Exploits a natural quasi-experiment to isolate the effects that were uniquely due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Section 404 led to
conservative reported earnings, but also imposed real costs reducing the market value of small firms.
Studies institutions, such as firms, in which multiple projects can require attention at unpredictable times. The model can explain overinvestment and the diversification discount even when managers are not agency-conflicted.
– Runner-up for the 2012 Oliver E. Williamson Prize for Best Article in Law, Economics and Organization.
We use that U.S. firms with a public float under $75 million did not have to hold a Say-on-Pay vote to quantify the effects of the new rule.
We find a positive market reaction to compliance with the Say-on-Pay rule. As implemented, the regulation did not affect the level or composition of CEO pay,
but led to increase in the general support for directors.
We characterize funds' vote decisions as stemming from the direction and precision of their signal relative to that of proxy advisors.
Funds with lower costs of collecting information and higher benefits from voting are three to seven times less likely to follow ISS's recommendation.
An SEC deregulation intended to increase the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets lead to a significant destruction of foreign firm value.
– Best Paper Award, IIROC-DeGroote Conference on Market Structure and Market Integrity 2010
– Presented at the European Finance Association Meeting 2010
– American Law & Economics Association Meeting 2010
– Financial Management Association Meeting 2010
– Northern Finance Association 2010.
Systematic study of shareholder voting across countries. Investors exercise greater corporate governance when they fear expropriation the most:
in cases of poor country-level institutions and controlling shareholders. Voting against management is linked with a greater number of directors that exit the board.
– American Finance Association Meeting 2012
– European Finance Association Meeting 2011
– 10th Annual Darden International Finance Conference 2011
– UNC Global Issues in Accounting Conference 2011
– Fifth McGill Conference on Global Asset Management 2011
– Northern Finance Association Meeting 2011.
Proposes a non-parametric way to model leverage ratios under the null hypothesis of random corporate behavior
- a placebo process - and embeds it with the common alternative of reverting to a target. The empirical estimates previously documented
are consistent with very slow speed of readjustment.
– Presented at the Western Finance Association Meeting 2011
– NBER Summer Institute 2009.
Instructor at Penn State (Smeal)
– Financial Management of the Business Enterprise, Fall 2012, Fall 2011, Spring 2011, Fall 2009
– Financial Markets and Institutions, Fall 2008
Teaching Assistant at Brown
– Financial Institutions, Spring 2007, Spring 2006
– Corporate Finance, Fall 2006, Spring 2005, Fall 2005
– Investments, Fall 2004