THE DANGEROUS MORALITY OF MANAGING EARNINGS

The majority of managers surveyed say it's not wrong to manage earnings.

BY WILLIAM J. BRUNS, JR., AND KENNETH A. MERCHANT

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Occasionally, the morals and ethics executives use to manage their businesses are examined and discussed. Unfortunately, the morals that guide the timing of nonoperating events and choices of accounting policies largely have been ignored.

The ethical framework used by managers in reporting short-term earnings probably has received less attention than its operating counterpart because accountants prepare financial disclosures consistent with laws and generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Those disclosures are reviewed by objective auditors.

Managers determine the short-term reported earnings of their companies by:

- Managing, providing leadership, and directing the use of resources in operations.
- Selecting the timing of some nonoperating events, such as the sale of excess assets or the placement of gains or losses into a particular reporting period.
- Choosing the accounting methods that are used to measure short-term earnings.

Casual observers of the financial reporting process may assume that time, laws, regulation, and professional standards have restricted accounting practices to those which are moral, ethical, fair, and precise. But most managers and their accountants know otherwise—that managing short-term earnings can be part of a manager’s job.

To understand the morals of short-term earnings management, we surveyed general managers and finance, control, and audit managers. The results are frightening.

We found striking disagreements among managers in all groups. Furthermore, the liberal definitions revealed in many responses of what is moral or ethical should raise profound questions about the quality of financial information that is used for decision-making purposes by parties both inside and outside a company. It seems many managers are convinced that if a practice is not explicitly prohibited or is only a slight deviation from rules, it is an ethical practice regardless of who might be affected either by the practice or the information that flows from it. This means that anyone who uses information on short-term earnings is vulnerable to misinterpretation, manipulation, or deliberate deception.

THE MORALS OF MANAGING EARNINGS

To find a “revealed” consensus concerning the morality of engaging in earnings management activities, we prepared a questionnaire describing 13 earnings-management situations we had observed either directly or indirectly. (See Short-Term Earnings Practices.) The actions described in the incidents were all legal (although some were in violation of GAAP), but each could be construed as involving short-term earnings management.

A total of 649 managers completed our questionnaire. Table 1 shows a rough classification of respondents by job function. A summary of the views on the acceptability of various earnings-management practices is shown in Table 2.

A major finding of the survey was a striking lack of agreement. None of the respondent groups viewed any of the 13 practices unanimously as an ethical or unethical practice. The dispersion of judgments about many of the incidents was great. For example, here is one hypothetical earnings-management practice described in the questionnaire:

In September, a general manager...
realized that his division would need a strong performance in the last quarter of the year in order to reach its budget targets. He decided to implement a sales program offering liberal payment terms to pull some sales that would normally occur next year into the current year. Customers accepting delivery in the fourth quarter would not have to pay the invoice for 120 days.

The survey respondents’ judgments of the acceptability of this practice were distributed as follows:

- Ethical: 279
- Questionable: 288
- Unethical: 82
- Total: 649

Perhaps you are not surprised by these data. The ethical basis of an early shipment/liberal payment program may not be something you have considered, but, with the prevalence of such diverse views, how can any user of a short-term earnings report know the quality of the information?

Although the judgments about all earnings management practices varied considerably, there are some other generalizations that can be made from the findings summarized in Table 2.

- On average, the respondents viewed management of short-term earnings by accounting methods as significantly less acceptable than accomplishing the same ends by changing or manipulating operating decisions or procedures. (Compare section 1 to section 2.)
- The direction of the effect on earnings matters. Increasing earnings is judged less acceptable than reducing earnings. (Compare the points in section 1.)
- Materiality matters. Short-term earnings management is judged less acceptable if the earnings effect is large rather than small. (Compare the points in section 2.)
- The time period of the effect may affect ethical judgments. Managing short-term earnings at the end of an interim quarterly reporting period is viewed as somewhat more acceptable than engaging in the same activity at the end of an annual reporting period. (See section 3.)
- The method of managing earnings has an effect. Increasing profits by offering extended credit terms is seen as less acceptable than accomplishing the same end by selling excess assets or using overtime to increase shipments. (See section 4.)

MANAgers INTERVIEWED

The survey results simply hypothetical, or did managers recognize they can manage earnings and choose to do so? To find the answers, we talked to a large number of the respondents. What they told us was rarely reassuring.

On accounting manipulations, a profit center controller reported: “Accounting is grey. Very little is absolute... You can save your company by doing things with sales and expenses, and, if it’s legal, then you are justified in doing it.”

A divisional general manager spoke to us about squeezing reserves to generate additional reported profit: “If we get a call asking for additional profit, and that’s not inconceivable, I would look at our reserves. Our reserves tend to be realistic, but we may have a product claim that could range from $50,000 to $500,000. Who knows what the right amount for something like that is? We would review our reserves, and if we felt some were on the high side, we would not be uncomfortable reducing them.”

We also heard about operating manipulations. One corporate group controller noted: “[To boost sales] we have paid overtime and shipped on Saturday, the last day of the fiscal quarter. If we...”

Managers often recognize that such actions “move” earnings from one period to another. For example, a division controller told us: “Last year we called our customers and asked if they would take early delivery. We generated an extra $300,000 in sales at the last minute. We were scratching for everything. We made plans, but we cleaned out our backlog and started in the hole this year. We missed our first quarter sales plan. We will catch up by the end of the second quarter.”

And a group vice president said: “I recently was involved in a situation where the manager wanted to delay the production costs for the advertising that would appear in the fall [so that he could meet his quarterly budget].”

Thus, in practice, it appears that a large majority of managers use at least some methods to manage short-term earnings. Although these methods are legal, they do not seem to be consistent with a strict ethical framework. While the managers’ actions have the desired effect on reported earnings, the managers know there are no real positive economic benefits and the actions might actually be quite costly in the long run. These actions are at best questionable because they involve deceptions that are not disclosed. Most managers who manage earnings, however, do not believe they are doing anything wrong.

We see two major problems. The most important is the generally high tolerance for operating manipulations. The other is the dispersion in managers’ views about which practices are moral and ethical.

THE DANGEROUS ALLURE

The essence of a moral or ethical approach to management is achieving a balance between individual interests and obligations to those who have a stake in what happens in the corporation (or what happens to a division or group within the corporation). These stakeholders include not only people who work in the firm, but customers, suppliers, creditors, shareholders, and investors as well.

Managers who take unproductive actions to boost short-term earnings may be acting totally within the laws and rules. Also they may be acting in the best interest of the corporation. But, if they fail to consider the adverse effects of their actions on other stakeholders, we may conclude that they are acting unethically.

The managers we interviewed explained that they rated accounting manipulations harshly because in
such cases the “truth” has somehow been denied or misstated. The recipients of the earnings reports do not know what earnings would have been if no manipulation had taken place. Even if the accounting methods used are consistent with GAAP, they reason, the actions are not ethical because the interests of major stakeholder groups—including the recipients of the earnings reports—have been ignored.

The managers judge the operating manipulations more favorably because the earnings numbers are indicative of what actually took place. The operating manipulations have changed reality, and “truth” is fairly reported.

We see flaws in that reasoning. One is that the truth has not necessarily been disclosed completely. When sales and profits are borrowed from the future, for example, it is a rare company that discloses the borrowed nature of some of the profits reported.

A second flaw in the reasoning about the acceptability of operating manipulations is that it ignores a few or all of the effects of some types of operating manipulations on the full range of stakeholders. Many managers consider operating manipulations as a kind of “victimless crime.”

But victims do exist. Consider, for example, the relatively common operating manipulation of early shipments. As one manager told us: “Would I ship extra product if I was faced with a sales shortfall? You have to be careful there; you're playing with fire. I would let whatever happened fall to the bottom line. I've been in companies that did whatever they could to make the sales number, such as shipping lower quality product. That's way too short-term. You have to draw the line there. You must maintain the level of quality and customer service. You'll end up paying for bad shipments eventually. You'll have returns, repairs, adjustments, billing that will cause you to lose the account...[In addition] it's tough to go to your employees one day and say ship everything you can and then turn around the next day and say that the quality standards must be maintained.”

Another reported: “We've had to go to [one of our biggest customers] and say we need an order. That kills us in the negotiations. Our last sale was at a price just over our cost of materials.”

These comments point out that customers—and sometimes even the corporation—may be victims.

Without a full analysis of the costs of operating manipulations, the dangers of such manipulations to the corporation are easily underestimated. Mistakes will be made because the quality of information is misjudged. The short term will be emphasized at the expense of the long term. If managers consistently manage short-term earnings, the messages sent to other employees create a corporate culture that lacks mutual trust, integrity, and loyalty.

A LACK OF MORAL AGREEMENT

W e also are troubled by the managers’ inability to agree on the types of earnings-management activities that are acceptable. This lack of agreement exists even within corporations.

What this suggests is that many managers are doing their analyses in different ways. The danger is obfuscation of the reality behind the financial reports. Because managers are using different standards, individuals who try to use the information reported may be unable to assess accurately the quality of that information.

If differences in opinions exist, it is likely that financial reporting practices will sink to their lowest and most manipulative level. As a result, managers with strict definitions of what is moral and ethical will find it difficult to compete with managers who are not playing by the same rules. Ethical managers either will loosen their moral standards or fail to be promoted into positions of greater power.

ACTIONS FOR CONCERNED MANAGERS

W e believe most corporations would benefit if they established clearer accounting and operating standards for all employees to follow. The standard-setting process should involve managers in discussions of the practices related to short-term earnings measurements.

Until these standards are in place, different managers will use widely

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2/MANAGING SHORT-TERM EARNINGS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Proportion of Managers Who Judge the Practice:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Managing Short-Term Earnings by Changing or Manipulating Operating Decisions or Procedures:</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ When the Result Is To Reduce Earnings.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ When the Result Is To Increase Earnings.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Managing Short-Term Earnings by Changing or Manipulating Accounting Methods:</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ When the Change To Earnings Is Small.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ When the Change To Earnings Is Large.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Managing Short-Term Earnings by Deferring Discretionary Expenditures into the Next Accounting Period:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ To Meet an Interim Quarterly Budget Target.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ To Meet an Annual Budget Target at Year-End.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Increasing Short-Term Earnings to Meet a Budget Target:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ By Selling Excess Assets and Realizing a Profit.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ By Ordering Overtime Work at Year-End to Ship as Much as Possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ By Offering Customers Special Credit Terms to Accept Delivery Without Obligation to Pay Until the Following Year.</td>
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Percentages are calculated from Harvard Business Review reader sample.
SHORT-TERM EARNINGS PRACTICES

Thirteen independent events were described in the questionnaire.* Respondents were asked to judge the level of acceptability of short-term earnings management practices associated with the events of a five-point scale:

1. Ethical practice.
2. Questionable practice. I would not say anything to the manager, but it makes me uncomfortable.
3. Minor infraction. The manager should be warned not to do it again.
4. Serious infraction. The manager should be severely reprimanded.
5. Totally unethical. The manager should be fired.

The following are examples of some of the events described for a division of a $1-billion corporation with annual sales of $100 million and a before-tax profit of $12 million.

- A building, scheduled for repainting in 1989, was painted and expensed in 1988 at a cost of $150,000 because the division was far ahead of budget.

- Hoping to save $150,000, the division general manager ordered all employees to defer discretionary expenditures into the next accounting period so that the division would make budgeted earnings targets.

- In September, the general manager realized that the division would need strong performance during the last quarter to reach its budgeted earnings targets. He implemented a sales program that allowed customers who accepted delivery this year to defer payment for 120 days, pulling sales that would have been made next year into the current year. Customers accepting delivery in the fourth quarter would not have to pay the invoice for 120 days.

- In an effort to meet budgeted earnings targets, the division manager ordered excess assets to be sold during the fourth quarter, realizing a profit of $40,000.

- In November, with the division straining to meet budgeted earnings targets, the general manager called the engagement partner of a consulting firm that was doing some work for the division. He asked that the firm not send an invoice until next year. The partner agreed. Estimated work done, but not invoiced, was $30,000.


IMMORAL AND UNETHICAL

We have no doubt that short-term earnings are being managed in many, if not all, companies. Some of these earnings-management practices can be properly labeled as immoral and unethical. The vast majority of managers who engage in these practices are not bad people—they just have an incomplete understanding of the implications of their practices.

The key to moral behavior is the obligation to look beyond your own self-interest to the concerns of others. The morality of doing otherwise is questionable. Based on our research, we doubt that enough managers realize this.

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The distributions of judgments vary slightly depending on the role of the respondent. Although we expected general managers to be more “liberal” and the finance, control, and audit managers to be more “conservative,” we did not find this to be the case. Likewise, there were not significant differences in the responses of managers of public companies from the responses of those in privately owned companies. Because the differences among the responses from the sample subgroups were slight, however, we will not show the data broken down by subgroups—only for the entire sample of 649 respondents.

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