But of course women did not receive the vote after the Civil War. Instead, the image of the armed women resurfaced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, not as a progressive embodiment of women's rights and abilities but rather as a symbol of white racial strength and superiority. Worried about declining birth rates among the upper and middle classes, and fearful that blacks and other minorities (including white ethnic groups) were gaining in population and power, white men began to redefine modern femininity as different from the earlier ideal of the spiritual yet sickly woman. Sculptures of pioneer women holding a baby in one arm and a rifle in the other—what Browder calls the “Prairie Madonna”—enjoyed great popularity. The St. Louis Globe Democrat editorialized in favor of big game hunting by women as uniting “those health-giving and exciting qualities for which the girls of strenuous age are looking” (p. 74). In 1904 Outdoor Life ran a photograph of a man and women hunting with the caption, “The Gun an Important Factor in the Saving of the American Race” (p. 73).

Having shown how the white establishment co-opted the image of the armed woman as a way to shore up its racial dominance and reaffirm the nation’s core mythology, Browder argues that the historical stage was set for viewing other armed women—nonwhites, outlaws, political radicals—as extremely dangerous and deviant. Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover routinely vilified women gangsters in the 1930s, saying “I’m going to tell the truth about these rats. I’m going to tell the truth about their dirty, filthy, diseased women” (p. 122). After Ma Barker’s son Herman was killed in a police shootout, Hoover said she transformed “from an animal mother of the she-wolf type to a veritable beast of prey” (p. 127). The implication is clear: such women should be killed immediately.

In the 1960s, when the Black Panther Party (BPP) advocated armed self-defense, women picked up the gun. Emory Douglas, the BPP Minister of Culture, created a poster with a woman holding a toddler who is holding a toy pistol, what Browder describes as an updating of the “image of the pioneer mother” (p. 151). She quotes former BPP leader Elaine Brown proclaiming her power as chair of the Central Committee, “I have all the guns and all the money. I can withstand challenge from without and within . . . Here I was, a woman, proclaiming supreme power over the most militant organization in America. It felt natural to me” (p. 152). The white women in the Weather Underground felt similarly empowered by their weapons and violence. The 1969 essay “Honky Tonk Women” celebrated their new lives: completely transformed from “passive wimps, afraid of blood or danger or guns, satisfied with the limitations set on us by hated slave relationships with one man, we became revolutionary women” (p. 173).

However, none of this worked. Generating mass fear did not create successful revolutionary movements. Gunfights did not bring down the state. In this respect, the would-be revolutionaries lived in a fantasy world created in part by their guns and the cultural myths they embodied. “Guns are perhaps the best cultural example of how the imaginary and the real cannot be conflated,” Browder concludes. “There is a fatal world of difference between props in fantasies and real guns that have the power to kill” (p. 232). Combat weapons just do not address the problems of advanced capitalism or patriarchy: “A woman cannot gain equal pay for equal work by shooting her boss” (p. 231). I would add that neither can men transform their lives with warrior fantasies and personal combat weapons.

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Since the disclosures in the wake of the Watergate scandal about the illegal activities of the U.S. intelligence community during the Cold War, research into the history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has blossomed. Scholarship on the FBI has advanced conflicting explanations for the political influence of the Bureau. Some scholars have pointed to deep-seated beliefs in the political culture, such as paranoia, countersubversion, and nativism fuelled by insecure groups in the U.S. population suffering from status anxiety. Others have argued that the political role of the FBI must be seen as part of the response of the growing federal state to domestic social and political unrest. In contrast, a number of historians have described the rise of the FBI as a part of the development of the national security state during times of international crisis and wars. Finally, it has been popular to point to the powerful influence wielded by the Bureau’s legendary director from 1924 to 1972, J. Edgar Hoover, as the explanation for the political power of the FBI.

Douglas M. Charles’s study of the FBI’s surveillance of conservative opponents of American intervention in World War II explains the Bureau’s activities as a response to international crisis. According to Charles, the national security state of the Cold War had its roots in what he calls the domestic security state that evolved during “the Great Debate” about U.S. intervention or isolationism in 1940–1941. As a conservative holdover from the previous Republican administrations, Hoover felt vulnerable when the Democrats came to power in 1933. In order to consolidate his position, Hoover tried to placate President Franklin D. Roosevelt by investigating his foreign policy opponents. Using the most damaging pieces of information, Hoover was able to portray legitimate critics as dangerous subservives to the White House. The surveillance targeted, among others, the leading anti-interventionist organization, the America First Committee, as well as prominent spokesmen such as Charles Lindbergh and Senator
Burton K. Wheeler. In the process, the FBI’s use of illegal methods such as wiretapping escalated and the liaison with British intelligence was forged, resulting in increased influence and autonomy of the Bureau, according to Charles a process that continued during the war and the ensuing Cold War.

This short but well-researched and well-written book adds to the existing literature about the origins of the Cold War national security state and about the link between international crisis and domestic surveillance. The book confirms previous portraits of FDR as a president with a somewhat relaxed view of civil liberties, and it shows compellingly how Hoover perfected the use of criminal investigations, launched to find evidence of unlawful activities and to gather, file, and disseminate political and other forms of noncriminal intelligence. It therefore fills a void in the scholarship on the FBI, which has tended to focus on the early political activities of the Bureau during World War I and the Red Scare of 1919–1920 or the Cold War era.

However, the book also suffers from several weaknesses. As Charles himself notes in the introduction, his study focuses on the conservative anti-interventionists, and he therefore avoids dealing with the FBI’s surveillance of left-wing opponents such as the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) and its various front organizations. The CPUSA had close links to the Soviet Union, which opposed intervention in the “imperialist” war among Germany, France, and Great Britain during the period of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact from August 1939 to June 1941. Moreover, the Communists supported strikes in the war production industries and, we now know, infiltrated and spied against the administration. If the author had included the CPUSA in his analysis, the description would have been more balanced, and it would have shown that the FBI to a considerable extent reacted to a real threat to the security of the United States.

Moreover, Charles seems to underestimate the seriousness of the foreign connections of some of the conservative critics. For example, Lindbergh had visited Nazi Germany and expressed his sympathy for the regime, a German propaganda agent wormed his way into the office of Congressman Hamilton Fish, and Laura Ingalls was paid by the German embassy. Clearly, non-intervention or neutrality on the part of the United States was in the interest of the Axis powers, and it was the duty of the FBI to investigate information, however implausible, about the supposed foreign links of the noninterventionists and to determine whether they were in violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

Furthermore, the expansion of the FBI’s surveillance needs to be appraised in the proper political context. As Charles notes, Hoover referred cases under investigation to the lawyers in the Department of Justice for decision. Thus, the Bureau did not act on its own initiative. In fact, the Roosevelt administration intended to use the intelligence and security agencies aggressively to combat supposed subversive activities. For example, FDR in April 1941 authorized the creation of a so-called “suicide squad” of FBI agents who were to operate “outside the law.” When the FBI during “the Great Debate” used illegal methods to gather political intelligence for the White House, it must be seen as a response to the wishes and intentions of the Roosevelt administration. The reason why observers and historians often tend to underestimate the extent to which political leaders have knowledge of and condone the activities of the intelligence and security services is the doctrine of “plausible denial”: there can be no written record of orders and instructions, as the administration must be able to deny any knowledge of illegal or controversial activities against its own citizens or foreign powers.

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Lawrence M. Friedman probes the legal protection of private life and personal reputation during three historical periods: the nineteenth century’s “Victorian compromise,” the early twentieth century’s era of vice, and the era of the post-sexual revolution. Friedman reads a wide range of legal cases involving sexual and moral impropriety in order to show how the legal protection of private life and reputation has changed. He argues that the nineteenth century’s legal “leeway” in matters of sex and vice allowed for a greater protection of privacy than exists in the contemporary period.

In the nineteenth century, an era Friedman describes as dominated by the “Victorian compromise,” there existed a tacit agreement that while the public sphere would adhere to norms of morality, especially in the realms of sex and vice, there was room for moral indiscretions in the private sphere. Thus during the nineteenth century, Friedman notes, there were laws regulating public indecency but also thriving vice districts containing brothels. Friedman presents a number of legal constructions that made possible the seeming contradictions contained in the Victorian compromise.

Friedman also documents how laws designed to protect reputation and privacy were used to rehabilitate a select group of privileged Americans. In a society built on dreams of upward mobility, and not on royalty or caste, reputation was something earned by achieving social standing. In this way, nineteenth-century law protected reputations for those that had achieved them. Those who were too poor or thought to be immoral could not protect their reputation because they had not earned or been granted one.

If the Victorian compromise led to a legal culture that protected the status of the elite by granting leeway in some legal matters, it eventually gave way to suspicions about the vulnerability of the masses to vice. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts upheld censorship of obscene material and film