What If String Theory is ...

Odenwald believes that an emerging gap in the existing theories has urged physicists and mathematicians to relentlessly pursue an alternative; namely superstring theory.  The standard models and ordinary general relatively are not robust enough to span the gap between everyday physics and the high energies where quantum gravity operates.  Addressing the gap, Superstring theory as an encompassing conceptualization has worked its way into different areas of today’s physics, ranging from nuclear physics to condensed matter physics.

Superstring theory is essentially erected on the basis of “extra dimensions”. Conventional superstring theory suggests the existence of extra dimensions in addition to the usual three.  These extra dimensions give physicists extra handle to delve into the theory of gravity and illuminates the properties of known particles. They are enormously smaller than a proton and unfold as six additional coordinates attached to each point in normal space. In fact these extra dimensions are pivotal for physics since they are regarded to change the behavior of gravity at small distances.  

The author however reveals his concerns of possible irrefutable data that can dispense with the theory. Once the theory proves refutable, many scientists believe that a vast amount of mathematical knowledge that has been accumulated over the years would be swept away. As a matter of fact string theory is sparse on experimental validation, and hence scientists are yet to fully validate it.  For instance, superstring theory contends that if nature follows supersymmetry (a mathematical principle of the theory) then every normal particle has a superpartner.  But these superpartners have not empirically been observed and hence are mere hypothetical entities. The author grapple with the possibility of some counterevidence and states that if we come to understand that these ideas are wrong, “the theory would go down in history as the most spectacular wrong-turn science has ever taken.”

The abovementioned concern, invited me to draw on Lakatos’ essay on “the falsification and the methodology of scientific research programs.”  I think the stance that Odenwald takes is in concert with naive falsification which puts forward that if a theory is “refuted” by experiment, it is irrational (and dishonest) to develop it further, and that one has to replace the old and refuted theory with a new and unrefuted one.  Lakatos on the other hand does downplay the role of such “crucial experiments.” He states that few experiments are really important. The heuristic guidance that physicists receive from tests and these sorts of refutations are usually so trivial that large scale testing may well be a waste of time. In most cases we need no refutations to tell that a theory is in urgent need of replacement.  While Odenwald is worried about the result of prospective experiments which could conflicts with pillar of Superstring theory, Lakatos dubs this view “instant rationality”, and considers it to be utopian. Lakatos cannot be receptive to the agenda that experiments can instantly flesh up the value (degree of confirmation) of a theory, and the elimination can take place as the instant result of the verdict of experiment.  

Laktos embarks on a number of case studies in the history of science (i.e. the Michelson-Morley experiment) and strives to demolish the concept of instants rationality.  In his view purely negative and destructive criticism like refutation does not eliminate a research program. Criticism of a program is a long and often frustrating process which demonstrates that rationality work much slower than most people tend to think. His model lends new emphasis to the “hindsight” element in scientific appraisal and leads to a further relaxation of firm falsification standards. To this end, a theory like superstring theory is not eliminated in the face of even the bitterest counterexamples (anchored in crucial experiments).  Lakatos strongly believes that each research program is allowed a few such defeats.

Reference:

Lakatos, I. (2004). "FALSIFICATION AND THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES." Karl Popper: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers.