Abstract
Robert Talisse objects that Deweyan democrats, or those who endorse John Dewey’s philosophy of democracy, cannot consistently hold that (i) “democracy is a way of life” and (ii) democracy as a way of life is compatible with pluralism, at least as contemporary political theorists define that term. What Talisse refers to as his “pluralist objection” states that Deweyan democracy resembles a thick theory of democracy, that is, a theory establishing a set of prior restraints on the values that can count as legitimate within a democratic community. In this paper, it is argued that his pluralist objection succumbs to some combination of four charges. The first two sections of the paper are devoted to presentations of Talisse’s two formulations of his pluralist objection, as they appear in his essay “Can Democracy be a Way of Life?” and his book A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, respectively. The four charges against the pluralist objection receive attention in the second section. In the third section, Dewey’s pluralist procedure is articulated and illustrated using a recent Canadian public policy debate, followed by some concluding remarks on the acceptability of relying on contemporary political examples of Deweyan democracy in action.

Keywords: Pluralism, democracy, Dewey, democratic theory, republicanism, pragmatism, multiculturalism

So let us not be naïve: Deweyan democracy is antipluralist in that it places decisive constraints upon the kinds of voices we need to include. . . . Consider that the Deweyan-democratic commitment to inquiry excludes
not only those who refuse to inquire, but also those who hold views
that are incompatible with the fallibilism and experimentalism at the
heart of inquiry. —Robert Talisse

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John Dewey’s philosophy of democracy, cannot consistently hold that
(i) “democracy is a way of life” and (ii) democracy as a way of life is
compatible with pluralism, at least as contemporary political theorists
define that term. Thus he recommends, “Deweyans . . . [should] drop
the vocabulary of pluralism.” What Talisse refers to as his “pluralist
objection” states that Deweyan democracy resembles a thick theory of
democracy, that is, a theory establishing a set of prior restraints on those
values that count as legitimate within a democratic community.

Talisse’s pluralist objection is susceptible to a combination of at least
four charges. First, in reading Deweyan democracy through the prism
of Isaiah Berlin’s value pluralism, his interpretation neglects to consider
John Dewey’s own theory of valuation. Second, Talisse’s pluralist
objection reaches its intended target, Deweyan democracy, only by
assessing it relative to a foreign standard—that is, in terms of Rawls’s
reasonable pluralism, not Dewey’s own principle of growth. Third,
Talisse criticizes Michael Sandel’s civic republicanism, treating it as
analogous to Dewey’s democratic theory and expecting his readers to
agree that the pluralist objection directed at the former holds with
equal force against the latter. All three of these charges are aimed at
offenses of a similar stripe. Each signals a general strategy of filtering
Dewey’s philosophy of democracy through more recent theoretical
frameworks in order to demonstrate that Deweyan democracy is
incompatible with the contemporary concept of pluralism. If Talisse
has indeed committed this illicit filtering move, then the three charges,
or some subset of them, will undermine his claim that the pluralist
objection represents an internal critique of Dewey’s democratic the-
ory—or in Talisse’s words, that “Deweyan democracy fails on its own
pragmatic grounds.”

In reaction to these three charges, Talisse could mount two possible
counter-arguments—one defective and the other meriting a partial
concession. First, he might object that Dewey’s account of historical
explanation requires that we construe a past theory (including Dewey’s
own democratic theory) prospectively, or by reference to present and
future concerns. While Dewey does affirm that historical explanation is
always, to some degree, relevant to present objectives, the objection fails
because Dewey also insists that scholars should attempt to appreciate a
theory relative to its own historical milieu. Second, Talisse could justi-
fiable claim that the argument for treating Dewey’s democratic theory
on its own terms, or appreciating its content without first filtering it
through more recent theoretical frameworks, is groundless. Indeed,
contemporary Deweyans must inevitably reconcile their own Dewey-inspired democratic theories with accounts of pluralism currently dominant in the democracy literature, including those advanced by Berlin and Rawls. This possible counter-argument is persuasive, and thus, to some degree, vitiates the force of the first three objections.

Unfortunately, there is no parallel avenue to escape the fourth charge. By framing the distinction between substantive and proceduralist democratic theory as a strict and exclusive dichotomy, Talisse mistakes Deweyan democracy for a purely substantive or thick theory. Instead, Dewey’s theory of democracy proves to be highly proceduralist, thin and perfectly compatible with a plurality of reasonable political views—or so I argue. Since my concern is to refute the pluralist objection to Deweyan democracy, I do not evaluate Talisse’s alternative: viz., his deliberative theory of democracy inspired by Charles Sanders Peirce.9

The paper is organized in the following manner. The first two sections are devoted to a presentation of the two formulations of Talisse’s pluralist objection, as they appear in his essay “Can Democracy be a Way of Life?” and his book *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy*, respectively. The four charges against the pluralist objection receive attention in the second section. In the third section, I articulate Dewey’s own pluralist procedure for negotiating the problem of pluralism, as he would have perceived it in his time and without the aid of more recent theoretical frameworks. Also in this section, a recent Canadian debate is examined in order to illustrate how Deweyan democracy, or democracy conceived as a way of life, might function as a tool for mediating conflicts. Finally, the paper concludes by considering whether reliance on contemporary examples, such as the Canadian ‘reasonable accommodation’ debate, commits the same species of mistake identified in the first three charges against Talisse’s pluralist objection.

**First Formulation**

In Talisse’s first formulation of his pluralist objection (in the essay “Can Democracy be a Way of Life?”) he characterizes “Deweyan democracy” as thick or substantive, “a style of... democratic theory which emphasizes citizen participation in the shared cooperative undertaking of self-government at all levels of social association.”10 On this view, to embrace Deweyan democracy is to commit oneself to a set of substantive values related to citizen engagement and inquiry; values that severely restrain the scope of acceptable conceptions of the good (or life plans) that may be entertained and pursued by citizens. According to Talisse, “Deweyan democrats must affirm a set of core values... [and] give these values priority over other values, expect that reasonable citizens will endorse them, and reject principles and claims which negate them.”11 If inquiry-related values, such as fallibilism and experimentalism, are incompatible with
the worldview of any person or group, then that incompatibility becomes a legitimate basis for excluding them from enjoying the public benefits of living in a Deweyan democracy. The reason that Deweyan democrats embrace a thick conception of democracy, Talisse claims, is that they wish to understand democratic life as Dewey did, that is, as “a mode of social organization in which citizens collectively inquire into shared problems.” Hence, when Deweyans employ the slogan “democracy is a way of life,” what they are really saying, in a convenient shorthand, is that they endorse an exclusively thick or substantive theory of democracy.

As both a descriptive and normative concept, pluralism plays a pivotal role, Talisse notes, in the contemporary literature on democratic theory. If a democratic theorist is to find a warm reception for her theory, she must grapple with the reality that “reasonable, sincere people profoundly disagree about . . . ultimate ends,” but go further than simply propound the truism “that toleration is necessary for democracy.” In so far as those who hold rival worldviews disagree over final ends or values, pluralism is an obstinate feature of modern political life and, in some cases, an insurmountable obstacle to democratic will-formation. “Pluralism,” in Talisse’s words, “is the thesis that at least some, and perhaps many, of these disagreements are inevitable, irresolvable, non-contingent, and, in a word, permanent.”

On Talisse’s view, there are two varieties of pluralism: (i) value (or ontological) pluralism and (ii) epistemic pluralism. Value pluralists, such as Isaiah Berlin and John Gray, argue that values resemble “objective moral facts” or “moral goods” that cannot be simultaneously realized in a single set, for some will inevitably prove incompatible, incompossible or incommensurable. Epistemic pluralists, such as John Rawls, sidestep the issue of whether all values can be consistently realized, measured and ranked in favor of an account of pluralism based on reason and its limits. Given the epistemic barriers to arriving at a comprehensive doctrine, a democratic state cannot reasonably resolve deep disagreements between citizens by endorsing a single overarching worldview, or at least not without supporting oppressive and antipluralist policies. So, the pertinent question, according to Talisse, is “How is democracy possible under conditions of pluralism?” Rawls’s answer to this question is complex. It involves foregoing a philosophically rich (or thick) defense of democracy in preference for a proceduralist (or thin) defense in order to accommodate the fact of pluralism. Citizens reach agreement on a set of highly abstract principles of justice to govern the “basic structure of society,” principles which it would be reasonable to support regardless of one’s philosophical or religious worldview.

With regard to harmonizing democracy and pluralism, Talisse sharply distinguishes Rawls’s proceduralist approach from the substan-
tive approach of Michael Sandel. Pluralism factors into both of their accounts of democracy because it constitutes a significant obstacle to democratic will-formation, to “an account of democracy that at least in principle could win the consent of all reasonable persons.” Rawls overcomes the obstacle by settling on a thin theory of democracy. Rather than offering the philosophically best form of government, democracy provides a set of reasonable procedures for both making collective decisions and negotiating the perpetual problem of pluralism. In contrast, Sandel’s civic republicanism demands that persons assimilate their separate and rival worldviews to the community’s single standard of virtuous citizenship. Therefore, Talisse concludes that the thickness of Sandel’s democratic theory makes it patently antipluralist. Likewise, the thickness of Dewey’s theory, particularly in its embrace of inquiry and intelligence as prerequisites for citizenship, qualifies it as antipluralist.

Second Formulation
Talisse’s second formulation of his pluralist objection begins with an extended panegyric to the American philosopher of democracy. Even though the practical activism of Dewey is widely lauded, Talisse contends, his “democratic theory—his vision of ‘democracy as a way of life’—is fundamentally misguided and ultimately incoherent when taken as a social ideal for contemporary democratic societies.” In the set-up for his argument against Deweyan democracy, Talisse defines ‘democracy’ in terms of majoritarianism, representation and constitutionalism—concepts that fit squarely in the territory of liberal theory. Conspicuously absent from his account is any discussion of the tension between majoritarian democracy and constitutionalism. He then introduces the distinction between proceduralist and substantive theories in a different form. Talisse couches his account of proceduralist democracy in terms of thoroughly aggregative procedures by invoking two sources: one, the democratic realist Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of democracy as an electoral competition between elites; and, two, the social choice critique of voting procedures for their inability to aggregate individual preferences into transitive, coherent and non-arbitrary social choices. However, defining proceduralist democracy as identical to aggregative democracy is not only a confusion, it is also inconsistent with Talisse’s categorization of Rawl’s deliberative theory, later in the paper, as purely proceduralist. While most deliberative theories are strongly proceduralist and some have an aggregative component, few democratic theorists would accept the claim that proceduralist democratic theories are necessarily aggregative. At least one such theorist, David Estlund, persuasively argues that normative social choice theories, which Talisse identifies as proceduralist, are examples of substantive theories of democracy, since they rely on independent criteria...
or rules for aggregating preferences. Given this confusion, Talisse’s second formulation of the pluralist objection is both weaker and more confused than his first. Thus, my fourth charge is directed at the stronger and clearer articulation of the substantive/proceduralist distinction found in Talisse’s first formulation of the pluralist objection.

In other respects, Talisse’s second formulation of the pluralist objection shows more promise than his first formulation. First, even though pluralism is defined as widely as in the first formulation, Talisse shrinks the scope of pluralism in his second formulation from the epistemic and ontological varieties to a single variety that he thinks Deweyan democrats should be concerned with. In the revised thesis, Deweyan democracy offends only the epistemic variety, particularly Rawls’s reasonable pluralism: “Deweyan democracy is inconsistent with the recognition of the fact of reasonable pluralism.” Thus, at least with respect to this second formulation, Talisse’s pluralist objection escapes my first charge that he reads Deweyan democracy through a Berlinian filter. However, as a consequence of narrowing his thesis, the burden of Talisse’s argument stands or falls on whether the Rawlsian definition of reasonable pluralism is appropriate for evaluating Deweyan democracy. Thus, the second charge that Deweyan democracy has been assessed relative to a foreign standard—namely, Rawls’s reasonable pluralism, rather than Dewey’s principle of growth—applies with even greater force to Talisse’s second formulation of the pluralist objection.

An additional strength of Talisse’s second formulation is that it clearly identifies Dewey’s democratic theory as a perfectionist doctrine. The first formulation only objects that Deweyan democracy is “anti-pluralist” in so far as it sanctifies “a set of core values.” Talisse’s more recent claim that Deweyan democracy advances a perfectionist doctrine is more ambitious than his earlier claim that it offers a group of key values for two reasons. One, “a set of core values” does not necessarily threaten pluralism, since those values could be neutral among competing conceptions of the good life. Two, a perfectionist theory endorses an overarching non-neutral view of what all citizens should deem valuable and thus threatens pluralism by crowding out all incompatible yet equally reasonable competitors. However, Talisse’s identification of Deweyan democracy with the perfectionism characteristic of civic republican theories, such as Michael Sandel’s, overlooks a more recent argument by Sandel. In this argument, Sandel endorses a perfectionist doctrine, but only in the diluted sense that “the principles of justice that define our rights cannot be detached from conceptions of the good life.” In other words, claims to liberal neutrality are specious, since all liberal values are situated within some, and usually many, particular views of what is good for the individual, the community and the nation-state.

Third, and finally, Talisse’s second formulation improves upon his earlier formulation of the pluralist objection in that it surveys the theo-
ries of more Deweyans. Some critics might respond to Talisse that Dewey’s theory of democracy today means many different things to many different people; so that there are as many conceptions of Deweyan democracy as there are Deweyan democrats. If this response is to be taken seriously (even though it likely exaggerates the matter), then it is incumbent upon Talisse to consider the views of more Deweyan democrats. Indeed, he delivers; between the first and the second formulation of the pluralist objection, the sample of Deweyans doubles in size.29 As anyone familiar with statistical sampling techniques knows, the benefit of increasing the sample size is often (especially when the population is small) to make the sample more representative of the target population.

Four Charges

In this section, I level four charges at Talisse’s pluralist objection to Deweyan democracy:30 One, Talisse filters democracy as life through the Berlinian ontology of value pluralism so that Dewey’s own theory of valuation recedes from view. Two, he assesses Deweyan democracy relative to an outside criterion, namely Rawls’s reasonable pluralism, not Dewey’s own principle of growth. Three, Talisse deftly substitutes Dewey’s democratic theory for Sandel’s republicanism in order to reorient his Rawlsian objection against democracy as a way of life. Four, he misconstrues Deweyan democracy as a thick theory by incorrectly assuming that the relationship between thick and thin theories is strict and exclusive.

Charge #1. For Isaiah Berlin, individuals select their values from among a universe of competing possibilities. According to this value ontology, human ends exist in a very real sense because they resemble distinct, incommensurable and often incompatible moral goods. Since “the ends of men are many, and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other,” persons must choose some values and reject others in cultivating their own value schema.31 No single metric can assist these value-choosers in rank-ordering the incommensurable options. Also, it proves impossible for every possible value or end to manifest in a comprehensive set or unitary system. In Berlin’s words, “the belief that some single formula can in principle be found whereby all diverse ends of men can be harmoniously realized is demonstrably false.”32 Intractable value conflicts therefore become an unassailable fact of human moral life. In as much as moral agents will always have differences among their philosophical, theological and moral commitments, the “necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the human condition.”33 Hence, in Berlin’s theory of valuation, values qua moral goods have an undeniably existential quality, and value pluralism resembles an “inescapable” feature of the “human condition.”
Talisse views Deweyan democracy through the prism of Berlin's value ontology and not through Dewey's own theory of valuation. First, he characterizes the notion of democracy found in Dewey's works as wedded to “the republican notion of freedom,” not unlike Sandel's civic republicanism. According to this account, humans deserve their status as free citizens only insofar as they embody a set of common values. Favorably quoting John Stuhr, Talisse agrees that in “the widest sense” Dewey’s philosophy “simply is social and political philosophy,” and thus Deweyan democracy must be a thick or substantive theory of democracy. “If Stuhr is correct,” he notes, “then Deweyan democracy is inextricably bound up with a deep, comprehensive worldview about which it seeks agreement.” Since, on Berlin’s analysis, an all-encompassing value system cannot reconcile itself with the inescapable fact of pluralism, Dewey’s theory of democracy must be incompatible with pluralism too.

The difficulty with Talisse’s reading of Dewey’s democratic theory is that he filters it through the prism of Berlin’s value ontology. In doing this, he fails to treat Deweyan democracy on its own terms, that is, relative to Dewey’s own theory of valuation. Through the social activity of appraisal or evaluation, private preferences, or what Dewey terms “prizings” (i.e., what is valued or desired), are converted into publicly shared values (i.e., what is valuable or desirable). For Dewey, values do not possess an existential quality in the Berlinian sense, except insofar as the prizing agent decides to appraise or evaluate objects in concert with others. Moreover, value-choosers do not naturally rank-order their ends with the intention of constructing a catalogue or ontological schema of accepted values. Indeed, for Dewey, logic always precedes ontology. Since logic means a theory of inquiry, any shared values must first undergo collective investigation and experimentation before being settled “over and above board,” that is, as the products of social inquiry. Therefore, Deweyan democracy does not offer a “comprehensive worldview” or unitary system of values, but rather a way, among many others, to reconcile different and often-times conflicting value orientations into a “mode of associated living.”

How might this reconciliation occur? For Dewey, reconciling values occurs through ongoing inquiry at the local level, by members of the community dedicated to settling differences among those “values which . . . [distinct] groups sustain.” Dewey understands a group impacted, either negatively or positively, by the activities of other groups as a “public,” that is, “all those affected by the indirect consequences of [other groups’] transactions.” While publics will often contain members with conflicting interests, their members are similarly affected by the problematic consequences of others’ activities (i.e., their “transactions”). According to Paul Stob, “Dewey’s terms speak not of what the public is but of what the public can do.” Once the individu-
als belonging to a public acknowledge their shared situation, the occasion arises for them to engage in dialogue and collective action aimed at (i) the disclosure and clarification of shared values and (ii) the negotiation of the terms on which they will associate, both among themselves and with other groups.42 According to James Gouinlock, Dewey “alternately refers to democracy as a way of life and a social method, but either conception implies the other.”43 So, democracy as a way of life does not deny the fact of pluralism. Instead, it offers a “social method” for negotiating the conflicts that grow out of, to borrow Berlin’s words, this “inescapable characteristic of the human condition.”44

Charge #2. According to John Rawls, legitimacy and stability within a democratic society require a neutral framework of principles to which all citizens may appeal in their use of public reason. Principles of justice provide fair terms of cooperation through a system of rights and protections that can successfully accommodate the “fact of reasonable pluralism”—or the reality that citizens with deep differences need to coexist in peaceful and tolerant ways.45 Otherwise, without the rights and protections afforded by liberal institutions, majorities would endanger the freedom of minorities, impose upon them a single conception of the good, and consequently jeopardize the polity’s stability. To ascertain what those fair terms of cooperation would be, citizens engage in a thought experiment, imagining themselves in an “original position” of perfect equality, where they would choose the principles to govern a just society without knowledge of their personal endowments or their private fortunes in the eventual distribution of goods.

In order to produce a stable regime, citizens must be willing to uphold a set of shared political values. Since imposing a single conception of the good life would be far too oppressive, they must agree to be reasonable, i.e., to suggest and comply with a neutral set of norms that will govern their interaction, and to thereby accept the “burdens of judgment” that come with living in a pluralist society. When citizens accept the burdens of judgment, they recognize that, given their deep differences in comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines, full consensus concerning their respective values is unlikely.46 In addition, as Rawls explains, reasonable demands that “[p]ersons . . . are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance others will likewise do so.”47 Thus, citizens are mutually obligated, in this contractarian sense, to be reasonable and follow the principles of justice that govern their political society. Legitimacy accrues to political institutions in the degree to which they remain neutral towards their diverse and typically discordant worldviews.

Legitimacy requires a neutral framework of principles to which all citizens may appeal in their use of public reason. To instantiate fair terms of cooperation, the principles of justice should establish a system
rights and protections that can successfully accommodate the “fact of reasonable pluralism” — or the reality that citizens with deep differences need to coexist in peaceful and tolerant ways. Otherwise, without the rights and protections afforded by liberal institutions, majorities would endanger the freedom of minorities, impose upon them a single conception of the good, and consequently jeopardize the polity’s stability. To ascertain what those fair terms of cooperation would be, citizens engage in a thought experiment, imagining themselves in an “original position” of perfect equality, where they would choose the principles to govern a just society without knowledge of their personal endowments or their private fortunes in the eventual distribution of goods. With the introduction of public reason, Rawls limits the subject-matter of political talk to exclusively political and constitutional matters, in other words, to what one would contemplate in the thought experiment of the original position: namely, the “basic structure of a just society.”

The restrictions on what kinds of reasons count as public reveal that Rawlsian democracy is far more substantive than Talisse’s account suggests. Rawls employs a “political conception of liberalism” in order to negotiate the problem of legitimacy and stability in a pluralist society. According to this conception, the plurality of views and values that citizens hold should overlap and, in the area of shared agreement, yield a principled account of justice. This “overlapping consensus” is made possible by two characteristics of citizens: (i) their status as free and equal citizens and (ii) their common understanding of political society as a “fair system” of long-term cooperation. Rawls's notion of public reason supplies an ideal for citizens to struggle towards in regulating their political talk. As a result, citizens who attempt to realize the ideal of public reason bracket the diverse aspects of their worldviews when engaging in public discourse about matters of justice. According to Rawls, public reasons must also be offered in the specific setting of “public forums,” including legislative, executive, and judicial institutions as well as among citizens voting “in elections when constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at stake.” Consequently, if they are to count as public, those reasons offered must pertain to politics narrowly construed, such as matters of justice and questions concerning the constitution — in other words, to the subject-matter of a “political conception of justice.” Therefore, these significant limitations on the substance of public discourse make Rawls’s democratic theory less proceduralist (or more substantive) than Talisse acknowledges.

While Talisse evaluates Deweyan democracy relative to Rawls’s notion of reasonable pluralism, he does so at the cost of ignoring Dewey’s comparably richer principle of growth. In his first formulation, Talisse identifies Dewey’s notion of growth with “the republican concept of freedom,” or the positive freedom to participate in politics; and in his second formulation characterizes it as a “moral vision of human flourishing” and “a
species of *perfectionism.* By associating Dewey's principle of growth with a republican view of liberty and a perfectionist account of human development, Talisse hitches Dewey's democratic theory to the substantive side of the strict and exclusive substantive-proceduralist dichotomy. However, the association does not withstand close scrutiny. Talisse is correct in so far as he claims that Dewey's principle of growth is distinctly different than Rawls's reasonable pluralism. Instead of an overlapping consensus between otherwise divergent worldviews, Dewey's principle of growth recommends that individuals and groups cultivate those experiences that liberate their potentialities. Specifically, the learning that takes place both in school and the greater society is a *sine qua non* for realizing the possibilities of human development. Dewey explains: “Since life means growth, a living creature lives as truly and positively at one stage as at another, with the same intrinsic fullness and the same absolute claims. Hence education means the enterprise of supplying the conditions which ensure growth, or adequacy of life, irrespective of age.” While Dewey explicitly identifies education as one of the “conditions . . . [for] growth,” he refrains from specifying exactly what that growth would entail, or its meaning in the concrete. Instead, working out collective and personal conceptions of growth (or self-realization) is a task better left for individuals and groups to undertake, not for philosophers or politicians to preordain. Thus, Dewey's principle of growth constitutes neither a “republican concept of freedom” nor a “species of *perfectionism*” because it does not prescribe a narrowly conceived view of the good or what it means to develop civic virtue. Rather, it is an open-ended and melioristic invitation for persons and groups to improve their capacities relative to their own diverse views of what constitutes a good life.

Talis's Rawlsian critique of Deweyan democracy also misses the mark because it misconstrues Dewey's own view of pluralism. Among Dewey's many writings on the policy issues of his day, one in particular, “The Principle of Nationality,” stands out as a commentary on how to contend with the competing claims of social, cultural, ethnic and religious groups. Although the terms ‘pluralism’ and ‘multiculturalism’ were not part of Dewey or his contemporaries’ vocabulary (at least not with the same meaning we now give these terms), the conundrum of Dewey's times that most closely resembled the contemporary problem of pluralism was whether the claims of minority groups to self-determination could be justified—what was termed the “question of nationality.” In his essay, Dewey distinguishes political and cultural nationality in order to demonstrate that the problematic nature of the nationality question stems from the common mistake of conflating the two notions. Unlike Rawls, Dewey does not set aside all metaphysical claims about the superiority of one worldview to another in favor of a purely political solution to the problem. “The remedy [for the problem of nationality] will not be found,” Dewey contends, “by continu-
ing the claim to complete sovereign rights but in provision for a maximum of cultural independence along with systematic provisions for free industrial and economic interdependence." Dewey wishes to grant minorities greater freedom of cultural expression, but without insulating them from the wider society. To guard against the prospect of increasing insularity, he recommends that minority groups increase their dependence upon other groups for their economic well-being—particularly through the activities of work and trade.

Charge #3. In Talisse’s critique of substantive democratic theories, his treatment of Dewey’s democratic theory as analogous to Sandel’s is untenable because the pragmatist’s position differs markedly from the civic republican’s. Talisse presumes that “Dewey’s conception of democracy closely resembles Sandel’s civic republicanism.” In both formulations of the pluralist objection, one theory is switched for the other in order to bring the Rawlsian critique of state-sponsored worldviews to bear as forcefully against the one as the other. However, while it was certainly the case that Dewey called for the development of a “Great Community” (as opposed to the “Great Society”), the proximity between Sandel’s and Dewey’s accounts of the relationship between the community and the state is, at least on Talisse’s account, wholly exaggerated. Dewey is unwilling to spell out the prerequisites for community membership, the virtues of *homo democraticus* or the patriotic values that entitle a person to citizenship within a democratic community. If, as Popper claims, “all life is problem solving,” or, as Dewey insists, inquiries “enter into every area of life and into every aspect of every area,” then claiming that democratic citizens should become adept at group problem solving is distinctly different from advancing a state-sponsored worldview or a perfectionist theory of democratic community. Instead, it is merely to restate the fact that humans are naturally problem-solvers; to observe that humans who are citizens of democracies confront common problems; and then to infer from the fact and observation that the challenge for democratic citizens is to become better collaborative problem-solvers. In other words, Dewey selectively emphasizes one common feature of human experience, i.e. our tendency to confront and resolve problematic situations, in order to demonstrate that problem-solving partnerships are at least possible, if not desirable, within a well-functioning democracy.

For Dewey, the breadth of content that can potentially count as subject-matter for collective problem solving and public discourse is virtually limitless. Reason features strongly in human experience, generally, because inquiry is a natural human activity, whether in politics or other spheres of activity. “The existence of inquiries,” Dewey claims in the *Logic*, “is not a matter of doubt. They enter into every area of life and into every aspect of every area.” According to Robert Asen, “John Dewey did not delimit his vision of democracy,” and one might add,
his vision of inquiry or problem solving, “to a properly political domain.” So, while inquiry encompasses Rawls’s matters of basic justice (or the content of public reason), it also extends far beyond such matters to issues of what exists, what is true, and what methods will permit inquirers to more effectively answer metaphysical questions. According to J. E. Tiles, “[h]ow to reach a consensus on an issue or a way of reconciling differences by relating them as ‘perspectives’ would be for Dewey only some of the problems calling for inquiry; problems also arise for individuals or for groups which are not simply about how to reach agreement. Problems arise with the things in our experience ....” More recently, John Stuhr asks, “If inquiry just shows us that some methods . . . are better than others, does it show us that some methods of living are better than others?” Consistent with Tiles’s point, a Deweyan answer to Stuhr would be in the affirmative, yet with certain qualifications. While inquiry provides a reason-guided process for tentatively settling the question of how best to live, it does not predetermine the right answer, or prescribe a perfectionist theory of the good life.

While Deweyan democracy does not mandate that all persons strive to be philosophers, it does require that average citizens work, at least from time-to-time, to improve their ability to analyze and evaluate their unreflective beliefs and opinions. According to David Hildebrand, “Dewey assumed that philosophical inquiry could help scrutinize current beliefs and further intelligent inquiry.” Collaterally, these individual efforts at self-improvement augment the collective capacity of citizens to engage in cooperative problem-solving, as well as to test and confirm their shared attitudes about policy issues. Likewise, James Campbell understands Dewey’s notion of democracy as a way of life in the highly proceduralist sense of an experimental way of living. When members of a community propose novel policy solutions to their shared problems, they reveal their commitment to a policy-making process that resembles an open-ended experiment: “[A]ll policy measures should be envisioned as experiments to be tested in their future consequences. As a consequence of this testing, the program will undergo ongoing revision.” In this way, Deweyan democracy constitutes, in Campbell’s words, a “process for developing an informed public opinion.”

In so far as citizens of a democracy hope to address their common problems, commitments to experimentalism and fallibilism prove their mettle as effective problem-solving tools. According to the famous American jurist Learned Hand, the meaning of liberty should be interpreted in a fallibilist, not an absolutist, manner because the resulting flexibility encourages citizens to discover common ground: “The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right . . . which seeks to understand the mind of other men and women.” In addition,
the terms on which democratic citizens associate should be understood experimentally. According to the deliberative democrats James Fishkin and Bruce Ackerman, “[d]emocracy is an experiment in self-government, and some experiments will fail. The question is whether the upside potential is large enough to justify the gamble.” Commitments to experimentalism and fallibilism serve as operational requirements for the conduct of intelligent inquiry, not discrete values in a particular worldview, elements in a perfectionist theory of the good life or substantive limitations on the democratic process. Although Talisse’s second formulation of the pluralist objection appears to anticipate and successfully reject this “shift . . . from substantive moral vision to method of collective inquiry,” it overlooks how fallibilism and experimentalism guide, but do not predetermine, the outcomes of inquiry.

In a democracy, these commitments increase the probability that the grand democratic experiment will succeed, whether success reflects the degree of citizen self-government or the extent to which groups reach a mutual understanding of their needs and values. Yet, at no time do these commitments guarantee success. When the gamble or experiment pays off, reformers reconstruct social institutions and practices via sound policy instruments, thereby promoting common goals and increasing the level and quality of democratic engagement.

So, Talisse’s move to substitute Dewey’s democratic theory for Sandel’s civic republicanism in order to bring the brunt of Rawls’s critique of state-sponsored worldviews against it fails. The experimentalism and fallibilism in Dewey’s theory do not resemble the core values of a perfectionist doctrine or the civic virtues of Sandel’s civic republicanism. To the contrary, they are functional commitments necessary for effective problem solving, and in so far as citizens must collectively solve problems, they are commitments that prove invaluable for living in a well-functioning democracy.

Charge #4. Finally, Talisse’s pluralist objection erects a strict and exclusive dichotomy between substantive and proceduralist conceptions of democracy. At one point in his original article, Talisse appears to anticipate this objection, stating that “[p]redictably, Deweyans will here launch a favorite rejoinder; they will object to what they call a ‘false dichotomy’ between pluralism and substantive democracy.” However, the dichotomy is not between pluralism and substantive democracy, but between proceduralist and substantive democracy. The difference between the two might on its face appear slight, yet it is critical to understanding Talisse’s oversimplification of the Deweyan response to his objection. Even substantive theories of democracy, such as Sandel’s civic republicanism, are compatible with some degree of pluralism. Likewise, most proceduralist accounts of democracy contain at least some substantive features—for instance, Rawls’s limitations on the content of public reasons. A more charitable interpretation of Talisse’s argu-
ment is that the more substantive a democratic theory is, the less pluralism it allows for; and *ipso facto*, the more proceduralist it is, the more pluralism it permits. So, presenting a dichotomy between pluralism and substantive democracy proves to be self-evidently false, and thus a mistake that Talisse would, at least on a charitable reading of his position, be unlikely to make.

Another concern is that this charge undermines a key distinction in democratic theory. Although the list of democratic theorists who employ this distinction is too long to rehearse, I will take Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson as representative. They attempt to refute the position that deliberation should be purely proceduralist, or that “the collective outcomes produced [by democratic deliberation] need no further justification beyond the rationale for the method itself.” Despite Gutmann and Thompson’s concern for what David Estlund calls the “flight from substance in democratic theory,” it is almost impossible to find a democratic theorist who endorses a purely proceduralist theory of democracy. Substantive or value-laden constraints on the process and outcome of democratic procedures are an inevitable feature of most, if not all, theories of democracy—even Rawls’s theory. By the same logic, most so-called ‘substantive theories of democracy’ also have at least some proceduralist characteristics. Thus, there is a rupture between the strict and exclusive conceptualization of the distinction and the actual features of most, if not all, democratic theories.

One way to mend this rupture is to reconstruct the substantive-proceduralist distinction. “To oppose one to the other,” Dewey warns, “is to set the moving tendency and the final result of the same process over against each other.” Although directed at another opposition (viz., the child versus the curriculum), the caveat applies with equal force to a strict and exclusive distinction between substantive and proceduralist democracy: Alternatively, the process and result might be conceived as a continuum, a continuous gradation of more or less proceduralist, as well as more or less substantive, democratic theories; not a quantum leap between those with purely proceduralist credentials and others with purely substantive credentials.

This brings us to the issue of where to locate Deweyan democracy along the proceduralist-substantive continuum. Talisse claims that democracy as a way of life is substantially thicker (or more substantive) than Rawls’s theory, and so on par with Sandel’s civic republicanism. Thus, Deweyan democracy proves to be incompatible with full-fledged pluralism, or the view that value conflict is an intransigent feature of human life. However, on closer examination, democracy as a way of life shows itself to be significantly thinner than Talisse admits. Dewey advances a theory of democracy that is both predominantly (though not exclusively) proceduralist and strikingly similar to contemporary
theories of deliberative democracy. Instead of a monumental event (e.g., a constitutional convention), democratic deliberation for Dewey is an on-going process of everyday discourse, a “back-and-forth give-and-take discussion” and a “conversation,” in which one ideal conception, or set of idealized conceptions, replaces another as the plans and projects of the community change.

So, by empowering citizens to propose, deliberate about and test their ideals, Deweyan democracy operates in a more proceduralist fashion than Talisse gives it credit. Moreover, Deweyan democracy does not impose burdensome prior restraints or value-specific conditions on what is to count as an ultimately true conception of the good. It resembles neither a purely substantive theory of democracy nor an oppressive state-sanctioned doctrine in the Rawlsian sense. Thus, fair procedures of, for instance, deliberation and negotiation permit reasonable citizens, groups and state agents in a Deweyan democracy to disagree without resorting to violence. Still, it might be objected that I have misconstrued Talisse’s sense of pluralism, which, to recall, is that “at least some, and perhaps many, of these [deep] disagreements [between citizens holding incompatible moral and philosophical doctrines] are inevitable, irresolvable, non-contingent, and, in a word, permanent.” Without employing the term ‘pluralism’, Dewey comes close to acknowledging the fact of pluralism, as Talisse and contemporary political theorists understand that term, in the following statement: “Conflict and uncertainty are ultimate traits.” If democracy as a way of life offered a comprehensive moral theory, then such “[c]onflict and uncertainty” would not be “ultimate,” but would be derivative of citizens’ inability (whether from ignorance or refusal) to align their conceptions of the good with that theory. Instead, the thin commitments to fallibilism and experimentalism, as required by Dewey’s theory, do not impose onerous prior constraints on the values that count as legitimate in a democratic society. Instead, they complement a democratic method for tentatively working out, while not permanently settling, the problematic situations that arise when groups espousing incompatible philosophical worldviews and moral doctrines disagree.

Dewey’s Pluralist Procedure and a Canadian Example

In this penultimate section, I present Dewey’s pluralist procedure and offer an illustration of democracy-as-a-way-of-life-in-action: the ‘reasonable accommodation’ debate in Québec, Canada. The reason for examining this case study is not only to illustrate how procedures central to Deweyan democracy operate in practical politics, but also to challenge an implicit assumption of Talisse’s objection, namely, that a single reasonable objection to a democratic theory is sufficient to disqualify it.

What is Dewey’s pragmatic standard of inclusion? It is a highly, though by no means exclusively, proceduralist standard that asks and answers two
questions. The first question pertains to the plurality of interests held in common by different groups—even those espousing divergent beliefs and conflicting worldviews. Specifically, it queries those affected groups, “How numerous and varied are the interests which are commonly shared?”90 The second question concerns whether these groups are open to readjusting the ways in which they associate. It asks, “How full and free is the interplay [of conventional forms of association] with other forms of association?”91 Thus, Dewey’s procedure for addressing the fact of pluralism might be called the ‘mutual interest and associative flexibility’ standard of inclusion. According to this two-step procedure, members of different groups, first, identify their shared interests and, second, propose novel and flexible ways for associating in order to address their shared problems. No part of this procedure is coercive or “oppressive” as measured against Rawls’s standard of reasonable pluralism. Moreover, no part requires that groups subordinate their separate worldviews to what Talisse terms “a substantive conception of democracy.” Furthermore, no part coerces citizens to conform their values and ways of life to a governmentally endorsed regime of value commitments, or an official conception of the good life. According to Larry Hickman, “Pragmatism holds that cultural difference per se is not an occasion that calls for inquiry, but only cultural difference that leads to a situation in which there are mutually exclusive claims about what is to be done.”92 Therefore, democracy as a way of life represents a method, not a state-sponsored worldview—a procedure for negotiating, though not permanently resolving, the deeply divisive and sometimes intractable differences between groups beholden to competing forms of life. In this way, Dewey’s democratic theory resembles, as William Caspary suggests, a framework for understanding democracy as a method for mediating conflicts.93

To demonstrate how Dewey’s pluralist procedure functions in a practical political setting, I would like to examine a recent public policy debate in Canada. When a law or norm is contrary to the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, the government has a legal obligation to modify the law or norm accordingly—to, in effect, accommodate reasonable differences between individuals and groups within a liberal regime of procedures and rules. For instance, despite the legal requirement that all voters show their face when casting a ballot, Elections Canada has permitted an exemption for Muslim women wearing the niqab (veil) or burka.94 Though these exemptions are well-intentioned, heated dispute has arisen at the margins. Those groups whose members have been granted exemptions face rival groups claiming that the exemptions violate norms of fair and equal treatment. In the province of Québec, the public debate has oscillated between civil confrontation and xenophobic denunciations. The question at issue is, under what circumstances does accommodation become unreasonable?95 To address the escalating tensions between these groups and
their competing ways of life, the provincial government has established a commission composed of two renowned Canadian public intellectuals. The Reasonable Accommodation Commission consults with academics, policy leaders and members of the rival groups. Though the results have been mixed, an institutional form (viz. the Commission) has been established as an initial step towards progressively arbitrating, though not permanently settling, the contested nature of what constitutes reasonable (versus unreasonable) accommodation.

To appreciate the significance of the ‘reasonable accommodation’ debate for my overall argument, it helps to consider the rationale for examining this and other case studies. One reason is to show that in the context of practical politics it would be unreasonable to accept Talisse’s low threshold for invalidating a democratic theory, viz., a single reasonable objection. Instead, if Dewey’s democratic theory is to be criticized internally—or to borrow Talisse’s phrase, “on its own pragmatic grounds”—the theory must be evaluated with respect to its practical consequences for actual public policies. Does the Canadian policy respect the ethnic, cultural, religious and philosophical differences among citizens? Does it enhance political legitimacy and regime stability? Does it tend to bring about fair and just outcomes? Answering these kinds of questions does not fall solely within the preserve of philosophers or democratic theorists. In the real world of democratic politics, policy questions such as these are rarely sequestered to faculty seminars for philosophers and democratic theorists to settle. Instead, questions of this type are matters of public policy, addressing problems that are better left to ordinary citizens and their representatives to deliberate about, negotiate over and decide on appropriate policy solutions to. If political philosophers and democratic theorists have any role to play in the policy process, it is that of public intellectuals attempting to persuade their fellow citizens to see the value in sharing their views—a role to which Dewey was no stranger. In the world of rough-and-tumble politics, unlike the faculty seminar room, a single objection, even if reasonable, is rarely enough to disqualify a candidate theory that would, by its adoption, likely improve our political practices, or the methods by which we solve our common problems. So, Talisse has more work to do if he hopes to successfully convince a critical mass of citizens and policy-makers—let alone pragmatists and Deweyans—to say “farewell to Deweyan democracy.”

**Conclusion**

Both formulations of Talisse’s pluralist objection fail to convince Deweyans to drop the language of pluralism because democracy as a way of life cannot be construed as an endorsement for a state-sponsored comprehensive worldview or a thoroughly substantive conception of democracy. Instead, Dewey offers a two-step procedure for negotiating
the inescapable fact of pluralism. Similar to this procedure, the approach taken by the Canadian Reasonable Accommodation Commission highlights the affected parties’ mutual interests and suggests flexible new ways for them to associate. However, one might object that this illustration poses the risk of resorting to the same filtering strategy I have identified in Talisse’s work, that is, reading Dewey’s ideas through contemporary theoretical frameworks. Appeals to recent political events typically invoke theories, approaches and views that were alien to Dewey’s times and thought, and in ways strikingly similar to Talisse’s Berlinian, Rawlsian and Sandelian filters. While the risk of filtering is undeniable, I believe that the pragmatic value of appealing to these recent events justifies that risk. Not only does the practice help us to see the contemporary relevance of Dewey’s ideas, it also assists Dewey scholars to rebut objections similar to Talisse’s, and to decline like-minded invitations to give up the language of contemporary political theory. 101

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NOTES

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4. Talisse, “Can Democracy be a Way of Life?” p. 13. More recently, Talisse’s argument against Deweyan pluralist democracy has become an ambitious project to reject Deweyan democracy en toto. Id., A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy.

5. Id., A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, p. 46.

6. Talisse’s mistake is analogous to an error that a contemporary commentator might make in understanding Plato’s Symposium through the post-Freudian category of homosexuality instead of the ancient Greek notion of homoeroticism. This analogy is suggested in Christopher Gill’s introduction to his translation of Plato’s Symposium (New York: Penguin, 1999), p. xiii.

7. Talisse’s specific objection is that Deweyans, who are committed to the “connection [between their philosophy and] . . . real-life problems and conditions,” still reject the undeniable fact of pluralism as “a salient trait of experience.” Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, p. 53. It is clear from the spirit of his objection that Talisse wishes to criticize Deweyan democracy internally, or on the basis of its own core assumptions.

8. Supporting this imagined objection is Dewey’s claim that “[h]istory is that which happened in the past and it is the intellectual reconstruction of these happenings at a subsequent time. The notion that historical inquiry simply reinstates the events that once happened ‘as they actually happened’ is incredibly naive.” Dewey, “Judgment as Spatial-Temporal Determination: Narration-Description,” in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, LW 12:235–236. Dewey states the value of appreciating a theory relative to the meaning it had in its own historical milieu in his historical reconstruction of Thomas Hobbes’ political theory: “It is the object of this essay to place the political philosophy of Hobbes in its own historic context.” He calls the illicit move of filtering a theory through more contemporary concepts and debates “temporal displacement.” Dewey, “The Motivation of Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” MW 11:18–40. 18. Also, see D.L. Hildebrand, “Progress in History: Dewey on Knowledge of the Past,” The Review of Philosophy and Social Science, vol. 25, nos. 1–31.

9. For the initial formulation of Talisse’s deliberative theory of democracy, see his Democracy After Liberalism: Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics (New York and London: Routledge, 2005). For his more recent formulation and its relationship to pluralism, see his A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, pp. 54–145.


11. Ibid., p. 12.


13. Ibid., p. 2.


15. In an earlier collaboration with Scott Aikin, Talisse claims that there are three kinds of pluralism: (i) ontological or deep pluralism, (ii) epistemic or shallow pluralism, and (iii) modus vivendi pluralism. The first two are identical to those he articulates in this article and the last is the liberal prescription for tolerance. See R.B. Talisse and S.F. Aikin, “Why Pragmatists Cannot Be Pluralists,”
16. Ibid. Values are incompatible insofar as they advance propositions that cannot be part of a consistent set; incompossible insofar as they cannot exist together in the value scheme; and incommensurable insofar as they cannot be measured and ranked on the same scale.

17. Ibid., p. 5.


19. Particularly damning, on Talisse’s evaluation, is Sandel’s claim that if self-government “requires the capacity to deliberate well about the common good, then citizens must possess certain excellences—of character, judgment and concern for the whole. But this implies that citizenship cannot be indiscriminately bestowed. It must be restricted to those who either possess the relevant virtues or can come to acquire them.” Democracy’s Discontent (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 318, cited in Talisse, “Can Democracy be a Way of Life?” p. 7.

20. Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, p. 28.


22. This is a slight development of Talisse’s more limited pronouncement that “it is impossible [according to the work of social choice theorists such as Kenneth Arrow] to devise a mechanism of preference aggregation that can arrive reliably at rational collective decisions.” A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, p. 30. There are at least three difficulties with what social choice theorists refer to as majority cycling or ‘the paradox of voting.’ The first difficulty, specified by Kenneth Arrow in his now-famous impossibility theorem, is that majority cycling leads to irrational collective behavior. As a condition for individual decisions to be rational, preference orderings should be transitive, i.e. if A is preferred to B and B to C, then A is preferred to C. Likewise, if collective decisions are rational, social preference orderings too should display transitivity. However, majority decision-making procedures can potentially result in intransitive social preference orderings, which thereby violate the rationality condition, as Arrow points out: “the method . . . for passing from individual to collective tastes fails to satisfy the condition of rationality, as we ordinarily understand it” (3). K. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: Wiley, 1951), p. 3. A second difficulty is that of incoherence. As the pairing of alternatives periodically shifts, so does the preferred social preference ordering. W. Riker and P. C. Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973):84ff. The majority-decided status quo, A, can become C (as C is preferred to A), then B (as B is preferred to C) and return to A (as A is preferred to B); a cycle that will
repeat itself indefinitely unless individual preferences change or some institution imposes a decision. In the case that a non-representative institution decides the outcome, then a minority group controlling the institution frustrates a majority disposed to another outcome. Lastly, the difficulty of arbitrariness occurs in any voting system which involves a series of head-to-head votes, such as an amendment process. See N. Frohlich and J. A. Oppenheimer, *Modern Political Economy* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978):17ff. The victor in such a series of matches normally constitutes what is called a ‘Condorcet winner’.


24. According to Estlund, “[s]ocial choice theory evaluates rules of aggregation from individual orderings to collective orderings, not actual procedures, which might or might not conform to those rules. . . . The point is important: the standards studied by social choice theory are, insofar as they are aggregative, really substantive standards applied to outcomes of possible temporal procedures.” *Democratic Authority* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 74–5.

25. Talisse still presents the ontological variety of pluralism, probably because it is relevant to his later response to William Caspary. See *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy*, p. 34–5, 50–1.


30. As mentioned in the last section, not all of the charges apply to both formulations of Talisse’s pluralist objection.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.


35. Ibid., p. 9.

36. Dewey, “Propositions of Appraisal” in *Theory of Valuation*, LW 13:216–8. Id., “The Construction of Good” in *The Quest for Certainty*, LW 4:207. Moreover, Dewey denies that individuals are typically cognizant of their own values: “Values and loyalties go together, for if you want to know what a man’s values are do not ask him. One is rarely aware, with any high degree of perception, what are the val-


42. According to Paul Stob, “[a] discursive politics underlies . . . Dewey’s understanding of the ‘public.’” “Kenneth Burke, John Dewey, and the Pursuit of the Public,” p. 234. Also, see R. Asen, “The Multiple Mr. Dewey: Multiple Publics and Permeable Borders in John Dewey’s Theory of the Public Sphere,” Argumentation and Advocacy, vol. 39 (2003): 174–88. Dewey refers to a singular monolithic ‘public’ and plural ‘publics’ in order address the many possible ways in which social conflict can manifest. Marion Smiley notes the reason behind this dual usage: “Presumably, cases will arise similar to those Dewey cites—in which all of us are threatened by a universal harm (e.g. nuclear war). But there will also be other cases (probably many more) in which some of us will create harm for others. In these cases, those of us who trace consequences will have to associate ourselves with a particular group and their particular interests.” “Pragmatic Inquiry and Social Conflict,” Praxis International, vol. 9, no. 4 (1990):365–80. Also, see my “Dewey in Spanish,” Education and Culture, vol. 22, no. 1 (2006):84–7, 85.


45. Rawls defines “reasonable pluralism” in the following way: “Under the political and social conditions secured by the basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines will come about and persist, should it not already exist. This fact about free societies is what I call the fact of reasonable pluralism.” See J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 34. He defends a political, not metaphysical, account of justice that is neutral between the plurality of comprehensive and reasonable worldviews: “political liberalism looks for a political conception of justice that we hope can gain support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines in a society regulated by it.” Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 10.

46. Ibid., p. 60.

47. Ibid., p. 49.

48. Rawls defines “reasonable pluralism” in the following way: “Under the political and social conditions secured by the basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines will come about and persist, should it not already exist. This fact about free societies is what I call the fact of reasonable pluralism.” See J. Rawls, Justice as
Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 34. He defends a political, not metaphysical account of justice that is neutral between the plurality of comprehensive and reasonable worldviews: “political liberalism looks for a political conception of justice that we hope can gain support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines in a society regulated by it.” Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 10.

49. Ibid., pp. 11–15.

50. Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, Rawls claims that social organization requires “a stable overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.” Ibid., pp. 36, 43.

51. Rawls states that his account of political liberalism “endorses the underlying ideas of citizens as free and equal and of society as a fair system of cooperation over time.” Id., The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 141.

52. “[T]he ideal of public reason is that citizens are to conduct their fundamental discussions within the framework of what each regards as a political conception of justice based on values that the others can reasonably be expected to endorse and each is, in good faith, prepared to defend that conception so understood.” Id., Political Liberalism, p. 226.

53. Ibid., p. 215.

54. For an argument that the narrow reading of public reason’s scope, viz., that public reason only pertains to matters of basic justice and constitutional essentials, is less defensible than a broad reading, viz., that public reason extends to all choices in which the state wields coercive authority over citizens, see and J. Quong, “The Scope of Public Reason,” Political Studies, vol. 52, no. 2 (2004): 233–50.


57. Id., “Education as Growth,” MW 9:56. “The everyday work of the school shows that children can live in school as out of it, and yet grow daily in wisdom, kindness, and the spirit of obedience—that learning may, even with little children, lay hold upon the substance of truth that nourishes the spirit, and yet the forms of knowledge be observed and cultivated; and that growth may be genuine and thorough, and yet a delight.” Dewey, “Three years of the University Elementary School” in The School and Society, MW 1:66.

58. The language of some commentators, such as Daniel Savage and Thomas Alexander, has perpetuated the widespread misunderstanding that Dewey’s notion of self-realization is perfectionist—a misunderstanding that Talisse has in turn, used to bolster his thesis that Deweyan democracy is incompatible with pluralism. Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, pp. 49–50. Witness Savage’s opening statement in the first chapter of his book: “John Dewey believed that the purpose of life is self-development and that perfectionism is a characteristic of life per se.” Savage, John Dewey’s Liberalism: Individual, Community, and Self-development (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002), p. 17.

59. Talisse, “Can Democracy be a Way of Life?” p. 8. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, p. 44. See C. Koopman, “Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Hope:
Emerson, James, Dewey, Rorty,” pp. 107, 112–3. Note that my claim is not that any criticism of Dewey’s democratic theory must agree with Dewey’s ethical notion of growth. Rather, the critic must at least acknowledge that she is objecting to the theory on the basis of a competing account of how different conceptions of the good ought to be accommodated. I thank the referee for pointing out this possible misunderstanding of my position.


61. Ibid., MW 10:290.


66. Dewey illustrates how partnerships between citizens and experts function to advance the common good with the shoe analogy: “The man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker is the best judge of how the trouble is to be remedied. Popular government has at least created public spirit even if its success in informing that spirit has not been great.” LW 2:364.


77. Talisse, “Can Democracy be a Way of Life?” p. 9. In his second formulation, Talisse restates the point in only a slightly altered form: “They [i.e., Deweyans] will object to what they will call a ‘false dichotomy’ between reasonable pluralism and Dewey’s substantive conception of democracy.” While he claims that the “distinction” between the epistemic and ontological versions of value pluralism (i.e., Rawls’s and Berlin’s) is “neither exclusive nor exhaustive,” the same claim is not made about the distinction between substantive and proceduralist conceptions of democracy. *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy*, pp. 46, 36.

78. In the deliberative democracy literature, the two theorists who initially formulated the distinction were Jürgen Habermas and Joshua Cohen. See J. Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy.” J. Cohen, “Substance and Procedure in Deliberative Democracy.”


80. Estlund, *Democratic Authority*, p. 65. Gutmann and Thompson argue similarly that “[s]uch [substantive] principles should be included so that the theory [of deliberative democracy] can explicitly recognize that both substantive and procedural principles are subject to contestation in similar ways.” Gutmann and Thompson, *Why Deliberative Democracy?*, p. 97.

81. Estlund echoes this point: “There is no interesting divide, then, between fully proceduralist theories of democracy, on the one hand, and impure theories that depart from merely procedural values, on the other.” *Democratic Authority*, p. 82.


83. This proposal is similar to how Dewey conceives the relationship between means and ends. Dewey’s instrumentalism reformulates the meaning of the category ‘end,’ construing it “[(i)] as end-in-view [or proximate goal] and [(ii)] as close or termination.” Dewey, “The Problem of Logical Subject-matter,” in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, LW 12:15. Dewey proposes that the concept of an end-in-view gives rise to a means-end continuum, wherein means and ends are interchangeable: “Every condition that has to be brought into existence in order to serve as means is, in that connection, an object of desire and an end-in-view, while the end actually reached is a means to future ends as well as a test of valuations previously made.” Dewey, “The Continuum of Ends-Means,” in *Theory of Valuation*, LW 13:229. Colin Koopman suggested this point.

85. Dewey, “The One-World of Hitler’s National Socialism,” MW 8:443. During his ninetieth birthday party, Dewey remarked that, “Democracy begins in conversation.” C. Lamont, Dialogue on John Dewey (New York: Horizon Press, 1959), pp. 58, 88. Community members working in concert with experts discuss and collectively decide how to understand their shared conceptions in the best possible light, or as would ideally suit their public values, and to solve their common problems and restructure their shared institutions accordingly. According to James Campbell, “conceptions [for Dewey] are tools to be used in our attempts to settle our social problems, and . . . they have an ‘absolute’ or ‘final’ meaning only in an abstract or definitional sense.” Campbell, Understanding John Dewey, p. 184. Dewey states that these conceptions of, for instance, democracy, equality and liberty are ideal in that they “are not intended to be themselves realized but are meant to direct our course to the realization of potentialities in existent conditions.” “General Theory of Propositions” in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, LW 12:303.

86. Of course, this is an oversimplification of the multitude of potential conditions under which wider and narrower terms of civil (and procedural) discourse will be warranted. See D.M. Estlund, “Deliberation Down and Dirty: Must Political Expression Be Civil?” in The Boundaries of Freedom of Expression and Order in American Democracy (Kent, OH: Kent State University, 2001), pp. 49–67. In Liberalism and Social Action, Dewey does stipulate an exception for his ban against state-sanctioned violence, or undemocratic means, to achieve democratic ends: “[W]hen society through an authorized majority has entered upon the path of social experimentation leading to great social change, and a minority refuses by force to permit the method of intelligence [or intelligent social action] to go into effect. Then force may be intelligently employed to subdue and disarm the recalcitrant minority.” “Renascent Liberalism,” LW 11:61.


89. This point was suggested by Michael Eldridge.


91. Ibid.

92. Hickman, Pragmatism as Post-postmodernism, p. 43.

93. W. Caspary, Dewey on Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). Talisse criticizes Caspary’s account of Deweyan democracy as a method of conflict mediation because it cannot deal with “tragic conflicts,” or disputes in which parties to it possess incompossible or incommensurable values. Thus, Caspary must weasel out of the difficulty by denying the existence of tragic conflicts. According
to Talisse, “Caspari correctly observes that Deweyan democracy is inconsistent with the existence of tragic conflicts; however, this does not entail that there are no tragic conflicts.” Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, pp. 50–1. However, in many of these tragic conflicts, such as volatile labor-management disputes, the mediator helps the parties agree on a procedure to resolve their dispute, thereby sidestepping their deeper disagreements over values. According to Charles E. Lindblom, the key to “muddling through” such conflicts is for parties to agree on means, not ends: “the contestants cannot agree on criteria for settling their disputes but can agree on specific proposals. Similarly, when one’s [. . . ] objective turns out to be another’s means, they often can agree on policy.” “The Science of ’Muddling Through’”, Public Administration Review, vol. 19, no. 1 (1959):79–88, 83–4.


95. This question has become subject for continued debate in the province of Québec, where the issue of national identity is still largely contested. In the case of Multani vs. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 2006 SCC 6, the Canadian Supreme Court determined that the decision of a school authority to prohibit a Sikh child from wearing a ceremonial dagger was contrary to the freedom of religion clause in the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.

96. The Commission (officially titled the “Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences”) was established by the Québec Premier, Jean Charest, in February 2007, and reported back to the provincial government on March 31, 2008. The two chairs of the Commission were the philosopher Charles Taylor and the historian and sociologist Gérard Bouchard.

97. The 37-page report on the Commission’s findings, entitled “Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation,” was published to mixed reviews. In one commentary, this sentiment is obvious: “The crucifix is out. The hijab is in. Preaching reconciliation with Quebec’s minorities, the long-awaited Bouchard-Taylor report recommends removing the crucifix from the National Assembly, allowing students to keep wearing their hijab, kippas, turbans, and even kirpans in class, and banning prayers at city council meeting.” J. Heinrich, “Bouchard, Taylor deliver their report,” The Gazette/Canada.com (Wednesday June 11, 2008), available at <http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/story.html?id=7ee7c4cb-cbf8-4eb8-b90e-072205ebc2bb>.

98. Richard Posner makes a similar complaint about Dewey-inspired deliberative theorists, namely, that they are guilty of “[m]odeling democracy on a faculty workshop.” Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, p. 135. However, his complaint would be more apt if directed at democratic theorists operating in the domain of ideal theory, or theory under highly idealized, counterfactual conditions (e.g. Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics). In contrast, most Deweyan democrats are concerned with the practical implications and feasibility constraints on the implementation of democratic reforms, i.e. non-ideal democratic theory. For Deweyans operating in this domain of non-ideal democratic theory, see McAfee, “Public Knowledge”; Koopman, “Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Hope”; Asen, “The Multiple Mr. Dewey”; and Campbell, “Democracy as Cooperative Inquiry,” in Philosophy and the Reconstruction of Culture: Pragmatic Essays after Dewey, edited by J. J. Stuhr (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993):17–35. On the

99. The belief that experts must have the last word in any debate over the final form of democratic practices is a conceit shared by some philosophers and democratic theorists. However, the most that philosophers and democratic theorists can hope for is to convince a critical mass to change their minds through dialogue with their fellow citizens. Some have objected to this conceit of democratic theorists and have promulgated a similar solution. For instance, Viktor Vanberg objects to the deliberative democrat John Dryzek’s contention that deliberative democracy is an appropriate substitute for constitutional democracy: “[T]he ultimate test that the suggested reforms must be judged as improvements [must occur] by the citizens themselves. . . . You would need to provide reasons for citizens why a regime of deliberative democracy promises more benefits to them than what liberal constitutionalism has to offer.” V. J. Vanberg, “Democracy, Discourse and Constitutional Economics: Comment on John Dryzek,” in *Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Theory and Deliberative Democracy*, edited by A. V. Aaken, C. List and C. Luetge (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 60–71, 71. For a sampling of Dewey’s commentaries on the public policy issues of his day, writing in the capacity of a public intellectual, see “What America Will Fight For” MW 10:271–5; “Imperialism is Easy” LW 3:158–62; “Democracy Joins the Unemployed” LW 6:239–46; and “After the Election—What?” LW 6:253–5.

100. See Talisse, “Farewell to Deweyan Democracy: Towards a New Pragmatist Politics.”

101. Gouinlock approvingly quotes John Herman Randall on this point: “The best way of honoring Dewey is to work on Dewey’s problems—to reconstruct his insights, to see, if need be, farther than Dewey saw.” Gouinlock, “Introduction,” liv. Perhaps such recent examples could be accompanied by a gentle caveat to the reader that any contemporary positions, theories or ideas are not Dewey’s own.