Positivism:

The main objective of a positivist is to construct a solid foundation for the science (i.e. IST). This foundation should be free from metaphysics, and pseudo-concepts introduced by metaphysics. Metaphysics is composed of assumptions that cannot be reduced to logical simples, subsequently cannot be verified empirically. In this way, he lets the science and the empirical world speak for themselves. All prepositions are "pictures of reality." The method of enquiry is hence treated as an objective pursuit. By restring himself to strict measures, a positivist seeks to adopt a genuinely natural point of view. He is looking for certainty and the certainty is generated by going about empirically and check out everything against nature.

His view toward the empirical world and its significance would lead to a number of implications for the kind of science we are doing at IST. The science is taken as a consolidated body of propositions. In other words, there is a one science underlying of various scientific disciplines; and this cornerstone reflects one real world. According to this concept of unity of science, different sub-disciplines within IST could not be treated as separable while they are derivatives of the neutral elements of experience. After all, all these scientific disciplines contain theories or research traditions that are largely commensurable.  What the "I" people are doing is not inwardly different from what their "P" and "T" counterparts come up with. Essentially they are digging into the same ground but from divergent sides. Whatever they pull out is anchored in the same principles (empirically verifiable), and according to the precise and strict measures of positivisms these findings are leading us to the same truth which is out there in the natural world. To this end, the old library since is not different from IST. Although the names might bring up different connotation, they are multiple conduits to the same reality. 

The reductionism put forth by positivisms also makes us treat different phenomena in our field almost alike. For instance, the way we might look at a purely technological enquiry like the evaluation of search engine agility, could not be that different from investigations of the perception of the users of an eGovernment website. A positivist strives to reduce even social phenomena and look at them, for example, as relationships between a system competency and respective behaviors of its users.   Within IST, outwardly different phenomena like people and technology ought to be studied alike.  When it comes to people and the complexity and uncertainty around their actions, we reduce our model and simply dispense with those qualities that are not empirically verifiable. 

Positivism also suggests its own method of enquiry for our enterprise. Given the objectiveness of the truth, the method is dissociated from the personality and social position of the investigators. That is to say, the results engendered by IST researchers are substantially transcultural and context independent. In this sense some of the current approaches and research within IST could not be treated as valid attempts. The sort of analysis that Andrea generates out of a corpus of interview is somehow bound to her own interpretation. She is essentially implicated in the research and has a great bearing on the instrument of the research. As such her approach does not satisfy positivist sort of criteria where the objectivity of the research is the one of the main precondition of research.  Her assumptions are also at odds with the kind of propositions that cannot be reduced to empirical prepositions. These non-extensial propositions are eliminated by positivists. The firm framework of empiricism also annihilates some of the stuff that is currently studied within IST. For example, in some research the possible outcomes could be regarded endless (particularly on the P side). However a positivist cannot tolerate any assertions of infinite collections or magnitudes.

Popper:

Popper believes that science undergoes a rational evolution. He also puts forth that it is possible to arrive at a judgment as to which of existing theories is closer to the truth. When we are exposed to different theories, we would accept the one that has excess empirical content, explicating everything that was formerly explained by the other one, and brining about some predictions that have been confirmed by experiment. For Popper inductive reasoning is a myth. Observing positive instances and then believing that the more positive instances, the more confirmation of a theory is not acceptable for Popper.   To him, it is not plausible to assume that having more inductive evidence would support a theory compared to its rivals. That is why he suggests an asymmetry between verification and falsification (as his own alternative). As opposed to positivists, he claims that no hypothesis is ever confirmed. Instead he directed attentions to the concept of corroboration. A hypothesis is corroborated if it has not yet been refuted and has stood up sever tests (i.e. attempts to refutation). This to say that rather going about purely experimental judgments, as with positivist views, we accept a theory until it is falsified. But a theory or statement is scientific if an observation can assert that it is false.

According to Popper we have to look at what we are doing here as an evolutionary science and a series of theory rather than theories. We need to take into account the relationships between theories. Although we may find that a couple of experiments are at odds with a theory, we don't dismiss it until a new theory is found which tells us the same things as the old one but without the difficulties of the old one. Here the conflict does not take place between theories and experiments but between rival theories.  A theory is regarded falsified when it is superseded by a theory with higher corroborated content. So Popper shifts the problems of how to appraise a theory to the problem of how to appraise a series of theories. So a series of theory rather than an isolated theory are said to be scientific or unscientific. To this end, falsification of Popper does not simply consider the relation of a theory with the empirical world, but it puts emphasis on the growth of empirical content engendered out of the completion of series of theories. This conceptualization presumes a cumulative process which is achieved by an articulation or extension of old paradigms. What is currently being done in IST does not revolutionize previous paradigms like library science. In contrast it is building on them, and attempts to get closer to the truth through an incremental process.  

Popper believes that the purpose of science is moving toward truth. The evolutionary process discussed above is supposed to move on to theories with more lines to truth. So we are always on the way, and cannot touch truth (like what positivists claim). That is why we have to be open to criticism even when it comes to basic statements, making sure that we are moving forward. In this sense, every theory is valid for the time being, and no solid foundation could be assumed for science as we proceed with competing theories.   We cannot for sure contend that the approaches we are currently drawing on within IST are in full accord with the absolute truth. Rather, we must make sure that on the grounds of Popperian falsification we are on the way. As such, the process of scientific evolution is put weight on, rather than the sort of instant results (embracing the absolute and objective truth) positivists are looking for. This however does not imply that every sort of theory can work its way into our circle. We are only receptive to a theory if and only if it's falsifiable. Hence, we might need to get rid of some of the theories we are currently employing here at IST, particularly the ones which do not lend themselves to the Popper's demarcation criterion.

Kuhn:

Kuhn bases his discussion on a descriptive account of the trajectory of science. One of the pivotal concepts that functions as the touchstone of his argument is the notion of "paradigm." A paradigm could be characterized as a set of theories and the kinds of methods that they share. A scientific community is formed around the paradigm and the paradigm is faithfully pursed by the related scientific community. We can treat information science as a new paradigm. It embraces the whole network of theories, beliefs, values, methods, and educational objectives of a scientific community. According to Kuhn, it provides the bond of the community and shapes its world-view and guides its research. At a more concrete level, it advances a set of guides of actions (what is called rules by Kuhn) that members (i scholars and students) are supposed to use in their scientific endeavor, and further articulate the paradigm.

I believe the new paradigm is stemming from a series of older paradigms like computer science. Over the last decades or so, a number of anomalies have arisen that were not well-addressed by computing conceptualization. Phenomena like lack of user acceptance have plagued many IS implementations while computer science did not have enough handle to cope with these emerging challenges. The rise of these anomalies signifies a serious decline in the puzzle-solving efficacy of the old paradigms. As a result, the new paradigm of Information Science has been brought about by the scientific community. Kuhn believes that the new paradigm should now solve some outstanding and generally recognized problems that can be met in no other way. The IST paradigm hence needs to promise to preserve relatively large part of the problem-solving ability that has accursed to science through its predecessors.

However, this is not to say that the whole process of paradigm shift is rational in a sense that is preached by scholars like Popper. Kuhn does suggest that there are no algorithmic procedures to decide which theory fares better. Although competing paradigms are treated as incommensurable, they can be compared. The incommensurability clarifies what is involved when we compare alterative and rival paradigms. The computer science paradigm can be logically incompatible with the IST paradigm, incommensurable (cannot be measured against each other point by point), but comparable. That is, they are capable of being compared with one another in multiple ways without requiring the assumption that there is a fixed, universal measure which can hammer out both paradigms. As a result the shift in paradigm can be due to multifaceted, and multilevel changes that take place in the scientific community. The rise of IST paradigm could be due to the striking penetration of computing technology into organizations in 80s and 90s and particularly the internet boom in late 90s. As such, the scientific change - from one paradigm to another- cannot be governed by sole rules of reason.

The construct of incommensurability can have other implications for what we are doing at IST. Kuhn believes that the world changes as a new paradigm is adopted. This is to say that the proponents of competing paradigms practice their rituals in different worlds. In other words, the two groups of scientists see different things when they look from the same point of view in the same direction. A computer scientist investigating a phenomenon can come up with completely different results from what his information scientist counterpart has conjectured by looking at the same thing.

I think by interpreting Kuhn writing, one can conclude that a paradigm shift in our field has taken place. But IST as a paradigm is far to reach the normal science status. During normal science new findings are forced into performed and relatively inflexible boxes that a paradigm supplies. So no innovation is intended or expected. The paradigm is not also tested. Similarly no attempts are made to review models, values, commitments of a paradigm. I think the existence of a course like the philosophy of science which embarks on different epistemologies which are practiced in the field is a clear sign that we are have not arrived at such an epoch. We have not taken for granted things like methods of enquiry, values, assumption and so on.

Lakatos:

Lakatos aims to propose a rational reconstruction of growth of science. Therefore he advances the notion of research program. The research program is the unit by which he appraises the nature and evolution of science since he rejects the emphasis on individual theories. Rather he looks at the comparison of sequence of theories in different research programs. According to Lakatos, a research program includes a hard-core, the negative heuristic, and the positive heuristics. I believe IST can be thought of a budding research program because now we are able to work out all these three constituents for it. By considering IST as a research program, we would assume continuity in the kind science that we are doing here. This continuity and tenacity of the theories that we are currently employing can be explained if we look at our science as a battleground of research programs rather than of a host of isolated theories. In this way, we can detach ourselves from the specific choices and specific situations that we are in for the time being. Rather than trying to appraise our choice instantly, the unit that we examine is our research program. This lets us look retrospectively at our program which develops and changes over time and is consequently historical.  

Lakatos' criterion of demarcation is aimed at making distinction between mature science, consisting of research program, and immature science consisting of a mere patched up patterns of train and errors. I believe what are happing in venues like iConferance are attempts towards crystallizing disparate subfields into a mature science. By definition, mature sciences consist of research programs that anticipate novel facts as well as novel auxiliary theories, so unlike immature sciences, they possess a striking heuristic power. In iConferences, iScientist converge to consolidate the power heuristic of the filed which further would lead to the autonomy of our theoretical science.

IST as a research program must have developed a hard-core, the negative heuristic, and the positive heuristic. IST seems to move towards a momentum where all community members more or less would share a hard-core consisting of a set of theoretical hypothesis. These hypotheses would be looked at as refutable facts. They are also deemed to immune to revision. Then, it is the negative heuristic that would protect the hard-core of our field and would forbid us to attempt any revision. We must however articulate a set of auxiliary hypothesis which can function as a protective belt in the face of anomalies. This protective belt could be considered as the set of secondary hypotheses we are putting forth in our research. They have to get adjusted and readjusted or even completely replaced to defend the hard-core. For instance, different conceptualizations about the impact of technologies could be classified in these categories while things like technological determinism have been replaced by newer and more succinct frameworks in the face of deficiency. This process of articulating suggestions as to how the IST could develop, either in the face of anomalies, or as attempts to accommodate new phenomena constitutes the positive heuristic of IST research program. Separating positive heuristic and the hardcore let us bring about a revolution or creative shift in positive heuristic which can revive our research program when it is getting into a degenerating phase.

Lakatos also allows us to dispense with the naïve falsification measure which forces us to refute a theory and replace it in the face of counterexamples. For example if a phenomenon like Youtube emerges and cannot be accounted for by our research program for the time being, we need no refutation to tell us that our program is in urgent need of replacement; in fact the positive heuristic of the program drives us forward anyway. Lakatos believes that such an instant rationality and learning is bound to fail, and rationality works much slower that most people tend to think. So in this way we permit our research program to develop, to show its hidden strength and we will judge it only in the long term. Our measures only are applied "with hindsight", after the occurrence of either "degenerating" or of "progressive" problem shifts.

Feyerabend:

Feyerabend advocates a view which does not assume the development of science to be entirely rational. What is central to Feyerabend's construct of science is overthrow of any universal and overarching standard of demarcation.  He does not see any such universalistic rule which can assess claims of competing paradigms. Therefore, according to him methodological rules generally do not contribute to scientific success.

He further embarks on the principle of tenacity which let a theory survive in the face of counterexamples. In a sense he relaxes the strict reliance on the empirical evidence. On this ground, we cannot come up with a theory that could be completely consistent with all relevant facts. This would root out naïve falsification which asserts that scientific theories should be annihilated if they don't agree with known facts.  I have seen lots of self-righteous claims in our field where their preachers strive to abolish contesting agendas, arguing theirs are more compatible with the truth. Essentially Feyerabend is critical of these sorts of claims and any guideline that aim to judge the quality of scientific ideas by comparing them to the known facts.

Feyerabend advances his thesis by complementing the concept of tenacity with proliferation construct. He attempts to establish an interplay between the two. We might drift to inertia by solely emphasizing tenacity of scientific theories. He thinks we should be able to introduce new ideas even if the current theories are well justified and well-entrenched.  IST could be regarded as an exemplar of proliferation of diverse and even conflicting paradigms. According to the construct of proliferation, paradigms like psychology, sociology, computer science, and etc can live together although they might seem incongruous.  However, upon the arrival of a newcomer, they have to open some room and "breathing space" for it. There is no need to suppress even the most outlandish sort of theory which tries to work its way into IST.

To further his thesis, Feyerabend also puts forth the incommensurability of scientific paradigms. The standards of rationality of each paradigm are radically unique. So there is no general universal measure which can evaluate these incommensurable paradigms; no practical comparison between these theories could be made.   In other words, we are not able to work out any measure to evaluate as to what theories would get us closer to the truth. What Lee Giles and Andrea Tapia are doing after all is their own creations, which include their own standards they impose upon IST. Their theories and views could be empirically disconnected. So the choice between their theories would become a matter of taste. Hence, no obligation could be imposed upon the researchers within the field to go for one of them since we cannot claim for sure what approach reflects a fuller picture of the truth. Incommensurability, as defined by Feyerabend, implies that switching from an old paradigm to a newer one always implicates some gains and losses. This view encourages coexistence of competing paradigms within our field insofar as each provides us with things that are absent in the other.

The Feyerabend's view can have some overt and covert implications for the sort of direction we should move forward. Students of the field should not be prevented from speculating along different lines of enquiry. This is to say no reduction should be made in the number of accepted and comprehensive theories within the IST community. Feyerabend strongly argues against closing our mind where hard-wiring to established paradigms and practices diminish the tendency to explore unknowns. Feyerabend would also turn our attentions from our sense of community to our individual creativity.  In his view some of the collective mechanism like iConferance, presence of different concrete angles (I,P,T) which are aimed at consolidating the field could be counterproductive. By these mechanisms, individual members of the community might be pushed toward conformity to certain accepted practices. He believes every community even the ones considered to be open-minded, and enlightened are in grave danger of becoming closed, rigid, and indolent to new ideas and alternatives. In short, Feyerabend would argue for a pluralistic methodology which sees the critical power of science in overthrow of fixed orthodoxies.

Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics has manifested itself as a robust alternative to Scienticism. It has essentially emerged as a defensive reaction against universalistic and reductionist claims made in the name of science. These claims aim to assimilate whatever sounds legitimate, acceptable and rational in their view into knowledge, and throw away whatever that cannot be reduced to cannons of scientific discourse. Hermeneutics would preclude us from adopting any such measures for falsifying a variety of science and paradigms we are practicing here, at IST. We cannot come up with a single silver-bullet-like demarcation criterion which judges what is strange and alien to us as if this was the sole and exhaustive measure of rationality for the whole spectrum of our field. If each distinct sub-field that constitutes our community views its alien counterparts in the above fashion, we could end up with disconnected islands which are attached to their orthodoxies (whether rooted in sociology or statistics), possessing tons of misconceptions about one another.

Hermeneutics portrays a distinct picture of truth and knowledge. It does make no distinction between reason and tradition. Reason gains its distinctiveness power always within accompanying traditions. Different traditions within IST bear their own rationality. These rationalities could not be accounted for unless we attend to the very historical contexts they are anchored in. For instance, one cannot appeal to the contingencies of the "P" people without delving into the sociological, psychological, and philosophical bedrock of their horizon.

The concept of incommensurability is central to Hermeneutics where no single language is thought as appropriately explaining contesting theories.  IST is no exception to this, hence consists of incommensurable and at times incompatible paradigms. However, this is not to say that we are by no means able to compare them and flesh out a sort of collective rationality. Although there does not exist a fixed grid by which we can hammer them out, Hermeneutics contends that they need to engage in a dialogue in order to arrive at a rational ground. As mentioned before, different traditions within our community bear their inevitable prejudices. Our prejudices however are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inexorably distort the truth. These are simply conditions whereby we experience something. I, as a student of Steve Sawyer and a person loyal to the pillars of social informatics, am not able to bracket all my prejudice and background while I am engaged in this dialogue. But the sort of dialogue sanctioned by Hermeneutics requires us to avoid imposing our beliefs, and classifications that are well entrenched in our tradition. This precondition for fusion of horizon lets us understand ourselves better and make adjustment based on the interactions we have had with the alien traditions.

I believe an exemplar of this sort of discourse is the one into which Rob Kling (as a computer scientist on one side) , and Steve Woolgar and Keith Grint (on the other side as sociologist) did get (See [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] for more details on the series of discussion). They immersed themselves in a discourse to see how the material properties of technology situate in a conceptualization of technological agency. While appealing to the other's horizon, they did not retreat from their own tradition.  I believe this could be a case to which other cross-disciplinary discourses in our field could look at as an exemplar. This collective rationality however was reached by becoming more aware of their own blind prejudices (i.e. what cannot be explained by sociology and what cannot be explained by computer science models), learning there is more to the "truth"  then is captured by their own entrenched view of the world. Here is where Hermeneutics distances itself from relativism when together we can enlarge and enrich our horizon by understanding alien horizons. Basically fusion of horizon brings us above our own horizon.

In conclusion, I think we are still in the quest of a kind of communal rationality insofar as we have not become a well-entrenched field. Our identity and scholarship are not as consolidated as those of business schools; even each iSchool opted for a different name. Our scholars have by and large been trained in other colleges, so attending different conferences ranging from computer science to sociology.  We are more prone to draw on Hermeneutics' agenda and interact with other paradigms. But there is a possibility that after a while we become like computer science departments or business schools that once upon time used to enjoy the same caliber that we reflect today. At that time, we might be somehow close to other paradigms when we would have our solid identity, our conferences, and when our students would be taught by professor who have obtained their PhD from iSchool and would have been indoctrinated within "iParadigm".

1.            Grint, K. and Woolgar, S. Computers, guns, and roses: What's social about being shot. Science, Technology and Human Values, 17 (3). 366-380.

2.            Kling, R. Audiences, narratives, and human values in social studies of technology. Science, Technology and Human Values, 17 (3). 349-365.

3.            Kling, R. When Gunfire Shatters Bone: Reducing Sociotechnical Systems to Social Relationships. Science, Technology & Human Values, 17 (3). 381.

4.            Woolgar, S. The Turn to Technology in Social Studies of Science. Science, Technology & Human Values, 16 (1). 20.

5.            Woolgar, S. and Grint, K. Computers and the transformation of social analysis. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 16 (3). 368-378.

One of the major points raised by the chapter is the use of multiple methods.  Methods are defined as tools by which a science obtains and analyzes information.  Each method should be thought as offering unique potentials not available by other means, but also as posing some inherent limitations. These limitations however could be offset by other methods. That is why the author dubs all research methods bounded opportunities.

The flaws of each method cannot be avoided unless the researcher brings more than one approach to bear on each aspect of the problem. The methods can add strength to one another by addressing each other’s weaknesses.  For instance, inevitable limitations of laboratory experiments are rather evident. Researchers might need to draw upon other strategies to complement the data collected through laboratory experiments. These alternatives include field studies, samples surveys and several others.  In a nutshell, credible empirical knowledge requires consistency or convergence of evidence across studies based on multiple methods.

In order to signify inherent limitations of each method, the chapter states “you cannot pound a nail if you don’t have a hammer. But if you do have a hammer, that hammer will not help you much if you need to cut a board in half.”  This claim sounds well justified, but how we assure that the phenomenon that we are going about is a nail, not a board? The author defines three interwoven domains that constitute the research process. In fact, neither of them would be able to accommodate the stance that a researcher should take when it comes to his/her theory of knowledge.

My paper for this week”Information Systems Epistemology: A Historical Perspective” turns attention to important issues associated with knowledge and its acquisition which could influence the way we think about what constitutes valid research in Information Systems. Basically they are anchored in reach historical traditions and are fundamental to our understanding of nature and society. Although many researchers are blind of this background, the epistemological position that they take could exert enormous influence over their results and conclusions.  Essentially epistemology refers to our conceptualization of knowledge; in particular how we acquire it. Hirschheim investigates into diverse and widely used sort of epistemology, including, but not limited to, Positivism and Post-Positivism.

His main contention is information systems are  a kind of social system rather than purely technical ones, given the nuanced social phenomena involved in the design and the adoption process. As such the epistemology of information system should be heavily borrowed from social sciences.  The scientific paradigm adopted by the natural sciences is appropriate insofar as it lends itself to the contingencies of social sciences. Finally he argues against one correct method of science, and makes a case for the methodological pluralism in Information Systems research.

References:

Hirschheim, R. (1985). "Information Systems Epistemology: An Historical Perspective." Research Methods in Information Systems: 13-35.

“Sky-surveys” embrace satellite technologies and information technology to offer a fuller picture of disasters. These imageries captured by satellites then are combined with GIS tools which incorporate data from multiple sources. The resulted integration would provide vital information on the locations of victims, their health status, and etc.

However, there is a question as to how effective these technologies are. I think the technology itself cannot bring about the expected results, but its proper use can.  For example, as the article states evidence of war crimes can also be collected through forensic technologies.  In Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s, the U.S military captured aerial photographs of mass graves. Despite the presence of international forces, the images failed to prompt an immediate halt of the slaughter. As such, technology can only drive change when further factors like political intentions come to play. What Fink , as a physician, does not sufficiently address in the article is the broader social and organizational considerations.

Maitland et al (2007) touches upon some of these issues and look at potential implications of ICT’s relief as complements to program for long term socioeconomic development. They particularly appeal to the transition between disaster and development, and posit that the transition could face many hurdles. They describe these as challenges regarding physical and organizational context, and inter-organizational coordination. 

Physical context ‘s difficulties could include Challenging environment for ICT deployment with a lack of fixed, infrastructure, poor or non-existent transportation, lack of power, and exposure to weather (lack of structures). Organizational context could lead to other problems. For example, the amount of operational information flowing through an organization during a disaster response can be overwhelming. More importantly they contend that the conflict of knowledge and authority is regarded as the one the factors that can plague the whole process. In fact, the most sophisticated technology is unable to solve the conflict. 

The lack of inter-organizational coordination has to do with the multiplicity of relief agencies. It includes differences in funding bases and organizational goals, professional and organizational status hierarchies, and the tendency of each organization to try to maximize its own autonomy. To cope with these challenges, these entities require to raise interdependencies and communication. Interdependencies have been described as pooled, sequential or reciprocal, each requiring a corresponding type of coordination. In pooled interdependence, efficient coordination is accomplished through standardization. For example, maintaining a shared inventory database across several organizations is a standardized policy.

References:

Maitland, C.F., Pogrebnyakov, N. and van Gorp, A.F. A Fragile Link: Disaster Relief, ICTs and Development. Information and Communication Technologies and Development, 2006. ICTD'06. International Conference on. 339-346.

Superstring theory is essentially erected on the basis of “extra dimensions”. Conventional superstring theory suggests the existence of extra dimensions in addition to the usual three.  These extra dimensions give physicists extra handle to delve into the theory of gravity and illuminates the properties of known particles. They are enormously smaller than a proton and unfold as six additional coordinates attached to each point in normal space. In fact these extra dimensions are pivotal for physics since they are regarded to change the behavior of gravity at small distances.  

The author however reveals his concerns of possible irrefutable data that can dispense with the theory. Once the theory proves refutable, many scientists believe that a vast amount of mathematical knowledge that has been accumulated over the years would be swept away. As a matter of fact string theory is sparse on experimental validation, and hence scientists are yet to fully validate it.  For instance, superstring theory contends that if nature follows supersymmetry (a mathematical principle of the theory) then every normal particle has a superpartner.  But these superpartners have not empirically been observed and hence are mere hypothetical entities. The author grapple with the possibility of some counterevidence and states that if we come to understand that these ideas are wrong, “the theory would go down in history as the most spectacular wrong-turn science has ever taken.”

The abovementioned concern, invited me to draw on Lakatos’ essay on “the falsification and the methodology of scientific research programs.”  I think the stance that Odenwald takes is in concert with naive falsification which puts forward that if a theory is “refuted” by experiment, it is irrational (and dishonest) to develop it further, and that one has to replace the old and refuted theory with a new and unrefuted one.  Lakatos on the other hand does downplay the role of such “crucial experiments.” He states that few experiments are really important. The heuristic guidance that physicists receive from tests and these sorts of refutations are usually so trivial that large scale testing may well be a waste of time. In most cases we need no refutations to tell that a theory is in urgent need of replacement.  While Odenwald is worried about the result of prospective experiments which could conflicts with pillar of Superstring theory, Lakatos dubs this view “instant rationality”, and considers it to be utopian. Lakatos cannot be receptive to the agenda that experiments can instantly flesh up the value (degree of confirmation) of a theory, and the elimination can take place as the instant result of the verdict of experiment.  

Laktos embarks on a number of case studies in the history of science (i.e. the Michelson-Morley experiment) and strives to demolish the concept of instants rationality.  In his view purely negative and destructive criticism like refutation does not eliminate a research program. Criticism of a program is a long and often frustrating process which demonstrates that rationality work much slower than most people tend to think. His model lends new emphasis to the “hindsight” element in scientific appraisal and leads to a further relaxation of firm falsification standards. To this end, a theory like superstring theory is not eliminated in the face of even the bitterest counterexamples (anchored in crucial experiments).  Lakatos strongly believes that each research program is allowed a few such defeats.

Reference:

Lakatos, I. (2004). "FALSIFICATION AND THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES." Karl Popper: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers.

This line of reasoning was indeed stemming from the primacy of Approximation in natural science.  Approximation is regarded as modeling of nature through understanding of natural law, and attending to initial conditions of a system. What essentially happens through Approximation is reduction of the whole reality and overthrow of small influences, so that scientists are able to calculate the approximate behavior of a system. Approximation has been cornerstone of many sciences ranging from hard sciences (i.e. Physics) to human science (i.e. Economies). For instance, as with global weather forecasters, economists heavily rely upon this principle in their predication of systems’ behavior.

These models however cannot simplify what is really going on. The chapter states that in practice econometric models proved dismally blind to what the future would bring. These simplifications are employed since they are deemed to be better than nothing. Likewise, even though whether predications being engendered through these models can statically forecast a few days, they are incompetent when it comes to periods more than six or seven days.

Having scrutinized the patterns of the weather change, Edward Lorenz concluded that meager incidents can lead to thunderstorms or blizzards. In other words scanty uncertainties would multiply through an unknown and mysterious chain of turbulent future. His argument would inevitably imply that even the best kind of approximation brought about by the most advanced technologies would not be able to accommodate all these phenomena in its calculation. So there is no perfect approximation in existence.  System theory resonates with Lorenz’s conceptualizations. The universe as an open system comprises of infinite elements interacting with one another. One cannot grasp and predict the behavior of a system without examining all the delicate relationships between every single element and others. That is to say if some of these elements are left out in the assessment, we would lose the holistic view and any such prediction could not be totally conclusive.

The paper that I have chosen for this week is more or less an application oriented paper rather than a pure theoretical one.    It basically sheds light on problems of traditional supply chain management. One of the pivotal difficulties in this respect is “Bullwhip Effect.” The paper contends that the lack of information (what I call the lack of insight into the whole system) is taken as the main cause of “Bullwhip Effect.” This problem takes places where small fluctuations in every stage of supply chain become larger at every step up in the chain, from the customer through to the raw material suppliers. This effects result into increased raw material costs, overtime operations cost, additional transportation and warehousing const, and etc. I believe that this echoes what is implied by Butterfly effect where petite uncertainties magnify through the interaction of the system’s elements.  That is why manufacturers cannot oversee a great deal of patterns beyond immediate business patterns.

References:

• Lee, Hau L; Padmanabhan, V. and Whang, Seungjin (1997). "The Bullwhip Effect in Supply Chains". Sloan Management Review 38 (3): 93-102
  

Will Durant, while admiring da Vinci, discusses over the life of the painter and looks at many different aspects of his work as well as his personality. This is the most detailed portrayal of da Vinci’s life that I have ever read. Not only does Durant scrutinize his attainments, but also illuminates why he has embarked on specific work or journey.  To this end, Durant closely investigates things like whether da Vinci was a homosexual, and then uses these in the analysis of his motives and inspiration for specific artistic work. Interestingly these considerations could yield a noble understanding; for instance, da Vinci is said to be left-handed; that is why Durant concludes that this made him write from right to left.

I believe that by reading the chapter, one could come up with two reasons for distinctiveness of da Vinci among his peers whether painter, engineer, or scientist. First of all, da Vinci was paying a whole lot of attention to nature and its features. Durant states that the repetition as an innate quality of nature never dulled for him the marvel and majesty of what was going on; he filled thousand pages with observation concerning them. He was also curious over the peculiarities of nature simultaneously; da Vinci wrote: “The Nile has discharged more water into the sea than is at present contained in all the waters of the earth, so all the sea and rivers have passed through the mouth of the Nile as infinite number of time.” This enormous interest in nuances of nature could have been a central reason for his work being so gifted.

Second, as opposed to the most of other artists or scientists, da Vinci was not a sole artist, engineer, scientist or what not. He is all of them; in fact he had integrated most of these outwardly disparate skills. When he was painting he was borrowing the law of proportion and perspective from other disciplines. Durant contends that he tried his hand at almost every science. He took enthusiastically to mathematics as the purest form of reasoning, and he used that perception in geometrical figures of The Last Supper.   As such, his acquaintance with mathematics, anatomy, physics, and chemistry and so on provided him with a multidisciplinary view which makes his work so distinct.

In the second reading, Hart believes that the invention of paper and printing technology can place both Tsai and Gutenberg among the first ten persons in the list of the most influential persons in the history. This is because Tsai’s invention of paper pushes the Chinese civilization as well as the whole human civilization rapidly. Gutenberg‘s invention subsequently contributed massively to outburst of knowledge.

The paper I have opted for puts Hart’s argument in a somehow different way. It puts forth that there have been three significant revolutions in the history of human thoughts.  The first one took place hundreds of thousand years ago with the advent of language. The change is deemed to be revolutionary as thereby we became the first specie able to explain the world in which we live. The second cognitive revolution unfolded when the writing emerged in the human societies. Written language indeed made the man capable of preserving the code (oral one) independent of any speaker. The third revolution was the result of the invention of printing press in our own millennium. This is where its taxonomy overlaps with Hart’s.

I think this classification seems more inclusive than Hart’s. It is more in line with the trajectory of human cognitive and scientific progress. In fact it spans more portions of history.  Second, it is not that oriented toward and dependent on material technologies. The invention of language, though not a tangible technology, has had a great bearing on the whole history. In addition, the paper maintains that it singles out only these three revolutions because they had a qualitative effect on how we think. In a nutshell, speech made it possible to make propositions, hand-writing made it possible to preserve them speaker-independently, and print made it possible to preserve them hand-writer-independently. All three had a dramatic effect on HOW we thought as well as on how we expressed our thoughts, so arguably they had an equally dramatic effect on WHAT we thought.  As such the rest of the technological development were only quantitative evolution of the media created by speech, writing, and print.

References:

Harnad, S. (1991) Post-Gutenberg Galaxy: The Fourth Revolution in the Means of Production of Knowledge. Public-Access Computer Systems Review 2 (1): 39 - 53

That being said, the chapter gave me the impression that it was to categorize the most pivotal areas in a bunch of scientific disciplines. As such, I had a tough time to grasp the linkage between numerous constructs being explicated. At times it seemed to me that the authors were rambling over too many disparate directions; so making it to figure out what the structure of the text is. However, the tone of the text reminds me of encyclopedias like Britannica where brevity and inclusiveness do mother the most.

The part which interested me the most was where some contentious things were addressed and the author’s were revealing their specific takes on them. For instance, they raised the question:” is it true that the Arabs kept science alive during the middle ages, while Europe slumbered?” In fact this question underscores the gap in the history of scince that I had noticed when I read though the previous readings. By placing too much emphasis on the west’s contribution to the evolution of science, the role of the other side of the globe was almost neglected.  Particularly when it comes to the middle ages those sorts of historians unrealistically draw the pictures such that once would conclude that the middle age stopped the progress of science. Although this could be the case in the Europe, the science was moving forward in other regions, particularly the Middle East. Surprisingly the chapter contends that Islam made science international. As a result, Arabic was in effect the great switching station. In this regard, it brings up the example of Al-Razi, a Persian physician, who wrote the Comprehensive Book, whose title suggests the overall range of the effort: The comprehensive Book summed up everything that had been known of medicine in Greece, India, and the Middle East and some of what had been known of medicine in China.

The paper I have chosen elaborates more on the role that was played by Al-Razi. It suggests that many important Greek medical texts were translated to Arabic in the 9^th century. For the most part Muslim physicians reflected on the Greek medicine, and seldom questioned it.  But this is not to say that they did not add anything to it. Of the physicians who were working in Baghdad in that period, Abu Bakr Muhamamd Al-Razi stands out as exceptional. He soon became one of the greatest and most prolific physicians of the medieval period, wiring over 200 works ranging from Medicine to subjects like philosophy, theology, mathematics, astronomy and alchemy.

His seminal work, the Comprehensive Book, encompasses what he had read to the date, and has a great deal of parallels with the core concepts of today’s medicine. For instance, it suggests that “The physician, even though he has his doubts, must always make the patient believe that he will recover, for the state of the body is linked to the state of the mind.” His comprehensive understanding of the medicine anchored in multiple sources made his book one of the greatest contribution to medicine to date. In fact this has been taught in many schools all over the world before the emergence of modern medical science.

Reference:

Tibi S. Al-Razi and Islamic medicine in the 9th Century. The James Lind Library 2005. Available online at www.jameslindlibrary.org

The point that he raises about the deficit of Roman Republic, namely lack of a religious idea behind the state, sounds quite noble.  Wells holds that in spite of its huge size, the Roman Republic suffered from limitations set upon the possibilities of a community of knowledge. Scholars like Aristotle could form their own community of aristocrats where very few disciples were able to receive education. So this kind of system was unable to deliver a ubiquitous sort of knowledge and education for a mass of people. In contrast, religions could cross the boundaries and address “multitudes of diverse men together in common enterprises.” What I believe we can add to this line of reasoning is the strength of religions to address spiritual needs of humans which could be left out by most of scientific and worldly alternatives. For instance the very nature of man is prone toward an almighty and vigorous entity upon which he wishes to rely particularly when he is plagued with hardships. As such a state also needs to fill this spiritual void using something of that sort.  Wells states that the church provided the Roman Republic with a system of popular teaching, exactly what the state had lacked. This was brought about by a number of universities and methods of intellectual inter-communication. In addition, by looking carefully at other historical account, one can concluded that the Roman monarch has gone beyond what is pointed out by Wells, and harnessed the potential of the religion in the quest of legitimacy.  Constantine, as the first Christian Roman Emperor embarked on Christianity to consolidate his power while it was being threatened by an uncontrolled and rapid upsurge of Christianity. What he did in Council of Nicaea was simply jumping on bandwagon of the religion and transforming it from a threat to an opportunity.

The article that I found echoes Well’s argument on the important role that religions can undertake in political arenas. It states that even though philosophical schools of thought had strived to dispense with metaphysics including a vast majority of religious beliefs over the 20^th century, the religion has never lost ground and never gone away. This is in sharp contrast with the prediction of many scholars who were seeing religion being marginalized. But as I mentioned before, due to intrinsic popularity of religions; it is almost possible witnessing such a departure. But the main point here is that today the religions are employed as instruments in a lot of power struggles.  This article puts forth that lots of struggle particularly in middle east take a religious guise; and this make them extremely difficult to solve. To this end, I believe that in a modern society there are still a lot of holes to be filled by metaphysics and religions.

Another interesting point he touched upon is the industrial manufacture of paper. Although the history has witnessed a substantial number of influential technologies, the invention of printing and paper technologies seem like focal points. These innovations have enabled human to record things particularly scientific discoveries so that the knowledge could be shared in much easier manners. Given the limitations of communicative means, this has facilitated dissemination of knowledge from one generation to another and from one region to another one.   In addition, it is germane to expansion of knowledge, insofar as this turned books from a luxury good to a more accessible thing.  In this way, knowledge could surpass boundaries of elitist circles and find its way to other classes of society.  

On the flip side I believe the trajectory of Well’s argument in this chapter seems a bit arbitrary; I guess he was to convey a great deal of historical fact, but all these stories are presented at the expense of the main conclusion. In addition, I believe sometimes his claims seem too bold particularly when he is judging individuals. For example, when it comes the contention around Machiavelli’s intention, Wells audaciously contends that Machiavelli had not belief in any righteous altogether.

 
Reference:

http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=10063829

What I found particularly interesting in Asimove’s writing, is his final recommendation regarding the future direction of science in the last part of his essay. He believes that the development of science in the modern society has not been free of detrimental side effects. He particularly focuses on the damage that has been done to nature (destruction of Earth’ crust). Paradoxically his concern has not only faded away but has heightened in the early 21st century. He also suggests that the black box of modern science has to be opened up for non-scientists. The main argument is if the emerging gap between the scientific community and the public diminishes many of the destructive consequences of modern inventions or advances in science can be avoided. This requires the scientist to explain their field of study as simple as possible, and the non-scientist accepts the responsibility of listening.

The paper I found, bears a close relationship with Asimov’s mentioned as a solution to detrimental effects of science.  Leggett and Finlay (2001) reports on an initiative to overcome the barrier to effective communication which posed by scientific jargon and technical language. They contend that the modern life is over dependent on fossil fuel consumption. Scientific community would fail to turn the problem unless public understanding of the issue is raised. So the study has been concerned with questions like “how does the general public conceptualize differences between energy from fossil fuel sources and renewable energy? Do they see renewable energy as a viable alternative, a way of living on our energy income rather than our capital, or do they see it as a return to the dark ages?”

In order to investigate the above mentioned question, they have strived to delve into the ways people make sense of conflicting information from multiple sources. They design an interesting experiment within which the individuals communicated with peers where no technical jargon with regard to subject matter (the energy industry) was needed. The participant drew on pictures or storytelling to express their impression, opinion or hunch.  To this end they were able to convey more effectively their tacit knowledge or unconscious meanings. The study concludes that most of members of public have concerns and personal experiences concerning renewable energy, but the technical jargons and formal language put bounds to effective communication of these ideas.  Additionally, the researcher maintains that the kind of techniques employed in their experiment can afford participants with the freedom to explore their own understanding and express their agendas through their own language.

References:

Leggett M R and Findlay M 2001 Science, story, and image: a new approach to crossing the communication barrier posed by scientific jargon Public Understand. Sci. 10 157–71