Iliev, Peter and Michelle Lowry, forthcoming, Are Mutual Funds Active Voters? Review of Financial Studies. [Internet Appendix]
Characterizes funds' vote decisions as stemming from the direction and precision of their signal relative to that of proxy advisors.
Funds with lower costs of collecting information and higher benefits from voting are three to seven times less likely to follow ISS.
Iliev, Peter, Darius Miller and Lukas Roth, 2014, Uninvited U.S. Investors? Economic Consequences of Involuntary Cross-listings, Journal of Accounting Research 52 (2), 473-519. [Internet Appendix]
An SEC deregulation intended to increase the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets lead to a significant destruction of foreign firm value.
Iliev, Peter and Ivo Welch, 2013, "A Model of Operational Slack: The Short-Run, Medium-Run, and Long-Run Consequences of Limited Attention., Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 29 (1), 2-34.
(Runner-up for the 2012 Oliver E. Williamson Prize for Best Article in Law, Economics and Organization)
Studies institutions, such as firms, in which multiple projects can require attention at unpredictable times. The model can explain overinvestment and the diversification discount even when managers are not agency-conflicted.
Iliev, Peter, 2010, The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings Quality and Stock Prices, Journal of Finance 65 (3), 1163-1196. [Internet Appendix]
Exploits a natural quasi-experiment to isolate the effects that were uniquely due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Section 404 led to
conservative reported earnings, but also imposed real costs reducing the market value of small firms.
Iliev, Peter, Karl Lins, Darius Miller and Lukas Roth, 2014, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World.
Systematic study of shareholder voting across countries. Investors exercise greater corporate governance when they fear expropriation the most:
in cases of poor country-level institutions and controlling shareholders. Voting against management is linked with a greater number of directors that exit the board and with a lower probability of completing mergers.
Iliev, Peter and Svetla Vitanova, 2014, The Effect of Say-on-Pay in the U.S.
Uses that U.S. firms with a public float under $75 million did not have to hold a Say-on-Pay vote to quantify the effects of the new rule.
We find a positive market reaction to compliance with the Say-on-Pay rule. As implemented, the regulation did not decrease CEO pay,
but led to increase in the general support for directors.
Iliev, Peter and Ivo Welch, 2011, Reconciling Estimates of the Speed of Adjustment of Leverage Ratios.
Proposes a non-parametric way to model leverage ratios under the null hypothesis of random corporate behavior
- a placebo process - and embeds it with the common alternative of reverting to a target. The empirical estimates previously documented
are consistent with very slow speed of readjustment.
Instructor at Penn State (Smeal)
– Financial Management of the Business Enterprise: Fall 2013, Fall 2012, Fall 2011, Spring 2011,
– Financial Markets and Institutions: Fall 2008
Teaching Assistant at Brown
– Financial Institutions: Spring 2007, Spring 2006
– Corporate Finance: Fall 2006, Spring 2005, Fall 2005
– Investments: Fall 2004
Current class schedules: University Registrar webpage, teaching materials:
ANGEL (password protected), and final grades: eLion.