RAPID REQUEST

Call #  CURR  F 306 .F65
Note  O

ILLiad TN #: 761096

Print Date: July 13, 2015

Borrower: RAPID:UPM

Journal Title: Florida historical quarterly
Vol: 93  No: 3
Date:  2015
Pages: 482-485

Article Author: Charles, Douglas M.,
Article Title: The Kidnapping and Murder of Little Skeegie Cash: J. Edgar Hoover and Florida's Lindbergh Case.

ISSN: 0015-4113

Rapid# -9471828

FROM KKS:
lendserv@k-state.edu

NOTICE: This material may be protected by the Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code)
peninsula as a tropical fantasyland for white Americans (353-354).

Flagler is aptly portrayed as a moderate segregationist who opposed black suffrage while maintaining a paternalistic attitude to his many black employees. On race and class, however, the book could do more to locate Florida's resort towns within the wider Jim Crow South. A reliance on black labor lay at the heart of Flagler's economic empire, and African Americans featured regularly—as servants, caddies, and porters—in the promotional material which Flagler himself disdained. Yet the ways in which black performance—like the pervasive "cake walk"—created an appealingly sanitized racialized experience for affluent whites in Florida is touched upon only briefly. To what extent did Flagler's resorts mimic practices popular elsewhere in the South and/or the North? And, reversing the causal arrow, how important were St. Augustine and Palm Beach—with their promise of environmental exoticism, racial recreation, and tropical leisure—in fashioning a new and distinctive identity for Florida?

While these questions go largely unanswered, Mr. Flagler's St. Augustine provides a rich and nuanced account of how modern tourism first discovered the United States' oldest continuously inhabited city. Graham, a fine writer and accomplished biographer, has meticulously provided dozens of informative photographs, maps, and illustrations. The book will appeal to those interested in Gilded Age Florida and, in particular, its rapid development into a leading winter resort. Readers interested in vicariously reliving the hectic social whirl of travel, sport, dance, fine dining, and urban development that characterized turn-of-the-century Florida will also find much to enjoy here.

Henry Knight Lozano

Northumbria University, UK


This book is about the kidnapping and murder in Florida of five-year-old Skeegie Cash—one of several prominent child kidnapping cases of the 1930s—and J. Edgar Hoover's response. While
the authors’ accounting of the case’s day-to-day details are adequately researched and described, their core thesis about the FBI’s role is deeply flawed and thinly researched.

The authors contend that the Cash case, and solving it quickly, was central not only to J. Edgar Hoover’s public relations efforts, but vital to save the FBI from a funding disaster. They argue that the FBI in 1938 was “struggling” and “Hoover desperately needed a sensational (and successful) case” to restore vital funding because “the FBI had almost run out of money” (26). They further describe the case’s importance to Hoover as determining “the very survival of the FBI itself,” (43) and one he used in “plotting a course that would right the FBI” (47). Even worse, according to the authors, if Hoover failed to solve this case “his days at the FBI would have been in jeopardy” (77), particularly as he “had gambled his reputation and the prestige of his agency on solving the Cash kidnapping” (78). The authors also attribute Hoover’s personal appearance in Florida as representative of the “importance of the case to the future of the bureau” (116). Their argument, to say the least, is overblown.

The authors list three academic studies of the FBI in their bibliography, for example, yet cite only one in their endnotes (while incorrectly listing the editor of the volume). Otherwise, the authors primarily rely upon unsatisfactory journalistic accounts of Hoover and the FBI. Why they list Professor Richard Powers, a major FBI scholar, in their bibliography but fail to reference him in the endnotes is bizarre, because unlike the authors, he accurately describes the FBI of the 1930s.

Hoover’s job and the FBI’s future did not hinge on this case, nor was Hoover “gambling” with the bureau, nor was his FBI almost out of money. The authors, though, point to a 1938 Deficiency Bill passed through Congress at the time that allotted the FBI $308,000. This amount, however, did not determine the FBI’s future. This was merely supplemental funding earmarked for kidnapping cases and FBI agent salaries. The FBI’s actual budget in 1938 was $6.2 million, as listed in a book the authors cite. The $308,000 supplement constituted only 5% of this, hardly an amount leaving Hoover in financial straits. The Cash case, furthermore, was not central to the FBI’s future or appropriations. After 1936 criminal cases had become secondary to FBI intelligence and domestic security ones. Yet the authors suggest that FBI agents’ sluggish success damaged the FBI’s image and threatened its funding. The reality is they
solved the case in ten days — a remarkably quick achievement the authors fail to mention.

In chapter 10, "Politics and Peccadillos," the authors lay out their core argument. They contend that Hoover knew about President Roosevelt's sexual affairs and knew Eleanor Roosevelt was a lesbian. Having this information, the authors contend, "meant job security" for Hoover and it meant "the FBI invariably received special treatment from President Roosevelt." "In fact," they write, "just the knowledge that Hoover had proof of certain secrets that could have ruined his political career certainly made FDR more likely to grant favors to Hoover" (105). There is nothing certain about this whatsoever. The problem is the authors have it exactly backwards. During FDR's presidency, J. Edgar Hoover was not yet the feared bureaucrat who could threaten nearly anyone, including presidents, with his vaunted files; that would come only with the Cold War and only after Roosevelt. Hoover, in fact, as a conservative among liberals, relied upon Roosevelt's beneficence to retain his job. Hoover never blackmailed FDR. Quite the contrary, in fact. Time and again, Hoover bent over backwards to ingratiate himself with the president, sending him one effusive message after another, providing FDR with valuable political intelligence on his opponents, and catering to the president's every whim all to keep his job and expand his FBI. It's this relationship, actually, that explains Hoover's deep interest in solving the Cash case. In 1935 Hoover had declared child kidnappings a thing of the past, but in December 1936 another child, Charles Mattson, was kidnapped and brutally murdered. This case became a national cause célèbre, leading FDR to promise publicly that the FBI would never stop until the murderer was apprehended. The case was never solved, and it remained open until the 1980s. It was FDR's public promise, compounded by Hoover's now-embarrassing public statement about kidnappings and his failure with the Mattson case, plus Hoover's ingratiating himself with the president that actually explains Hoover's deep interest in the Cash case. In no way could he allow another case to go unsolved lest the close relationship he cultivated with FDR and his carefully crafted FBI image be damaged. Even then it didn't mean he would be fired or defunded over one case.

Lastly, the authors occasionally try to explain some of Hoover's behavior with oblique and progressively brazen references to his presumed sexuality. They refer to Hoover's second in command,
and alleged lover, Clyde Tolson, as "Hoover's special friend" (119). They over-interpret Hoover's petty response to the killer's wife's request for food (he gave her too much) as somehow Hoover's "irrational hatred" for the woman (132). When describing the post-case careers of those involved with the investigation, the authors unnecessarily but clearly with animus describe Hoover, by quoting Richard Nixon, as an "old cock-sucker" who stayed in power thanks to his files (157). As a decade's worth of scholarly literature on Hoover demonstrates, no evidence exists to prove his sexuality one way or another, so its inclusion and presumed effects are at best questionable. But it's also one last example, among many, of this book's interpretive and evidential flaws.

Douglas M. Charles

Penn State University


The prolific Glenn Feldman has added another title to his body of work on southern politics. In _The Irony of the Solid South: Democrats, Republicans, and Race, 1865-1944_, he analyzes the ways in which race has determined southern political affiliation since Reconstruction. Through a series of at least three ironies and two meldings (see the introduction), Feldman chronicles the South's longstanding affinity for a socially, economically, and culturally conservative form of political action built on a legacy of white racial supremacy. Feldman's book reads like a tragedy, replete with a cadre of master manipulators and sheep-like supplicants who allowed their prejudices to govern their political choices and beliefs. Indeed, little promise but much peril exists in the author's Solid South as Feldman blames its proponents for a series of political choices from massive resistance to the onset of Tea Party politics.

Feldman focuses—_a la_ C. Vann Woodward—on three ironies of the Solid South. First, the book analyzes how the South's commitment to the white racial order and socioeconomic conservatism drew voters to the Democratic Party after the Civil War, but also drew them away from the party by the New Deal era as the Republicans became a more faithful exemplar of these beliefs. Historians