[Date Index] [Thread Index] [FOM Postings] [FOM Home]

*To*: Charles Silver <csilver@sophia.smith.edu>*Subject*: Re: FOM: Mathematical Certainty: reply to Silver*From*: Joe Shipman <shipman@savera.com>*Date*: Tue, 15 Dec 1998 14:01:31 -0500*CC*: fom@math.psu.edu*Organization*: Savera systems*References*: <Pine.SUN.3.96.981215131713.6810B-100000@sophia.smith.edu>*Sender*: owner-fom@math.psu.edu

Charles Silver wrote: > This criterion may be right in all cases that we know of, but it > is still possible for it to come out wrong. This establishes that > agreement and correctness are distinct. > I agree with you of course, but Hersh doesn't; I am not defending Hersh's position, just talking about what arguments can be used against it. > I think you are doing something very different from what Hersh > wanted to do. Hersh wanted to capture the *meaning* of mathematical > truth. For him, agreement of a certain sort simply *is* mathematical > truth. I don't think you are claiming that your criteria capture the > *meaning* of mathematical truth. The very fact that you are asking > whether anyone knows any counterexamples shows that the concepts > "mathematically true" and "satisfy the criteria" are distinct. Yes; but if no counterexamples can be found Hersh can maintain that this is a distinction without a difference! The point is that a counterexample would show that his notion of mathematical truth did not entail a property of mathematical truth that we would all agree on (namely incorrigibility) and therefore could not be correct; without such a counterexample he is free to redefine what mathematicians are "really" doing.

**Follow-Ups**:**Charles Silver**- Re: FOM: Mathematical Certainty: reply to Silver

**References**:**Charles Silver**- Re: FOM: Mathematical Certainty: reply to Silver

[Date Prev] [Date Next] [Thread Prev] [Thread Next]

[Date Index] [Thread Index] [FOM Postings] [FOM Home]