR. With a hardware side channel [34] [28], he can infer the coarse memory layout without leaking any kernel memory content. Despite kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI [13]) removes some side channels with extra overhead, he can also uses a restricted memory leak primitive to infer the coarse memory layout [68]. In the default setting of Linux kernel, knowing coarse memory layout is enough for various exploit techniques. (Kernel) Code diversification/randomization [14] [15] [27] [74] [42] [53] could significantly raise the bar of code-reuse exploitation by thwarting an attacker from locating useful gadget.

3 Assumptions and Threat Model

Our threat model consists of a modern Linux kernel protected by widely-deployed mitigations with a known vulnerability.

Mitigation setting. Similar to recent major Linux release versions, we make the following assumptions of kernel mitigations. A kernel has enabled SMEP and SMAP [11] protection to prevent direct userspace access in kernel execution. A kernel has enabled stack canary to protect return address over stack for all functions containing local variable [22]. A kernel has enabled protection to prevent direct modification of sensitive kernel data objects including process credential [40] and page table [17]. A kernel has enabled KASLR. A kernel has enabled KPTI [13] protection. A kernel has been protected by virtualization-based hypervisor which prevents unauthorized modification of cr4 register [49]. A kernel has set physmap pages as non-executable. A kernel has enabled STATIC_USERMODEHELPER. The option routes all call_usermodehelper() calls through a guard binary that can properly filter the requested userland programs to be run by the kernel [43]. However, a kernel does not enable a CFI enforcement such as RAP [70] because of performance concerns.

Available Exploit Primitives. We assume there is a PoC which triggers the vulnerability and leads to a control-flow hijacking primitive (CFHP). We assume the CFHP is already identified with the PoC through either manual analysis or dynamic analysis such as symbolic tracing, thus finding exploit primitives is orthogonal to our work and we can focus on evaluating the CFHP. We assume a restricted memory leak primitive to help infer coarse kernel memory layout (e.g., getting the base address of code section .text and physmap region). We do not assume the existence of an arbitrary memory write primitive which could write to arbitrary kernel memory address. We do not assume the existence of an arbitrary memory leak primitive that can dump arbitrary kernel memory content. Under the threat model, the content in arbitrary memory address such as the stack canary value of arbitrary kernel thread usually remains secret because the coarse kernel memory layout information does not reveal the stack canary value of a kernel stack. We also assume the location of current kernel stack
4 Motivating Example

(a) Definition of struct ip_mc_socklist. Its first member next_rcu is unmanageable because the PoC uses a heap spray technique which does not allow us to control first QWORD of struct ip_mc_socklist.

```c
struct ip_mc_socklist {  
    struct ip_mc_socklist *next_rcu;  
    struct ip_mreqn multi;  
    unsigned int sfmode;  
    struct ip_sf_socklist *sflist;  
    struct rcu_head rcu;  
};
```

(b) Tailored source code pertaining to the CFHP. Function ip_mc_drop_socket repeat invoking kfree_rcu() which queues a rcu task for asynchronous execution until inet->mc_list is NULL. The site pertaining to the CFHP is in function rcu_reclaim.

```c
void ip_mc_drop_socket(struct sock *sk){  
    struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);  
    struct ip_mc_socklist iml;  
    while ((iml = inet->mc_list) != NULL) {  
        struct ip_mc_socklist *next_rcu;  
        while (list) {  
            struct ip_mc_socklist *list;  
            next = list->next;  
            rcu_reclaim(list);  
            list = next;  
        }  
        rcu_do_batch(...){  
            head->func(head);  
            rcu_reclaim(iml, rcu);  
        }
    }  
}
```

Table 1: A control-flow hijacking primitive in kernel UAF vulnerability CVE-2017-8890.

We illustrate the challenges in evaluating a CFHP on x86-64 with CVE-2017-8890 [50], a recent vulnerability in the Linux kernel.

4.1 Vulnerability and Exploit Primitive

The root cause of the bug is an Use-After-Free over an object ip_mc_socklist defined in Table 1a. As is shown in Table 1b, the UAF bug results in a dangling pointer inet->mc_list and *iml become an alias of the dangling pointer in line 5. In line 7, there is an UAF access by dereferencing iml->next_rcu. In line 9, kfree_rcu(iml) queues a callback denoted by iml->rcu. Function rcu_do_batch handles the previously queued callback when the CPU gets a chance to process the rcu callback list, thus triggers another UAF access to the ip_mc_socklist object in rcu_reclaim(). The loop from line 5 to line 10 will continue and add another callback if iml->next_rcu is not NULL.

The CFHP is due to an asynchronous kfree_rcu call over the dangling pointer *iml. To be specific, by manipulating the value in iml->rcu_head through a proper heap spray, a security analyst can get a CFHP later in rcu_reclaim() because function kfree_rcu() (line 9) is designed to queue a rcu callback denoted by iml->rcu_head. Function rcu_do_batch will be executed in the future, it will iterate over a list of rcu_head added by kfree_rcu(). The statement pertaining to the CFHP (line 13) allows the attacker to control zip (head->func) through heap spraying. At the time of the control-flow hijacking, register rdi (head) points to a controllable memory region.

4.2 Challenges of Crafting Working Exploit

However, developing an exploit with the aforementioned CFHP is quite difficult because of the following challenges.

4.2.1 Challenge 1: Exploit Mitigations

Widely deployed kernel mitigations frustrate a large amount of straight forward exploit techniques. With the presence of SMEP/SMAP protection, it is impossible to directly launch a traditional ret2user/pivot2usr attack. The ret2dir attack [39] is also not suitable because the physmap region is no longer executable [10]. With the write-protection over sensitive data such as process credential and page table, it is not possible to direct overwrite these data to escalate privilege by converting the CFHP into a memory write primitive.

A security analyst may think of the "cr4-flipping" attack which usually requires two CFHPs: one for flipping the cr4 register and the other to launch ret2user/pivot2usr. However, this is often infeasible because virtualization based hypervisor could easily detect the behavior of flipping cr4 register by inspecting a vmexit [49] [51]. Even if there is no protection over cr4 register, leveraging the "cr4-flipping" attack or a similar exploit technique relying multiple CFHP with this CFHP still faces the following challenge.

4.2.2 Challenge 2: Exploit Path Pitfall

Attempting to leverage the "cr4-flipping" exploit technique, a security analyst would expect two CFHPs to disable SMEP/SMAP and pivoting to userspace respectively. However, such a exploit technique could be infeasible because of the exploit path pitfall after the first CFHP.
As is shown in Figure 1, after using the CFHP in `rcu_reclaim` to disable SMAP protection by invoking the function `native_write_cr4()` to zero the corresponding bits in cr4 register, an attacker encounters an unexpected termination: in previous execution, the loop from line 5 to line 10 in Table 1b queues another RCU callback denoted by `head' (iml->next_rcu->rcu) which is not under our control and causes a kernel panic.

This kernel panic attributes to an invalid memory access. The heap spray technique used by the PoC does not allow an attacker to control first QWORD of iml (an ip_mc_socklist object) because the first QWORD of an freed chunk becomes heap-metadata, thus iml->next_rcu becomes unmanageable.

A straight-forward solution to tackle the invalid memory access is adding extra constraints to ensure all related memory accesses are valid. However, constraint solving for complex program usually incurs high cost (both cpu time and memory) [4] and could fail because of constraint conflicts [5]. Instead of devoting extra resource to handle these pitfalls, an ideal exploit path should effectively detour them. As a result of lacking control of iml->next_rcu, the exploit path pitfall can not be simply prevented by techniques like adding constraints over the sprayed data and thus unavoidably panic the kernel.

Although previous works have demonstrated the power of code-reuse attack, mounting a traditional ROP attack for this CFHP seems surprisingly difficult because of the lack of stack pivoting gadget. Without the capability of performing ROP attack, one may think of reusing other kernel functions. Unfortunately, there is also a problem of insufficient control over general registers because only rdi points to a memory region under control and other registers are not in control initially. We need to enhance this CFHP by controlling more general registers and perform subsequent exploitation.

5 Overview

To tackle the three challenges exposed by the motivating example, a security analyst needs to design a new exploit technique to turn a CFHP into a more exploit-friendly machine state based on the vulnerability context and his prior experience. Due to the lack of a ready-to-use exploit technique, he could expect a lot of debugging and manual efforts to explore possible exploit paths and improve his prototype exploit during the exploit development process and such practice could
be extremely time-consuming and even fruitless.

In the following, we discuss the considerations that go into the design of KEPLER as well as the high level design of this framework to facilitate CFHP evaluation.

5.1 Requirements for Design

To support evaluation of a CFHP with working exploits, KEPLER should receive as input a state representing a CFHP and it should be able to find an exploit path towards priviledge escalation and output corresponding exploit. To achieve the above ultimate goal, KEPLER should adopt an exploit technique which satisfies the following requirements.

First, an exploit technique is able to bypass all the widely-deployed mitigations enabled in the threat model. Second, taking potential exploit path pitfalls into consideration, an exploit technique should depend on only one control-flow hijacking primitive and detour these pitfalls to prevent an unexpected termination and make exploitation more reliable. The form of an exploit technique would be ideally similar to a “magic gadget” which is previously mentioned in user-space exploitation [18], especially in the context of adversarial scenarios like Capture-The-Flag cyber competition. Third, an exploit technique should benefit from time-tested exploit technique such as ROP by efficiently bootstrapping traditional code-reuse attack in absence of stack pivoting gadget with an ill-suited CFHP. Last but not least, an exploit technique should be suitable for the automation framework. On one hand, it should be hard-to-defeat and not depend on any special code or feature which could be easily eliminated. On the other hand, the exploit generation phase should be easily automated - it should be a well-defined search problem over a search space of reasonable size.

5.2 High Level Design

![Figure 2: Overall of KEPLER’s design.](image)

To satisfy the requirements mentioned above, we design KEPLER to facilitate exploit primitive evaluation. KEPLER automatically generates an exploitation chain to bootstrap any kernel ROP chain with a single CFHP through “single-shot” exploitation.

Figure 2 shows how KEPLER automates the analysis task necessary to leverage a CFHP to produce an exploit in the presence of aforementioned challenges. Given a kernel state snapshot representing the CFHP, KEPLER enhances its power to construct a kernel stack-overflow by symbolically stitching several types of candidate gadget identified by static analysis on the kernel binary image.

As is mentioned before, our basic idea is to bootstrap a traditional ROP attack with a CFHP in Linux kernel. At the high level, we achieve this by a "single-shot" exploitation chain which transforms a function pointer corruption based primitive (CFHP) into a stack-overflow based primitive (CFHP’) as is shown in Figure 2.

![Figure 3: A comparison of two exploitation approaches; a known approach triggers a vulnerability twice but blocked by an exploit path pitfall and the other triggers the vulnerability only once.](image)

Although there is not any gadget in Linux kernel which allows an attacker to directly escalate privileged, The proposed “single-shot” exploitation is similar to “magic gadget” mentioned above in a sense that it only requires a single CFHP and could reliably achieve the goal of arbitrary code execution in kernel context. To be specific, as is shown in Figure 3b, the "single-shot" exploitation chain could finish exploitation with a single CFHP and thus is able to circumvent an exploit path pitfall after the return of CFHP which could cause an unexpected termination otherwise. We can benefit from a stack-overflow based CFHP because it allows us to place arbitrary ROP payload on current kernel stack without any stack pivoting gadget. Given the scarcity (or non-existence) of intra-kernel stack pivoting gadget, we argue that constructing a kernel stack overflow is the most generic approach to perform a kernel ROP attack.
We present stack-smashing gadgets which relies on functions that serve as data channel between user-space and kernel.

There is a family of prevalent stack smashing gadgets inside Linux kernel, we observe they could greatly aid constructing exploit path pitfalls with a bridging gadget that could smash kernel stack with carefully crafted payload.

6 Design

In this section, we describe the exploit technique adopted by KEPLER and the insights behind the exploit technique. As is mentioned before, KEPLER uses a CFHP to construct a stack overflow and bootstraps arbitrary ROP payload.

Our "single-shot" exploitation technique builds on two key ideas of breaking isolation with I/O functions and improving exploit success ratio with a single CFHP.

First, we can break isolation between kernel-space and user-space by abusing kernel I/O functions. The insight behind is such data channels are born to bypass SMAP which prohibits user-space access because SMAP is explicitly and temporarily disabled during execution of these functions. Figure 4 illustrates a practice of reusing I/O functions to construct kernel stack overflow by first leaking kernel stack canary with copy_to_user and then smashing kernel stack with copy_from_user.

Second, "single-shot" exploitation can be achieved through stitching various kernel function gadgets. We can enhance register control for a CFHP with blooming gadget - a prevalent family of function gadgets in Linux kernel. We can detour exploit path pitfalls with a bridging gadget.

6.1 Constructing Stack Overflow

There is a family of prevalent stack smashing gadgets inside Linux kernel, we observe they could greatly aid constructing stack-overflow via taking intrinsic short return path triggered by a page fault. However, such gadgets can not be directly used because initial CFHP does not have enough register control and the presence of a stack canary. We address the two problem in Section 6.2 and 6.3.

6.1.1 Looking into Stack-Smashing Gadget

We present stack-smashing gadgets which relies on functions that serve as data channel between user-space and kernel-space. The gadget could aid exploitation by transporting payload of arbitrary length from user-space to kernel stack, without assuming the stack location is already known.

As is specified in Linux kernel implementation, the function copy_from_user() takes as input three arguments - dst, src and length - which indicate the destination, source and length of the data that need to be copied from the user to kernel space.

From the perspective of an attacker, a kernel stack overflow could be caused if he lets the CFHP jump to the site right before the invocation of copy_from_user (line 2 in Table 2b) and the machine state satisfies the following three requirements:

```
(b) Assembly code.
1 static long bsg_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned
2 int cmd, unsigned long arg){
3 struct sg_io_v4 hdr;
4 ...
5 if (copy_from_user(shdr, uarg, sizeof(hdr)))
6 return -EFAULT; // short return
7 ...
8 }            
9...

10 mov rcx,QWORD PTR [rsp+0xa0]
11 xor rcx,QWORD PTR gs:0x28
12 jne _<stack_chk_fail>
13 add rsp,0xa8
14 pop rbx
15 ret
```

Table 2: The kernel code fragment of an stack-smashing gadget that could smash kernel stack with carefully crafted payload.
parameter dst (e.g., rdi) points to current kernel stack, parameter src (e.g., rsi) points to any user-space address so that its content is controllable by an attacker, parameter length (e.g., rdx) is greater than the size of current stack frame to cause a kernel stack overflow.

An interesting observation is that most (91% in Linux 4.15) invocations of this function set destination dst to address of a variable on kernel stack and thus will copy user data into a kernel stack. If control-flow is hijacked to a invoking site of this function (e.g., line 2 in Table 2b), an attacker could abuse such coding style to satisfy the requirement above because the code snippet help set rdi to current stack frame. However requirements 2 and 3 are still waiting to be satisfied given the initial CFHP does not imply any control over register rdi and register rsi. We will address this issue with blooming gadget in Section 6.3.

6.1.2 Choosing Short Return Path

The prevalent error handling code which is introduced to make kernel code more robust also provides a short return path for an attacker. An attacker could benefit from such a short return path after overflowing current stack frame.

As is depicted in line 4-5 in Table 2a, function bsg_ioctl will directly return if return value of copy_from_user is not zero. Our statistic indicates the function copy_from_user() has been invoked at 671 sites in Linux 4.15. Among all these invocation sites, more than 99% contain the fault handling implementation.

The insight of prioritizing short return path after stack smash is to prevent un-expected kernel panic as well as avoid the complexity of resolving extra data dependency in an error-prone and long normal return path of the function containing tens of basic blocks.

To take a short return path, copy_from_user must return a non-zero value as is shown in Table 2a. Reviewing the source code of kernel function copy_from_user, we have identified 3 different situations which will force the function to return a non-zero value, 1) incurring an integer overflow when calculating src+length, 2) neither src+length nor src residing in user-space, 3) encountering an unresolvable page fault during copy. For the first two situations, the function copy_from_user() performs sanity check and returns a non-zero value without actually copying data to the kernel. For the last situation, the function migrates data to the kernel and pads with zeros the bytes failing to be copied.

6.1.3 Triggering Page Fault during copy_from_user

To force copy_from_user returning a non-zero value as well as successfully copying the ROP payload from user-space to kernel stack, we trigger page fault after copying enough payload according to the last condition described above.

We illustrate a representative example in Figure 5. We map two adjacent pages (p1 and p2) in the user-space and then unmap the second one. We fill the end of the page p1 with the actual payload including a stack canary and a ROP chain. We will discuss how to leak stack canary in Section 6.2. Through the technical approaches mentioned in Section 6.3, assume we have already obtained the control over registers rsi and rdx pertaining to the second and third parameters of copy_from_user respectively. Leveraging the control over registers, we manipulate the values in these registers. More specifically, we set rsi and rdx to p1 + PAGE_SIZE – n and n + 1 respectively, with n representing the length of payload actual copied. When the function attempts to copy the last byte, it fails to access the content at p2 and triggers a page fault because the page p2 is not mapped into the memory. Eventually copy_from_user returns a positive number 1 because one byte is not successfully copied.

6.2 Bypassing Stack Canary

As is mentioned earlier, to prepare a working payload for stack smash, an attacker has to know the value of kernel stack canary which remains secret in our threat model. We consider the presence of a strong kernel stack canary setting where stack canary is enabled for all functions containing a local variable.

We will first introduce two kinds of prevalent gadgets, then we discuss how to pair them to dump kernel stack memory.

6.2.1 Exposing Stack-disclosure Gadget and Auxiliary Function

To leak stack canary, an intuitive way is to construct an info leak of its value to user-space through an official data channel such that SMAP is not violated. In the following we introduce stack-disclosure gadget which is twin gadget of stack-smash gadget as well as auxiliary function prologue gadget.

Stack-disclosure gadget. Function copy_to_user() is widely used in the Linux kernel codebase to copy kernel memory into user-space. In Linux kernel 4.15, our statistic indicates this function has been invoked at 594 sites. Of all these invocations, 82% are used for copying data from kernel
Auxiliary function
push rbx
mov rax, [rdi]
call rax
...
sub rsp, 58h
push r12
mov rbp, rsp
...
we are closer to successfully disclose stack contents by satisfying an indirect call after the function prologue.

and stack size of 8 bytes difference.

prologue of auxiliary function. A pair of them should have requirements, we pair stack-disclosure gadget with auxiliary function to generate a valid stack frame.

function to create a similar stack frame as the stack-disclosure gadget and continue exploitation, we use auxiliary function which saves registers and establishes a stack frame, the target of indirect call call rax is set to the stack disclosure gadget in \( \mathcal{G} \). Then content of current stack frame is copied to user-space by \textit{copy_to_user}, a page fault is triggered to force non-zero return value of \textit{copy_to_user}, as result \textit{short return path} is taken in \( \mathcal{G} \). Before the function returns, stack canary sanity check is performed \( \mathcal{G} \), because the auxiliary function put a valid stack canary in current stack frame, the canary check is successfully passed and return to the caller of auxiliary function.

6.2.2 Disclosing Canary on Kernel Stack

By diverting the control-flow to a call site of \textit{copy_to_user()}, we are closer to successfully disclose stack contents by satisfying the following four requirements. \( \mathcal{G} \), the registers should be set properly as parameters for \textit{copy_to_user}, \( \mathcal{G} \), the kernel should not panic during the path caller function returns, \( \mathcal{G} \), the caller function of \textit{copy_to_user} checks stack canary before return, \( \mathcal{G} \), the return address on stack must be set properly to continue the rest of the exploitation.

To tackle the first requirement, we leverage \textit{blooming gadget} described in Section 6.3. For the second requirement, we could trigger a page fault and take a short return path similar to the technique described in Section 6.1.2. For the last two requirements, we pair stack-disclosure gadget with auxiliary function to generate a valid stack frame.

The key insight behind using auxiliary function to pair with stack-disclosure gadget is reusing the canary generated by the prologue of auxiliary function. A pair of them should have the same number of saved registers, the same canary location and stack size of 8 bytes difference.

6.3 Putting them together: "Single-shot" Exploitation

It remains challenging to use an ill-suited CFHP to first disclose stack canary and then smashing kernel stack. The reason behind is a CFHP in practice may have limitations in the following two aspects. First, difficulty in combining aforementioned two building blocks with a single CFHP, second, lack of register control. "Single-shot" exploitation uses a \textit{blooming gadget} to amplify control over other registers and a \textit{bridging gadget} to combine the two actions sequentially.

6.3.1 Augmenting CFHP with Blooming Gadget

To enhance a CFHP with the ability to control more registers, we introduce a family of \textit{blooming gadgets}. The use of blooming gadget is inspired by \textit{COOP} \[59\] which exploits a series of type confusions C++ program. Although Linux is written in C, its code heavily exhibits feature of object-oriented programming. The “self” object is usually passed as the first argument of function through \textit{rdi}. And oftentimes the function contains ” indirect call using function pointer that resides in the object passed as parameter. We could let the CFHP to land at these functions to abuse type confusion.

We illustrate one such blooming gadget in Table 3. Kernel function aliasing_gtt_unbind_vma() contains an indirect call with three parameters calculated by dereferencing the function’s first parameter \( \ast \text{vma} \). Assume we have a CFHP with

Table 3: The kernel code fragment (a blooming gadget) that could enhance the control over multiple general registers.

To elucidate the rationale behind the pairing, we take for example the routine of canary disclosure in Figure 6. We re-direct a CFHP to auxiliary function, After the prologue of auxiliary function which saves registers and establishes a stack frame, the target of indirect call call rax is set to the stack disclosure gadget in \( \mathcal{G} \). Then content of current stack frame is copied to user-space by \textit{copy_to_user}, a page fault is triggered to force non-zero return value of \textit{copy_to_user}, as result \textit{short return path} is taken in \( \mathcal{G} \). Before the function returns, stack canary sanity check is performed \( \mathcal{G} \), because the auxiliary function put a valid stack canary in current stack frame, the canary check is successfully passed and return to the caller of auxiliary function.
As is demonstrated in the motivating example in Section 4, an exploitation practice depending on re-triggerable CFHP is not reliable because of exploit path pitfalls. We use bridging gadget - a family of kernel functions with multiple controllable indirect calls - to spawns two CFHPs and combine canary leak and stack smash into a single shot.

For example, function regcache_mark_dirty() shown in Table 4 is such a bridging gadget which contains two indirect calls, map->lock in line 2 and map->unlock in line 5.

As we can observe from the kernel gadget shown in Table 4, the function pointers tied to these two indirect calls are enclosed in a data object referred by the first argument of the function regcache_mark_dirty(). Recall that the first argument of a function is specified by the general register rdi, and we can usually obtain the control over that register using technique described in Section 6.3.1. As a result, in order to obtain control over both function pointers, we could first employ ret2dir [39] to allocate physmap pages and carefully crafted a data object accordingly. Then, we could refer the register rdi to a proper spot and set rdi to the entry site of the gadget shown in Table 4. As is shown in Figure 7, assume the data carefully crafted in the spots of A and B represent the address of the auxiliary gadget together with a disclosure gadget responsible for leaking stack canary as well as the entry address of the gadget pertaining to stack smashing respectively. Then, by executing the bridging gadget shown in Table 4, we could first leak canary using the first indirect call. After the return of the call to copy_to_user(), there is no operations between the consecutive indirect calls that impose additional constraint to the second function pointer. Therefore, we could perform the stack smashing using the second function pointer without involving unexpected termination.

### 7 Implementation

Using IDA Pro SDK [20] and angr [64], we implemented KEPLER with about 8,000 lines of Python code. KEPLER is an automated tool that tracks down the aforementioned exploitation gadgets and chains them for exploitability assessment. Figure 8 depicts how these gadgets are concatenated. While previous sections have discussed the basic building blocks to perform an "single-shot" exploitation, the exploit chain could not be determined once and for all with static analysis because uniqueness of each CFHP and different gadget combinations bring about the variation of the exploitation context. For example, the consecutive exploitation gadgets might no longer obtain the control over related registers with a different initial CFHP.

To address this problem, we developed our tool to assess each of the gadget chains potentially useful for kernel exploitation. More specifically, we follow the guidance of the exploitation chain construction shown in Figure 8, and design our tool to perform a depth-first exhaustive search which explores all the possible combinations of exploitation gad-
gets. When performing the depth-first search: starting from the rip hijack site, KEPLER symbolically executes the gadget chain that the search algorithm explores. To determine whether a gadget chain is useful for exploitation, our tool checks the memory access and deems a gadget chain useless if that exploitation chain attempts to access the user space or an unmapped kernel memory region. In addition, KEPLER examines the control over the registers at two critical sites – one at the entry of the disclosure gadget and the other at the entry of the overflow gadget. We implemented KEPLER to deem a gadget chain useless and terminate symbolic execution earlier if it has no control over the registers rdi and rdx at the first checking site or has no control over rsi and rdx at the second checking site. The reason behind this implementation is that, after executing bridging and auxiliary gadgets, we might lose the control over the registers needed for disclosure and overflow gadgets. With the check right before symbolically executing the two gadgets, we can quickly determine the usefulness of the gadget chain in exploitation, terminate unnecessary symbolic execution and thus save the computation resources.

In the process of the assessment of the exploitation chain, KEPLER symbolically executes each exploitation gadget. For some of them, they might carry a large number of basic blocks and even infinite loops. This could significantly influence the efficiency our tool and even incur the state explosion problem. To avoid these issues, for each path in an exploitation gadget, we set KEPLER to explore at most 20 basic blocks. In addition, we developed KEPLER to concretize each symbolic address.

To be more specific, we set up a kernel page under our control in the physmap region and then concretize each symbolic address with a non-overlapping address of that memory page. In this work, we implemented this concretization mechanism by simply extending ControlledData – one of the symbolic address concretization strategies of angr.

For each gadget chain that passes the assessment, KEPLER further performs constraint solving to generate payload accordingly. Technically, this can be easily done by using angr. However, the z3 solver used in angr consumes memory exhaustively and generally does not release the memory used for constraint solving even after the completion of computation. To address this problem, KEPLER partitions symbolic execution and constraint solving into two different processes. In this way, KEPLER could terminate the memory-intensive process every time the constraint solving is completed and thus free the memory for consecutive computation. As is described in Section 6.1, the payload smashed to the stack contains the stack canary disclosed as well as a sequence of addresses indicating an ROP chain that performs actual exploitation. With respect to the stack canary, we employ a separated thread in the user-space to rapidly retrieve the canary – whenever it is disclosed to the user-space – and then make it ready for stack smashing. Regarding the ROP payload used in this work, we simply choose the ROP payload commonly used for privilege escalation. In Appendix, we specify the ROP payload used in this work. It invokes kernel functions commit_creds() and prepare_kernel_creds() to obtain the root privilege. Note that the construction of an ROP payload is out of scope of this paper. There are many commonly-adopted ROP payloads, which can be naturally hooked with our new kernel exploitation technique.

8 Case Study and Evaluation

In this section, we demonstrate our new exploit technique and evaluate our automated tool KEPLER using real-world kernel vulnerabilities and some recently-released CTF challenges. To be specific, we compare KEPLER with various kernel exploitation techniques to show it is an effective exploit technique, we also compare KEPLER with automatic exploit generation systems to highlight its power in evaluating exploitability with a CFHP. In addition, we show the efficacy and efficiency of KEPLER in facilitating exploitation chain construction.

8.1 Setup

We first randomly selected 3 recently released CTF challenges as well as 16 real-world kernel vulnerabilities archived between 2016 and 2017. Then, we successfully assembled these vulnerabilities in a mainline Linux kernel 4.15.0 by inserting them into the kernel code or reverting their patch accordingly. In this work, we evaluate our tool KEPLER by using this single Linux kernel, and demonstrate the effectiveness of “single-shot” exploitation by launching exploitations against the inserted vulnerabilities.

As is summarized in Table 5, the vulnerabilities inserted cover various types such as Use-After-Free and Out-Of-Bound (OOB) read/write etc. It should be noted that the CVEs selected are a little bit unbalanced – with more in 2017 and less in 2016. On the one hand, this is because there are more than 2× of kernel vulnerabilities reported in 2017 than those in 2016 [1]. On the other hand, this is because some components in Linux kernel experience significant overhaul since 2016 and we have difficulty of re-enabling the corresponding vulnerabilities in a new kernel image.

In order to run and evaluate KEPLER, we also assembled and configured a testbed which has a 32-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) Platinum 8124M CPU and 256GB of memory. For each vulnerability, we then used this testbed to run 28 concurrent workers which symbolically explore the kernel code space and track down useful exploitation chains in parallel.

8.2 Effectiveness of “single-shot” exploitation

By searching the Internet, we gathered 10 exploits pertaining to the vulnerabilities inserted. As is shown in Table 5, these
publicly available exploits perform exploitation through various approaches and therefore demonstrate different capability in bypassing kernel mitigations. Among these exploits, we found there are only 5 of them demonstrating the ability to perform exploitation under our aforementioned threat model. In comparison with the working exploits generated by **KEPLER**, publicly available exploits demonstrate much weaker exploitability (with 5 vs 17 cases). To some extent, this implies existing exploitation approaches highly rely upon the quality of the target vulnerability and corresponding **CFHP**, whereas our approach **KEPLER** could utilize prevalent kernel function and gadgets to explore exploitable machine states and thus escalate the exploitability for a **CFHP**. However, previous exploit technique \( Q \) [60] could not generate working exploit because \( Q \) relies on a stack pivoting gadget while its gadget discovery phase return none of working pivoting gadget. \( \text{FUZE} \) could only generate exploit for 3 cases because it evaluate exploitability of a **CFHP** simply with two straight forward exploit technique: pivot-2-user and "cr4-flipping". The former does not bypass **SMAP** and the latter only works when at least two **CFHPs** is available.

Even for the vulnerabilities against which both public exploits and ours demonstrate the same capabilities in bypassing mitigations, we argue that our approach still exhibits stronger exploitability. This is because the public exploits circumvent mitigations by manipulating control registers with two **CFHPs**, as is discussed in Section 2.3, this practice can be easily restricted by virtualization extension. For the two vulnerabilities **CVE-2017-17053** and **CVE-2016-9793** for which our approach fails to derive working exploits, we manually examine their execution traces leading to the kernel panic. We find that the failure results from the following fact. In order to take the control over \( \text{rip} \) prior to exploitation, both of these vulnerabilities require an exploit to access the data in the user space. This violates the protection of **SMAP**. **KEPLER** restricts any operations that violate our threat model and output a failure if none of the exploitation chains could avoid such violation.

### 8.3 Effectiveness and Efficiency of Our Tool

Our experiment utilizes **KEPLER** to explore the aforementioned kernel image with the vulnerabilities inserted. In this process, we exhaustively search gadget chains useful for exploitation and mitigation circumvention. In Table 5, we show the total number of useful exploitation chains identified as well as the total amount of time spent on finding these gadget chains. As we can observe, **KEPLER** could automatically pinpoint tens of thousands of unique kernel gadget chains to perform exploitation without triggering kernel protections. Since we implement **KEPLER** to perform gadget chain exploration in parallel, we also discover that these gadget chains could typically be identified within 50 hours. These observations together imply that **KEPLER** could diversify the ways of performing kernel exploitation in an efficient fashion. Given that some commercial security products pinpoint kernel exploita-

<table>
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<th>G2</th>
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Table 5: The comparison of exploitability as well as performance of **KEPLER**. G1, G2, G3 and G4 represent the blooming gadget, bridging gadget, auxiliary and disclosure gadget pair, and stack-smash gadget. The “first chain” column indicates the time spent on pinpointing the first exploitation chain. The “total time” column specifies the total amount of time spent on finding all useful exploitation chains. † symbol represents the cases where the exploits could only bypass major mitigations (e.g., **SMAP** and **SMEP**) and fail to bypass others under our threat model. ✓ and X symbols indicate the existence and non-existence of a working exploit.
tion by using the patterns of exploits, the ability to diversify exploitation has the potential to assist an adversary to bypass the detection of commercial security products.

From Table 5, we also observe that, for different vulnerabilities, KEPLER generates different number of gadget chains useful for exploitation. This can be attributed to the following fact. In the process of gadget chain identification and assessment, KEPLER starts gadget assessment from different machine states and contexts. For some vulnerabilities, the machine states and contexts do not provide us with sufficient control over some registers and memory regions. Under this circumstance, the availability of useful kernel gadgets would vary and thus influence the total number of generated exploits.

In Table 5, we also depict the time spent on finding the first kernel gadget chain useful for exploitation. As we can observe, KEPLER could quickly output an useful exploitation chain in less than about 50 wall-clock minutes (and the corresponding CPU-core time is roughly 1400 minutes given the prototype system uses 28 concurrent workers). This implies KEPLER has the potential to be used as a tool to quickly derive a working exploit without too many human efforts. Last but not least, Table 5 also shows the total number kernel gadgets in different categories. As we can observe, there are typically tens of gadgets in each categories. This means that one cannot simply block our exploitation approach by eliminating a small number of kernel gadgets. In Section 9, we will further discuss the defense of our exploitation approach.

9 Discussion and Future Research

In this section, we discuss some plausible defence mechanisms against our “single-shot” exploit chain. Also, we elaborate why they are not effective nor suitable for preventing the proposed attack. Following our discussion and analysis, we then provide some suggestions for the future research. **Plausible Defense Mechanisms.** To defend against the exploit chain mentioned above, one straightforward reaction is to eliminate the gadgets that must be used in kernel exploitation. However, as we have already demonstrated and discussed in Section 8, the tool we develop could enrich the choices of the gadgets needed for exploitation. This means that, following this potential solution, Linux developers would inevitably introduce significant amount of kernel code changes and it is difficult to guarantee these changes would not bring about negative influence upon Linux kernel execution. Other security mitigation could also be used as potential defense mechanisms. For example, there have already been a rich collection of research works on control and data flow integrity protection (e.g. [2] [78] [79] [25] [16] [26]). In addition, randomizing stack canary per-function call [73] could ideally prevent our exploit technique because it discourage the effort to fake stack frame and leak stack canary with copy_to_user. Integrating and enabling them in Linux kernel, they could easily fail the attack mentioned above. Unfortunately, these techniques usually incur unacceptable overhead (e.g., [16] has an average overhead of 13%) or sometimes rely upon hardware features to reduce their overhead (e.g., [25]). As a result, they are barely used as a practical, general defense solution in popular release version of Linux kernel.

**Possible Future Research.** Looking ahead, we suggest the future research could be conducted from two aspects. From the perspective of automatic exploit primitive evaluation, we believe there is an emerging need to invent technique to systematically evaluate various exploit primitives, especially for those weak exploit primitives. In practice, theory and techniques should be proposed to facilitate deriving better exploit primitive with a initially weak exploit primitive. From the perspective of defense, on one hand, we believe there remains the need to design lightweight control-flow enforcements for Linux kernel. On the other hand, instead of manually overhauling kernel code, one could augment GCC with the ability to eliminate the exploitation gadgets at compilation time.

10 Conclusion

We show it is generally challenging to generate exploits with a control-flow hijacking primitive in the Linux kernel under a realistic threat model, while there are a lot of research efforts in identifying exploit primitives and facilitating exploit generation with various exploit primitives. We propose KEPLER, a framework to facilitate evaluation of control-flow hijacking primitives which leverages a novel “single-shot” exploitation to convert a control-flow hijacking primitive into a classic stack overflow and thus bootstrap traditional code-reuse attack against modern Linux kernel. In comparison with previous automatic exploit generation and exploit hardening techniques, we showed that KEPLER outperforms other exploit techniques and could automatically generate thousands of working exploit for a control-flow hijacking primitive in Linux kernel despite the challenges of widely-deployed security mitigations, exploit path pitfall and ill-suited exploit primitive. Following this finding, we safely conclude that KEPLER can significantly facilitate evaluating control-flow hijacking primitive in the Linux kernel.

11 Availability

We release the source code of KEPLER, a kernel embedded with vulnerabilities and generated gadget chains for research and education purpose [76].

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References


As is discussed in Section 6, we utilize a series of kernel gadgets to bypass kernel mitigations. After that, we redirect the control flow of the Linux kernel to a universal ROP payload. By using that payload,
considering Linux kernel might perform inline permission checks and we need to execute an ROP payload with an arbitrary length, we further utilize the ROP payload like the one shown in Table 7 to address this payload length issue.