What’s in a Name?
Reputation and Monitoring in the Audit Market

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Abstract

Unlike audit reports in some countries, an audit report issued in the USA does not include the name of the engagement partner. In December 2015, a new rule was passed (pending approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission) which requires that the name of the engagement partner be disclosed in audit reports issued after January 2017. We study the incentives of auditors under the two regimes - with and without disclosure of partner names. We argue that if the level of monitoring within the audit firm remains the same under the two regimes, then audit quality will be higher under the disclosure regime. However, an unintended consequence of the new rule is that partners (an engagement quality reviewer or a successor partner) have lower incentives to monitor a fellow partner under the disclosure regime. As a result, under some parametric conditions, audit quality may be lower if partner names are disclosed. This problem can be addressed through a realignment of incentives inside the accounting firm, external monitoring from regulators or through increased audit fees.

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1 Introduction

Currently, audit reports issued in the USA do not reveal the name of the lead partner at the audit firm who conducted the audit. In December 2015, PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) approved a new rule which mandates that the lead partner’s name be disclosed in Audit reports. This rule may come into effect after January 2017 if it gets approved by the Security and Exchange Commission. In this paper, we analyse partner incentives under the two regimes (with and without disclosure of partner names) and explore the possible impact of the new rule on audit quality. This paper highlights an important tussle between monitoring and reputation incentives in a partnership under two different information structures - a collective reputation environment and an individual reputation environment. Thus, our paper contains a more general message but we set it in the audit market environment for two reasons - a) To analyse the impact of the proposed rule and b) To write down a rich model which incorporates many details particular to the audit industry in the hope that this model can be used for analysing several different questions related to the audit market.

Our analysis leads us to a potential unintended consequence of disclosure of partner names - we show that when there are similar incentives to monitor in the two regimes, then an engagement partner has higher incentives to produce higher quality of audits under the disclosure regime (as compared to the non-disclosure regime). However, incentives to monitor a fellow partner may be lower under the disclosure regime, which in turn can lead to lower audit quality. We argue that this unintended consequence can be mitigated through a realignment of incentives inside the accounting firm, external monitoring from regulators or through increased audit fees. A more detailed discussion about the intuition for these results is presented later in the introduction after we have described the setting but the essential idea is as follows. While the identification of the partner makes his reputation (and therefore future payoffs) more sensitive to his actions, the incentives to monitor a fellow partner reduces with identification because bad actions taken by another partner no longer affects your own reputation (since reputation is not collectively shared with others under partner identification). This creates a tradeoff which makes the impact of the new rule on audit quality uncertain.

Before we describe our analyses and results, a bit of context is in order (we will give more details and context in section 4). An external auditor checks the financial statements of a legal entity or organization in accordance with specific laws or rules. It is independent of the entity being audited. For example, Deloitte could be the Audit firm which checks the financial statements for Coca-Cola. Users of the entity’s financial information, such as investors, government agencies and the general public rely on the external auditor to present an unbiased and independent audit report. Audit firms usually operate as partnerships and audit partners are responsible for managing the audit department and engage in client audits. Unlike several other jurisdictions such as the EU countries and Australia, in the U.S.A., the name of the lead audit partner is not disclosed to investors and other users of financial statements of publicly traded companies. This has been criticized by several papers for the following reasons. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s oversight activities reveal that audit quality varies across engagements within the big accounting firms (PCAOB (2013)). Knechel, Vanstraalen, and Zerni (2015) provide evidence that reporting ‘style’ varies systematically across individual auditors and persists over time. They argue that such differences could be due to systematic differences in risk tolerance or other idiosyncratic partner attributes affecting decisions made during the course of the audit. Researchers also argue that differences across individual partners may
influence audit quality (DeFond and Francis (2005)). Consequently, compared to the identity of the audit partner, the identity of the accounting firm may constitute a less informative signal of audit quality for individual engagements. At this juncture, it is important to ask the following question - in real life, do capital market participants (like investors) indeed value the information contained in the identity of individual audit partners beyond the information provided by the identity of the audit firm? In a recent study, Aobdia et al. (2015) use data from Taiwan and document positive association between the partner’s quality and the client firm’s earnings response coefficient. They also report positive market reaction when a firm replaces a lower quality partner with a higher quality one and they find evidence that firms audited by higher quality partners experience smaller Initial Public Offering (IPO) underpricing which allows them to obtain better debt contract terms. Overall, their results suggest that capital market participants place (and should place) positive value on information which reveals the identity of the audit partner to them. The other reason for revealing partner names is the argument of transparency leading to improved audits. This is the idea that if an audit partner’s name is revealed in the audit report, it could generate stronger incentives for the partner to build his reputation via high quality audit reports. This may lead to an improvement in audit quality. Next, we describe the key relationships affecting incentives.

Our model includes three types of bilateral relationships unique to the audit market, that could affect audit quality. The first is the partner-issuer manager relationship, which arises because of the manager’s ability to pressure the auditor by imposing a cost (external exclusion) on the auditor in the event of a disagreement about the issuer’s financial statements. The second is the partner-partner relationship. Here the ‘monitor’ partner (who can be an engagement quality reviewer or a successor partner) may observe the behavior of the engagement partner and disclose it to the accounting firm. The third is the audit firm - audit partner relationship, which captures the audit firms’ ability to impose sanctions on a partner or fire (internal exclusion) and replace a partner if the partner is found to be guilty of succumbing to the issuer’s pressure. Next, we describe these relationships and give an intuitive idea of our model.

Investors base their investment decisions on issuer firm’s financial statements. An audit report on the issuer firm’s financial statement is the product of an interaction between the issuer-manager and the auditor. Investors’ interests and the manager’s interests are not always perfectly aligned for various reasons. For example, the manager’s compensation may be tied to the company’s performance. As a result, the manager has a direct incentive to paint a positive picture of the company’s financial state. The auditor’s role is to form an opinion about the quality of the issuer’s financial statements and the audit opinion is disclosed to the investors. This helps mitigate information risk for the investors. While the investors value accurate information, the managers of issuer-firms may prefer favorable reports from auditors. This conflict of interest between the investors and managers affects the auditor because the manager of the issuer firm has considerable influence on decisions regarding hiring and compensating of the auditor (Beck and Mauldin (2014)). Therefore, managers can pressure auditors into issuing favorable opinions and succumbing to this pressure impairs auditor independence, thereby reducing audit quality (DeFond and Zhang (2014), Carcello and Neal (2000)). To guard against this, accounting firms have monitoring systems in place. A partner’s behavior is therefore controlled by the internal monitoring activities and sanctions that the accounting firm may impose in case of low quality of audits. In addition, compensation of the partner plays a key role in driving incentives for the partner. The novelty of our analysis is in exploring how partner identification can directly and indirectly affect the key drivers of incentives, namely compensation and sanctions.
In our two-period model, revenue from auditing an issuer is increasing in reputation, where reputation is directly linked to the perceived audit quality on that particular engagement. The partner auditing the issuer obtains a noisy signal about the issuer’s cash-flows, which is to be announced to the investor. The issuer prefers a favorable signal and can commit to put pressure (make it costly for the partner to announce his realized signal) on the engagement partner to issue a favorable audit report. By acquiescing, a partner avoids the cost (pressure) the issuer would have imposed on him. However, acquiescing to the issuer leads to lower quality of audits and adversely affects the reputation of the firm and the engagement partner depending on the disclosure regime. Whether a partner acquiesced to the client may be detected by a successor partner or an engagement quality reviewer. A successor partner is one who is assigned to the issuer in the second period. Under the mandatory audit partner rotation rule, a partner must be replaced by a new successor partner every five years. In the model, there is a positive probability that the partner assigned to an issuer in the first period is replaced by a different partner in the second period. In this case, the new successor partner acts as a monitor and can report against the engagement partner if the audit evidence does not support the audit opinion. If an engagement partner is reported by the monitor partner and is found to have acquiesced, he faces sanctions from the leadership of the audit firm. There is a fixed cost of reporting which the monitor partner has to incur in case he reports the other partner of acquiescing. Hence, the incentives to raise a flag against the engagement partner depend on how reporting affects the expected payoff of the monitor partner; which in turn depends on the sharing rule, how reputation affects audit fees and the cost of reporting. An engagement partner’s incentives similarly depend on how the investor updates his belief about the partner and the accounting firm, the existing payment rule inside the accounting firm and the expected sanctions.

Note that a partner’s payoff depends on the existing profit sharing rule and the collective reputation of the accounting firm when partner names are not disclosed. On the other hand, when partner names are disclosed, the payoff of the partner is directly linked to his own reputation. Thus, for a given level of monitoring, the engagement partner has lower incentives to acquiesce under the disclosure regime because the action of a partner directly affects his own future payoff by changing beliefs about his reputation. However, incentives to monitor may be higher in the non-disclosure regime as partners share reputation. The intuition for this is as follows. In the disclosure regime, a partner’s payoffs are more heavily dependent on his own reputation since partner names are observed. Bad behavior of the other partner does not affect the reputation of the current partner and therefore has minimal effect on his payoffs. In comparison, in the non-disclosure regime, investors don’t observe the identity of the engagement partner; so bad behavior by one partner reduces the reputation of both partners. This generates incentives for the successor partner to report the other partner and clear his name (increase own reputation) whenever he observes bad behavior. Thus, if there is no cost of reporting, or if an outside third party can compensate or punish partners and ensure reporting, then disclosing the name of the partner can lead to higher quality audit reports. On the other hand, if the cost of reporting is positive (but not so high to discourage monitoring), then not disclosing the name of engagement partners may provide incentives to the monitor to report on the erring partner. Note that monitoring by the successor partner is important because of two reasons. First, it improves the quality of an audit in the future, since the partner who has been reporting incorrectly in the first period faces internal exclusion and is replaced

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1This cost can be interpreted as a personal cost of accusing a fellow partner and going through the entire process of investigation and internal inquiry subsequently. Alternatively, we could also interpret the cost as Reuben and Stephenson (2013), who show that individuals who report against fellow group members are often shunned later.

2An accounting firm is a collective body of partners and these partners are heterogeneous in individual characteristics. Since the partner names are not disclosed in the United States, the accounting firm’s reputation depends on the behavior of each of its partners.
by another partner. Second, the threat of being detected provides additional incentives for the engagement partner to not acquiesce to the client in the first period.

One caveat to this model is that monitoring by the successor partner does not improve audit quality by preventing an incorrect audit report from being issued in the current period. We address this problem in Section 8 where monitoring comes from the engagement quality reviewer. An engagement quality reviewer can prevent an incorrect audit report by reporting against the engagement partner before the audit report is issued. When monitoring comes from an engagement quality reviewer instead of a successor partner, reporting against an erring partner not only improves audit quality in the future, but also improves audit quality in the current period. We show that under the disclosure regime, like the successor partner, the engagement quality reviewer too has lower incentives to monitor. This in turn can keep the policy from achieving the benefits to its full potential.

In Section 10 we discuss three different solutions to the monitoring problem. The first solution is to increase external monitoring by regulators, which raises expected costs for the monitor if he fails to detect that the engagement partner had acquiesced. The Auditing Standard No. 7 (AS7), Engagement Quality Review, requires that an “engagement quality reviewer is to perform an evaluation of the significant judgements made by the engagement team and the related conclusions reached in forming the overall conclusion on the engagement and in preparing the engagement report, if a report is to be issued, in order to determine whether to provide concurring approval of issuance.” Thus the Auditing Standard No. 7 works as a complement to the disclosure of partner names. Second, we argue that the problem can be addressed even without external intervention through realignment of incentives within the audit firm. The desired goal can be achieved by treating the monitor as the “sink” who collects penalty from the engagement partner for acquiescing to the client. The third potential solution is to increase audit fees which in turn leads to increased revenue for the firm. For a given sharing rule, an increased audit fee can provide incentives for both the engagement partner and the monitor partner. The proposed solution is also supported by the empirical findings of Carcello and Li (2013) where the authors report the joint occurrence of higher quality of audits and higher audit fees after audit partners were mandated to sign the audit report in the UK.

Our paper contributes to the literature by providing a theoretical model on how partner identification interacts with profit sharing rules and sanctions inside the accounting firms and affects incentives of partners. To the best of our knowledge this paper is the first to model the three relational aspects unique to the audit market (the leadership of the accounting firm to audit partner relationship, the partner-partner relationship via monitoring, and the partner’s interaction with the client) to explore the consequences of a disclosure of partner names. Although the model is streamlined to fit the audit context, our analysis speaks to the broader issue of incentives under collective reputation versus those under individual reputation models of partnerships. We show that there may be trade off in monitoring and reputation incentives when moving from collective reputation environments to individual reputation environments.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes some of the related literature. We go on to describe a simplistic toy model in section 3 to highlight the intuition in our paper without going into technical or institutional detail. Before going into our model, in section 4, we discuss the history and context of our setting to help readers who are unfamiliar with the audit market environment. Section 5 presents the formal model with partner rotation. Section 6 presents the analysis of equilibria in our benchmark model for the disclosure and non-disclosure regime. Section 7 analyzes the model with external
transfer under the two regimes. Section 8 analyzes monitoring incentives of the engagement quality reviewer. Section 9 provides a brief discussion on an alternative model of multitasking, which yields results with similar policy implications as the earlier sections. Section 10 discusses potential solutions to the monitoring problem. Section 11 presents the summary and possible extensions of the model.

2 Literature

In this section we describe the related literature. While the main purpose of this paper is to analyze the changes in incentives of partners and the impact on audit quality of the partner identification rule, at its heart this paper analyzes the more general issue of monitoring in collective reputation environments versus individual reputation environments. Thus, this paper is related to at least two strands of literature: first, the work on analyzing the impact of such laws in other countries (like Carcello and Li (2013)) and second, the literature on collective reputation and monitoring. Additionally, our paper shares some common themes with other papers who look at incentives in the audit market like Lee (2014). We describe some of these papers next and highlight how our paper makes a contribution.

Empirical evidence on whether partner identification can lead to higher audit quality is mixed. Blay et al. (2014) find no evidence of improved audit quality following the implementation of the partner identification rule in Netherlands. Carcello and Li (2013), on the other hand, document an increase in audit fees as well as an improvement in audit quality in United Kingdom after this law was approved. The implications of our theory is consistent with the findings of Carcello and Li (2013). Our theory predicts that audit quality may go down when the regime changes from non-disclosure to disclosure. This is due to the reduced incentives to monitor. However, we show that a sufficient increase in audit fee can raise reputation building incentives enough to compensate for the lack of monitoring incentives, thereby leading to an increase in audit quality.

Tirole (1996) was the first to present a formal model of collective reputation exploring the effects of internal exclusion (by the firm) and external exclusion (by the clients). However, Tirole does not discuss the issue of collective reputation versus individual reputation, which is the focus of our analysis. Most theoretical research on collective reputation since, has focused on the overlapping generations model of collective reputation (Bar-Isaac (2007), Chen, Morrison, and Wilhelm, (2013)). Bar-Isaac (2007) argue that agents expend effort for individual reputation when young (since their prior reputation is low) and work for collective reputation (the reputation of the firm) when they are old. A similar analysis is conducted by Jeon (1995) who addresses an important organizational issue and finds that inter-generational grouping may be more efficient than intra generational grouping in the presence of moral hazard in joint production. These papers sidestep adverse selection issues and concentrate on moral hazard while in our model, we set aside issues of moral hazard focus on reputation and monitoring in the presence of adverse selection. Within the literature on group monitoring, we must mention the literature on microfinance which has received a lot of attention over the last two decades (see Ghatak and Guinnane (1999)). Mutual monitoring in groups is an important aspect of the joint liability group lending model adopted by many micro-finance institutions across the globe. Under joint liability lending, every member of the group is liable for the loan. Members suffer punishment from the bank if any member of the group fails to repay the loan. This generates incentives for the group members to monitor fellow members. The difference from our work is the following - In microfinance models, the incentives to monitor and report against a fellow group member exist because the
borrowers want to avoid the punishment imposed on the entire group by the bank. However, these papers do not formally discuss how the incentives to protect the collective reputation of the group may induce reporting or monitoring, which is the focus of our paper. Additionally, they have not paid attention to the change in monitoring incentives caused by the change in reputation building incentives when microfinance institutions started shifting from group liability models to individual liability models.

Chen, Morrison and Wilhelm (2013) discuss a case where individuals may do worse on their own as compared to when they are part of a firm. Thus, it is possible to think of this as an analysis which highlights some differences between the collective reputation regime and an individual reputation regime. They show that if individual incentives to signal ability by taking actions which may not be optimal for the clients are very strong, then individuals may prefer to work at a firm where there their reputation building incentives will be known to be controlled by internal monitoring. The firm engages in monitoring so that clients are reassured that individual partners will not take actions which are orthogonal to their preferences. This builds the reputation of the firm. In our paper, we consider the situation where partners are already working at a firm and we show how monitoring and reputation building incentives change when a partner identification rule changes the environment from a collective reputation regime to an individual reputation regime. Thus, the way profits within the firm are shared makes a big difference to our analysis (payoffs could be correlated across engagements). Moreover, we show that monitoring need not always come from the leadership of the firm - for example, in Chen, Morrison and Wilhelm (2013), the monitoring capability of the owner of the firm is exogenously given. We show that partners will endogenously choose to monitor each other in a collective reputation regime.

In terms of research theme, the paper closest to our paper is Lee (2014). Lee’s paper looks at individual partner incentives and the partnership’s choice of internal quality control. She shows that identifying the individual partner increases individual partner’s incentives by increasing accountability. However, she points out that partner identification decreases the partnership’s incentive for choosing high cost-high value internal monitoring to motivate partners to exert high effort. As a result, the partnership’s choice of internal quality control could be lower in the partner identification setting. This could lead to lower quality audits. The partnership may be forced to pick a higher level of monitoring if there is sufficient external monitoring. Our paper differs from Lee (2014) in three significant ways. One, Lee has a costly monitoring technology which needs to be selected at the beginning of the game. Thus, there is no problem of implementing monitoring in her paper or, in other words, she assumes that it is possible to commit to monitoring in the beginning of the game. In contrast, in our paper, partners may choose to monitor or not in equilibrium so we analyse questions like - will the partners actually monitor in equilibrium given that monitoring is not observed? We feel that this is important since monitoring is rarely done by mechanical devices which are impervious to deviations. Two, in Lee’s paper, the quality of the audit depends upon the effort choice of the partner when the partner knows the cost of effort. In our paper, the partner’s problem is whether or not to reveal his true signals in the face of an external cost which is endogenously determined in the model. Finally, Lee’s research highlights the importance of external monitoring by regulators in the context of partner identification. Our paper, on the other hand, focuses on internal realignment of incentives and audit fees as tools to achieve higher quality of

3Think of investment bankers signalling their ability by coming up with complex derivatives which may not necessarily serve best the interests of their client. Also see Ely, Jeffrey C., and Juuso Valimaki. “Bad Reputation” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2003): 785-814.
4Cost imposed by the issuer manager.
3 Toy Model

We will discuss the reputation and monitoring effects in two different reputation regimes - Collective reputation and Individual reputation. We want to make it very clear that this is not our formal model. This is a simplistic model designed to highlight the two forces at play. These opposing forces create a trade off which should be considered when contemplating a shift from collective reputation institutions to individual reputation institutions. We will outline our formal model and analysis after this section.

The general set up is that of a multi-period game with a firm with more than one worker and one customer. Each worker has a type which is known only to that worker. The customer prefers one of these types to the other, thereby making the reputation of the worker important to the customer. The customer does not know which worker from the firm is working on his job in the collective reputation regime. So the worker’s share a collective reputation whereas in the individual reputation regime, the customer knows the identity of the worker who works on his job so the individual reputation of that worker matters more. A simple model which describes this set up follows.

3.1 Toy Model - Reputation Effect

Consider a simple 3 player, 2 period example. There are two workers and one customer. The workers can take one of two actions - good (G) or bad (B). The action choice is not observed by the customer. The good action is costly for the player and cost is \( c \) whereas the bad action is free. Each worker can either be Non-Strategic (NS) or Strategic (S). Each worker’s type is his private information. The non-strategic worker is behavioral and always takes the action \( G \) i.e. the good action whereas the strategic type worker can take either action.

The prior probability of either worker being non-strategic is given by \( p_n \). This is common knowledge. Both workers are in a firm which has two jobs. Job 1 belongs to the customer and the pay from job 1 depends upon the reputation of the worker to be of non-strategic type (as perceived by the customer). Suppose the pay in job 1 is equal to the reputation and is given by \( p \) which is the probability that the player is of non-strategic type. The pay from job 2 is fixed at \( W \). Job 1 can be a success (S) or failure. This outcome is publicly observed. The probability of success depends upon the action taken:

\[
P(S/G) = 1
\]
\[
P(S/B) = \frac{1}{2}
\]

\( ; \ P(S/a) = \text{Probability of success when action a is taken.} \)

Thus, the good action always yields success and the bad action has success with probability \( \frac{1}{2} \). The timing of the game is as follows. Nature picks the workers’ types and the workers learn their own types privately. One of the workers is randomly chosen to work on job 1. **The customer does not observe this selection in the collective reputation model and observes it in the individual reputation model.** The worker takes his private action. The outcome of job 1 is observed. With probability \( \frac{1}{2} \), the worker who performed job 1 will work on job 2 next and with probability \( \frac{1}{2} \) that worker will continue on job 1 in period...
2. The customer does not observe this change in the collective reputation model and observes it in the individual reputation model. After this selection is made, the customer pays the firm based on his beliefs about the type worker assigned to him. Again the worker on job 1 chooses his action, the outcome is observed and the game ends.

Only period 2 payoff matters (this is just to simplify analysis). The customer pays before the job is executed in period 2 and so the payoff to the firm in period 2 is \( p \) from job 1 and \( W \) from job 2 where \( p \) is the reputation of the worker who will perform job 1 in period 2. This payoff is split among the workers in the following way. Each worker gets a share of the payoff from his own job and a share of the payoff from the other worker’s job. The worker who is on job 1 gets \( \alpha p + \beta W \) and the worker on job 2 gets \( (1 - \alpha)p + (1 - \beta)W \). We assume that you get more from your own assignment i.e. \( \alpha > \frac{1}{2} > \beta \).

We will argue that in this model it will be easier to get the strategic type worker to play the good action in period 1 in the individual reputation regime as compared to the collective reputation regime. ‘Easier’ here will simply mean that the range of parameters under which the good action equilibrium exists in the collective reputation regime is a subset of the set of parameters required for the existence of the same equilibria in the individual reputation regime. Note that the strategic type worker will always play the costless bad action in period 2 since it is the last period. So only period 1 play is interesting.

### 3.1.1 Collective Reputation

In the collective reputation model, the customer does not see which worker is working on job 1 at any time. We ask the following question - Is there an equilibrium of this game in which the strategic type worker plays the good action in period 1?

Suppose there is then the following must be true for the strategic type worker:

\[
\text{Payoff from } G \geq \text{Payoff from } B
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow \quad \frac{1}{2}[\alpha p_n + \beta W] + \frac{1}{2}[(1 - \alpha)p_n + (1 - \beta)W] - c \geq \frac{1}{2}\left[\frac{1}{2}[(1 - \alpha)p_n + (1 - \beta)W] + \frac{1}{2}(\alpha p_n + \beta W) + \frac{1}{2}(1 - \alpha)p_n + (1 - \beta)W]\right]
\]

\[
; p = \frac{1}{2} \theta + \frac{1}{2} p_n = \frac{p_n}{2}
\]

The above boils down to the condition:

\[
p_n \geq 8c
\]

### 3.1.2 Individual Reputation

In the individual reputation model, the customer does see which worker is working on job 1 at any time. We again ask the following question - Is there an equilibrium of this game in which the strategic type worker plays the good action in period 1?
Suppose there is then the following must be true for the strategic type worker:

\[ Payoff \text{ from } G \geq Payoff \text{ from } B \]

\[ \iff \frac{1}{2} [\alpha p_n + \beta W] + \frac{1}{2} [(1 - \alpha)p_n + (1 - \beta)W] - c \geq \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2} \left[ \alpha p_n + \beta W \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[(1 - \alpha)p_n + (1 - \beta)W\right] \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2} \left[ \alpha p' + \beta W \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[(1 - \alpha)p'' + (1 - \beta)W\right] \right) \]

\[ : p' = 0 \& p'' = p_n \]

The above boils down to the condition:

\[ p_n \geq \frac{4c}{\alpha} \] (6)

Since \( \alpha > \frac{1}{2} \), it is easy to see that the range of \( p_n \) for which there exist equilibria in which the strategic type worker takes the good action in period 1 is much larger in the individual regime as compared to collective reputation regime.

### 3.1.3 Intuition

The intuition here is simple. The reason why players may take the good action is that the gains from maintaining a high reputation are more than cost of taking the good action. The reason why this might be more effective in an individual reputation regime is as follows: in a collective reputation regime, the cost of taking the bad action (loss of reputation) is not completely born by the worker who takes the bad action. Since the customer does not know which worker is working on his job, even when he observes that the worker failed in period 1, he has to allow for the possibility that the worker in period 2 is the other one (who has an untainted reputation). This means that the reputation drop (payoff drop) suffered by the worker in period 1 who took the bad action is not as severe as the drop he would have to face if it was the individual reputation regime (where his reputation would fall to zero after a failure). In this sense, the transparency of the individual reputation regime encourages better behavior by increasing reputation incentives.

### 3.2 Toy Model - Monitoring Effect

In this section we will present a slightly modified version of the previous model. **This modification will not change the result of the previous section.** However, we do this because the modification allows us to present some intuitive ideas.

The modification to the previous section is to the probability of success functions. For this section we assume that:

\[ P(S/G) = \frac{1}{2} \] (7)

\[ P(S/B) = 0 \] (8)

So, while in the previous section we had that the non-strategic worker always succeeds and the strategic worker can fail if he chooses the bad action, in this section we make the assumption that the non-strategic
worker may succeed or fail and the strategic worker will always fail if he takes the bad action but may succeed if he takes the good action. This modification allows us to present the difference between the two information structures. In the previous section bad news (news of failure) was fully informative and good news (news of success) may have come from either type worker. In this section, on the other hand, we have that it is not necessary (depending upon the equilibrium being played) that either news of success or news of failure reveal types. The critical difference that comes with this modification is that bad news is not fully informative but is more likely to come from the strategic worker. If we had used the probabilities from the previous section then bad news would have removed the information asymmetry completely while the the news which had the information asymmetry (good news) was more likely to come from the non-strategic worker. We will see how this impacts our analysis. Note once again, that the result from the previous section will go through with this environment as well. Next, we describe the monitoring addition to the model.

Suppose that the worker who is assigned to job 1 at the beginning of period 2 learns if the previous worker on job 1 had played $G$ or $B$. At a cost $c_m$ to himself (independent of worker type) he can initiate an investigation which will find out if the first worker played $B$. If the investigation finds the first worker guilty, the worker is removed and replaced with another worker from a pool of workers where the probability of any given worker being of non-strategic type is given by $p_n$. If the new worker incorrectly accuses the previous partner for playing $B$ then he himself is removed and replaced. We assume that the investigation always uncovers the truth. The customer always observes if a worker is fired but does not observe which worker is fired in the collective reputation regime. He does observe the identity of the fired worker in the individual reputation regime.

In such an environment, we ask - when will the second worker report the first worker in equilibrium? The first thing to notice is that if the first period play is a pooling equilibrium (both types playing the good action) then there is no benefit in reporting the other worker. This is because the old worker’s reputation is unchanged in a pooling equilibrium and remains at $p_n$ which cannot be improved by getting the worker fired in either regime. Since there is a positive cost and no benefit we can not have reporting in an equilibrium in which both types behave in the first period. However, there may be other equilibria of the game in which there is reporting and the strategic worker plays the bad action with positive probability in period 1. The following claim establishes the fact that there are no reporting equilibria in the individual reputation regime. Then we will show that in the collective reputation regime there are reporting equilibria. One might feel that claim 1 uses the fact that the payoff from job 2 is independent of the worker’s reputation. However corollary 1 establishes claim 1 to be a general result.

### 3.2.1 Individual Reputation

**Claim 1.** There is no reporting equilibria in the individual reputation regime.

**Proof.** This is easy to see. Suppose the first worker had played the bad action $B$ and failed and suppose there is an equilibrium with reporting under the individual reputation regime where a first period strategic worker plays the bad action with probability $1 - q$ and the good action with probability $q$ where $q \in [0, 1)$. Then:

$$\text{Payoff from reporting} = \alpha p_n + \beta W - c_m \quad (9)$$

$$\text{Payoff from not reporting} = \alpha p_n + \beta W \quad (10)$$
This is because in the individual reputation regime, the identity of the worker on job 1 is revealed to the customer. So the payoff to the worker from his own job is guaranteed at $\alpha p_n$. In this simple construction, the payoff from job 2 is independent of the worker’s reputation so the result follows.

**Corollary 1.** Even if the payoff from job 2 depended upon the worker’s reputation (the worker engaged on job 2), there is still no reporting equilibria in the individual reputation regime.

**Proof.** Suppose the payoff from job 2 to the worker engaged on job 1 is $\beta p'$ where $p'$ is the reputation of the worker engaged on job 2. If the worker on job 1 reports the first worker, then the worker is fired and replaced by another with reputation $p_n$. So the payoff to the reporting worker is $\alpha p_n + \beta p_n - c_m$. If the worker does not report the first worker, the the worker is not fired and since the customers believe that the players are playing an equilibrium with reporting they interpret the no firing to be because the first worker played the good action. This makes the reputation of the worker engaged in job 2 equal to $p_n$. This is because both types have the same probability of success when they play the good action\(^5\). Thus, the payoff of the worker on job 1 is $\alpha p_n + \beta p_n > \alpha p_n + \beta p_n - c_m$.

3.2.2 Collective Reputation

Suppose the first worker had played the bad action $B$ and had failed. Consider an equilibrium with reporting under the collective reputation regime where the first period strategic worker plays the bad action with probability $1 - q$ and the good action with probability $q$ where $q \in [0, 1)$. We don’t show the optimality of the first period actions here (that mixing is equilibrium behavior) here but it can easily be shown that such an equilibrium exists under simple conditions like the cost of taking the good action is not too high. We concentrate our attention to showing that under the collective reputation regime, unlike the individual reputation regime, there exists an equilibrium with reporting.

**Theorem 1.** Under the collective reputation regime, if $\frac{\alpha p_n}{2}(1 - p_n)(1 - q) \geq c_m$ holds, then there exists a reporting equilibrium where the strategic type worker in period 1 plays the good action with probability $q$.

**Proof.** Notice first that a worker would never report on himself in equilibrium. This fact will be useful in constructing this equilibrium. This is because since the customer does not observe if the worker has been switched or not, the customer assigns positive probability to the same worker returning. Thus, when the customer sees no firing after a failure, the interpretation is that either the worker was switched and the first worker took the good action (else the worker would have been reported) or the worker was not switched in which case the worker would never have been reported. So it is possible in the minds of the customer, that the first worker took the bad action and failed and was not reported because the same worker was assigned in period 2. Consider the incentives of the worker who has to make the reporting decision.

\[
\text{Payoff from reporting} = \alpha p_n + \beta W - c_m \quad (11)
\]

\[
\text{Payoff from not reporting} = \alpha p' + \beta W \quad (12)
\]

\(^5\)The corollary result would also go through if the non-strategic worker had a higher probability of success when taking the action $G$ (compared to the strategic worker).
where $P'$ is the probability that the worker engaged on project 1 is of non-strategic type after the customer observes the history - failure, no firing. This probability is given by the following expression:

$$P' = \frac{p_n}{2}(1 + p_n + (1 - p_n)q)$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

It is easy to show that $P' < p_n$ since $q < 1$. So the second worker can actually improve his reputation by reporting the first worker and getting him fired. If the gains from this improvement are large enough then there is a reporting equilibrium. Formally, there is a reporting equilibrium if:

$$\alpha p_n + \beta W - c_m \geq \alpha P' + \beta W$$
$$\Leftrightarrow$$
$$\alpha(p_n - P') \geq c_m$$
$$\Leftrightarrow$$
$$\frac{\alpha p_n}{2}(1 - p_n)(1 - q) \geq c_m$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

The above expression would hold for small $c_m$. Thus, if costs are positive but small then there are reporting equilibria in the collective reputation regime but not in the individual reputation regime.

### 3.2.3 Intuition

Essentially, the idea here is as follows. Consider the monitoring incentives of worker who has been assigned job 1 in period 2 and he observes that the worker in period 1 had taken the bad action which resulted in failure. In the collective reputation regime, bad behavior of the first period worker lowers the reputation of the second period worker as well since they share a collective reputation. This generates incentives for the second period worker to report the first period worker who took the bad action which led to failure. On the other hand, if it is an individual reputation regime, then the customers know that the new worker has been assigned to the job so the reputation of the new worker is unaffected by the bad action taken by the first period worker.

### 4 History and Context

Unlike several other jurisdictions such as the EU countries and Australia, in the U.S.A., the name of the lead audit partner is not disclosed to investors and other users of financial statements of publicly traded companies. We have pointed out the criticisms for this in the introduction. In response to a recommendation by the U.S. Department of Treasury, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued a Concept Release Requiring the Engagement Partner to Sign the Audit Report (No. 2009-005 – Concept Release). Greater transparency and higher accountability of individual auditors were the two main goals this new standard aimed to achieve. The proposed rule was strongly opposed by the major accounting firms (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Pricewaterhouse-Coopers) who were of the opinion that given the nature of checks and balances existing in most audit firms, the signature requirement would be irrelevant to audit quality and would subject engagement partners to additional liability risks. Moreover, they felt that this additional expo-
sure would lead to inefficiently high levels of effort by partners trying to play it safe. Investors, on the other hand, supported the proposal and argued that greater transparency would enhance audit quality by increasing the engagement partner’s sense of accountability to financial statement users. After four rounds of public comments, in December 2015, the PCAOB approved the new rule which mandates that the lead engagement partner’s name be disclosed in the new PCAOB Form AP, Auditor Reporting of Certain Audit Participants. The PCAOB believes that this approach will achieve the objectives of transparency and accountability of the audit while appropriately addressing concerns regarding liability of the auditor (PCAOB, 2015). Upon approval by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), the new rule for engagement partner disclosure will apply to auditor’s reports issued on or after Jan. 31, 2017, or three months after SEC approval of the final rules, whichever is later.

5 Model

In this section we present the benchmark model in a simple two-period set up with all agents being risk neutral.

5.1 Players

There is an audit firm with three partners: one managing partner (who acts as the leadership/owner of the audit firm) and two engagement partners who can work on projects/auditing jobs. There is an issuer (client) who wishes to be audited and every period there is an investor for whom the issuer’s firm is an investment prospect. In our model, the managing partner of the audit firm and the investor will be passive (behavioral) players. This simplification allows us to concentrate our study on the reputation and monitoring incentives faced by the engagement partners in the face of pressure from the issuer to issue favorable reports. The partners maximize discounted sum of payoffs where the discount factor is denoted by $\delta$. The issuer is assumed to be myopic and he maximizes only current period payoff. This assumption is for simplicity and will not change our results qualitatively.

5.2 Projects and State of the World

In each period the issuer’s period cash flows is picked by nature and could take two values: $G$ and $B$ with probability $p$ and $1 - p$ respectively. This probability is common knowledge. At the end of each period, the true cash flow of that period is revealed to all players. One engagement partner audits the issuer’s firm and the partner who does not work with the issuer is engaged in another project that we name Project 2. We assume that this project is one in which a partner of any type (partner types will become clear shortly) plays the same action and therefore the reputation of the partner is unaffected by its outcome. This assumption simplifies our analysis and allows to us focus on the issuer’s project. As is clear, we will primarily be interested in the issuer’s project and we will call it the good state of the world if the cash-flow drawn by nature in that period is $G$, else it is the bad state of the world.
5.3 Partner Assignment and Rotation

The issuer has to hire the audit firm in every period\(^6\). After the issuer hires the audit firm in Period 1, an unbiased coin is tossed to decide which engagement partner works with the issuer in that period and which partner works on Project 2. The issuer, engagement partners and the managing partner observe the realization of this coin toss. Under the non-disclosure regime, the investor does not know the identity of the partner chosen to issue the audit report for the issuer. Under the disclosure regime, the identity of the partner is observed by the investor as well (since the partner signs their name, you know who issued the audit report).

Partner rotation and monitoring occurs as follows. In Period 2, the partner continues to be with the issuer with probability \(\gamma\). With probability \(1 - \gamma\), the other partner is assigned to the issuer. The investor does not observe the switch in partners in the non-disclosure regime (but does so in the disclosure regime). However, the parameter \(\gamma\) is common knowledge to all players.

5.4 Partner Signals/Auditing

Each period, the partner assigned to the issuer gets a signal \(s \in \{g, b\}\) about the true cash flow in that period. The conditional distribution of signals is as follows. The audit partner observes the signal \(g\) whenever the true cash flow is \(G\). However, if the true cash flow is \(B\) the audit partner observes \(g\) with probability \(\epsilon\) (this may not be small) and \(b\) with probability \(1 - \epsilon\). The partner informs the issuer of his signal truthfully. We assume that he cannot misinform the issuer. This is to be interpreted as a file documenting the partner’s ‘assessment’ of the issuer which the partner has to show to the issuer. The audit partner has to announce a signal to all players, in particular to the investor. The investor wants to invest in the issuer only if the state is \(G\). He updates his beliefs about the true state being \(G\) after observing the signal announced by the partner.

5.5 Conflict and Issuer Actions

A conflict between the issuer and the auditor occurs whenever the audit partner gets the signal \(b\) since, if announced, this would indicate to the investor that the true state is bad resulting in zero investment by the investor that period. This hurts the payoff of the issuer (payoffs will be described formally later). If there is a conflict, the issuer can commit to a one period cost\(^7\) (cost \(\in [0, \infty)\)) which he would impose on the partner if the partner chooses to announce \(b\) instead of \(g\). Putting pressure on the partner is costly for the issuer as well.

We assume that the cost of putting pressure level \(B\) is \(B^k\) i.e. the utility from putting pressure \(B\) is \(-B\).

5.6 Partner Actions

We assume that the partner reports the signal \(g\) whenever he gets \(g\). One may wonder if this is reasonable. In particular, could the partner threaten to announce \(b\) when his true signal is \(g\)? We do not allow for this possibility for the following reasons. One, the issuer can sue the auditor for lying. Remember the auditor’s signal is \(g\) and he threatens to disclose \(b\). Thus, the auditor has no supportive evidence for the opinion as the signal he received does not match the signal he plans to disclose. Two, on a similar note, the client can

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\(^6\)This may be required by law as observed in the U.S.A.

\(^7\)Alternatively, a transfer. This cost can be interpreted as anything from making life hard for the partner to getting him fired or not offering him a job in the future

\(^8\)This could be interpreted as an expected loss in the future if this action was discovered.
report the partner to the managing partner and that can initiate an investigation on the lying partner. A similar assumption has been made by others including McLennan and Park (2003).

If the partner gets the signal \( b \), he may be pressured into announcing \( g \) by the issuer who fears losing that periods investment by the investor. If there is a conflict at time \( t \), then the partner has two action choices. He can either bow to the pressure and acquiesce \( (A) \) (by choosing to announce signal \( g \) instead of \( b \) to avoid the cost \( B \)) to the issuer or not acquiesce \( (NA) \) (announce true signal \( b \)).

Thus, if there is no conflict at \( t \), then the partner’s action set is simply \( \{NA\} \) and if there is a conflict at time \( t \), the partner’s action set is \( \{A, NA\} \).

### 5.7 Partner Types

The partners can be one of two types: Rigid \( (R) \) or Flexible \( (F) \) (we define types following Dye, Balachandran, and Magee (1990)). At time zero, nature picks the type of the two partners independently from a distribution \( \Gamma \) where the probability of being rigid is \( p_h \). An \( R \) type partner is behavioral and never acquiesces. An \( F \) type partner is strategic and decides optimally whether to acquiesce or not. A partner’s type is his private information. For simplicity, we assume that the issuer’s manager gets to know of the partner’s type when he meets him. This can be justified by assuming that professionally interacting with an engagement partner and credibly threatening him with pressure makes his type apparent. Note that the investor does not know the partner’s type.

Naturally, we will describe all strategies for the flexible type partner only since the other type is behavioral.

### 5.8 Monitoring

The partner assigned to the issuer in period 2 learns if the previous partner had acquiesced or not. We interpret this as the new partner being able to figure out if the audit evidence matches the audit opinion issued by reading the papers filed by the old partner. He then decides whether to report his predecessor to the managing partner with a message correct or incorrect \( \{C, NC\} \) (the former indicates that the audit evidence supports the audit opinion). While reporting \( C \) is costless, there is a fixed cost \( c \) for reporting a partner’s action to be \( NC \). This is to be interpreted as a personal cost of confrontation or conflict with a fellow partner. Reuben and Stephenson (2013) show that individuals who report against fellow group members are often shunned later. Alternatively, this cost can be interpreted as the cost of having to go through the entire investigation procedure after making the accusation. It is assumed that if a partner reports that the other partner played \( A \) in the previous period, then his accusation will be investigated and the investigation will always reveal the truth. It is also assumed that if the partner reports \( C \), then there will be no further investigation from the leadership of the firm (we could alternatively assume a lower probability of investigation). Both type of partners are strategic when it comes to making the decision of incurring \( c \) and reporting on the other partner.

### 5.9 Managing Partner’s Actions, Investor actions and Reputation of Partner

The consequences of monitoring are as follows. Following a report \( NC \), there is an investigation which reveals the true signal obtained by the previous partner to the managing partner. The managing partner is
behavioral and fires (action $f$) a partner if and only if he finds out that the partner had not reported his true signal. The fired partner is replaced by another partner from the distribution $\Gamma$ immediately (at no cost). The investor observes if a partner has been fired. However, the investor does not observe the identity of the fired partner. If a partner reports against the other partner, but investigations reveal this to be untrue, then the reporting partner is fired. If the reporting partner reports $C$, the managing partner takes the action of not firing (action $nf$) that is no one is fired.

The reputation of the audit firm at time $t$ indicates the beliefs held by the investor about the probability that the partner assigned to the issuer in period $t$ is of type $R$. The reputation at time $t$ is given by $R_t$. In period one, this is the reputation in the beginning of the period, that is, $p_h$. In period 2, this is the reputation of the audit firm after the managing partner has made his firing decision. Let $R'_2$ indicate the probability that the partner engaged in project 2 is of $R$ type.

The investor wants to invest in the issuer only if the state is $G$. He updates his beliefs about the true state being $G$ and then makes his investment decision. We assume that the investor invests the amount $I \times Pr(G|s, R_t)^9$ in the issuer where $Pr(G|s, R_t)$ is the posterior probability of the true state being $G$ given that engagement partner $i$ announced the signal $s$ and the reputation of the audit firm is $R_t$. $I$ is a fixed positive constant indicating size of investment. The investment by the investor in Period $t$ is denoted by $i(t)$.

### 5.10 Errors/Refinements

All partners make an error in announcing the signal with probability $\nu$. Essentially, this means that if the partner wanted to announce a signal, he announces it with probability $1 - \nu$ and announces the other signal with probability $\nu$. We will present all results assuming $\nu \to 0$. Thus, our equilibrium concept will be extensive form trembling hand perfect equilibrium. We make this assumption as a refinement to deal with beliefs off the equilibrium path (example - what are the beliefs if the signal announced is $b$ but the state is revealed to be $G$ at the end of period 1? Unless partners can make mistakes, this cannot happen as the engagement partner has to receive the signal $g$ in state $G$ and in this case the partner’s action set is singleton $\{g\}$. The following assumption also deals with possible off equilibrium events. We assume that there is a small probability that the partner in period one gets fired regardless of his signal or state realization. This is to deal with beliefs following a history where the signal was $g$, the state realized was $G$, but the partner was fired.

### 5.11 Timeline

The sequence of events is as follows. At the beginning of the first period, nature draws the type of the two engagement partners from the distribution $\Gamma$ and randomly assigns one of the two partners to the issuer. Then, nature picks the true state of the world (true cash flow for issuer) for period 1 and the engagement partner receives a signal ($s \in \{g, b\}$). The engagement partner communicates the signal to the issuer truthfully. If there is a conflict, the issuer commits to how much pressure he would put on the partner in case the partner plays $NA$ and communicates this to the partner. The engagement partner chooses to acquiesce or not and publicly announces a signal. If there is no conflict, the engagement partner announces true signal ($g$). After

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9Any investment function, increasing in the investor’s expectation about the probability of the $G$ state, will qualitatively produce similar results.
observing the signal, the investor makes investment decision. All players receive their first period payoffs. At the end of the first period, the true cash flow for the first period is observed by all players.

At the beginning of the second period, nature picks the partner to be assigned to the issuer in period 2 (probability of picking same partner is $\gamma$). The partner assigned to the issuer learns about the signals and actions of the previous partner. The new partner decides whether to report against the previous partner if the audit evidence does not support the audit opinion issued by the predecessor partner. The managing partner makes the firing decision. If a partner is fired, he is replaced by a partner drawn from the distribution $\Gamma$ immediately. The investor observes whether a partner has been fired or not but may not observe the identity of the fired partner\(^{10}\). Next, nature draws the true cash flow for period 2 for the issuer and sends a signal to the assigned partner ($s \in \{g, b\}$). The engagement partner communicates the signal to the issuer truthfully. If there is a conflict, the issuer commits to how much pressure he would put on the partner in case the partner plays $NA$ and communicates this to the partner. The engagement partner chooses to acquiesce or not and publicly announces a signal. If there is no conflict, the engagement partner announces the true signal ($g$). After observing the signal, the investor makes investment decision. All players get their second period payoffs. The true cash flow for the second period is observed by all players. The game ends.

5.12 Payoffs, Strategies and Equilibrium

In each period, the payoffs of players depend on the reputation of the two partners, the sharing rule, the action taken by the engagement partner and the cost imposed by the issuer in case the partner does not acquiesce in a conflict. Let $I_{ai}$ be an indicator function which takes the value 1 when partner $i$ is assigned to the issuer. Let $I_c$ be an indicator function which equals 1 when there is conflict. If a partner is fired in the first period, his payoff in the second period is given by the outside option $v_f$ ($\leq 0$). Essentially, the audit firm’s fees in any period is a linear combination of the reputations of its two partners. The engagement partners get a share of this and the managing partner of the audit firm is the residual claimant. The issuer gets whatever the investor invests. Since we assume the investor to be behavioral, we do not model his payoffs.

Suppose the issuer commits to impose the cost $B$ on the partner if he plays $NA$ in case of a conflict at period $t$. Then the period payoffs for the players in the game at time $t$ is given by the following functions of the action taken by the engagement partner:

$$
Managing\;Partner(A, NA) = (1 - \alpha_1 - \beta_1)(WR_t) + (1 - \alpha_2 - \beta_2)(XR_t')
$$

$$
Partner^i(NA) = I_{ai}[I_c(\alpha_1(WR_t) + \alpha_2(XR_t') - B) + (1 - I_c)(\alpha_1(WR_t) + \alpha_2(XR_t'))] + (1 - I_{ai})[\beta_1(WR_t) + \beta_2(XR_t')]
$$

$$
Partner^i(A) = I_{ai}[\alpha_1(WR_t) + \alpha_2(XR_t')] + (1 - I_{ai})[\beta_1(WR_t) + \beta_2(XR_t')]
$$

$$
Issuer(NA) = I_c(I.Pr(G|b, R_t) - B) + (1 - I_c)I.Pr(G|g, R_t)
$$

$$
Issuer(A) = I.Pr(G|g, R_t)
$$

$\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \beta_1, \beta_2 \in (0, 1)$ are the shares of the engagement partners. $\alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2$ are the shares of the engagement partner assigned to the issuer, where $\alpha_1$ is his share of the audit fee received from the issuer and

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\(^{10}\)Observe in the disclosure regime and does not observe in the non-disclosure regime. 
\( \alpha_2 \) is his share of the revenue from Project 2. Similarly, \( \beta_1 \) and \( \beta_2 \) are the other partner’s share of the audit fee and Project 2-revenue respectively. Audit fees for the issuer and Project 2 are \( W R_t \) and \( X R'_t \) respectively. \( X \) and \( W \) are positive scalars and \( R_t \) and \( R'_t \) are the probabilities that the partner assigned to the issuer and Project 2 is of the rigid type respectively.

A strategy for an engagement partner is a set of history contingent actions, where the action set in period 1 is \( \{A, NA\} \) in case of conflict and \( \{NA\} \) if there is no conflict. The action set in period 2 is \( \{A, NA\} \ast \{C, NC\} \) in case of conflict in period 2 and \( \{NA\} \ast \{C, NC\} \) in case of no conflict\(^{11}\).

The issuer’s strategy is a pair of history contingent actions \((B_1, B_2)\), which specifies the amount of pressure he puts on an assigned partner in case of a conflict in period 1 and 2 respectively.

Let \( E \) be the set of all equilibrium strategy profiles. \( E = \{E_1, E_2\} \) where \( E_1 \) represents strategies in period 1. The belief function \( \pi_t : [0, 1] \times E_t \times \{g, b\} \rightarrow [0, 1] \) gives the investor beliefs about the probability that the project will generate \( G \) at time \( t \), given reputation of the current partner \( R_t \), the equilibrium strategies and the signal report.

The equilibrium concept is extensive form trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Equilibrium consists of action strategies by engagement partners, pressure exerted by the issuer \((B_1, B_2)\), and beliefs held by the investor such that:

1. The strategy of the engagement partner maximizes the expected lifetime utility for the partner.
2. \( \{B_1, B_2\} \) maximize the expected lifetime utility for the issuer.
3. \( R_t, R'_t \) are calculated using Bayes’ rule.

## 6 Analysis in Benchmark Case

In this section we solve the game described in the previous section using backward induction and characterize the equilibrium strategy profile for all levels of investment \( I \). We introduce a terminology at this point: we will refer to an Acquiesce equilibrium as \( A \)-equilibrium, a Not-Acquiesce equilibrium as \( NA \)-equilibrium and a mixed strategy equilibrium where partners will mix between \( A \) and \( NA \) in period 1. Since period 2 actions for the engagement partner will be fixed in any equilibrium (as we will show shortly), these equilibria will differ only in first period actions. In an Acquiesce equilibrium, the \( F \) partner plays \( A \) in case of a conflict in period 1\(^{12}\). In a Not-Acquiesce equilibrium, the \( F \) partner plays \( NA \) in case of a conflict in period 1. We then analyze the conditions necessary for the existence of these equilibria.

We begin our analysis by characterizing equilibria for our benchmark case where the cost of reporting \( c \) is zero. We analyze equilibrium behavior of the engagement partner and the successor partner under two regimes. Finally, we look at the equilibria when an external transfer is allowed to the partner who reports against a partner playing \( A \) and the cost of reporting may be positive.

We solve the game using backward induction. Let us first focus on the equilibrium strategies of the partner, the issuer and the investor in the second period. The following two lemmas summarize the second

\(^{11}\) Notice that action in period 1 is a function of reputation \( R_t \), the pressure from the manager \( B_1 \), and the partner’s belief about the second period reporting action \( r \in \{C, NC\} \) of the other partner.

\(^{12}\) In period 2, it will always be weakly optimal to play \( A \).
Lemma 1. At $t = 2$, in case of a conflict, $B_2 = 0$ and if the $F$ type partner is assigned to the issuer then he plays $A$ irrespective of the name disclosure requirement.

Proof. As the game ends at $t = 2$, an $F$ type partner has no reputation concern and he is indifferent between playing $A$ and $NA$ in period 2 in case there is conflict and the pressure imposed is zero. If $B_2 > 0$, the partner strictly prefers the action $A$. Thus, the issuer has to impose any positive cost on the partner to make him play $A$. Thus, in any equilibrium we must have that the partner plays $A$ when he is indifferent (any other play would not be in equilibrium as the issuer can always impose a small positive cost). This implies that the issuer will choose $B_2 = 0$ and the partner will acquiesce.

Lemma 1 shows that in the second period, which is also the last period of the game, the partner acquiesces to the issuer whenever the issuer puts pressure $B_2 \geq 0$. Also, it is optimal for the issuer to play $B_2 = 0$ in order to make the partner play $A$. Next, we look at the reporting incentives of the successor partner at the beginning of Period 2. Lemma 2 and corollary 2 show that when the cost of reporting is zero, there are only reporting equilibria (where the successor partner reports against the predecessor if the predecessor partner played $A$) in both disclosure and non-disclosure regime. We will show later that when the cost of reporting is positive, the reporting equilibrium does not exist in the disclosure regime but may exist in the non-disclosure regime.

Lemma 2. If $c = 0$, then under both regimes, there is a reporting equilibrium where the new successor partner reports $NC$ if and only if the predecessor partner played $A$ in the first period.

Proof. See Appendix.
if he is not fired\(^\text{13}\) (same as the reputation of the new partner if the first partner would have been fired). Since, the cost of reporting is zero, it is a weakly dominant strategy for the successor partner to report under the disclosure regime.

**Corollary 2.** There does not exist an equilibrium without reporting when the cost of reporting is zero.

*Proof.* Suppose there is a no-reporting equilibrium. Consider the incentives of the newly rotated in successor partner. If no one gets fired, people assume it was because either the first period partner played \(A\) but there was no reporting or the first period partner played \(NA\). Therefore, after a history of \((g,B,\text{nf})\) the reputation of the first period partner will fall below \(p_h\) as it allows for the former possibility. However, the reporting partner has incentives to deviate and report. This is because of the belief of the investor when he does observe a firing. Our assumption on errors says that there is a small positive probability that the first period partner gets fired irrespective of his signal or state. Therefore, if the investor believes that no-reporting is happening in equilibrium but still observes firing, he must think that this is because the first period partner got fired by mistake and therefore the reputation of the other partner will be \(p_h\) (since the fired partner will get replaced from the pool randomly). This is above the reputation that can be achieved by the other partner if there was no reporting. Since the cost of reporting is zero and the successor partner’s payoff is positively dependent upon the other partner’s reputation in either regime, he will report. Thus, there is profitable deviation. Therefore, there does not exist any no-reporting equilibrium when the cost of reporting is zero.

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6.1 Benchmark case without disclosure of partner name

In this subsection we consider the equilibria in the non-disclosure regime. Thus, investors do not know the identity of the partner who gives the audit signal about the issuer. We have already described the equilibrium behavior of the partner, the issuer and the reporting actions taken by the partner in period two. Next, we describe how the investor updates belief about the reputation of the engagement partners and makes his investment decision.

**Investor’s behavior in period 2**

The investor does not observe the identity of the partner in the second period and bases his investment decision on his belief that the assigned partner is of type \(R\). The investor forms his belief about the assigned partner’s type based on the history which consists of the first period audit report, the true cash-flow, whether a partner has been fired and his belief about the equilibrium being played. Let us first define the belief revision functions for all possible histories in order to obtain the optimal investment decision of the investor in period 2. As Lemma 1 indicates (we can infer that the \(b\) signal arrives only when the state is bad), the investor never invests if the signal in period 2 is \(b\). So we only consider his investment decision when the signal in period 2 is \(g\). The investor’s decision depends on the reputation of the partner who discloses the signal in period 2, while the reputation of the partner depends on the equilibrium being played and the history of the game. Notice that under monitoring (successor partner reports \(A\) play), reputation of the partner remains unchanged following all histories but \((b,B,\text{nf})\) and \((g,B,\text{nf})\) i.e. histories in which the state in period 1 turned out to be \(B\) and there was no firing. In histories in which there is firing, the engagement partner’s reputation is

\(^{13}\)Since probability of making a mistake is same for both types.
since the investor can infer from observing that a partner was fired that the old partner must have been reported by the rotated partner\textsuperscript{14}

For the $F$ type partner, let $x$ be the probability of playing $A$ in the first period in equilibrium. We define $\phi(x)$ as the probability that the engagement partner assigned to the issuer in the first period is of type $R$ given history $(b, B, n, f)$ and $\phi'(x)$ as the probability that the engagement partner assigned to the issuer in the first period is of type $R$ given history $(g, B, n, f)$. Let $\hat{\gamma}$ be the perceived probability that the same predecessor partner is assigned to the client in the second period following the history $(g, B, n, f)$ (where $\hat{\gamma}(g, B, n, f) = Pr(same \ partner|g, B, n, f) = \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + (1 - \gamma)p_h} > \gamma$). Note that we have to use perceived probability because the fact that there was no firing after the history $(g, B)$ is an informative signal of whether the partner was rotated or not (since a partner would never report against himself if he is not rotated out). Following history $(g, B, n, f)$, the probability that the partner assigned to the issuer in the second period is of type $R$ is given by

$$R_2(x) = \hat{\gamma} \phi'(x) + (1 - \hat{\gamma})p_h$$

(15)

Also let $R_2'(x)$ be the probability that the partner assigned to Project 2 in period 2 is of type $R$ following the history $(g, B, n, f)$. $R_2'(x) = \hat{\gamma}p_h + (1 - \hat{\gamma})\phi'(x)$.

Now define $R_2h(x)$ to be the probability that the partner assigned to the issuer is of type $R$ following the history $(b, B, n, f)$. $R_2h(x)$ is given by the following expression

$$R_2h(x) = \gamma \phi(x) + (1 - \gamma)p_h$$

(16)

and $R_2h'(x)$, the probability that the partner assigned to Project 2 is of type $R$ following the history $(b, B, n, f)$ is given by $R_2h'(x) = \gamma p_h + (1 - \gamma)\phi(x)$. The following table summarizes, for all possible histories, the optimal investment decision of the investor in the second period, when the equilibrium behavior dictates that the partner in the first period plays $A$ with probability $x$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>History</th>
<th>$\hat{\gamma}^*$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$g, G, f, g$</td>
<td>$\frac{pl}{p + (1 - p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b, G, f, g$</td>
<td>$\frac{pl}{p + (1 - p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g, B, f, g$</td>
<td>$\frac{pl}{p + (1 - p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b, B, f, g$</td>
<td>$\frac{pl}{p + (1 - p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g, G, n, f, g$</td>
<td>$\frac{pl}{p + (1 - p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b, G, n, f, g$</td>
<td>$\frac{pl}{p + (1 - p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g, B, n, f, g$</td>
<td>$\hat{\gamma} \frac{pl}{p + (1 - p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b, B, n, f, g$</td>
<td>$\hat{\gamma} \frac{pl}{p + (1 - p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ldots, b$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the investor invests more in the second period if the history is $(b, B, n, f)$, where the audit report

\textsuperscript{14}A partner would never report on himself.
and the actual cash-flows match. This particular history is followed by a favorable belief revision for the audit firm. On the other hand, the investor revises his belief downward following the history \((g, B, nf)\), where the realized cash-flows do not match the audit report and invests less.

To summarize the second period behavior of the players, we have the \(F\) partner playing \(A\) in case of a conflict, the issuer putting pressure \(B_2 = 0\), the successor partner reports on the previous partner if the previous partner played \(A\) and the investor revising beliefs in favor of (against) the accounting firm whenever the signal matches (differs from) the true outcome. We now move on to analyzing optimal actions for players in the first period.

**Equilibrium behavior at \(t = 1\):**

Note that at \(t = 1\), the \(F\) partner faces reputation incentives in case of a conflict. Playing \(NA\) might invite a cost \(-B_1\) (chosen in equilibrium by the issuer) but it may increase reputation in the second period which leads to higher payoffs at \(t = 2\). Playing \(A\) avoids the cost \(-B_1\) in the first period, but may lower reputation in the second period. Additionally, playing \(A\) might result in the partner getting fired in the next period. The optimal action for the engagement partner clearly depends on the maximum pressure the issuer is willing to put on the partner. Since putting pressure on the partner is also costly for the issuer, the maximum pressure the issuer puts on the partner must not exceed the difference between payoffs to the issuer from actions \(A\) and \(NA\). We define \(\max B\) as the maximum pressure the issuer is willing to put on the partner to persuade him to play \(A\) in case of conflict in period 1. In any equilibrium, this will be given by the following expression:

\[
\max B = \text{payoff for issuer if partner plays } A - \text{payoff for issuer if partner plays } NA
\]  

(17)

For the rest of our analysis we refer to partner strategy as the \(F\) type engagement partner’s strategy in case of a conflict. By successor partner we refer to the partner who is assigned to the issuer in the second period, but was not assigned to the issuer in the first period. If the same partner is reassigned we mention this separately. As we already know the actions which all players in period 2 will take for all histories and equilibria being played we focus the rest of our analysis on period 1 incentives and strategies.

In period 1, the flexible partner’s strategy can be described by a single variable \(x\), where \(x\) refers to the probability of announcing the signal \(g\) when the actual signal was \(b\). We call a pure strategy equilibrium the Acquiesce equilibrium (\(A\)-equilibrium) if \(x = 1\) and the Not-Acquiesce equilibrium (\(NA\)-equilibrium) if \(x = 0\).

Suppose, in equilibrium, the partner in the first period plays \(A\) with probability \(x \in [0,1]\). The function \(\text{Payoff } A\) formally defines the returns for the partner who plays action \(A\).

\[
\text{Payoff } A = \alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h + \delta [\gamma (\alpha_1 W R_2(x) + \alpha_2 X R_2'(x)) + (1 - \gamma) v_f I_f] \\
+ \delta (1 - \gamma) (\beta_1 W R_2(x) + \beta_2 X R_2'(x) I_{nf}),
\]

where \(I_f\) and \(I_{nf}\) are indicator functions assuming value 1 if the partner is fired and not fired, respectively. \(R_2(x)\) is the belief held by the investor that the partner assigned to the issuer is of type \(R\) following the history \((g, B, nf)\) and \(R_2'(x)\) is the belief held by the investor that the other partner is of type \(R\).
In case of a conflict if the engagement partner chooses to play action \( NA \), the only history that the investor observes is \((b, B, n_f)\) and formally the payoff to the partner is:

\[
Payoff \ NA = \alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - B_1 + \delta [\gamma (\alpha_1 W R_2 h(x) + \alpha_2 X R'_2 h(x))] + (1 - \gamma) (\beta_1 W R_2 h(x) + \beta_2 X R'_2 h(x))],
\]

where \( R_2 h(x) \) is the probability that the partner assigned to the issuer is of type \( R \) following the history \((b, B, n_f)\) and \( R'_2 h(x) \) is the probability that the other partner is of type \( R \).

The following proposition characterizes equilibrium behavior of the engagement partner under monitoring for a given reputation \( p_h \).

**Proposition 1.** Given \( p_h \in (0, 1) \) and \( c = 0 \), there exist \( I > 0 \) and \( T > I \) such that the following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium.

At \( t = 2 \), a rotated successor partner reports \( NC \) if and only if the predecessor partner played \( A \). In case of a conflict, \( B_2 = 0 \) and the assigned partner plays \( A \). The investor invests \( i^* \) if the audit report is \( g \) and does not invest otherwise.

At \( t = 1 \), in case of a conflict,

(a) If \( I \leq I \), the issuer puts pressure \( B_1 = 0 \). The engagement partner plays \( NA \). The investor invests \( \frac{Ip}{p+(1-p)c} \) if the audit report is \( g \) and does not invest if the report is \( b \).

(b) For each \( I \in (I, T) \), there exists \( x^* \in (0, 1) \) such that the issuer puts pressure \( B_1 = \frac{Ip}{p+(1-p)c+(1-p_h)(\epsilon+(1-\epsilon)x^*)} \). The engagement partner plays \( A \) with probability \( x^* \). The investor invests \( \frac{Ip}{p+(1-p)c+(1-p_h)(\epsilon+(1-\epsilon)x^*)} \) if the audit report is \( g \) and does not invest if the report is \( b \).

(c) If \( I \geq T \), the issuer puts pressure \( B_1 = \gamma \alpha_1 W [R_2 h(1) - R_2(1)] + (1 - \gamma) [\beta_1 W R_2 h(1) + \beta_2 X R_2 h'(1) - v_f] \), where, \( R_2 h(1) = \gamma + (1 - \gamma)p_h, R_2(1) = \tilde{\gamma} \frac{p_h}{p_h(1-p_h)} + (1 - \tilde{\gamma})p_h, \tilde{\gamma} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\gamma} \), and \( R_2 h'(1) = \gamma p_h + (1 - \gamma) \). The engagement partner plays \( A \). The investor invests \( \frac{Ip}{p+(1-p)c+(1-p_h)} \) if the audit report is \( g \) and does not invest if the report is \( b \).

**Proof.** See Appendix \( \square \)

Proposition 1 characterizes the conditions under which the \( F \) type partner plays \( NA \) in the first period. The proposition states that the \( F \)-partner, in case of a conflict, always plays \( NA \) for lower values of \( I \), plays \( NA \) with positive probability in the middle range, and always plays \( A \) for high values of \( I \).

It is interesting to note that the pure strategy \( NA \)-equilibrium does not exist if the cost of reporting \( c \) is positive. The idea being the following\(^{15} \). Suppose the cost of reporting is positive and there exists a \( NA \) equilibrium. Since the investor does not observe the partner’s identity, if the investor believes that both types of partners are reporting correctly in period 1, then there will be incentives to misreport because all such incorrect reports will be attributed to the partner receiving the wrong signal, thereby leaving the partner’s reputation untarnished. Thus, we cannot have reporting. However, we cannot have an \( NA \) equilibrium without reporting as deviating and playing \( A \) would become profitable. This is a contradiction as we started

\(^{15}\)This is easy to show as a corollary to proposition 5 when \( T = 0 \). We avoid the formal proof for now.
with an \(NA\) equilibrium. Thus, for the \(NA\)-equilibrium to exist we must have \(c = 0\) and 
\[
\frac{p_I}{p + (1 - p)p} < \delta(1 - \gamma)(\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X p_h - v_f).
\]
These conditions are met if \(I\) is small or \(v_f\) is a large negative number. The conditions have the following implications in the context of our model. From the second condition, it is clear that the strategic partner has strong incentives to misreport if the size of the investment on the line is large. This is because the issuer is willing to put more pressure on the partner to make him report favorably when the size of the investment is big. Also, the higher the reputation of the audit firm, the lower are the incentives of the partner to misreport.

The \(A\)-equilibrium exists if the investment on the line is above a certain threshold. Above this threshold, the issuer pressures the partner enough to make him play \(A\). Another necessary condition for the existence of the \(A\)-equilibrium is that the expected sanction (internal exclusion) is not too large. We make the following observations regarding Proposition 1. If \(\gamma\) is low, that is, there is a high probability of partner rotation, then the partner’s incentive to disclose the correct signal increases. This is due to two reasons. First, the partner expects sanctions with a high probability if he plays \(A\). Second, the partner can build reputation in period 1 by reporting correctly and gain from it in period 2 via \(\beta_1\) and \(\beta_2\). As \(\gamma \to 1\), the engagement partner has high incentives to misreport. This is because the probability of sanctions goes to zero and the only channel through which reputation incentives play a role is the partner’s share of his own project. This observation reinforces the importance of monitoring and sanctions (internal exclusion) to discourage misreporting.

The mixed strategy equilibrium completes our analysis by specifying equilibrium strategies for the middle range of \(I\). The partner for this range of \(I\) is indifferent between actions \(A\) and \(NA\) and plays \(A\) with a positive probability \(x^*\). Notice that \(x^*\) monotonically increases with \(I\) and reaches value 1 at \(\overline{I}\), which is the threshold for the existence of the \(A\)-equilibrium.

Our next proposition states that, for a given value of \(I\) and \(c = 0\), the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is unique.

**Proposition 2.** Given \(p_h \in (0, 1)\) and \(c = 0\), the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is unique.

**Proof.** See Appendix.

### 6.2 Benchmark case with disclosure

In this section, we characterize the equilibria in an environment where the identity of the engagement partner is disclosed to the investors. First, notice that the \(NA\)-equilibrium described in Proposition 1 still holds with the disclosure of partner’s identity. This is easy to show.

Thus, we know that the the only equilibria possible if \(I < \overline{I}\) is \(NA\)-equilibrium with reporting. We will now describe equilibria for other levels of \(I\).

We know that there are no equilibria without reporting (Lemma 2 and corollary 2). This leaves us with three possibilities for equilibria - \(NA\) equilibria with reporting, \(A\) equilibria with reporting and equilibria in which the flexible partner plays \(A\) with positive probability (but not 1) when there is conflict in period 1. We have already found necessary and sufficient conditions for \(NA\)-equilibrium. The following analysis describes the conditions required for the other two kinds of equilibria.

**Proposition 3.** Given \(p_h > 0\), and \(c = 0\), there exists \(\overline{I}_d > 0\) such that for all \(I > \overline{I}_d\) the following pure strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium. Moreover, if \(I > \overline{I}_d\) then this is the unique equilibrium.
At \( t=2 \), a new successor partner reports \( NC \) if and only if the other partner played \( A \) in the first period. In case of a conflict, \( B_2 = 0 \) and the assigned partner plays \( A \) if \( F \) type. The investor invests \( i_D^* \) (given for all histories in the appendix) if the report is \( g \) and does not invest if the report is \( b \).

At \( t=1 \), in case of a conflict, \( B_1 = \delta \left[ \gamma \alpha_1 W (1 - R'_2) + (1 - \gamma) \left( \beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X - v_f \right) \right] \) and the assigned partner plays \( A \) if \( F \) type. The investor invests \( I^* p + (1 - p) \left[ p \epsilon + (1 - p) \right] \) if the report is \( g \) and does not invest if the report is \( b \).

\[ ; R'_2 = \frac{\epsilon p_h}{\epsilon p_h + (1 - p_h)}. \]

**Proof.** See Appendix.

As in proposition 1, we can show that there is a mixed strategy equilibrium for all \( I \in (L, T_d) \). Thus, similar to the non-disclosure case, we have the following result: The \( F \)-partner, in case of a conflict, always plays \( NA \) for lower values of \( I \in [0, L] \), plays \( NA \) with positive probability \( x_d^* \) in the middle range \( I \in (L, T_d) \), and always plays \( A \) for values of \( I \geq T_d \). This leads us to our next proposition which shows that the engagement partner’s incentive to acquiesce is lower under the disclosure regime when cost of reporting is zero.

**Proposition 4.** Given \( p_h \in (0, 1) \) and \( c = 0 \), for \( \alpha_2, \beta_1 \to 0 \) \( T_d > T \) and \( x_d^* < x^* \).

**Proof.** See Appendix.

When partners are paid according to their own performance, the disclosure regime provides more incentives to not acquiesce to the client. The intuition is as follows. Under the disclosure regime, a partner’s reputation is more sensitive to his actions as the investor can see the identity of the partner. This provides more incentives to build reputation under the disclosure regime as compared to the non-disclosure regime. Moreover, when reputation is shared (as in the non-disclosure regime), the loss in reputation due to a bad action is also shared (if the partner is not fired). This can reduce the cost of taking the bad action\(^{\footnote{Unless the loss in payoff when fired is too much.}}\). However, if a partner’s compensation is less sensitive to his own reputation, the partner may have lower incentives to build reputation even under the disclosure regime as a substantial part of the cost arising from low reputation is borne by other partners in the partnership. The same argument holds for any given level of monitoring, including no monitoring in equilibria under both regimes.

## 7 Positive Cost of Reporting

In this section we consider the following case - What if the cost of reporting is not zero (as assumed in the previous section? As we saw in the previous section, even when the cost of reporting is zero, it may not always be possible to have the \( F \) type partner disclose the correct signals (\( A \) equilibria exist). This was despite the fact that monitoring always occurred in equilibrium. When the cost of monitoring is positive, we show that under some parametric conditions we have monitoring equilibria under the non-disclosure regime but not under the disclosure regime. No monitoring may lead to lower audit quality under the disclosure regime which is in stark contrast to proposition 4. It would also be interesting to analyze environments in which the cost of monitoring may be compensated by internal or external rewards for reporting. Thus, we analyze an environment where the cost of reporting (\( c \)) is positive, and an amount \( T \geq 0 \) can be transferred to
the monitor partner when he reports correctly against the previous engagement partner. We assume that this transfer is being made by an outside player to keep things simple. Note that the case of no external transfers is simply the case of $T = 0$.

Proposition 5 below says that unless the transfer is bigger than the cost, there cannot be an NA equilibrium i.e. an equilibrium where the $F$ type partner always reports the correct signal in period 1. The intuition for this result is simple - Suppose there was an NA equilibrium. Note that for this equilibrium to exist, reporting must occur in period 2. If there is no reporting in period 2 then we can never have an NA equilibrium since there will be no cost for taking the action $A$ in period 1 and therefore there will be a profitable deviation. Consider the incentives to report for the partner in period 2 when he observes that the first period audit report does not match the audit signal. First note that the new engagement partner’s reputation will always be $p_h$ if a pooling equilibrium (like NA equilibrium) is expected to be played in period 1. So his payoffs can only be affected via the reputation of the first partner. If he reports the erring partner, then the first partner will be fired and replaced with another from the labor market who will have reputation $p_h$. If he does not report the partner, the investor will think the following - the first period play is expected to be NA (equilibrium strategy), so no firing is expected along the equilibrium path. The partner must have gotten the wrong signal in period 1 to have announced $g$ instead of $b$. Since probability of receiving the incorrect signal is the same across types, the reputation of the first period partner is believed to be $p_h$. Thus, irrespective of whether the successor partner reports the partner or not, if the investor believes that an NA equilibrium is being played, the reputation of the first period partner will be $p_h$. Thus, if the cost of reporting is not covered by an external transfer, the successor partner would never report an erring partner. As mentioned before, we cannot have an NA equilibrium without monitoring.

**Proposition 5.** Given $p_h > 0$ and $c > 0$, if $T \geq c$, then there exists $I_0 > 0$ such that for all $I \leq I_0$ the NA-equilibrium exists in both the Disclosure-regime and the Non-disclosure-regime. If $T < c$, the NA-equilibrium does not exist in either regimes.

**Proof.** See Appendix.

Note that if we assumed that it was the manager of the audit firm who was making the transfers to ensure monitoring then we would run into the following problem - If the NA-equilibrium is expected to be played, then it is not incentive compatible for the managing partner of the audit firm to transfer any positive amount $T$ to ensure reporting. This is because the reputation of the partner’s will never change in equilibrium (and therefore not affect the payoff of the manager). Thus, to ensure correct reporting of signals in period 1, a necessary condition is that the reward for reporting comes from outside.

We have shown that we need the external transfer to completely cover the cost of reporting for any reporting to happen if an NA equilibrium is expected to be played. Since reporting can affect the quality of audit in period 1 by changing the incentives of the first period partner, next we consider the conditions needed to get reporting in either regime in other equilibria. Proposition 6 points out that in the disclosure regime, the reward necessary to induce reporting in the $A$-equilibrium is also at least $c$ whereas proposition 7 shows that we can get reporting under the non-disclosure regime with smaller transfers as well. We demonstrate...

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17 There are positive costs to take the action NA (pressure from issuer) but reputation rewards as beliefs will not be updated in a NA equilibrium since the two types pool on the same action.
in proposition 8 that this can lead to lower quality audit reports in the disclosure regime when compared to those in the non-disclosure regime.

**Proposition 6.** Given \( p_h > 0 \), and \( c > 0 \). If \( T < c \), an A-equilibrium with reporting does not exist in the disclosure regime. If \( T \geq c \), there exists \( T > 0 \) such that for all \( I \geq T \), there exists an A-equilibrium with reporting under the disclosure-regime.

**Proof.** See Appendix. \( \square \)

Proposition 6 shows that in the disclosure regime, the external transfer needs to cover the cost of monitoring completely to have an A equilibrium with monitoring. The intuitive idea here is simple. The new partner’s reputation will be \( p_h \) (since the change is observed). The new partner’s payoff from monitoring and reporting is only affected via the reputation of the other partner. However, if an A equilibrium with monitoring is believed to be played then the reputation of the other partner is the investor’s belief about the second period partner will be lower belief (lower than \( p \)). This ensures that the investor’s belief about himself as an observed firing will inform the investor about the change of partners.

The next proposition highlights a key difference between the disclosure and the non-disclosure environment. The idea is as follows. Consider the case of the non-disclosure regime. Here, the reputation (and therefore the payoff) of the assigned partner depends upon the collective reputation of the audit firm. Thus, if the predecessor partner had played A in period 1 and the equilibrium being played is the A-equilibrium, then the successor partner is faced with the following choice. If he does not report the partner, the investor does not observe any firing. In this case, the investor puts positive probability on the event that no firing occurred because the same partner was assigned to the issuer again in period 2. This causes the investor to have a lower belief (lower than \( p_h \)) about the reputation of the current partner which reduces the payoff of the partner assigned to the issuer in period 2. By reporting the other partner, the successor partner can change the investor’s belief about himself as an observed firing will inform the investor about the change of partners. This ensures that the investor’s belief about the second period partner is \( p_h \) which gives the successor partner a higher payoff in that period.

**Proposition 7.** Let \( \alpha_1W(1 - \epsilon) - \gamma c(1 - \epsilon) - 2\sqrt{\alpha_1W(1 - \epsilon)ce} > 0 \). Given \( p_h > 0 \), if

\[
T \geq \begin{cases} 
\frac{c - \alpha_1W(p_h - \frac{s_p}{\gamma + (1 - \gamma)c})}{\alpha_1W(p_h - \frac{s_p}{\gamma + (1 - \gamma)c}) + \frac{\gamma c(1 - \epsilon)}{\sqrt{\gamma c}}} : p_h < \frac{1}{\sqrt{\gamma}} \left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} - \sqrt{\left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} \right)^2 - (b + d)} \right) \\
0 : p_h \in \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{\gamma}} \left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} - \sqrt{\left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} \right)^2 - (b + d)} \right), \frac{1}{\sqrt{\gamma}} \left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} + \sqrt{\left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} \right)^2 - (b + d)} \right) \right) \\
\frac{c - \alpha_1W(p_h - \frac{s_p}{\gamma + (1 - \gamma)c})}{\alpha_1W(p_h - \frac{s_p}{\gamma + (1 - \gamma)c}) + \frac{\gamma c(1 - \epsilon)}{\sqrt{\gamma c}}} : p_h > \frac{1}{\sqrt{\gamma}} \left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} + \sqrt{\left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} \right)^2 - (b + d)} \right) 
\end{cases}
\]

then there exists \( T > 0 \) such that for all \( I \geq T \) the A-equilibrium with monitoring exists under the no-disclosure-regime. The parameters in the above expressions are given by : \( a = \alpha_1W(1 - \epsilon), b = \gamma c(1 - \epsilon), d = cc \).

**Proof.** See Appendix. \( \square \)

**Corollary 3.** If the following is not satisfied by \( T \), then there is no A-equilibrium with reporting under the non-disclosure-regime.

\[
T \geq \begin{cases} 
\frac{c - \alpha_1W(p_h - \frac{s_p}{\gamma + (1 - \gamma)c})}{\alpha_1W(p_h - \frac{s_p}{\gamma + (1 - \gamma)c}) + \frac{\gamma c(1 - \epsilon)}{\sqrt{\gamma c}}} : p_h < \frac{1}{\sqrt{\gamma}} \left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} - \sqrt{\left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} \right)^2 - (b + d)} \right) \\
0 : p_h \in \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{\gamma}} \left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} - \sqrt{\left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} \right)^2 - (b + d)} \right), \frac{1}{\sqrt{\gamma}} \left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} + \sqrt{\left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} \right)^2 - (b + d)} \right) \right) \\
\frac{c - \alpha_1W(p_h - \frac{s_p}{\gamma + (1 - \gamma)c})}{\alpha_1W(p_h - \frac{s_p}{\gamma + (1 - \gamma)c}) + \frac{\gamma c(1 - \epsilon)}{\sqrt{\gamma c}}} : p_h > \frac{1}{\sqrt{\gamma}} \left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} + \sqrt{\left( \frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\gamma}} \right)^2 - (b + d)} \right) 
\end{cases}
\]
Proposition 7 and proposition 6 state that if the cost of reporting is positive and there are no outside transfers ($T = 0$) to facilitate reporting, then monitoring will never be optimal under the disclosure regime but may exist in the non-disclosure regime. Proposition 8 formally describes this. Under these parametric conditions, the quality of audit (described by the probability of $F$ type partner playing $A$ in period 1) under the disclosure regime will be lower than that under the non-disclosure regime.

**Proposition 8.** There exists $p_h$, $c$ and a range of $I$ such that in equilibrium, there is no monitoring under disclosure and monitoring under non-disclosure. Moreover, the probability of playing $A$ under the non-disclosure regime is strictly lower than that under the disclosure regime.

*Proof.* See Appendix.

Thus, under some parametric conditions, the probability that the investor gets the correct signal from the engagement partner is lower in the disclosure regime. In other words, the quality of audit is lower under the disclosure regime when compared to the non-disclosure regime.

### 8 Engagement quality reviewer (EQR)

Our previous analysis explores the incentives of an engagement partner and a monitor partner who may be rotated in to an engagement at the end of the first period. In this section, we study the more specific case of an Engagement Quality Reviewer (EQR). Engagement quality review is a quality control mechanism used by public accounting firms to monitor the quality of audit engagements. The engagement quality reviewer serves as an evaluator of the performance of the engagement partner and the engagement team. According to the PCAOB Auditing Standard No.7, the “objective of the engagement quality reviewer is to perform an evaluation of the significant judgments made by the engagement team and the related conclusions reached in forming the overall conclusion on the engagement and in preparing the engagement report, if a report is to be issued, in order to determine whether to provide concurring approval of issuance.”

Unlike the successor partner, an EQR can detect whether the audit evidence supports the audit opinion before the audit report is issued. In this section, we consider a variation of our model and show that even if monitoring is done via an EQR (instead of partner rotation) we will still obtain the result that the monitor will be less inclined to report under the disclosure regime. This will serve as a robustness check for our result that audit quality may go down when the regime changes from a non-disclosure regime to a disclosure regime due to the lower incentives to monitor in the latter environment. To analyze the incentives of an EQR as a monitor partner, we incorporate the following changes in our baseline model.

In this extension to our baseline model, the audit firm receives the audit fee in each period and partners get their payoffs upfront in every period. In the first period, the random assignment rule decides which partner is assigned to the issuer. The other partner, who serves on project 2, also serves as an EQR for the issuer’s project. With probability $1 - \gamma$ the engagement quality reviewer learns about the signals and actions of the engagement partner. With probability $\gamma$, he does not observe the signal obtained by the engagement partner. If he observes that the partner played $A$, he decides whether to report against the partner or not. The cost of reporting is as before. If the engagement partner is fired then a new partner becomes the engagement
partner in period 2, whereas, if the EQR is fired \(^{18}\), then the new partner takes charge of project 2 and the EQR position in period 2. If the EQR reports a partner and an investigation ensues, the true signal of the engagement partner is reported to the investor, else the engagement partner’s original report is announced. We assume that the EQR cannot change the signal and not report the partner. In the second period, the EQR’s actions do not affect the payoff of the partners. So to simplify our analysis, we assume away the EQR’s action stage in period 2.

The payoff-structure is the same as described in Section 2. The partner assigned to project 2 does not get any additional payoffs for his role as an EQR. In contrast to the partner rotation model, in this model, the engagement partner in the first period is assumed to continue with the issuer in the second period if the EQR does not report against the engagement partner. If the engagement partner is fired, he is replaced by a new partner with reputation \(p_h\), who is assigned to the issuer. The big distinction in this section is that we assume that the investor does not observe if an engagement partner is fired. In the disclosure regime, the investor knows the name of the engagement partner so he can infer that the first partner must have been fired if he observes a change in partner. However, he is unable to do this in the non-disclosure regime. Moreover, the investor cannot distinguish between a report with the signal \(b\) issued by the engagement partner playing \(NA\) and a report with the same signal which is issued when the EQR discovered that the engagement partner had played \(A\) and a corrected report was issued thereafter. Therefore, in the non-disclosure regime, if the investor observes the signal \(g\) and learns that the state was \(B\), he may believe that with positive probability the partner played \(A\) and this was undetected by the EQR. However, if in the same regime, the investor observes the signal \(b\) and learns that the state was \(B\), he may believe that with positive probability the partner played \(NA\) in period 1 and is therefore more likely to be \(R\) type. This gives us the intuition for our result. From the EQR’s point of view - he faces a cost of reporting and his benefit from reporting comes from the increase in his wages due to the increased reputation of the engagement partner. When the EQR learns that the audit report does not match the signal, he has the following incentives to report under the two regime. In the non-disclosure regime, a report followed by a change in signal would lead to the history \(b, B\). Since the investor does not observe the firing, he places positive beliefs about the event that the partner played \(NA\). In all other events, the reputation of the engagement partner in period two is atleast \(p_h\). This leads to the revised reputation being above \(p_h\). However, in the disclosure regime, since the investor can infer a change in partner, the maximum reputation for this partner can be \(p_h\) (obtained when the EQR reports the partner and a new partner joins the firm as engagement partner in period 2). Thus, the gain from reporting for the EQR is higher in the non-disclosure regime and therefore if the cost of reporting is positive but not very high, the EQR will only report in the non-disclosure regime. Under such conditions, we have higher quality of audits under the non-disclosure regime. The following analysis shows this more formally. Consider equilibria where the EQR always reports. Then:

In case of a conflict, the engagement partner’s payoff from playing \(A\) in period 1 is

\[
\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h + \delta (\gamma [\alpha_1 W \phi'(x) + \alpha_2 X p_h] + (1 - \gamma) v_f)
\]

In case of a conflict, payoff from playing \(NA\) is

\[
\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h + \delta (\gamma [\alpha_1 W \phi(x) + \alpha_2 X p_h] + (1 - \gamma) [\alpha_1 W \phi(x) + \alpha_2 X p_h])
\]

\(^{18}\)for wrongful reporting for example

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where $x$ is the probability that the $F$ type partner plays $A$ in period 1 and $\phi(x) = P(R|b, B)$ and $\phi'(x) = P(R|g, B)$ are the reputation of the engagement partner assigned to the issuer at period 2.

The EQR’s payoff at time $t$ depends on the reputation of the engagement partner in the following way.

$$EQR \text{ payoff} = \beta_1(WR_t) + \beta_2(Xp_h) - I_r.c$$

where $R_t$ is the reputation of the engagement partner at time $t$, $I_r$ is an indicator function which takes the value one if the EQR chooses to report\(^{19}\). If the EQR reports against the engagement partner, the history that the investor observes changes from $(g, B)$ to $(b, B)$. If he does not report, the history observed by the investor is $(g, B)$. Thus the EQR reports if and only if

$$\beta_1 \delta W(\phi(x) - \phi'(x)) \geq c \quad (18)$$

Under the disclosure regime, along with the history of outcomes, the investor also observes if the engagement partner is reassigned to the issuer. In case of a conflict, if the partner plays $A$ and the EQR fails to detect it, then the relevant history to the investor is $(g, B, nf)$ under the disclosure regime.

If the EQR reports against the engagement partner, the history the investor observes changes from $(g, B, nf)$ to $(b, B, f)$. Notice that, $R_t = p_h$ following the history $(b, B, f)$. If he does not report, the history observed by the investor is $(g, B, nf)$ and $R_t = \phi'$. The reputation following $(g, B)$ in the non-disclosure regime is the same as the reputation of the engagement partner after the history $(g, B, nf)$ in the disclosure regime because the history $(g, B)$ implies no firing in the non-disclosure regime\(^{20}\). Thus the EQR will report if and only if

$$\beta_1 \delta W(p_h - \phi') \geq c \quad (19)$$

Since $\phi(x) > p_h$ for all $x \in (0, 1)$, comparing (18) and (19), we observe that the EQR has higher incentives to report under the non-disclosure regime than in the disclosure regime. A detailed analysis can be found in the Appendix.

9 Multitasking and Collective Reputation

One highly debated aspect of Auditing Standard No. 7 has been about the nature of engagement quality review. The debate has been over whether the review partner’s role should be independent and almost adversarial in nature versus the review being a collegial, non-adversarial process. In earlier sections, we analysed the incentives of a monitor partner when the nature of the review process is adversarial (since the erring partner may get fired following a report). In this section, we discuss how incentives change under the two regimes when the EQR has a non-adversarial role and works as a “second pair of eyes”. In order to capture this, we describe an modeling choice and show that it has implications similar to those discussed in earlier sections. This discussion serves the purpose of a robustness check for our results.

\(^{19}\)We know that the EQR does not misreport in equilibrium so we don’t consider that possibility here.

\(^{20}\)Firing could have happened only if the EQR reported the engagement partner. However, then the EQR would have changed the report. This is because we assume that the EQR cannot change the report without reporting thee engagement partner. Thus, had there been any firing the history would have been $(b, B)$.  

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Consider an environment where there are two engagement partners and a managing partner in an audit firm. There are two issuers/clients. Each engagement partner is assigned to one issuer and must perform the role of an engagement quality reviewer for the other engagement partner. For the sake of simplicity we abstract away from issues of collusion between partners. Moreover, in this section the issuer is not able to pressure the engagement partner into announcing favorable reports. However, the engagement partner can make mistakes (announce the wrong signal by mistake) and this affects the quality of the audit. Let’s assume that the $R$ type partner never makes a mistake (and always detects if EQR) and the $F$ type partner can make mistakes with positive probability (may detect with positive probability if EQR). For the flexible type partner, the probability of a mistake depends upon the time spent on that engagement. Each partner is endowed with a fixed amount of time to be allocated between his own engagement and the EQR job. If the EQR finds that the audit opinion is not supported by the signal then he simply changes it to the correct signal. Thus, in this section the EQR acts as a “second pair of eyes”. We assume away the role of the EQR as a whistle-blower i.e. there is no reporting and firing of partners. Audit quality of an engagement (probability of no mistake) depends on the time spent by the engagement partner on the engagement and the time spent by the EQR (for that engagement) looking for errors committed by the engagement partner. Suppose the quality of an audit is increasing in the time a partner spends on that engagement. That is, the probability that an engagement partner makes a mistake, declines with the time spent on the engagement. Also, suppose that the probability of finding a mistake as a reviewer is increasing in the time the EQR spends on the job. Therefore, audit quality of an engagement is increasing in time spent by both the engagement partner and the EQR on that particular engagement.

Under the non-disclosure regime, the reputation of both the partners in period 2 depends on the perceived audit quality of the two engagements in period 1. Under the disclosure regime, the investor can observe which partner is with which engagement. Notice that under both regimes, the optimal time allocation for a partner depends on the his share of revenue from his own engagement and his share of revenue from the other engagement. Suppose each partner can only spend a total time of $T$. Let $(x, y)$ be the time allocated to one’s own engagement and the EQR job such that $x + y \leq T$. Given the other partner’s time allocation $(a, b)$, a partner allocates his own time in a way such that the marginal gain from spending time in his own engagement equals the marginal gains from spending additional time in the EQR job.

Suppose both partners are drawn from a distribution where it is much more likely that they are Flexible type. Consider the following kind of symmetric equilibrium in the disclosure regime. The engagement partner puts in a lot of time on the engagement and very little time on the EQR job. This will be an equilibrium for the following reasons. Given that the other partner is not going to put in much effort to review the engagement and that the partner is expected to put in a lot of time in the engagement, the outcome of an engagement believed to be more heavily influenced by the engagement partner’s actions. Thus, the reputation of an engagement partner is closely related to the audit quality of his own engagement and less with his EQR job. Therefore, he puts in a lot of effort towards his own engagement. Also, given that the engagement partner is putting in a lot of time on his engagement, an EQR’s incentive to monitor goes down even further since the

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21Since the $R$ type partner will never mistakes (independent of the time he chooses to spend on his engagement client), he can choose to spend no time on his engagement project and all his time on the EQR project. This justifies an extremely high likelihood of detecting mistakes. Alternatively, we can think of the $R$ type partner as a very conscientious partner who does each job as well as humanly possible.

22If the randomly selected partner is very likely to be $R$ type, then an $F$ type partner would believe that if he makes a mistake, it will be detected with high probability. So he is likely to free ride on this.
engagement partner is less likely to make a mistake and therefore it becomes optimal to put in low effort in the EQR job.

A similar equilibrium will exist in the non-disclosure regime. However, from the EQR’s point of view, the marginal gains from monitoring are stronger in this regime since his payoff depends upon the collective reputation. So, in a symmetric equilibrium, both partners are likely to spend a little more time on the EQR job (less time on the engagement job) in the non-disclosure regime than in the disclosure regime. If the gain in audit quality is decreasing in the time spent i.e. the marginal increase in audit quality is higher when less time is spent on the engagement then this can lead to a fall in audit quality when one shifts from a non-disclosure regime to a disclosure regime.

10 Potential solutions to the monitoring problem

It is clear from our analysis that disclosure of the engagement partner’s identity may reduce the monitoring incentives of a successor partner/engagement quality reviewer. It is also evident that an additional external transfer or analogously, an increased expected external sanction, can help mitigate this problem. This class of solutions can be implemented only through an increased cost for regulators. In this section, we propose three other solutions. These can be implemented through increased audit fees or through a realignment of incentives within the audit firm.

10.1 Increase in audit fee

Carcello and Li (2013) report improved audit quality and increased audit fees in U.K. firms after the partners were required to sign the audit report. The increased audit fee can reflect an increased audit effort to counter the increased risk for individual partners. In the context of our model however, there is another explanation for a rise in audit fees following the implementation of the signature rule. In our model, the audit fee for the partner with the issuer is a linear function of $WR_t$. Therefore, a higher $W$ will lead to increased incentives for the engagement partner to not acquiesce to the client’s demands in the case of a conflict. Thus, the increased audit fee may be because the audit firm’s management want to compensate for the reduced incentive to report with an increased incentive to not misbehave. When monitoring comes from the engagement quality reviewer, since the reporting incentives of the EQR are also increasing in audit fees, an increased $W$ can lead to both increased incentives for the engagement partner as well as improved incentives for the EQR.

10.2 Treating the monitor as the “sink”

If the compensation contracts in partnerships can collect penalty from a group of partners and distribute the collected penalty to another group, then the latter is called the “sink.” In a natural a setup the risk neutral principal acts as a sink. However, in our model, the managing partner can not act as the sink. This is because only the successor partner or the EQR can observe the action of the engagement partner. Since contracts can only be made on observables, the managing partner cannot impose a penalty on the engagement partner unless the successor partner or the EQR reports against him. To provide incentives for the monitor partner to report, the managing partner must make a transfer $T$ to the monitor. From our previous analysis, it is evident that the minimum transfer the managing partner needs to make in order to ensure monitoring may be higher
under the disclosure regime. In this event, the minimum penalty that needs to imposed on the engagement partner must be higher under the disclosure regime. This type of incentive realignment has the following properties. First, it balances budget. Second, the managing partner or the principal of the audit firm has no incentive not to implement the sharing rule. Third, when monitoring comes from the engagement quality reviewer, the penalty imposed on the engagement partner is also a function of his own reputation, which further improves reputation incentives for engagement partners under disclosure.

10.3 The modified eat-what-you-kill compensation structure

Knechel, Niemi, and Zerni (2013) observe that the Big-4 accounting firms vary in their profit sharing arrangements. In one end of the spectrum there are profit sharing rules close to the lock-step arrangement, where partners are paid according to seniority and their compensation are relatively less sensitive to own performance. On the other end of the spectrum there are partnerships that follow sharing rules close to the eat-what-you-kill model. In the context of our model, a partner’s compensation is linked to the revenues from the issuer and from project 2 through exogenous parameters $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \beta_1$ and $\beta_2$. Clearly, monitoring incentives can be improved by increasing the monitor’s share of the revenue from the issuer. In our model an increase in the monitor partner’s share of the revenue earned from the issuer can only be achieved by reducing either the share of the engagement partner or by reducing the share of the managing partner. However, we can use this insight in the context of a more general compensation function. Consider the following compensation function for a partner $i$ in a partnership of $N$ partners.

$$\text{Pay}_i = \alpha \times \{\text{Revenue from engagement}\}_i + \beta \times \{\text{Revenue from engagements reviewed}\}_i$$

$$+ \theta \times \{\text{Revenue from other engagements}\}_i + \eta \times \{\text{Revenue from nonaudit services}\}_i$$

A sharing rule relatively less sensitive to own performance will be represented by high values of $\theta$ and $\eta$ while $\alpha$ and $\beta$ will be low. In order to maximize incentives for the monitor partner and the engagement partner, their share of revenue from other engagements and non-audit services should be minimized, while their compensation should be highly sensitive to their performance as an engagement partner and as a reviewer. With the disclosure of the partners name, by moving towards a modified eat-what-you-kill compensation can generate additional monitoring incentives as well as can reduce incentives to acquiesce for the partners.

11 Summary and possible extensions

This paper uses a model of reputation to examine the incentives of auditors at the audit-partner level under two policy regimes: the disclosure regime and the non-disclosure regime. Under the non-disclosure regime, investors and other financial statement users do not observe the identity of the engagement partner who performs the audit. They only observe the identity of the audit firm who issues the audit report. Under the disclosure regime, the identity of the engagement partner is disclosed to the investor. Currently, the name of the audit partner is not disclosed in the USA. Our study is motivated by a proposal made by PCAOB to disclose the names of audit partners with audit reports issued in the United States. We examine whether partner identification can lower incentives of a strategic engagement partner to misreport. We also investi-
gate the impact of such a regime change on the incentives of a ‘monitor’ partner to raise a flag against an engagement partner who misreports. Our analysis shows that if monitoring incentives remain the same, an engagement partner has lower incentives to misreport under the disclosure regime. This is because the reputation of a partner is more sensitive to the partner’s own actions under the disclosure regime. However, our analysis also shows that the incentives for a monitor partner to raise a flag are actually higher under the non-disclosure regime. This is because, under the non-disclosure regime, a partner’s actions affect the collective reputation of the firm which is shared by other partners in the firm. Hence a monitor partner may report a partner who misreports to improve the collective (and therefore his own) reputation. Using these intuitions we provide conditions under which the audit quality might actually go down when the regime changes from non-disclosure to disclosure.

Our model puts structure to the organizational design of audit firms and emphasizes the role of different relational aspects that affect the incentives of auditors. This sort of model can be used to study multiple interesting extensions. For example, we could look at the incentives of the leadership of the audit firms to create the right incentives for partners. In our model, we assume that the managing partner imposes sanctions against the engagement partner whenever the latter is found to misreport. We also assume that the compensation structure remains the same under the two regimes. A study exploring strategic behavior of the managing partner and endogenous realignment of compensation structure in this context will provide further insights into this matter. We hope to work on these issues in the future.
References


A Appendix

First we list some definitions which should help the reader go through the proofs. Some of this notation has been listed in the text but we reproduce them here to make the reading of this section easier.

\( \Pi(x) \) - This is the payoff from playing \( NA \) minus the payoff from playing \( A \) in period 1 for the flexible partner who plays \( A \) with probability \( x \) in period 1. It does not include the cost imposed by the issuer so it can be interpreted as the gain in reputational payoff from taking the right action.

\( R_2 \) - This is the reputation of the partner who is assigned to the issuer in period 2.

\( R'_2 \) - This is the reputation of the partner who is assigned to project 2 in period 2.

\( \phi(x) \) - This is the reputation of the partner who was assigned to the issuer in period 1 when the partner was supposed to play \( A \) with probability \( x \) in a conflict in period 1 and after the history \( \{b, B, nf\} \) i.e. when the partner announced the signal \( b \) and the state turned out to be \( B \) and there was no firing.

\( \phi'(x) \) - This is the reputation of the partner who was assigned to the issuer in period 1 when the partner was supposed to play \( A \) with probability \( x \) in a conflict in period 1 and after the history \( \{g, B, nf\} \) i.e. when the partner announced the signal \( g \) and the state turned out to be \( B \) and there was no firing.

\( \max_B \) - This is the maximum cost the issuer is willing to commit to putting on the partner if the partner plays \( NA \) instead of \( A \) when there is a conflict.

Lemma 2 - Statement and Proof

If \( c = 0 \), then under both regimes, there is a reporting equilibrium where the new successor partner reports \( NC \) if the predecessor partner played \( A \) in the first period.

Proof. Clearly, no partner will report against himself (since that will get him fired) and reporting \( NC \) when the other partner did not play \( A \) is not optimal (because truth is always revealed in any inquiry so the partner who reports \( NC \) incorrectly will definitely get fired). So the only situation to be considered is one where the partner is rotated and the predecessor partner had played \( A \) in period 1.

Suppose the partner assigned observes that the other partner played \( A \). At this point, the history observed by the investor is \( \{g, B\} \). If he reports, the partner will be fired and the history observed by the investor is \( \{g, B, f\} \). Thus payoff from reporting is:

\[
\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - c
\]  

(20)

Note that reputation of the partner assigned to the issuer is \( p_h \) because a partner getting fired reveals to the investor that the partner must have been rotated. Reputation of the partner not with the issuer is also \( p_h \) because the partner who got fired must have been replaced from the pool of partners following distribution \( \Gamma \).

If he does not report, there will be no firing and the history observed by the investor is \( \{g, B, nf\} \). Payoff from not reporting:

\[
\alpha_1 W R_2 + \alpha_2 X R'_2
\]  

(21)

where \( R_2 \) is the reputation of the partner with the issuer and \( R'_2 \) is the reputation of the partner not with the issuer.
Suppose in equilibrium, the predecessor partner plays $A$ with probability $x$ and the investor believes that the successor partner reports $NC$ whenever the previous partner plays $A$. Then $R_2$ and $R'_2$ are given by the following two equations under the no-disclosure regime.

$$R_2(x) = Pr(R|g, B, nf) = \frac{p_h \epsilon}{p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h)[\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x]} + (1 - \hat{\gamma})p_h < p_h$$

where \( \hat{\gamma}(g, B, nf) = Pr(same\ partner|g, B, nf) = \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + (1 - \gamma)\epsilon} > \gamma \) and

$$R'_2(x) = p_h.$$

Thus reporting is better than not reporting if the gains from reporting exceeds the cost of reporting. That is,

$$\alpha_1 W(p_h - \frac{\hat{\gamma}p_h \epsilon}{p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h)[\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x]} - (1 - \hat{\gamma})p_h) + \alpha_2 X(p_h - p_h) > c$$

\( \Leftrightarrow \alpha_1 W(\hat{\gamma}p_h - \frac{\epsilon p_h}{p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h)[\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x]}) > c \)

Note that \( p_h - \frac{\epsilon p_h}{(1 - p_h)[\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x]} \geq 0 \) holds with strict equality for \( x = 0 \). Therefore with \( c = 0 \), the successor partner has strictly positive incentive to report if \( x > 0 \) and it is weakly dominant for the successor partner to report $NC$ when \( x = 0 \).

Under the disclosure regime, a partner who played $A$ and was reported is replaced by a new partner whose identity is observed by the investor. Whether or not the monitor partner reports, since the change in partner is observed, the investor assigns $p_h$ to be the probability that the partner with the issuer is of the rigid type. Thus $R_2(x) = p_h$ for all $x \geq 0$ under the disclosure regime.

Now if the monitor partner reports, a new partner with reputation $p_h$ is assigned to Project 2. If the monitor partner does not report, the first period partner is assigned to Project 2. Since it is believed that the partner in the first period is reported and fired if he plays $A$, not firing of the first period partner is associated with the belief that the first partner announced $b$ because of a mistaken signal and not from action $A$. Since the probability of a mistake is the same across both types, $R'_2(x) = p_h$. This implies that it is always a weakly dominant strategy for the successor partner to report under the disclosure regime.

A.1 Benchmark case with no disclosure

Statement and Proof of Proposition 1

Given $p_h \in (0, 1)$ and $c = 0$, there exist $I > 0$ and $T > I$ such that the following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium.

At $t = 2$, a rotated successor partner reports $NC$ iff the predecessor partner played $A$. In case of a conflict, $B_2 = 0$ and the assigned partner plays $A$. The investor invests $i^*$ if the audit report is $g$ and does not invest otherwise.

At $t = 1$, in case of a conflict,

a) If $I \leq \underline{I}$ the issuer puts pressure $B_1 = 0$. The engagement partner plays $NA$. The investor invests
\[
\frac{\text{IP}}{p+(1-p)\epsilon} \text{ if the audit report is } g \text{ and does not invest if the report is } b.
\]

b) For each \( I \in \mathcal{L} \), there exists \( x^* \in (0, 1) \) such that the issuer puts pressure \( B_1 = \frac{\text{IP}}{p+(1-p)\epsilon+(1-p_h)(\epsilon+(1-\epsilon)x^*)} \).

Proof. From Lemma 1 we know that at \( t = 2 \), in case of a conflict, \( B_2 = 0 \) and the assigned partner plays \( A \).

We also know from Lemma 2, that if a new partner is assigned to the issuer in Period 2, the successor partner plays \( NC \) if the predecessor partner played \( A \) at \( t = 1 \).

Now let’s consider the partner’s behavior and the issuer’s behavior at \( t = 1 \). Notice that their can be three types of equilibrium actions played by the flexible partner in period 1. One, where the flexible partner never plays \( A \), two where a flexible partner always plays \( A \) and three where the flexible partner mixes between playing \( A \) and \( NC \). We establish all these equilibria one by one.

The engagement partner’s payoff from playing \( A \) is
\[
Payoff_A = \alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h + \delta [\gamma \alpha_1 W \{ \gamma \phi'(x) + (1-\gamma)p_h \} + \alpha_2 X \{ \gamma p_h + (1-\gamma)\phi'(x) \}] + (1-\gamma) v_f \tag{22}
\]

In case of a conflict if the engagement partner chooses to play action \( NC \), his payoff is:
\[
Payoff_NA = \alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - B_1 + \delta [\gamma \alpha_1 W \{ \gamma \phi(x) + (1-\gamma)p_h \} + \alpha_2 X \{ \gamma p_h + (1-\gamma)\phi(x) \}] \]
\[
+ \delta (1-\gamma) [\beta_1 W \{ \gamma \phi(x) + (1-\gamma)p_h \} + \beta_2 X \{ \gamma p_h + (1-\gamma)\phi(x) \}] \tag{23}
\]

The engagement partner’s incentives to play \( NC \) is given by the payoff from playing \( NC \) minus the payoff from playing \( A \). This is denoted as a function by \( \Pi(x) - B_1 \) where:
\[
\Pi(x) = \delta [\alpha_1 W \{ \gamma \phi(x) + (1-\gamma)p_h - \gamma \phi'(x) - (1-\gamma)p_h \} + \alpha_2 X \{ \gamma p_h + (1-\gamma)\phi(x) - \gamma p_h - (1-\gamma)\phi'(x) \}]
\]
\[
+ \delta (1-\gamma) [\beta_1 W \{ \gamma \phi(x) + (1-\gamma)p_h \} + \beta_2 X \{ \gamma \phi(x) + (1-\gamma)p_h \} - v_f] \tag{24}
\]

The partner plays \( NA \) if and only if \( \Pi(x) \geq B_1 \).

The \( NA \)-Equilibrium: Notice that under the \( NA \)-equilibrium, \( \phi(0) = \phi'(0) = p_h \). This is because if the investor expects the flexible partner to play exactly as the rigid partner, then the reputation will not be updated along the equilibrium path.

The partner plays \( NA \) in period 1 if the payoff from \( NA \) is bigger than the payoff from playing \( A \). This reduces to:
\[
\delta (1-\gamma) [\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X p_h] - v_f \geq B
\]

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Now let’s consider the issuer’s incentives to pressure the engagement partner. If the engagement partner plays \(A\) and reports \(g\) in a conflict situation, the payoff of the issuer is \(\frac{pI}{p+(1-p)\epsilon}\). On the other hand, if the partner plays \(NA\) and reports \(b\), the investor does not invest in the project, in which event the payoff of the issuer is 0.

\[
\text{Payoff } A = \frac{pI}{p+(1-p)\epsilon} \quad (25)
\]
\[
\text{Payoff } NA = 0 \quad (26)
\]

So the maximum \(B\) the manager puts on the partner is:

\[
\max B = \frac{pI}{p+(1-p)\epsilon}
\]

For the \(NA\)-equilibrium to hold we need:

\[
\max B \leq \text{Gains from } NA \\
\iff \max B \leq \delta(1-\gamma)(\beta_1Wp_h + \beta_2Xp_h - v_f)
\]
\[
\iff \frac{pI}{p+(1-p)\epsilon} \leq \delta(1-\gamma)(\beta_1Wp_h + \beta_2Xp_h - v_f) \quad (27)
\]

Now \(\max B\) is a linear monotonically increasing function of \(I\) and \(v_f \leq 0\). Therefore there exists \(L\) such that, given \(p_h \in (0,1)\), if \(I = L\) then \(\max B = \delta(1-\gamma)(\beta_1Wp_h + \beta_2Xp_h - v_f)\) and \(\max B < \delta(1-\gamma)(\beta_1Wp_h + \beta_2Xp_h - v_f)\) if \(I < L\).

**The \(A\)-Equilibrium:**  Now consider period 1 incentives for the engagement partner. In case of a conflict:

\[
\text{Payoff } A = \alpha_1 Wp_h + \alpha_2 Xp_h + \delta[\gamma(\alpha_1 WR_2 + \alpha_2 XR_1) + (1-\gamma)v_f] \quad (28)
\]
\[
\text{Payoff } NA = \alpha_1 Wp_h + \alpha_2 Xp_h - B_1 + \delta[\gamma(\alpha_1 WR_2h + \alpha_2 XR_2) + (1-\gamma)(\beta_1WR_2h + \beta_2XR_2h)] \quad (29)
\]

where \(R_2h = \gamma.1 + (1-\gamma)p_h\)
\(R_2h = \gamma p_h + (1-\gamma).1\)
Notice that the maximum pressure the issuer is willing to put on the partner is given by
\[ P_r \]

Mixed Strategy Equilibrium:
\[ \text{Let } \beta \]
\[ \text{hand, if the partner plays } A \text{ with probability } \alpha \]
\[ \text{respectively. } \]
\[ \text{Now fix } I_0 \in (L, T). \text{ We want to show that there exists } x \in (0, 1) \text{ such that the mixed strategy of playing } A \text{ with probability } x \text{ is an equilibrium strategy. We look for mixed strategy equilibrium with reporting.} \]
The engagement partner’s incentives to play $NA$ is given by

$$
\Pi(x) = \gamma[\alpha_1 W \{ \gamma \phi(x) + (1 - \gamma)p_h - \hat{\gamma} \phi'(x) - (1 - \hat{\gamma})p_h \} + \alpha_2 X \{ \gamma p_h + (1 - \gamma) \phi(x) - \hat{\gamma} p_h - (1 - \hat{\gamma}) \phi'(x) \}]
+(1 - \gamma) [\beta_1 W \{ \gamma \phi(x) + (1 - \gamma)p_h \} + \beta_2 X \{ \hat{\gamma} \phi(x) + (1 - \hat{\gamma})p_h \} - \nu_f]
$$

where $\hat{\gamma}(g, B, n_f) = \Pr(\text{same partner}|g, B, n_f) = \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + (1 - \gamma)\epsilon} > \gamma$. Notice that, $\hat{\gamma}$ does not depend on the probability $x$.

We can also show that $\phi(x) = \frac{p_h}{p_h + (1 - p_h)(1 - x)}$ is increasing in $x$ and $\phi'(x) = \frac{p_h(1 - \gamma) + \beta_2 x}{p_h + (1 - p_h)(1 + (1 - r)\gamma)}$ is decreasing in $x$. Therefore, $\Pi(x)$ is a continuous increasing function of $x$. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, the partner is indifferent between playing $A$ and $NA$ in a conflict situation and $\Pi(x)$ should be equal to $\max_B(x)$.

Now $\max_B(x)$ is given by

$$
\max_B(x) = I \times \Pr(G|g, x)
$$

Since, $\Pr(G|g, x)$ is decreasing in $x$, for a given $I$, $\max_B$ is a decreasing function of $x$.

Also, from the existence of the $NA$-equilibrium we have,

$$
\Pi(x = 0) = \mathcal{L} \times \Pr(G|g, x = 0)
$$

and

$$
\Pi(x = 1) = \mathcal{T} \times \Pr(G|g, x = 1)
$$

With $I_0 \in (\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{T})$, $\max_B(x) = I_0 \times \Pr(G|g, x)$ is a continuous monotonically decreasing function satisfying the following conditions

$$
\Pi(x = 0) < \max_B(x = 0)
$$

and

$$
\Pi(x = 1) > \max_B(x = 1)
$$

Moreover, $\Pi(x)$ is a continuous monotonically increasing function of $x$. Therefore there exists $x \in (0, 1)$ such that $\Pi(x) = I_0 \times \Pr(G|g, x)$.

Hence the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium under collective reputation and monitoring. 

\[\Box\]

**Proof of Proposition 2:** We will prove the proposition by contradiction.

Consider $I \leq \mathcal{L}$. Suppose the engagement partner plays $A$ with probability $x \in (0, 1]$.

For $x \in (0, 1)$ to be an equilibrium we must have $\Pi(x) = \max_B(x)$ and for $x = 1$ to be an equilibrium we must have $\Pi(x) \leq \max_B(x)$. Combining the two we have,

$$
\gamma[\alpha_1 W \{ \gamma \phi(x) + (1 - \gamma)p_h - \hat{\gamma} \phi'(x) - (1 - \hat{\gamma})p_h \} + \alpha_2 X \{ \gamma p_h + (1 - \gamma) \phi(x) - \hat{\gamma} p_h - (1 - \hat{\gamma}) \phi'(x) \}]
+(1 - \gamma) [\beta_1 W \{ \gamma \phi(x) + (1 - \gamma)p_h \} + \beta_2 X \{ \hat{\gamma} \phi(x) + (1 - \hat{\gamma})p_h \} - \nu_f]
$$

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\[+(1 - \gamma) [\beta_1 W \{\gamma \phi(x) + (1 - \gamma)p_h\} + \beta_2 X \{\hat{\gamma} \phi(x) + (1 - \hat{\gamma})p_h\} - v_f]\]

\[\leq \frac{I_p}{p + (1 - p) [p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h) \{\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x\}]}
\]

holding with strict equality for \(x \in (0, 1)\).

Notice that the right hand side is strictly deceasing in \(x\). That is, \(\max_B(x > 0) < \max_B(x = 0)\), for a given \(I\). Similarly, \(\Pi(x = 0) < \Pi(x > 0)\).

From the \(NA\)-equilibrium we know that, for all \(I \leq I_0\) \(\Pi(x = 0) \geq \max_B(x = 0)\). Thus (32) can never hold. That is, the flexible partner does not play \(A\) with positive probability when \(I < I_0\).

Now consider \(I \geq I_0\). Suppose, the engagement partner plays \(A\) with probability \(x \in [0, 1)\). For \(x\) to be an equilibrium we must have

\[\gamma [\alpha_1 W \{\gamma \phi(x) + (1 - \gamma)p_h - \hat{\gamma} \phi'(x) - (1 - \hat{\gamma})p_h\} + \alpha_2 X \{\gamma p_h + (1 - \gamma)\phi(x) - \hat{\gamma} p_h - (1 - \hat{\gamma})\phi'(x)\}] + (1 - \gamma) [\beta_1 W \{\gamma \phi(x) + (1 - \gamma)p_h\} + \beta_2 X \{\hat{\gamma} \phi(x) + (1 - \hat{\gamma})p_h\} - v_f]\]

\[\geq \frac{I_p}{p + (1 - p) [p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h) \{\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x\}]}
\]

holding with strict equality for \(x \in (0, 1)\).

From the \(A\)-equilibrium we know that, for all \(I \geq I_t\) \(\Pi(x = 1) \leq \max_B(x = 1)\). Since, \(\Pi(x)\) is an increasing function and \(\max_B(x)\) is decreasing (33) can never hold. That is the flexible partner will not play \(A\) with any probability strictly below 1.

The uniqueness of the mixed strategy equilibrium follows from strict monotonicity of the functions \(\Pi(x)\) and \(\max_B(x)\).

Hence the proof.

\(\square\)

A.2 Benchmark case with disclosure

This is the benchmark case, \(c = 0\) and issuer is myopic.

\(A\)-equilibrium with reporting If such an equilibrium exists then we can calculate the optimal investment decisions in equilibrium. Define \(i^*_D\) to be the optimal investment decision by the investor in period 2 when the signal announced is \(g\). Notice that, \(i^*_D\) depends on the history of outcome in period 1, the equilibrium being played, and \(R_2\). The following table gives us the optimal investment decision for the investor in the \(A\)-equilibrium with reporting in the disclosure regime. Now in the disclosure regime, the investor can see exactly which partner is assigned to the issuer in period 2. We will denote by \(\{g, B, n, f, S\}\) the history in which the signal in period 1 was \(g\), the state realization at the end of period 1 was \(B\), there was no firing and the same partner is with the issuer in period 2. If the partner is rotated then the history observed by the investor can be represented by \(\{g, B, n, f, D\}\) (\(D\) is for different partner).
Proof of proposition 3  Period 2 actions post reporting are optimal for the same reasons as outlined in previous equilibria. So let’s consider the reporting decisions.

Suppose the partner assigned observes that the other partner played A. At this point, the history observed by the investor is \((g, B)\).

If he reports, the history is \((g, B, f, D)\). Thus payoff from reporting is:

\[
\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - c
\]

If he does not report, history is \((g, B, n f, D)\). Payoff from not reporting:

\[
\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X R''_2
\]

where \(R''_2\) is the reputation of the partner not assigned to the issuer at history \((g, B, n f, D)\). Since the investor believes that the monitor partner always reports, if the other partner is not fired, then the predecessor partner is believed to have issued \(g\) on account of getting the wrong signal. Thus \(R''_2 = p_h\) since both type players can get the wrong signal with the same probability. Thus, the new rotated partner is indifferent between reporting and not reporting. Therefore, by our assumption, he will report. Consider period 1 incentives: in case of a conflict if the assigned partner chooses to play A, his payoff is given by,

\[
Payoff A = \alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h + \delta[\gamma(\alpha_1 W R'_2 + \alpha_2 X p_h) + (1 - \gamma)v_f]
\]

where \(R'_2 = \frac{\epsilon p_h}{\epsilon p_h + (1-p_h)}\).

In case of a conflict if the engagement partner chooses to play action NA, his payoff is,

\[
Payoff NA = \alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - B_1 + \delta[\gamma(\alpha_1 W + \alpha_2 X p_h) + (1 - \gamma)(\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X)]
\]

Therefore, for the A-equilibrium to hold we must have that payoff from playing A is higher. This holds if:

\[
B_1 > \delta \left[ \gamma \alpha_1 W (1 - R'_2) + (1 - \gamma) (\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X - v_f) \right]
\]

Now let’s consider the issuer’s incentives to pressure the engagement partner. If the engagement partner
plays $A$ and reports $g$ in a conflict situation, the payoff of the issuer is $\frac{pI}{p+1-p(p_h\epsilon+(1-p_h))}$. On the other hand, if the partner plays $NA$ and reports $b$, the investor does not invest in the project, in which event the payoff of the issuer is 0. The maximum $B$ the issuer imposes on the partner is given by the difference in payoff to the issuer when the partner plays $A$ in period 1 versus when he plays $NA$. Since the latter is zero, $\text{max}_B$ is given by:

$$\text{max}_B = \frac{pI}{p+1-p(p_h\epsilon+(1-p_h))}$$

Now $\text{max}_B$ is a linear monotonically increasing function of $I$. Therefore there exists $I_d$ such that for all $I > I_d$, $\text{max}_B > \delta [\gamma_1 W (1 - R'_2) + (1 - \gamma) (\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X - v_f)]$ for all $p_h \in (0, 1)$.

Clearly, here $I_d = \frac{p+1-p(p_h\epsilon+(1-p_h))}{p} \delta [\gamma_1 W (1 - R'_2) + (1 - \gamma) (\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X - v_f)]$.

Proof of uniqueness is similar to the uniqueness proof given in proposition 2. □

**Proof of Proposition 4:** Under the non-disclosure regime, partner’s incentive to play $NA$ is given by

$$\Pi(x) = \delta \gamma [\alpha_1 W (\gamma \phi(x) + (1 - \gamma) p_h - \hat{\gamma} \phi'(x) - (1 - \hat{\gamma}) p_h)] + \alpha_2 X [\gamma p_h + (1 - \gamma) \phi(x) - \hat{\gamma} p_h - (1 - \hat{\gamma}) \phi'(x)]$$

$$+ \delta (1 - \gamma) [\beta_1 W (\gamma \phi(x) + (1 - \gamma) p_h)] + \beta_2 X [\hat{\gamma} \phi(x) + (1 - \hat{\gamma}) p_h] - v_f$$

Under the disclosure regime, partner’s incentive to play $NA$ is given by

$$\Pi_d(x) = \delta [\gamma_1 W (\phi(x) - R'_2) + (1 - \gamma) (\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X R(x) - v_f)]$$

Put $\alpha_2 \approx 0$ and $\beta_1 \approx 0$. Therefore rewriting the above equations in terms of $\phi(x)$ and $\phi'(x)$ we get,

$$\Pi(x) = \delta \gamma [\alpha_1 W (\gamma \phi(x) + (1 - \gamma) p_h - \hat{\gamma} \phi'(x) - (1 - \hat{\gamma}) p_h)] + \delta (1 - \gamma) [\beta_2 X (\hat{\gamma} \phi(x) + (1 - \hat{\gamma}) p_h] - v_f$$

and

$$\Pi_d(x) = \delta [\gamma_1 W (\phi(x) - \phi'(x)) + (1 - \gamma) (\beta_2 X \phi(x) - v_f)]$$

It is clear from the above equations that, $\Pi(x) < \Pi_d(x)$ for $x \in (0, 1]$.

Hence the proof. □

**Proof of Proposition 5:** Suppose players are expected to play the $NA$-equilibrium in period 1.

At the end of $t = 1$, the partner assigned observes that the other partner played $A$. At this point, the history observed by the investor is $(g, B)$.

In either regime, if he reports, the payoff from reporting is:

$$\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - c + T$$

If he does not report the payoff is:

$$\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h$$
Thus if \( T < c \), reporting is not optimal in either regime. Note that if the partner does not have incentives to report, then we cannot have the \( NA \)-equilibrium. A \( F \)-partner plays \( NA \) in period 1 despite facing pressure from the issuer for two reasons: first, for reputation gains, and second, due to the threat of sanctions. If \( NA \) is expected to be played in period 1 then there is no reputation gain (since both types of partners are expected to play in the same way in period 1 and any incorrect signal will be attributed to the player receiving the wrong signal). With no reporting as well, a player has no incentive to play \( NA \) in period 1. Therefore, for the \( NA \)-equilibrium to hold, we must have that the reporting partner reports the behavior of the other partner.

For the successor partner to report the other partner’s behavior, we must have \( c \leq T \). Now, let \( c \leq T \). Then there is an \( NA \)-equilibrium with reporting if:

\[
\delta(1 - \gamma) \left[ (\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X p_h) - v_f \right] \geq B_1
\]

The maximum pressure the manager puts on the partner:

\[
max_B = \frac{p I}{p + (1 - p) \epsilon}
\]

Since, \( max_B \) is a linear monotonically increasing function of \( I \), there exists \( L \) such that \( max_B < \delta(1 - \gamma)(\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X p_h - v_f) \) for all \( p_h \in (0, 1) \).

Hence the proof. \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 6:** Suppose the partner assigned observes that the other partner played \( A \). At this point, the history observed by the investor is \( (g, B) \).

If he reports, the history is \( (g, B, f) \). Thus payoff from reporting is:

\[
\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - c
\]  

(41)

If he does not report, history is \( (g, B, n f) \). Payoff from not reporting:

\[
\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X R_2''
\]  

(42)

where \( R_2'' \) is the reputation of the partner not with the issuer.

We want to find conditions for an \( A \)-equilibrium with reporting. Since the investor believes that the monitor partner always reports in equilibrium, \( R_2'' = p_h \). Therefore, for the monitor partner to report \( A \), we must have \( c \leq T \).

The rest of the proof follows from the proof of Proposition 3. \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 7** Consider the monitoring decision. Suppose the partner assigned in period 2 observes that the other partner played \( A \) in period 1.

If he reports, the history is \( (g, B, f) \). Thus the payoff from reporting is:

\[
\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - c + T
\]  

(43)
If he does not report, history is \((g, B, nf)\) and the payoff is:

\[ \alpha_1 W R_2 + \alpha_2 X R'_2 \]  

(44)

where \(R_2\) is the reputation of the engagement partner and \(R'_2\) is the reputation of the monitor partner.

Now from the proof of proposition 1, we know that, \(R_2 = \frac{ep_h}{ep_h + (1 - p_h)(\gamma + (1 - \gamma)\epsilon)}\) and \(R'_2 = p_h\).

With \(T = 0\), reporting is better than not reporting if:

\[ \alpha_1 W (p_h - \frac{ep_h}{ep_h + (1 - p_h)(\gamma + (1 - \gamma)\epsilon)}) + \alpha_2 X (p_h - p_h) > c \]

\[ \Leftrightarrow \alpha_1 W (p_h - \frac{ep_h}{ep_h + (1 - p_h)(\gamma + (1 - \gamma)\epsilon)}) > c - T \]

\[ \Leftrightarrow \alpha_1 W p_h [(1 - p_h)(1 - \epsilon)\gamma] > c(\epsilon + [(1 - p_h)(1 - \epsilon)\gamma]) \]

\[ \Leftrightarrow -\alpha_1 W \gamma(1 - \epsilon)p_h^2 + (\alpha_1 W \gamma(1 - \epsilon) + \gamma c(1 - \epsilon))p_h - \gamma c(1 - \epsilon) - \epsilon c > 0 \]  

(45)

Note that the above is a quadratic inequation which does not hold when \(p_h\) is too small or too large. Also note that \(p_h - \frac{ep_h}{ep_h + (1 - p_h)(\gamma + (1 - \gamma)\epsilon)} > 0\).

We can write (31) as:

\[-ap_h^2 + (a + b)p_h - (b + d) > 0\]

The discriminant for the above is positive if:

\[ D > 0 \]

\[ \Leftrightarrow (a + b)^2 - 4a(b + d) \]

\[ \Leftrightarrow a - b - 2\sqrt{ad} > 0 \]

\[ \alpha_1 W \gamma(1 - \epsilon) - \gamma c(1 - \epsilon) - 2\sqrt{\alpha_1 W \gamma(1 - \epsilon)\epsilon c} > 0 \]  

(46)

We can solve (32) and show that, if \(\alpha_1 W \gamma(1 - \epsilon) - \gamma c(1 - \epsilon) - 2\sqrt{\alpha_1 W \gamma(1 - \epsilon)\epsilon c} > 0\), then the monitor partner always reports for all \(T \geq 0\) if \(p_h \in \left[ \frac{1}{\sqrt{\alpha}} (\frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\alpha}} - \sqrt{\left(\frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\alpha}}\right)^2 - (b + d)}) , \frac{1}{\sqrt{\alpha}} (\frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\alpha}} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\alpha}}\right)^2 - (b + d)}) \right]\)  

If \(p_h < \frac{1}{\sqrt{\alpha}} (\frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\alpha}} - \sqrt{\left(\frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\alpha}}\right)^2 - (b + d)})\), then to ensure monitoring we must have, \(T \geq c - \alpha_1 W (p_h - \frac{ep_h}{ep_h + (1 - p_h)(\gamma + (1 - \gamma)\epsilon)})\).

Similarly, if \(p_h > \frac{1}{\sqrt{\alpha}} (\frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\alpha}} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{a + b}{2\sqrt{\alpha}}\right)^2 - (b + d)})\), to ensure monitoring we must have \(T \geq c - \alpha_1 W (p_h - \frac{ep_h}{ep_h + (1 - p_h)(\gamma + (1 - \gamma)\epsilon)})\).

The rest of the proof follows from proposition 1. \(\square\)

**Proof of Proposition 8**  We first show that for \(c\) above a certain threshold, the successor partner has no incentives to monitor under the disclosure regime.
Consider the reporting decision in period 2 now:

\[
\text{Payoff from reporting} = \alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - c
\]

\[
\text{Payoff from not reporting} = \alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p'
\]

where \(p'\) is reputation of other partner in history \((g, B, n f)\) and the no reporting is equilibrium strategy. Therefore:

\[
p' = \frac{p_h \epsilon}{p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x)}
\]

For an equilibrium where no reporting is optimal we must have:

\[
\frac{\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p'}{\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - c} > 0 
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow c > \frac{\alpha_2 X p_h (1 - \epsilon)(1 - p_h)x}{p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x)}
\]

Thus for \(c > g\), the successor partner has no incentives to monitor under the disclosure regime.

In period 1, for all \(x > 0\), we must have:

\[
\text{Payoff from } A = \text{Payoff from } NA
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow \alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h + \delta(\gamma(\alpha_1 W p' + \alpha_2 X p_h) + (1 - \gamma)(\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X p')) = \alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - B +
\]

\[
\delta(\gamma(\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h)(1 - \epsilon) + \alpha_2 X p_h + (1 - \gamma)(\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X p')) = \alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - B
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow B = \delta(\gamma \alpha_1 W + (1 - \gamma)\beta_2 X)\left[\frac{p_h}{p_h + (1 - p_h)(1 - x)} - \frac{p_h \epsilon}{p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x)}\right]
\]

Now we have the following expression for maximum pressure:

\[
\max_B = \frac{p I}{p + (1 - p)(p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x))}
\]

For any \(x > 0\), we must have \(B = \max_B\), else the issuer manager can definitely get \(A\) behavior from the flexible partner by increasing the pressure by a very small amount.

Thus, we have the following results:

i) Let \(c > g\) and \(I > T_{d1m} = \frac{p + (1 - p)(p_h \epsilon + 1 - p_h)}{p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x)}\). Then the equilibrium in the disclosure regime is that of an \(A\)-equilibrium without reporting.

ii) Let \(c > g\) but \(I < T_{d1}\). There exists a unique \(x(I)\) such that \(\max_B = \delta(\gamma \alpha_1 W + (1 - \gamma)\beta_2 X)\left[\frac{p_h}{p_h + (1 - p_h)(1 - x)} - \frac{p_h \epsilon}{p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x)}\right]\).

iii) Let \(c > \frac{\alpha_2 X p_h (1 - \epsilon)(1 - p_h)}{p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h)}\) but \(I < T_{d1m}\). Then the unique equilibrium in the disclosure regime is a mixed strategy equilibrium where the flexible partner plays the following strategy in a conflict situation in period 1: \(P(g/b) = x(I)\).

Now let’s look at the non-disclosure regime.
Consider the reporting decision in period 2 now:

\[ \text{Payoff from reporting} = \alpha_1 Wp_h + \alpha_2 Xp_h - c \]
\[ \text{Payoff from not reporting} = \alpha_1 WR(x) + \alpha_2 XR'(x) \]

where \( R(x) \) is reputation of partner with client in period 2 and \( R'(x) \) is reputation of other partner in history \((g, B, n f)\) and reporting is equilibrium strategy. Therefore:

\[ R(x) = \frac{p_h \epsilon}{p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x\gamma)} \]
\[ R'(x) = p_h \]

Since we want an equilibrium where reporting is optimal we must have:

\[ \alpha_1 WR(x) + \alpha_2 XR'(x) < \alpha_1 Wp_h + \alpha_2 Xp_h - c \]
\[ \Leftrightarrow c < \frac{\alpha_1 Wp_h (1 - p_h)(1 - \epsilon)x\gamma}{\epsilon p_h + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x\gamma)} \]

Fix \( c = c \). So we need the following condition:

\[ \frac{\alpha_2 Xp_h (1 - \epsilon)(1 - p_h)}{p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h)} \leq \frac{\alpha_1 Wp_h (1 - p_h)(1 - \epsilon)x\gamma}{\epsilon p_h + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x\gamma)} \]
\[ \Leftrightarrow \frac{\alpha_2 X}{\epsilon p_h + (1 - p_h)} \leq \frac{\alpha_1 Wx\gamma}{\epsilon p_h + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x\gamma)} \]

The above is not true for low \( x \) as RHS is monotonically increasing in \( x \). Let’s assume that it works at least for the highest \( x \). That is, assume that the following holds:

\[ \frac{\alpha_2 X}{\epsilon p_h + (1 - p_h)} \leq \frac{\alpha_1 Wx\gamma}{\epsilon p_h + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x\gamma)} \]

In period 1, for all \( x > 0 \), we must have:

\[ \text{Payoff from A} = \text{Payoff from NA} \]
\[ \Leftrightarrow \alpha_1 Wp_h + \alpha_2 Xp_h + \delta[\gamma(\alpha_1 WR(x) + \alpha_2 XR'(x)) + (1 - \gamma)(v_f)] = \alpha_1 Wp_h + \alpha_2 Xp_h - B + \delta[\gamma(\alpha_1 W(\frac{p_h}{p_h + (1 - p_h)(1 - x)} + (1 - \gamma)p_h) + \alpha_2 X(\frac{p_h}{p_h + (1 - p_h)(1 - x)} + \gamma p_h)) + (1 - \gamma)(\beta_1 W(\frac{p_h}{p_h + (1 - p_h)(1 - x)} + (1 - \gamma)p_h) + \beta_2 X(\frac{p_h}{p_h + (1 - p_h)(1 - x)} + \gamma p_h))] \]
\[ \Leftrightarrow B = \delta[\gamma(\alpha_1 WR_h(x) - R(x)) + \gamma_2 X(R_h(x) - R'(x)) + (1 - \gamma)(\beta_1 WR_h(x) + \beta_2 XR'_h(x) - v_f)]. \]

where \( R_h(x) = \gamma \frac{p_h}{p_h + (1 - p_h)(1 - x)} + (1 - \gamma)p_h \) and \( R'_h(x) = (1 - \gamma) \frac{p_h}{p_h + (1 - p_h)(1 - x)} + \gamma p_h \)

We have the following expression for maximum pressure:

\[ \max_B = \frac{pI}{p + (1 - p)(p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x))} \]
For any \( x > 0 \), we must have \( B = \max_B \), else the issuer manager can definitely get \( A \) behavior from the flexible partner by increasing the pressure by a very small amount.

Now \( B \) is increasing in \( x \) (because \( R_h(x), R'_h(x) \) are increasing in \( x \) and \( R(x), R'(x) \) are non-increasing in \( x \)). Also \( \max_B \) is decreasing in \( x \). Thus we have the following:

iv) If \( I > I_{RND} \), then there is an \( A \)-equilibrium with reporting in the non-disclosure regime. \( I_{RND} \) is given by:

\[
I_{RND} = \frac{p + (1 - p)(ph \epsilon + (1 - ph))}{p}[\gamma \alpha_1 W(R_h(1) - R(1)) + \gamma \alpha_2 X(R'_h(1) - R'(1)) + (1 - \gamma)(\beta_1 W R_h(1) + \beta_2 X R'_h(1) - v_f)]
\]

v) If \( I > \max\{I_d, I_{RND}\} \), then there exists an \( A \)-equilibrium with reporting in the non-disclosure regime but the only equilibrium in the disclosure regime is \( A \)-equilibrium without reporting. In this case, in period 2, the flexible partner will not be removed in the disclosure regime and the audit firm will have lower payoffs from project 2.

Notice that, \( v_f \) being a large negative number, is a sufficient condition for \( RHS (51) \leq RHS (47) \).

Let us now go back to condition (49). The condition is not true for low \( x \) and also, \( RHS \) is monotonically increasing in \( x \). If \( \alpha_2 \) is small, we will find \( \hat{x} \in (0, 1) \) such that (49) holds with equality. From uniqueness of equilibrium under monitoring, we can find \( \hat{I} \) such that under the non-disclosure regime and monitoring equilibrium, \( x(\hat{I}) = \hat{x} \). Moreover, \( \hat{I} > I \), where \( I \) is threshold below which the \( NA \)-equilibrium holds under monitoring.

Hence, for \( I \in [\hat{I}, I_{dim}] \) incentive to play \( A \) is higher under disclosure if \( v_f \) is not small. □

A.3 Engagement Quality Reviewer

A.3.1 Non-disclosure regime:

In this section we look for the equilibrium behavior of the engagement partner and the EQR when the name of the engagement partner is not disclosed to the investor. Suppose that, in equilibrium, the probability that the \( F \) partner announces \( g \) when he actually got the signal \( b \) is \( x \in [0, 1] \). Then,

\[
Pr(R|b, B) = \phi(x) = \frac{ph[1 + (1 - ph)x(1 - \gamma)]}{ph + (1 - ph)(x(1 - \gamma) + (1 - x))}
\] (52)

and

\[
Pr(R|g, B) = \phi'(x) = \frac{ep_h}{ep_h + (1 - ph)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x\gamma)}
\] (53)

\( \phi(x) \) captures the probability that the partner assigned to the issuer at the second period is of type \( R \), given the history \((b, B)\). Since the identity of the engagement partner is not observed by the investor, \( \phi(x) \in (ph, 1) \) for all \( x \in (0, 1] \). Similarly, \( \phi'(x) \) gives the probability that the partner assigned to the issuer is of type \( R \), given the history \((g, B)\). Notice that, the history \((g, B)\) implies that the engagement partner assigned to the issuer in the first period is also assigned to the issuer in the second period\(^{23}\). The history can

\(^{23}\)Had the partner been fired, it would have to be the case that the partner had played \( A \) and was going to report \( g \). However, in
be observed if the assigned partner is of type $R$ and gets the wrong signal in the first period, or the assigned partner is of type $F$ and gets the wrong signal, or the assigned partner is of type $F$ who plays $A$ and the EQR does not detect the unsupported opinion. Thus, $\phi'(x) < p_h$ for all $x \in (0, 1]$.

**Investment under the non-disclosure regime:**

For all possible histories, the investor’s optimal investment rule (following report $g$) in the second period is given by the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>History</th>
<th>$i^*$ in N.A-Equilibrium</th>
<th>$i^*$ in Mixed Strategy Equilibrium</th>
<th>$i^*$ in A-Equilibrium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$g, G$</td>
<td>$p + (1-p)[p_h + (1-p_h)]$</td>
<td>$p + (1-p)[p_h + (1-p_h)]$</td>
<td>$p + (1-p)[p_h + (1-p_h)]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b, G$</td>
<td>$p + (1-p)[p_h + (1-p_h)]$</td>
<td>$p + (1-p)[p_h + (1-p_h)]$</td>
<td>$p + (1-p)[p_h + (1-p_h)]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g, B$</td>
<td>$p + (1-p)[p_h + (1-p_h)]$</td>
<td>$p + (1-p)[\phi(x) + (1-\phi(x))]$</td>
<td>$p + (1-p)[\phi(x) + (1-\phi(x))]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b, B$</td>
<td>$p + (1-p)[p_h + (1-p_h)]$</td>
<td>$p + (1-p)[\phi(x) + (1-\phi(x))]$</td>
<td>$p + (1-p)[\phi(x) + (1-\phi(x))]$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the belief update functions, the engagement partner’s incentives to play N.A is given by the function $II(x)$.

$$II(x) = \delta [\gamma \alpha_1 W(\phi(x) - \phi'(x)) + (1 - \gamma)\delta[\alpha_1 W\phi(x) + \alpha_2 Xp_h - v_f]]$$

**Proposition 9:** Given $p_h \in (0, 1)$ and $c = 0$, there exist $I > 0$ and $T > I$ such that the following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium.

At $t = 2$, the EQR always reports $C$. In case of a conflict, $B_2 = 0$ and the assigned partner plays $A$ if his type is $F$. The investor invests $i^*$ if the audit report is $g$ and does not invest otherwise.

At $t = 1$, in case of a conflict,

a) If $I \leq L$, the issuer puts pressure $B_1 = 0$. The engagement partner plays N.A. The EQR reports NC if and only if the engagement partner plays $A$. The investor invests $\frac{lp}{p + (1-p)\epsilon}$ if the audit report is $g$ and does not invest if the report is $b$.

b) For each $I \in (L, T)$, there exists $x^* \in (0, 1)$ such that the issuer puts pressure $B_1 = \frac{lp}{p + (1-p)[p_h + (1-p_h)(\epsilon + (1-\epsilon)x^*)]}$. The engagement partner plays $A$ with probability $x^*$. The EQR reports NC if and only if the engagement partner plays $A$. The investor invests $\frac{lp}{p + (1-p)[p_h + (1-p_h)(\epsilon + (1-\epsilon)x^*)]}$ if the audit report is $g$ and does not invest if the report is $b$.

c) If $I \geq T$, the issuer puts pressure $B_1 = \delta[\gamma(\alpha_1 WR'_2 + \alpha_2 XR''_2)h + (1 - \gamma)(\beta_2 X R''_2 + \beta_2 X R''_2)h]$, and the assigned partner plays $A$ if his type is $F$. The investor invests $I^* \frac{lp}{p + (1-p)[p_h + (1-p_h)(\epsilon + (1-\epsilon)x^*)]}$ if the report is $g$ and does not invest if the report is $b$. $R'_2 = \frac{lp}{(p_h + (1-p_h)(\gamma + (1-\gamma)x^*)}$, $R''_2 = p_h$, $R''_2 = 0.1 + (1 - \gamma)p_h$, and $R''_2 h = \gamma p_h + (1 - \gamma).1$.

**Proof of Proposition 9:** Let’s prove by backward induction. It is trivial that an $F$ type partner is indifferent between playing $A$ and N.A in period 2 in case there is conflict and $B_2 = 0$. If $B_2 > 0$, the partner strictly this case the final report would have been changed to be $b$. 

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prefers the action $A$. Thus, the issuer has to impose any positive cost on the partner to make him play $A$. We assume that the partner plays $A$ when he is indifferent. This implies that the issuer will choose $B_2 = 0$ and the partner will acquiesce.

Now let’s consider the behavior at $t = 1$.

The $NA$-equilibrium: First, consider the reporting decision of the EQR. The EQR reports against the engagement partner if and only if

$$\beta_1 W(\phi(x) - \phi'(x)) \geq 0$$

In equilibrium, if the engagement partners plays $NA$ with probability 1, $\phi = \phi' = p_h$. That is, the EQR is indifferent between reporting and not reporting against the engagement partner. Thus reporting against the engagement partner is weakly optimal for the EQR.

Next, consider the incentives of the engagement partner to play $NA$. The engagement partner’s incentives to play $NA$ is given by

$$\Pi(x) = \gamma \alpha_1 W(\phi(x) - \phi'(x)) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W p(x) + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f]$$

Under the $NA$–equilibrium we have,

$$\Pi(0) = \gamma \alpha_1 W(p_h - p_h) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f]
= (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f]$$

Now let’s consider the issuer’s incentives to pressure the engagement partner. If the engagement partner plays $A$ and reports $g$ in a conflict situation, the payoff of the issuer is $\frac{p_I}{p + (1 - p)}$. On the other hand, if the partner plays $NA$ and reports $b$, the investor does not invest in the project, in which event the payoff of the issuer is 0. So the maximum $B$ the manager puts on the partner is:

$$max_B = \frac{p_I}{p + (1 - p)}$$

For the $NA$-equilibrium to hold we need:

$$max_B < (1 - \gamma)(\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X p_h - v_f)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{p_I}{p + (1 - p)} < (1 - \gamma)(\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X p_h - v_f)$$

Now $max_B$ is a linear monotonically increasing function of $I$ and $v_f \leq 0$. Therefore, there exists $I$
such that $\max B < (1 - \gamma)(\beta_1 W \rho_{h} + \beta_2 X \rho_{h} - v_f)$ for all $\rho_{h} \in (0, 1)$. Specifically, $I = \frac{p + (1 - p)\epsilon}{p + (1 - p)\epsilon + (1 - \rho_{h})}$. 

The $A$-Equilibrium: Under the $A$-equilibrium, the EQR reports against the engagement partner if and only if

$$\beta_1 W(\phi(1) - \phi'(1)) \geq 0$$

, where $\phi(1) = \frac{\rho_{h}[1 + (1 - \rho_{h})(1 - \gamma)]}{\rho_{h} + (1 - \rho_{h})(1 - \gamma)} > \rho_{h}$ and $\phi'(1) = \frac{\epsilon \rho_{h}}{\epsilon \rho_{h} + (1 - \rho_{h})(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)\gamma)} < \rho_{h}$. Therefore, it is a strictly dominant strategy for the EQR to report against the engagement partner.

The engagement partner’s incentives to play $NA$ is given by

$$\Pi(x) = \gamma\alpha_1 W(\phi(x) - \phi'(x)) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W \phi(x) + \alpha_2 X \rho_{h} - v_f]$$

Under the $A$–equilibrium we have,

$$\Pi(1) = \gamma\alpha_1 W(\phi(1) - \phi'(1)) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W \phi(1) + \alpha_2 X \rho_{h} - v_f]$$

Now, if the engagement partner plays $A$ and reports $g$ in a conflict situation, the payoff of the issuer is

$$\frac{pl}{p + (1 - p)(\rho_{h}\epsilon + (1 - \rho_{h}))}$$. On the other hand, if the partner plays $NA$ and reports $b$, the investor does not invest in the project, in which event the payoff of the issuer is $0$.

So the maximum $B$ the issuer puts on the partner is:

$$\max B = \frac{pl}{p + (1 - p)(\rho_{h}\epsilon + (1 - \rho_{h}))}$$

Now $\max B$ is a linear monotonically increasing function of $I$. Therefore, there exists $T$ such that if $I > T$ then $\max B > \gamma\alpha_1 W(\phi(1) - \phi'(1)) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W \phi(1) + \alpha_2 X \rho_{h} - v_f]$ for all $\rho_{h} \in (0, 1)$. Specifically, $T = \frac{p + (1 - p)(\rho_{h}\epsilon + (1 - \rho_{h}))}{p + (1 - p)(\rho_{h}\epsilon + (1 - \rho_{h}))}\Pi(1)$.

Mixed Strategy Equilibrium: We first show that $T > L$.

Notice that for a given $I$,

$$\max B(x = 0) > \max B(x = 1)$$

(55)

Also, note that,

$$\Pi(x = 0) < \Pi(x = 1)$$

(56)

For the $NA$-equilibrium to hold we must have,

$$\Pi(x = 0) \geq \max B(x = 0)$$

(57)
On the other hand, for the $A$-equilibrium to hold we must have,

$$\Pi(x = 1) \leq maxB(x = 1) \tag{58}$$

Therefore, $T > L$ follows from (55), (56), (57), and (58).

Let’s consider $I \in (L, T)$. Suppose the engagement partner plays $A$ with probability $x \in (0, 1)$.

The EQR reports against the engagement partner if and only if

$$\beta_1W(\phi(x) - \phi'(x)) \geq 0$$

, where $\phi(x)$ and $\phi'(x)$ is given by (52) and (53) respectively.

For the mixed strategy equilibrium to hold, the engagement partner must be indifferent between playing $A$ and $NA$. The issuer should also be indifferent between putting pressure $B_2$ and not putting pressure. That is, we must have

$$B_2 = maxB(x)$$

Thus, in equilibrium the following condition has to hold

$$\Pi(x) = maxB(x)$$

$$\Rightarrow \gamma\alpha_1W(\phi(x) - \phi'(x)) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1W\phi(x) + \alpha_2Xp - v_f] = \frac{Ip}{p + (1 - p)p + (1 - p)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x)} \tag{59}$$

Notice that, $\phi(\cdot)$ is continuous and monotonically increasing in $x$. Also, $\phi'(\cdot)$ is continuous and monotonically decreasing in $x$. Therefore, the left hand side of equation (59) is monotonically increasing in $x$ and right hand side of equation (59) is decreasing in $x$ with the following conditions being satisfied. First, $\Pi(0) < maxB(0)$ and $\Pi(1) > maxB(1)$.

Therefore, for a given $I \in (L, T)$, there exists a unique $x^* \in (0, 1)$ such that equation (59) is satisfied.

Hence, the proof. \(\square\)

Using similar arguments as in Proposition 2, we can show that the equilibrium described in Proposition 9 is unique.

A.3.2 Disclosure regime:

Under the disclosure regime, along with the history of outcomes, the investor also observes if the engagement partner is reassigned to the issuer. In case of a conflict, if the partner plays $A$ and the EQR fails to detect it, then the relevant history to the investor is $(g, B, nf)$ under the disclosure regime. Suppose that, in equilibrium, the probability that the $F$ partner announces $g$ when he actually got the signal $b$ is $x \in [0, 1]$. Then,

$$Pr(R|b, B) = \phi_d(x) = \frac{p_h}{p_h + (1 - p_h)(1 - x)} \tag{60}$$

58
and
\[ Pr(R|g, B) = \phi_d'(x) = \frac{\epsilon p_h}{\epsilon p_h + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x)} \] (61)

Under the NA-equilibrium, \( \phi_d = 1 \) and for all \( x \in [0, 1], \phi(x) = \phi_d'(x) \). Given the belief update functions, the engagement partner’s incentives to play NA is given by the function \( \Pi_d(x) \).

\[ \Pi_d(x) = \delta \left[ \gamma \alpha_1 W(\phi_d(x) - \phi_d'(x)) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W(\phi_d(x) + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f)] \right] \]

**Optimal investment under the disclosure regime:**

For all possible histories, the investor’s optimal investment rule (following report \( g \)) in the second period is given by the following table. In the table \( S \) stands for the same partner assigned to the issuer in the second period, while \( D \) stands for a different partner being assigned to the issuer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>History</th>
<th>( i_d^* ) in NA-Equilibrium</th>
<th>( i_d^* ) in Mixed Strategy Equilibrium</th>
<th>( i_d^* ) in A-Equilibrium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( g, G, S )</td>
<td>( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)]} )</td>
<td>( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)]} )</td>
<td>( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)]} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( b, G, S )</td>
<td>( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)]} )</td>
<td>( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)]} )</td>
<td>( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)]} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>( b, B, S )</td>
<td>( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)]} )</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>( g, G, D )</td>
<td>( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)]} )</td>
<td>( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)]} )</td>
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</tr>
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<td>( b, G, D )</td>
<td>( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)]} )</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>( g, B, D )</td>
<td>( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)]} )</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>( b, B, D )</td>
<td>( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)]} )</td>
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<td>( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)]} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Proposition 10:** Given \( p_h \in (0, 1) \) and \( c = 0 \), there exist \( L_d > 0 \) and \( T_d > L_d \) such that the following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium.

At \( t = 2 \), the EQR always reports C. In case of a conflict, \( B_2 = 0 \) and the assigned partner plays A if his type is \( F \). The investor invests \( i_d^* \) if the audit report is g and does not invest otherwise.

At \( t = 1 \), in case of a conflict,

a) If \( I \leq L_d \), the issuer puts pressure \( B_1 = 0 \). The engagement partner plays NA. The EQR reports NC if and only if the engagement partner plays A. The investor invests \( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)]} \) if the audit report is g and does not invest if the report is b.

b) For each \( I \in (L_d, T_d) \), there exists \( x_d^* \in (0, 1) \) such that the issuer puts pressure \( B_1 = \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)](\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x_d^*)} \). The engagement partner plays A with probability \( x_d^* \). The EQR reports NC if and only if the engagement partner plays A. The investor invests \( \frac{p_l}{p + (1 - p)[p_h + (1 - p_h)](\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x_d^*)} \) if the audit report is g and does not invest if the report is b.

c) If \( I \geq T_d \), the issuer puts pressure \( B_1 = \delta \left[ \gamma \alpha_1 W(1 - \phi'(1)) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f] \right] \). The engagement partner plays A if his type is \( F \). The EQR reports NC if and only if the engagement partner
plays A. The investor invests \( \frac{pI}{p + (1 - p)\epsilon h + (1 - p)\epsilon} \) if the audit report is g and does not invest if the report is b.

**Proof of Proposition 10:** Let’s prove by backward induction. Following the same argument as in Proposition 1, the issuer will choose \( B_2 = 0 \) and the partner will acquiesce.

Now let’s consider the behavior at \( t = 1 \).

The **NA-Equilibrium:** First, consider the reporting decision of the EQR. The EQR reports against the engagement partner if and only if

\[
\beta_1 W(\phi_d(x) - \phi'_d(x)) \geq 0
\]

In equilibrium, if the engagement partners plays NA with probability 1, \( \phi_d = \phi'_d = p_h \). That is, the EQR is indifferent between reporting and not reporting against the engagement partner. Thus reporting against the engagement partner is weakly optimal for the EQR.

Next, consider the incentives of the engagement partner to play NA. The engagement partner’s incentives to play NA is given by

\[
\Pi_d(x) = \gamma (\alpha_1 W(\phi_d(x) - \phi'_d(x)) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W \phi_d(x) + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f]
\]

Under the NA-equilibrium we have,

\[
\Pi_d(0) = \gamma (\alpha_1 W (p_h - p_h) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f]
\]

\[
= (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f]
\]

Now let’s consider the issuer’s incentives to pressure the engagement partner. If the engagement partner plays A and reports g in a conflict situation, the payoff of the issuer is \( \frac{pI}{p + (1 - p)\epsilon} \). On the other hand, if the partner plays NA and reports b, the investor does not invest in the project, in which event the payoff of the issuer is 0. So the maximum \( B \) the manager puts on the partner is:

\[
\max B = \frac{pI}{p + (1 - p)\epsilon}
\]

For the NA-equilibrium to hold we need:

\[
\max B < (1 - \gamma)(\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X p_h - v_f)
\]

\[
\iff \frac{pI}{p + (1 - p)\epsilon} < (1 - \gamma)(\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X p_h - v_f)
\]

(62)
Now \(\max B\) is a linear monotonically increasing function of \(I\) and \(v_f \leq 0\). Therefore, there exists \(L_d\) such that \(\max B < (1 - \gamma)(\beta_1 W p_h + \beta_2 X p_h - v_f)\) for all \(p_h \in (0, 1)\). Specifically, \(L_d = \frac{p + (1 - p)\epsilon}{p} \Pi_d(0)\).

**The A-Equilibrium:** Under the A-equilibrium, the EQR reports against the engagement partner if and only if

\[
\beta_1 W (\phi_d(1) - \phi_d'(1)) \geq 0
\]

where \(\phi_d(1) = 1 > p_h\) and \(\phi_d'(1) = \frac{p}{p_h + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)\gamma)} < p_h\). Therefore, it is a strictly dominant strategy for the EQR to report against the engagement partner.

The engagement partner’s incentives to play \(NA\) is given by

\[
\Pi_d(x) = \gamma \alpha_1 W (\phi_d(x) - \phi_d'(x)) + (1 - \gamma) [\alpha_1 W \phi_d(x) + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f]
\]

Under the A-equilibrium we have,

\[
\Pi_d(1) = \gamma \alpha_1 W (1 - \phi_d'(1)) + (1 - \gamma) [\alpha_1 W + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f]
\]

Now, if the engagement partner plays \(A\) and reports \(g\) in a conflict situation, the payoff of the issuer is

\[
\frac{p_I p}{p + (1 - p)(p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h))}.\]

On the other hand, if the partner plays \(NA\) and reports \(b\), the investor does not invest in the project, in which event the payoff of the issuer is 0.

So the maximum \(B\) the issuer puts on the partner is:

\[
\max B = \frac{p_I}{p + (1 - p)(p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h))}
\]

Now \(\max B\) is a linear monotonically increasing function of \(I\). Therefore, there exists \(T_d\) such that if \(I > T_d\) then \(\max B > \gamma \alpha_1 W (\phi(1) - \phi'(1)) + (1 - \gamma) [\alpha_1 W \phi(1) + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f]\) for all \(p_h \in (0, 1)\). Specifically, \(T_d = \frac{p + (1 - p)(p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h))}{p} \Pi_d(1)\).

**Mixed Strategy Equilibrium:** We first show that \(T > L\).

Notice that for a given \(I\),

\[
\max B(x = 0) > \max B(x = 1)
\]

(63)

Also, note that,

\[
\Pi_d(x = 0) < \Pi_d(x = 1).
\]

(64)

For the \(NA\)-equilibrium to hold we must have,

\[
\Pi_d(x = 0) \geq \max B(x = 0)
\]

(65)
On the other hand, for the $A$-equilibrium to hold we must have,

$$\Pi_d(x = 1) \leq \max B(x = 1)$$  \hspace{1cm} (66)

Therefore, $\mathcal{T} > \mathcal{I}$ follows from (63), (64), (65), and (66).

Let’s consider $I \in (\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{T})$. Suppose the engagement partner plays $A$ with probability $x \in (0, 1)$.

The EQR reports against the engagement partner if and only if

$$\beta_1 W(\phi_d(x) - \phi'_d(x)) \geq 0$$

where $\phi_d(x)$ and $\phi'_d(x)$ is given by (60) and (61) respectively.

For the mixed strategy equilibrium to hold, the engagement partner must be indifferent between playing $A$ and $NA$. The issuer should also be indifferent between putting pressure $B_2$ and not putting pressure. That is, we must have

$$B_2 = \max B(x)$$

Thus, in equilibrium the following condition has to hold

$$\Pi_d(x) = \max B(x)$$

$$\Rightarrow \gamma \alpha_1 W(\phi_d(x) - \phi'_d(x)) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W \phi_d(x) + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f] = \frac{I_p}{p + (1 - p)[p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h)(\epsilon + (1 - \epsilon)x)]}$$  \hspace{1cm} (67)

Notice that, $\phi_d(\cdot)$ is continuous and monotonically increasing in $x$. Also, $\phi'_d(\cdot)$ is continuous and monotonically decreasing in $x$. Therefore, the left hand side of equation (67) is monotonically increasing in $x$ and right hand side of equation (67) is decreasing in $x$ with the following conditions being satisfied. First, $\Pi_d(0) < \max B(0)$ and $\Pi_d(1) > \max B(1)$.

Therefore, for a given $I \in (\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{T})$, there exists a unique $x^*_d \in (0, 1)$ such that equation (67) is satisfied.

Hence, the proof. $\square$

**Proposition 11:** Given $p_h \in (0, 1)$ and $c = 0$, a) $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_d$, b) $\mathcal{T}_d > \mathcal{T}$, c) $x^* < x^*_d$

**Proof of Proposition 11:** a) From the proof of Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 we know that, $\mathcal{L} = \frac{p + (1 - p)c}{p} \Pi(0)$ and $\mathcal{L}_d = \frac{p + (1 - p)c}{p} \Pi_d(0)$.

Notice that, $\Pi(0) = (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W p_h + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f] = \Pi_d(0)$.

b) From the proof of Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 we know that, $\mathcal{T} = \frac{p + (1 - p)(p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h))}{p} \Pi(1)$ and $\mathcal{T}_d = \frac{p + (1 - p)(p_h \epsilon + (1 - p_h))}{p} \Pi_d(1)$.

Now,

$$\Pi_d(1) = \gamma \alpha_1 W(1 - \phi'(1)) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f]$$
\[ > \alpha_1 W (\phi(1) - \phi'(1)) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W \phi(1) + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f] = \Pi(1) \]

c) We know that
\[ \Pi(x) = \gamma \alpha_1 W (\phi(x) - \phi'(x)) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W \phi(x) + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f] \]

and
\[ \Pi_d(x) = \gamma \alpha_1 W (\phi_d(x) - \phi'(x)) + (1 - \gamma)[\alpha_1 W \phi_d(x) + \alpha_2 X p_h - v_f] \]

Now, \( \phi_d(x) = \frac{p_h}{p_h + (1 - p_h)(1 - x)} > \phi(x) = \frac{(1 - \epsilon)p_h + p_h (1 - \epsilon)x (1 - \gamma)(1 - p_h)}{(1 - \epsilon)p_h + (1 - p_h)(1 - \epsilon)(1 - x) + (1 - \epsilon)x (1 - \gamma)} \). Hence the proof.

Now consider an environment where the cost of reporting \( c \) is positive, and an amount \( T \geq 0 \) can be transferred to the monitor partner when he reports correctly against the engagement partner.

**Proposition 12:** Let, \( T = max \{0, c - \beta_1 \delta W (\phi(x) - \phi'(x))\} \) and \( T_d = max \{0, c - \beta_1 \delta W (p_h - \phi'(x))\} \). Then \( T_d \geq T \) for all \( x \), and \( T_d > T \) for some \( x \).

**Proof of Proposition 12:**

Follows directly from comparing (18) and (19).

Following the same argument as in Section 3, the above proposition implies that, if the cost of reporting is positive and transfers \( T = 0 \), then in equilibrium, monitoring may be optimal under the non-disclosure regime but not optimal under the disclosure regime. That is, there exist parameter values \( p_h, c \) and a range of \( I \) such that in equilibrium, there is monitoring under the non-disclosure and no monitoring under disclosure. This in turn leads to the probability of playing \( A \) under the non-disclosure regime being strictly lower than that under the disclosure regime.