Edited Text © Matthew Woessner 2005
IN RE YAMASHITA (1946) Dissenting Opinion
7 to 2 in favor of the government and against General Yamashita
DISSENT: MR. JUSTICE
MURPHY, dissenting.
The significance of the issue facing the Court today cannot be overemphasized.
An American military commission has been established to try a fallen military
commander of a conquered nation for an alleged war crime. The authority for
such action grows out of the exercise of the power conferred upon Congress by
Article I, § 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution to "define and punish .
. . Offences against the Law of Nations . . ." The grave issue raised by
this case is whether a military commission so established and so authorized may
disregard the procedural rights of an accused person as guaranteed by the
Constitution, especially by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The answer is plain. The Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process of law
applies to "any person" who is accused of a crime by the Federal
Government or any of its agencies. No exception is made as to those who are
accused of war crimes or as to those who possess the status of an enemy
belligerent. Indeed, such an exception would be contrary to the whole
philosophy of human rights which makes the Constitution the great living
document that it is. The immutable rights of the individual, including those
secured by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, belong not alone to
the members of those nations that excel on the battlefield or that subscribe to
the democratic ideology. They belong to every person in the world, victor or
vanquished, whatever may be his race, color or beliefs. They rise above any
status of belligerency or outlawry. They survive any popular passion or frenzy
of the moment. No court or legislature or executive, not even the mightiest
army in the world, can ever destroy them. Such is the universal
and indestructible nature of the rights which the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment recognizes and protects when life or liberty is threatened by
virtue of the authority of the
The existence of these rights, unfortunately, is not always respected. They are
often trampled under by those who are motivated by hatred,
aggression or fear. But in this nation individual rights are recognized and
protected, at least in regard to governmental action. They cannot be ignored by
any branch of the Government, even the military, except under the most extreme
and urgent circumstances.
The failure of the military commission to obey the dictates of the due process
requirements of the Fifth Amendment is apparent in this case. The petitioner
was the commander of an army totally destroyed by the superior power of this
nation. While under heavy and destructive attack by our forces, his troops
committed many brutal atrocities and other high crimes. Hostilities ceased and
he voluntarily surrendered. At that point he was entitled, as an individual
protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, to be treated
fairly and justly according to the accepted rules of law and procedure. He was
also entitled to a fair trial as to any alleged crimes and to be free from
charges of legally unrecognized crimes that would serve only to permit his
accusers to satisfy their desires for revenge.
A military commission was appointed to try the petitioner for an alleged war
crime. The trial was ordered to be held in territory over which the
In my opinion, such a procedure is unworthy of the traditions of our people or
of the immense sacrifices that they have made to advance the common ideals of
mankind. The high feelings of the moment doubtless will be satisfied. But in
the sober afterglow will come the realization of the boundless and dangerous
implications of the procedure sanctioned today. No one in a position of command
in an army, from sergeant to general, can escape those implications. Indeed,
the fate of some future President of the
That there were brutal atrocities inflicted upon the helpless Filipino people,
to whom tyranny is no stranger, by Japanese armed forces under the petitioner's
command is undeniable. Starvation, execution or massacre without trial,
torture, rape, murder and wanton destruction of property were foremost among
the outright violations of the laws of war and of the conscience of a civilized
world. That just punishment should be meted out to all those responsible for
criminal acts of this nature is also beyond dispute. But these factors do not
answer the problem in this case. They do not justify the abandonment of our
devotion to justice in dealing with a fallen enemy commander. To conclude
otherwise is to admit that the enemy has lost the battle but has destroyed our
ideals.
War breeds atrocities. From the earliest conflicts of recorded history to the
global struggles of modern times inhumanities, lust and pillage have been the
inevitable by-products of man's resort to force and arms. Unfortunately, such
despicable acts have a dangerous tendency to call forth primitive impulses of
vengeance and retaliation among the victimized peoples. The satisfaction of
such impulses in turn breeds resentment and fresh tension. Thus does the spiral
of cruelty and hatred grow.
If we are ever to develop an orderly international community based upon a
recognition of human dignity it is of the utmost importance that the necessary
punishment of those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible from the ugly
stigma of revenge and vindictiveness. Justice must be tempered by compassion
rather than by vengeance. In this, the first case involving this momentous
problem ever to reach this Court, our responsibility is both lofty and
difficult. We must insist, within the confines of our proper
jurisdiction, that the highest standards of justice be applied in this trial of
an enemy commander conducted under the authority of the United States.
Otherwise stark retribution will be free to masquerade in a cloak of false
legalism. And the hatred and cynicism engendered by that retribution will
supplant the great ideals to which this nation is dedicated.
This Court fortunately has taken the first and most important step toward
insuring the supremacy of law and justice in the treatment of an enemy
belligerent accused of violating the laws of war. Jurisdiction properly has
been asserted to inquire "into the cause of restraint of liberty" of
such a person…. Thus the obnoxious doctrine asserted by the
Government in this case, to the effect that restraints of liberty resulting
from military trials of war criminals are political matters completely outside
the arena of judicial review, has been rejected fully and unquestionably. This
does not mean, of course, that the foreign affairs and policies of the nation
are proper subjects of judicial inquiry. But when the liberty of any person is
restrained by reason of the authority of the United States the writ of habeas
corpus is available to test the legality of that restraint, even though direct
court review of the restraint is prohibited. The conclusive presumption must be
made, in this country at least, that illegal restraints are unauthorized and
unjustified by any foreign policy of the Government and that commonly accepted
juridical standards are to be recognized and enforced. On that basis judicial
inquiry into these matters may proceed within its proper sphere.
The determination of the extent of review of war trials calls for judicial
statesmanship of the highest order. The ultimate nature and scope of the writ
of habeas corpus are within the discretion of the judiciary unless validly
circumscribed by Congress. Here we are confronted with a use of
the writ under circumstances novel in the history of the Court.
For my own part, I do not feel that we should be confined by the traditional
lines of review drawn in connection with the use of the writ by ordinary
criminals who have direct access to the judiciary in the first instance. Those
held by the military lack any such access; consequently the judicial review
available by habeas corpus must be wider than usual in order that proper
standards of justice may be enforceable.
But for the purposes of this case I accept the scope of review recognized by
the Court at this time. As I understand it, the following issues in connection
with war criminal trials are reviewable through the use of the writ of habeas
corpus: (1) whether the military commission was lawfully created and had
authority to try and to convict the accused of a war crime; (2) whether the
charge against the accused stated a violation of the laws of war; (3) whether
the commission, in admitting certain evidence, violated any law or military
command defining the commission's authority in that respect; and (4) whether
the commission lacked jurisdiction because of a failure to give advance notice
to the protecting power as required by treaty or convention.
The Court, in my judgment, demonstrates conclusively that the military
commission was lawfully created in this instance and that petitioner could not
object to its power to try him for a recognized war crime. Without pausing here
to discuss the third and fourth issues, however, I find it impossible to agree
that the charge against the petitioner stated a recognized violation of the
laws of war.
It is important, in the first place, to appreciate the background of events
preceding this trial. From October 9, 1944, to September 2, 1945, the
petitioner was the Commanding General of the 14th Army Group of the Imperial
Japanese Army, with headquarters in the Philippines. The reconquest of the
Philippines by the armed forces of the United States began approximately at the
time when the petitioner assumed this command. Combined with a
great and decisive sea battle, an invasion was made on the island of Leyte on
October 20, 1944. "In the six days of the great naval action the Japanese
position in the Philippines had become extremely critical. Most of the
serviceable elements of the Japanese Navy had been committed to the battle with
disastrous results. The strike had miscarried, and General MacArthur's land
wedge was firmly implanted in the vulnerable flank of the enemy . . . There
were 260,000 Japanese troops scattered over the Philippines but most of them
might as well have been on the other side of the world so far as the enemy's ability
to shift them to meet the American thrusts was concerned. If General MacArthur
succeeded in establishing himself in the Visayas where he could stage, exploit,
and spread under cover of overwhelming naval and air superiority, nothing could
prevent him from overrunning the Philippines."…
By the end of 1944 the island of Leyte was largely in American hands. And on
January 9, 1945, the island of Luzon was invaded. "Yamashita's inability
to cope with General MacArthur's swift moves, his desired
reaction to the deception measures, the guerrillas, and General Kenney's
aircraft combined to place the Japanese in an impossible situation. The enemy
was forced into a piecemeal committment of his troops." Ibid., p.
78. It was at this time and place that most of the alleged atrocities took
place. Organized resistance around Manila ceased on February 23. Repeated land
and air assaults pulverized the enemy and within a few months
there was little left of petitioner's command except a few remnants which had
gathered for a last stand among the precipitous mountains.
As the military commission here noted, "The Defense established the
difficulties faced by the Accused with respect not only to the
swift and overpowering advance of American forces, but also to the errors of
his predecessors, weaknesses in organization, equipment, supply with especial
reference to food and gasoline, training, communication, discipline and morale
of his troops. It was alleged that the sudden assignment of Naval and Air
Forces to his tactical command presented almost insurmountable difficulties.
This situation was followed, the Defense contended, by failure to obey his
orders to withdraw troops from Manila, and the subsequent massacre of unarmed
civilians, particularly by Naval forces. Prior to the Luzon Campaign, Naval
forces had reported to a separate ministry in the Japanese Government and Naval
Commanders may not have been receptive or experienced in this instance with
respect to a joint land operation under a single commander who was designated
from the Army Service."
The day of final reckoning for the enemy arrived in August, 1945. On September
3, the petitioner surrendered to the United States Army at Baguio, Luzon. He
immediately became a prisoner of war and was interned in prison in conformity
with the rules of international law. On September 25, approximately three weeks
after surrendering, he was served with the charge in issue in this case. Upon
service of the charge he was removed from the status of a prisoner of war and placed
in confinement as an accused war criminal. Arraignment followed on October 8
before a military commission specially appointed for the case. Petitioner
pleaded not guilty. He was also served on that day with a bill of particulars
alleging 64 crimes by troops under his command. A supplemental bill alleging 59
more crimes by his troops was filed on October 29, the same day that the trial
began. No continuance was allowed for preparation of a defense as to the
supplemental bill. The trial continued uninterrupted until December 5, 1945. On
December 7 petitioner was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to be
hanged.
The petitioner was accused of having "unlawfully disregarded
and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the
members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other
high crimes." The bills of particulars further alleged that specific acts
of atrocity were committed by "members of the armed forces of Japan under
the command of the accused." Nowhere was it alleged that the petitioner
personally committed any of the atrocities, or that he ordered their
commission, or that he had any knowledge of the commission thereof by members
of his command.
The findings of the military commission bear out this absence of any direct
personal charge against the petitioner. The commission merely found that
atrocities and other high crimes "have been committed by members of the
Japanese armed forces under your command . . . that they were not sporadic in
nature but in many cases were methodically supervised by Japanese officers and
noncommissioned officers; . . . That during the period in question you failed
to provide effective control of your troops as was required by the
circumstances."
In other words, read against the background of military events in the
Philippines subsequent to October 9, 1944, these charges amount to this:
"We, the victorious American forces, have done everything possible to
destroy and disorganize your lines of communication, your effective control of
your personnel, your ability to wage war. In those respects we
have succeeded. We have defeated and crushed your forces. And now we charge and
condemn you for having been inefficient in maintaining control of your troops during
the period when we were so effectively besieging and eliminating your forces
and blocking your ability to maintain effective control. Many
terrible atrocities were committed by your disorganized troops. Because these
atrocities were so widespread we will not bother to charge or prove that you
committed, ordered or condoned any of them. We will assume that
they must have resulted from your inefficiency and negligence as a commander.
In short, we charge you with the crime of inefficiency in controlling your
troops. We will judge the discharge of your duties by the disorganization which
we ourselves created in large part. Our standards of judgment are whatever we
wish to make them."
Nothing in all history or in international law, at least as far as I am aware,
justifies such a charge against a fallen commander of a defeated force. To use
the very inefficiency and disorganization created by the victorious forces as
the primary basis for condemning officers of the defeated armies bears no
resemblance to justice or to military reality.
International law makes no attempt to define the duties of a commander of an
army under constant and overwhelming assault; nor does it impose liability
under such circumstances for failure to meet the ordinary responsibilities of command.
The omission is understandable. Duties, as well as ability to control troops,
vary according to the nature and intensity of the particular battle. To find an
unlawful deviation from duty under battle conditions requires difficult and
speculative calculations. Such calculations become highly untrustworthy when
they are made by the victor in relation to the actions of a vanquished
commander. Objective and realistic norms of conduct are then extremely unlikely
to be used in forming a judgment as to deviations from duty. The probability
that vengeance will form the major part of the victor's judgment is an
unfortunate but inescapable fact. So great is that probability that
international law refuses to recognize such a judgment as a basis for a war crime,
however fair the judgment may be in a particular instance. It is this
consideration that undermines the charge against the petitioner in this case.
The indictment permits, indeed compels, the military commission of a victorious
nation to sit in judgment upon the military strategy and actions
of the defeated enemy and to use its conclusions to determine the criminal
liability of an enemy commander. Life and liberty are made to depend upon the
biased will of the victor rather than upon objective standards of conduct.
The Court's reliance upon vague and indefinite references in certain of the
Hague Conventions and the Geneva Red Cross Convention is misplaced. Thus the
statement in Article 1 of the Annex to Hague Convention No. IV of October 18,
1907,… to the effect that the laws, rights and duties of war apply to
military and volunteer corps only if they are "commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates," has no bearing upon the problem in this
case. Even if it has, the clause "responsible for his subordinates"
fails to state to whom the responsibility is owed or to indicate the type of
responsibility contemplated. The phrase has received differing interpretations
by authorities on international law. In Oppenheim, International Law… it
is stated that "The meaning of the word 'responsible' . . . is not clear.
It probably means 'responsible to some higher authority,' whether the person is
appointed from above or elected from below; . . ." Another
authority has stated that the word "responsible" in this particular
context means "presumably to a higher authority," or "Possibly
it merely means one who controls his subordinates and who therefore can be
called to account for their acts." Still another authority, Westlake,
International Law… states that "Probably the responsibility intended
is nothing more than a capacity of exercising effective control." Finally,
Edmonds and Oppenheim, Land Warfare… state that it is enough "if the
commander of the corps is regularly or temporarily commissioned as an officer
or is a person of position and authority . . ." It seems
apparent beyond dispute that the word "responsible" was not used in
this particular Hague Convention to hold the commander of a defeated army to
any high standard of efficiency when he is under destructive attack; nor was it
used to impute to him any criminal responsibility for war crimes committed by
troops under his command under such circumstances.
The provisions of the other conventions referred to by the Court
are on their face equally devoid of relevance or significance to the situation
here in issue. Neither Article 19 of Hague Convention No. X,… nor Article
26 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929,… refers to circumstances
where the troops of a commander commit atrocities while under heavily adverse
battle conditions. Reference is also made to the requirement of Article 43 of
the Annex to Hague Convention No. IV,… that the commander of a force
occupying enemy territory "shall take all the measures in his power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country." But the petitioner was more than a commander of a force
occupying enemy territory. He was the leader of an army under constant and
devastating attacks by a superior re-invading force. This provision is silent
as to the responsibilities of a commander under such conditions as that.
Even the laws of war heretofore recognized by this nation fail to impute
responsibility to a fallen commander for excesses committed by his disorganized
troops while under attack. Paragraph 347 of the War Department publication,
Basic Field Manual, Rules of Land Warfare,… states the principal offenses
under the laws of war recognized by the United States. This includes all of the
atrocities which the Japanese troops were alleged to have committed in this
instance. Originally this paragraph concluded with the statement
that "The commanders ordering the commission of such acts, or under whose
authority they are committed by their troops, may be punished by the
belligerent into whose hands they may fall." The meaning of the phrase
"under whose authority they are committed" was not clear. On November
15, 1944, however, this sentence was deleted and a new paragraph was added
relating to the personal liability of those who violate the laws of war. Change
1,… The new paragraph 345.1 states that "Individuals and
organizations who violate the accepted laws and customs of war may be punished
therefor. However, the fact that the acts complained of were done pursuant to
order of a superior or government sanction may be taken into consideration in
determining culpability, either by way of defense or in mitigation of
punishment. The person giving such orders may also be punished." From this
the conclusion seems inescapable that the United States recognizes individual
criminal responsibility for violations of the laws of war only as
to those who commit the offenses or who order or direct their commission. Such
was not the allegation here.
There are numerous instances, especially with reference to the Philippine
Insurrection in 1900 and 1901, where commanding officers were found to have
violated the laws of war by specifically ordering members of their command to
commit atrocities and other war crimes….. And in other cases officers
have been held liable where they knew that a crime was to be
committed, had the power to prevent it and failed to exercise that
power….. In no recorded instance, however, has the mere inability to
control troops under fire or attack by superior forces been made the basis of a
charge of violating the laws of war.
The Government claims that the principle that commanders in the field are bound
to control their troops has been applied so as to impose liability on the
United States in international arbitrations.…. The difference
between arbitrating property rights and charging an individual with a crime
against the laws of war is too obvious to require elaboration. But even more
significant is the fact that even these arbitration cases fail to establish any
principle of liability where troops are under constant assault
and demoralizing influences by attacking forces. The same observation applies
to the common law and statutory doctrine, referred to by the Government, that
one who is under a legal duty to take protective or preventive action is guilty
of criminal homicide if he willfully or negligently omits to act and death is
proximately caused…. No one denies that inaction or negligence may give
rise to liability, civil or criminal. But it is quite another thing to say that
the inability to control troops under highly competitive and disastrous battle
conditions renders one guilty of a war crime in the absence of personal culpability.
Had there been some element of knowledge or direct connection with the
atrocities the problem would be entirely different. Moreover, it must be
remembered that we are not dealing here with an ordinary tort or
criminal action; precedents in those fields are of little if any value. Rather
we are concerned with a proceeding involving an international crime, the
treatment of which may have untold effects upon the future peace of the world.
That fact must be kept uppermost in our search for precedent.
The only conclusion I can draw is that the charge made against the petitioner
is clearly without precedent in international law or in the annals of recorded
military history. This is not to say that enemy commanders may escape
punishment for clear and unlawful failures to prevent atrocities. But that
punishment should be based upon charges fairly drawn in light of established
rules of international law and recognized concepts of justice.
But the charge in this case, as previously noted, was speedily drawn and filed
but three weeks after the petitioner surrendered. The trial
proceeded with great dispatch without allowing the defense time to prepare an
adequate case. Petitioner's rights under the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment were grossly and openly violated without any justification. All of
this was done without any thorough investigation and prosecution of those
immediately responsible for the atrocities, out of which might have come some
proof or indication of personal culpability on petitioner's part. Instead the
loose charge was made that great numbers of atrocities had been committed and
that petitioner was the commanding officer; hence he must have been guilty of
disregard of duty. Under that charge the commission was free to establish whatever
standard of duty on petitioner's part that it desired. By this flexible method
a victorious nation may convict and execute any or all leaders of a vanquished
foe, depending upon the prevailing degree of vengeance and the absence of any
objective judicial review.
At a time like this when emotions are understandably high it is difficult to
adopt a dispassionate attitude toward a case of this nature. Yet
now is precisely the time when that attitude is most essential. While peoples
in other lands may not share our beliefs as to due process and the dignity of
the individual, we are not free to give effect to our emotions in reckless
disregard of the rights of others. We live under the Constitution, which is the
embodiment of all the high hopes and aspirations of the new world. And it is
applicable in both war and peace. We must act accordingly. Indeed, an uncurbed
spirit of revenge and retribution, masked in formal legal procedure for
purposes of dealing with a fallen enemy commander, can do more lasting harm
than all of the atrocities giving rise to that spirit. The people's faith in
the fairness and objectiveness of the law can be seriously undercut by that
spirit. The fires of nationalism can be further kindled. And the hearts of all
mankind can be embittered and filled with hatred, leaving forlorn and
impoverished the noble ideal of malice toward none and charity to all. These
are the reasons that lead me to dissent in these terms.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, dissenting.
Not with ease does one find his views at odds with the Court's in a matter of
this character and gravity. Only the most deeply felt convictions could force
one to differ. That reason alone leads me to do so now, against strong
considerations for withholding dissent.
More is at stake than General Yamashita's fate. There could be no
possible sympathy for him if he is guilty of the atrocities for which his death
is sought. But there can be and should be justice administered according to
law. In this stage of war's aftermath it is too early for Lincoln's great
spirit, best lighted in the Second Inaugural, to have wide hold for the
treatment of foes. It is not too early, it is never too early, for the nation
steadfastly to follow its great constitutional traditions, none older or more
universally protective against unbridled power than due process
of law in the trial and punishment of men, that is, of all men, whether
citizens, aliens, alien enemies or enemy belligerents. It can become too late.
This long-held attachment marks the great divide between our enemies and
ourselves. Theirs was a philosophy of universal force. Ours is one of universal
law, albeit imperfectly made flesh of our system and so dwelling among us.
Every departure weakens the tradition, whether it touches the high or the low,
the powerful or the weak, the triumphant or the conquered. If we need not or
cannot be magnanimous, we can keep our own law on the plane from which it has
not descended hitherto and to which the defeated foes' never rose.
With all deference to the opposing views of my brethren, whose attachment to
that tradition needless to say is no less than my own, I cannot
believe in the face of this record that the petitioner has had the fair trial
our Constitution and laws command. Because I cannot reconcile what has occurred
with their measure, I am forced to speak. At bottom my concern is that we shall
not forsake in any case, whether Yamashita's or another's, the basic standards
of trial which, among other guaranties, the nation fought to keep; that our
system of military justice shall not alone among all our forms of judging be
above or beyond the fundamental law or the control of Congress within its orbit
of authority; and that this Court shall not fail in its part under the
Constitution to see that these things do not happen.
This trial is unprecedented in our history. Never before have we tried and
convicted an enemy general for action taken during hostilities or otherwise in
the course of military operations or duty. Much less have we condemned one for
failing to take action. The novelty is not lessened by the trial's having taken
place after hostilities ended and the enemy, including the accused, had
surrendered. Moreover, so far as the time permitted for our
consideration has given opportunity, I have not been able to find precedent for
the proceeding in the system of any nation founded in the basic principles of
our constitutional democracy, in the laws of war or in other internationally
binding authority or usage.
The novelty is legal as well as historical. We are on strange ground. Precedent
is not all-controlling in law. There must be room for growth, since every
precedent has an origin. But it is the essence of our tradition for judges,
when they stand at the end of the marked way, to go forward with caution
keeping sight, so far as they are able, upon the great landmarks left behind
and the direction they point ahead. If, as may be hoped, we are now to enter
upon a new era of law in the world, it becomes more important than ever before
for the nations creating that system to observe their greatest traditions of
administering justice, including this one, both in their own judging and in
their new creation. The proceedings in this case veer so far from some of our
time-tested road signs that I cannot take the large strides validating them
would demand.
Section I.
It is not in our tradition for anyone to be charged with crime which is defined
after his conduct, alleged to be criminal, has taken place; n1 or in language
not sufficient to inform him of the nature of the offense or to enable him to
make defense. Mass guilt we do not impute to individuals, perhaps in any case
but certainly in none where the person is not charged or shown actively to have
participated in or knowingly to have failed in taking action to
prevent the wrongs done by others, having both the duty and the
power to do so.
It is outside our basic scheme to condemn men without giving reasonable
opportunity for preparing defense; n3 in capital or other serious crimes to
convict on "official documents . . . ; affidavits; . . . documents or
translations thereof; diaries . . . , photographs, motion picture
films, and . . . spapers" n4 or on hearsay, once, twice or thrice removed,
n5 more particularly when the documentary evidence or some of it is prepared ex
parte by the prosecuting authority and includes not only opinion but
conclusions of guilt. Nor in such cases do we deny the rights of confrontation
of witnesses and cross-examination.
Our tradition does not allow conviction by tribunals both authorized and bound
n7 by the instrument of their creation to receive and consider evidence which
is expressly excluded by Act of Congress or by treaty obligation; nor is it in
accord with our basic concepts to make the tribunal, specially constituted for
the particular trial, regardless of those prohibitions the sole and exclusive
judge of the credibility, probative value and admissibility of
whatever may be tendered as evidence.
The matter is not one merely of the character and admissibility of evidence. It
goes to the very competency of the tribunal to try and punish consistently with
the Constitution, the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, and
treaties made under the nation's authority.
All these deviations from the fundamental law, and others, occurred in the
course of constituting the commission, the preparation for trial and defense,
the trial itself, and therefore, in effect, in the sentence imposed. Whether
taken singly in some instances as departures from specific constitutional
mandates or in totality as in violation of the Fifth Amendment's command that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, a trial so vitiated cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
One basic protection of our system and one only, petitioner has had. He has
been represented by able counsel, officers of the army he fought. Their
difficult assignment has been done with extraordinary fidelity, not only to the
accused, but to their high conception of military justice, always to be
administered in subordination to the Constitution and consistent Acts of
Congress and treaties. But, as will appear, even this conceded shield was taken
away in much of its value, by denial of reasonable opportunity for them to
perform their function.
On this denial and the commission's invalid constitution specifically, but also
more generally upon the totality of departures from constitutional norms
inherent in the idea of a fair trial, I rest my judgment that the commission
was without jurisdiction from the beginning to try or punish the petitioner and
that, if it had acquired jurisdiction then, its power to proceed was lost in
the course of what was done before and during trial.
Only on one view, in my opinion, could either of these conclusions be avoided.
This would be that an enemy belligerent in
petitioner's position is altogether beyond the pale of
constitutional protection, regardless of the fact that hostilities had ended
and he had surrendered with his country. The Government has so argued, urging
that we are still at war with Japan and all the power of the military effective
during active hostilities in theatres of combat continues in full force
unaffected by the events of August 14, 1945, and after.
In this view the action taken here is one of military necessity, exclusively
within the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief and his military
subordinates to take in warding off military danger and subject to no judicial
restraint on any account, although somewhat inconsistently it is said this
Court may "examine" the proceedings generally.
As I understand the Court, this is in substance the effect of what has been
done. For I cannot conceive any instance of departure from our basic concepts
of fair trial, if the failures here are not sufficient to produce that effect.
We are technically still at war, because peace has not been negotiated finally
or declared. But there is no longer the danger which always exists before
surrender and armistice. Military necessity does not demand the same measures.
The nation may be more secure now than at any time after peace is officially
concluded. In these facts is one great difference from Ex parte Quirin,…
Punitive action taken now can be effective only for the next war, for purposes
of military security. And enemy aliens, including belligerents, need the
attenuated protections our system extends to them more now than before
hostilities ceased or than they may after a treaty of peace is signed. Ample
power there is to punish them or others for crimes, whether under the laws of
war during its course or later during occupation. There can be no question of
that. The only question is how it shall be done, consistently
with universal constitutional commands or outside their restricting effects. In
this sense I think the Constitution follows the flag.
The other thing to be mentioned in order to be put aside is that we have no
question here of what the military might have done in a field of combat. There
the maxim about the law becoming silent in the noise of arms applies. The
purpose of battle is to kill. But it does not follow that this would justify
killing by trial after capture or surrender, without compliance with laws or
treaties made to apply in such cases, whether trial is before or after
hostilities end.
I turn now to discuss some of the details of what has taken place. My basic
difference is with the Court's view that provisions of the Articles of War and
of treaties are not made applicable to this proceeding and with its ruling
that, absent such applicable provisions, none of the things done so vitiated
the trial and sentence as to deprive the commission of jurisdiction.
My brother MURPHY has discussed the charge with respect to the substance of the
crime. With his conclusions in this respect I agree. My own primary concern
will be with the constitution of the commission and other matters taking place
in the course of the proceedings, relating chiefly to the denial of reasonable
opportunity to prepare petitioner's defense and the sufficiency of the
evidence, together with serious questions of admissibility, to prove an
offense, all going as I think to the commission's jurisdiction.
Necessarily only a short sketch can be given concerning each matter. And it may
be stated at the start that, although it was ruled in Ex parte Quirin, supra,
that this Court had no function to review the evidence, it was not there or
elsewhere determined that it could not ascertain whether conviction is founded
upon evidence expressly excluded by Congress or treaty; nor does
the Court purport to do so now.
Section II.
Invalidity of the Commission's Constitution.
The fountainhead of the commission's authority was General MacArthur's
directive by which General Styer was ordered to and pursuant to which he did
proceed with constituting the commission. The directive was
accompanied by elaborate and detailed rules and regulations prescribing the
procedure and rules of evidence to be followed, of which for present purposes
§ 16, set forth below, is crucial.
Section 16, as will be noted, permits reception of documents, reports,
affidavits, depositions, diaries, letters, copies of documents or other
secondary evidence of their contents, hearsay, opinion evidence and
conclusions, in fact of anything which in the commission's opinion "would
be of assistance in proving or disproving the charge," without any of the
usual modes of authentication.
A more complete abrogation of customary safeguards relating to the proof,
whether in the usual rules of evidence or any reasonable substitute and whether
for use in the trial of crime in the civil courts or military tribunals, hardly
could have been made. So far as the admissibility and probative value of
evidence was concerned, the directive made the commission a law unto itself.
It acted accordingly. As against insistent and persistent objection to the
reception of all kinds of "evidence," oral, documentary and
photographic, for nearly every kind of defect under any of the usual prevailing
standards for admissibility and probative value, the commission not only
consistently ruled against the defense, but repeatedly stated it was bound by
the directive to receive the kinds of evidence it specified, n10 reprimanded
counsel for continuing to make objection, declined to hear
further objections, and in more than one instance during the course of the
proceedings reversed its rulings favorable to the defense, where initially it
had declined to receive what the prosecution offered. Every conceivable kind of
statement, rumor, report, at first, second, third or further hand, written,
printed or oral, and one "propaganda" film were allowed to come in,
most of this relating to atrocities committed by troops under
petitioner's command throughout the several thousand islands of the Philippine
Archipelago during the period of active hostilities covered by the American
forces' return to and recapture of the Philippines.
The findings reflect the character of the proof and the charge. The statement
quoted above n12 gives only a numerical idea of the instances in which ordinary
safeguards in reception of written evidence were ignored. In
addition to these 423 "exhibits," the findings state the commission "has
heard 286 persons during the course of this trial, most of whom have given
eye-witness accounts of what they endured or what they saw."
But there is not a suggestion in the findings that petitioner personally
participated in, was present at the occurrence of, or ordered any of these
incidents, with the exception of the wholly inferential suggestion noted below.
Nor is there any express finding that he knew of any one of the incidents in
particular or of all taken together. The only inferential findings that he had
knowledge, or that the commission so found, are in the statement that the
"crimes alleged to have been permitted by the Accused in violation
of the laws of war may be grouped into three categories" set out below,
n13 in the further statement that "the Prosecution presented
evidence to show that the crimes were so extensive and widespread, both as to
time and area, n14 that they must either have been wilfully permitted
by the Accused, or secretly ordered by" him; and in the conclusion
of guilt and the sentence. (Emphasis added.) Indeed the commission's
ultimate findings n16 draw no express conclusion of knowledge,
but state only two things: (1) the fact of widespread atrocities and crimes;
(2) that petitioner "failed to provide effective control . . . as was required
by the circumstances."
This vagueness, if not vacuity, in the findings runs throughout the
proceedings, from the charge itself through the proof and the findings, to the
conclusion. It affects the very gist of the offense, whether that
was wilful, informed and intentional omission to restrain and control troops known
by petitioner to be committing crimes or was only a negligent failure on his
part to discover this and take whatever measures he then could to stop
the conduct.
Although it is impossible to determine from what is before us whether
petitioner in fact has been convicted of one or the other or of both these
things, n17 the case has been presented on the
former basis and, unless as is noted below there is fatal duplicity, it must be
taken that the crime charged and sought to be proved was only the failure, with
knowledge, to perform the commander's function of control, although the Court's
opinion nowhere expressly declares that knowledge was essential to guilt or
necessary to be set forth in the charge.
It is in respect to this feature especially, quite apart from the reception of
unverified rumor, report, etc., that perhaps the greatest prejudice arose from
the admission of untrustworthy, unverified, unauthenticated evidence which
could not be probed by cross-examination or other means of testing credibility,
probative value or authenticity.
Counsel for the defense have informed us in the brief and at the argument that
the sole proof of knowledge introduced at the trial was in the form of ex parte
affidavits and depositions. Apart from what has been excerpted from the record
in the applications and the briefs, and such portions of the record as I have
been able to examine, it has been impossible for me fully to verify counsel's
statement in this respect. But the Government has not disputed it; and it has
maintained that we have no right to examine the record upon any question
"of evidence." Accordingly, without concession to that view, the
statement of counsel is taken for the fact. And in that state of things
petitioner has been convicted of a crime in which knowledge is an essential
element, with no proof of knowledge other than what would be inadmissible in
any other capital case or proceeding under our system, civil or military, and
which furthermore Congress has expressly commanded shall not be received in
such cases tried by military commissions and other military tribunals.
Moreover counsel assert in the brief, and this also is not denied, that the
sole proof made of certain of the specifications in the bills of
particulars was by ex parte affidavits. It was in relation to this also vital
phase of the proof that there occurred one of the commission's reversals of its
earlier rulings in favor of the defense, n19 a fact in itself conclusive
demonstration of the necessity to the prosecution's case of the prohibited type
of evidence and of its prejudicial effects upon the defense.
These two basic elements in the proof, namely, proof of knowledge of the crimes
and proof of the specifications in the bills, that is, of the atrocities
themselves, constitute the most important instances perhaps, if not the most
flagrant, of departure not only from the express command of Congress against
receiving such proof but from the whole British-American tradition of the
common law and the Constitution. Many others occurred, which
there is neither time nor space to mention.
Petitioner asserts, and there can be no reason to doubt, that by the use of all
this forbidden evidence he was deprived of the right of cross-examination and
other means to establish the credibility of the deponents or affiants, not to
speak of the authors of reports, letters, documents and newspaper articles; of
opportunity to determine whether the multitudinous crimes specified in the
bills were committed in fact by troops under his command or by naval or air
force troops not under his command at the time alleged; to ascertain whether
the crimes attested were isolated acts of individual soldiers or were military
acts committed by troop units acting under supervision of officers; and,
finally, whether "in short, there was such a 'pattern' of" conduct as
the prosecution alleged and its whole theory of the crime and the evidence
required to be made out.
He points out in this connection that the commission based its decision on a
finding as to the extent and number of the atrocities and that
this of itself establishes the prejudicial effect of the affidavits, etc., and
of the denial resulting from their reception of any means of probing the
evidence they contained, including all opportunity for cross-examination. Yet
it is said there is no sufficient showing of prejudice. The effect could not
have been other than highly prejudicial. The matter is not one merely of "rules
of evidence." It goes, as will appear more fully later, to the basic right
of defense, including some fair opportunity to test probative value.
Insufficient as this recital is to give a fair impression of what was done, it
is enough to show that this was no trial in the traditions of the common law
and the Constitution. If the tribunal itself was not strange to them otherwise,
it was in its forms and modes of procedure, in the character and substance of
the evidence it received, in the denial of all means to the
accused and his counsel for testing the evidence, in the brevity and ambiguity
of its findings made upon such a mass of material and, as will appear, in the
denial of any reasonable opportunity for preparation of the defense. Because
this last deprivation not only is important in itself, but is closely related
to the departures from all limitations upon the character of and modes of
making the proof, it will be considered before turning to the important legal
questions relating to whether all these violations of our traditions can be
brushed aside as not forbidden by the valid Acts of Congress, treaties and the
Constitution, in that order. If all these traditions can be so put away, then
indeed will we have entered upon a new but foreboding era of law.
Section III.
Denial of Opportunity to Prepare Defense.
Petitioner surrendered September 3, 1945, and was interned as a prisoner of war
in conformity with Article 9 of the Geneva Convention of July 27,
1929. He was served with the charge on September 25 and put in
confinement as an accused war criminal. On October 8 he was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. On October 29 the trial began and it
continued until December 7, when sentence was pronounced, exactly four years
almost to the hour from the attack on Pearl Harbor.
On the day of arraignment, October 8, three weeks before the trial began,
petitioner was served with a bill of particulars specifying 64 items setting
forth a vast number of atrocities and crimes allegedly committed by troops
under his command. The six officers appointed as defense counsel thus had
three weeks, it is true at the prosecution's suggestion a week longer than they
sought at first, to investigate and prepare to meet all these items and the
large number of incidents they embodied, many of which had occurred in distant
islands of the archipelago. There is some question whether they then
anticipated the full scope and character of the charge or the evidence they
would have to meet. But, as will appear, they worked night and day at the task.
Even so it would have been impossible to do thoroughly, had nothing more
occurred.
But there was more. On the first day of the trial, October 29, the prosecution
filed a supplemental bill of particulars, containing 59 more
specifications of the same general character, involving perhaps as many
incidents occurring over an equally wide area. A copy had been given the
defense three days earlier. One item, No. 89, charged that American soldiers,
prisoners of war, had been tried and executed without notice having been given
to the protecting power of the United States in accordance with the
requirements of the Geneva Convention, which it is now argued, strangely, the
United States was not required to observe as to petitioner's trial.
But what is more important is that defense counsel, as they felt was their
duty, at once moved for a continuance. The application was denied.
However the commission indicated that if, at the end of the prosecution's
presentation concerning the original bill, counsel should "believe they
require additional time . . . , the Commission will consider such a motion at
that time," before taking up the items of the supplemental bill. Counsel
again indicated, without other result, that time was desired at once "as
much, if not more" to prepare for cross-examination "as the
Prosecution's case goes in" as to prepare affirmative defense.
On the next day, October 30, the commission interrupted the prosecutor to say
it would not then listen to testimony or discussion upon the supplemental bill.
After colloquy it adhered to its prior ruling and, in response to inquiry from
the prosecution, the defense indicated it would require two weeks before it
could proceed on the supplemental bill. On November 1 the commission ruled it
would not receive affidavits without corroboration by witnesses on any
specification, a ruling reversed four days later.
On November 2, after the commission had received an affirmative answer to its
inquiry whether the defense was prepared to proceed with an item in the
supplemental bill which the prosecution proposed to prove, it announced:
"Hereafter, then, unless there is no [sic] objection by the Defense, the
Commission will assume that you are prepared to proceed with any items in the
Supplemental Bill." On November 8, the question arose again upon the
prosecution's inquiry as to when the defense would be ready to proceed on the
supplemental bill, the prosecutor adding: "Frankly, sir, it took the War
Crimes Commission some three months to investigate these matters and I cannot
conceive of the Defense undertaking a similar investigation with any less
period of time." Stating it realized "the tremendous task which we
placed upon the Defense" and its "determination to give them the time
they require," the commission again adhered to its ruling of October 29.
Four days later the commission announced it would grant a continuance
"only for the most urgent and unavoidable reasons."
On November 20, when the prosecution rested, senior defense counsel moved for a
reasonable continuance, recalling the commission's indication that it would
then consider such a motion and stating that since October 29 the defense had
been "working day and night," with "no time whatsoever to
prepare any affirmative defense," since counsel had been fully occupied
trying "to keep up with that new Bill of Particulars."
The commission thereupon retired for deliberation and, on resuming its sessions
shortly, denied the motion. Counsel then asked for "a short recess of a
day." The commission suggested a recess until 1:30 in the afternoon.
Counsel responded this would not suffice. The commission stated it felt
"that the Defense should be prepared at least on its opening
statement," to which senior counsel answered: "We haven't had time to
do that, sir." The commission then recessed until 8:30 the following
morning.
Further comment is hardly required. Obviously the burden placed upon the
defense, in the short time allowed for preparation on the original bill, was
not only "tremendous." In view of all the facts, it was an impossible
one, even though the time allowed was a week longer than asked. But
the grosser vice was later when the burden was more than doubled by
service of the supplemental bill on the eve of trial, a procedure which, taken
in connection with the consistent denials of continuance and the commission's
later reversal of its rulings favorable to the defense,
was wholly arbitrary, cutting off the last vestige of adequate chance to
prepare defense and imposing a burden the most able counsel could not bear.
This sort of thing has no place in our system of justice, civil or military.
Without more, this wide departure from the most elementary principles of
fairness vitiated the proceeding. When added to the other denials of
fundamental right sketched above, it deprived the proceeding of any semblance
of trial as we know that institution.
Section IV.
Applicability of the Articles of War.
The Court's opinion puts the proceeding and the petitioner, in so far as any
rights relating to his trial and conviction are concerned, wholly outside the
Articles of War. In view of what has taken place, I think the decision's
necessary effect is also to place them entirely beyond limitation and
protection, respectively, by the Constitution. I disagree as to both
conclusions or effects.
The Court rules that Congress has not made Articles 25 and 38 applicable to
this proceeding. I think it has made them applicable to this and all other
military commissions or tribunals. If so, the commission not only lost all
power to punish petitioner by what occurred in the proceedings. It never
acquired jurisdiction to try him. For the directive by which it was
constituted, in the provisions of § 16, was squarely in conflict with Articles
25 and 38 of the Articles of War and therefore was void.
Article 25 allows reading of depositions in evidence, under prescribed
conditions, in the plainest terms "before any military court or
commission in any case not capital," providing, however, that
"testimony by deposition may be adduced for the defense in capital
cases."… This language clearly and broadly covers every kind of
military tribunal, whether "court" or "commission." It
covers all capital cases. It makes no exception or distinction for any accused.
Article 38 authorizes the President by regulations to prescribe procedure,
including modes of proof, even more all-inclusively if possible, "in cases
before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions, and other
military tribunals." Language could not be more broadly inclusive. No
exceptions are mentioned or suggested, whether of tribunals or of accused
persons. Every kind of military body for performing the function
of trial is covered. That is clear from the face of the Article.
Article 38 moreover limits the President's power. He is so far as practicable
to prescribe "the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of
criminal cases in the district courts of the United States,"
a clear mandate that Congress intended all military trials to conform as
closely as possible to our customary procedural and evidentiary
protections, constitutional and statutory, for accused persons. But there are
also two unqualified limitations, one "that nothing contrary to or
inconsistent with these articles [specifically here Article 25] shall be
so prescribed"; the other "that all rules made in pursuance of this
article shall be laid before the Congress annually."
Notwithstanding these broad terms the Court, resting chiefly on Article 2,
concludes the petitioner was not among the persons there declared to be subject
to the Articles of War and therefore the commission which tries him is not
subject to them. That Article does not cover prisoners of war or war criminals.
Neither does it cover civilians in occupied territories, theatres of military
operations or other places under military jurisdiction within or without the
United States or territory subject to its sovereignty, whether they be neutrals
or enemy aliens, even citizens of the United States, unless they are connected
in the manner Article 2 prescribes with our armed forces, exclusive of the
Navy.
The logic which excludes petitioner on the basis that prisoners of war are not
mentioned in Article 2 would exclude all these. I strongly doubt the Court
would go so far, if presented with a trial like this in such instances. Nor
does it follow necessarily that, because some persons may not be mentioned in
Article 2, they can be tried without regard to any of the limitations placed by
any of the other Articles upon military tribunals.
Article 2 in defining persons "subject to the articles of war" was, I
think, specifying those to whom the Articles in general were applicable. And
there is no dispute that most of the Articles are not applicable to the
petitioner. It does not follow, however, and Article 2 does not provide, that
there may not be in the Articles specific provisions covering
persons other than those specified in Article 2. Had it so provided, Article 2
would have been contradictory not only of Articles 25 and 38 but also of
Article 15 among others.
In 1916, when the last general revision of the Articles of War took place, for
the first time certain of the Articles were specifically made applicable to
military commissions. Until then they had applied only to courts-martial. There
were two purposes, the first to give statutory recognition to the military
commission without loss of prior jurisdiction and the second to give those
tried before military commissions some of the more important protections
afforded persons tried by courts-martial.
In order to effectuate the first purpose, the Army proposed Article 15.
To effectuate the second purpose, Articles 25 and 38
and several others were proposed. But as the Court now construes the
Articles of War, they have no application to military commissions before which
alleged offenders against the laws of war are tried. What the Court holds in
effect is that there are two types of military commission, one to try offenses
which might be cognizable by a court-martial, the other to try war crimes,
and that Congress intended the Articles of War referring in terms
to military commissions without exception to be applicable only to the first
type.
This misconceives both the history of military commissions and
the legislative history of the Articles of War. There is only one kind of
military commission. It is true, as the history noted shows, that what is now
called "the military commission" arose from two separate military
courts instituted during the Mexican War. The first military court, called by
General Scott a "military commission," was given jurisdiction in
Mexico over criminal offenses of the class cognizable by civil courts in time
of peace. The other military court, called a "council of war," was
given jurisdiction over offenses against the laws of war….. During the
Civil War "the two jurisdictions of the earlier commission and council
respectively . . . [were] united in the . . . war-court, for which the
general designation of 'military commission' was retained as the preferable
one."…. Since that time there has been only one type of military
tribunal called the military commission, though it may exercise different kinds
of jurisdiction,… according to the circumstances under which and purposes
for which it is convened.
The testimony of General Crowder is perhaps the most authoritative evidence of
what was intended by the legislation, for he was its most active
official sponsor, spending years in securing its adoption and revision.
Articles 15, 25 and 38 particularly are traceable to his efforts. His concern
to secure statutory recognition for military commissions was equalled by his
concern that the statutory provisions giving this should not restrict their
preexisting jurisdiction. He did not wish by securing additional jurisdiction,
overlapping partially that of the court-martial, to surrender
other. Hence Article 15. That Article had one purpose and one only. It was to
make sure that the acquisition of partially concurrent jurisdiction with
courts-martial should not cause loss of any other. And it was jurisdiction, not
procedure, which was covered by other Articles, with which he and Congress were
concerned in that Article. It discloses no purpose to deal in any way with
procedure or to qualify Articles 25 and 38. And it is clear that General
Crowder at all times regarded all military commissions as being governed by the
identical procedure. In fact, so far as Articles 25 and 38 are concerned, this
seems obvious for all types of military tribunals. The same would appear to be
true of other Articles also, e. g., 24 (prohibiting compulsory
self-incrimination), 26, 27, 32 (contempts), all except the last dealing with
procedural matters.
Article 12 is especially significant. It empowers general courts-martial to try
two classes of offenders: (1) "any person subject to military law,"
under the definition of Article 2, for any offense "made punishable by
these articles"; (2) "and any other person who by the law of war
is subject to trial by military tribunals," not covered by the
terms of Article 2….
Article 12 thus, in conformity with Article 15, gives the general court-martial
concurrent jurisdiction of war crimes and war criminals with military
commissions. Neither it nor any other Article states or indicates there are to
be two kinds of general courts-martial for trying war crimes; yet this
is the necessary result of the Court's decision, unless in the alternative that
would be to imply that in exercising such jurisdiction there is only one kind
of general court-martial, but there are two or more kinds of military
commission, with wholly different procedures and with the result that "the
commander in the field" will not be free to determine whether general court-martial
or military commission shall be used as the circumstances may dictate, but must
govern his choice by the kind of procedure he wishes to have employed.
The only reasonable and, I think, possible conclusion to draw from the Articles
is that the Articles which are in terms applicable to military commissions are
so uniformly and those applicable to both such commissions and to
courts-martial when exercising jurisdiction over offenders against the laws of
war likewise are uniformly applicable, and not diversely according to the
person or offense being tried.
Not only the face of the Articles, but specific statements in General Crowder's
testimony support this view. Thus in the portion quoted above n34 from his 1916
statement, after stating expressly the purpose of Article 15 to preserve
unimpaired the military commission's jurisdiction, and to make it concurrent
with that of courts-martial in so far as the two would overlap, "so that
the military commander in the field in time of war will be at liberty to
employ either form of court that happens to be convenient," he went on to
say: "Both classes of courts have the same procedure," a statement so
unequivocal as to leave no room for question. And his quotation from Winthrop
supports his statement, namely: "Its [i. e., the military commission's]
composition, constitution and procedure follow the analogy of
courts-martial."
At no point in the testimony is there suggestion that there are two types of
military commission, one bound by the procedural provisions of
the Articles, the other wholly free from their restraints or, as the Court
strangely puts the matter, that there is only one kind of commission, but that
it is bound or not bound by the Articles applicable in terms, depending upon
who is being tried and for what offense; for that very difference makes the
difference between one and two. The history and the discussion
show conclusively that General Crowder wished to secure and Congress intended
to give statutory recognition to all forms of military tribunals; to enable
commanding officers in the field to use either court-martial or military
commission as convenience might dictate, thus broadening to this extent the
latter's jurisdiction and utility; but at the same time to preserve its full
preexisting jurisdiction; and also to lay down identical provisions for
governing or providing for the government of the procedure and rules of
evidence of every type of military tribunal, wherever and however constituted.
Finally, unless Congress was legislating with regard to all military
commissions, Article 38, which gives the President the power to "prescribe
the procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial, courts
of inquiry, military commissions, and other military tribunals," takes on
a rather senseless meaning; for the President would have such power only with
respect to those military commissions exercising concurrent jurisdiction with
courts-martial.
All this seems so obvious, upon a mere reading of the Articles themselves and
the legislative history, as not to require demonstration. And all this Congress
knew, as that history shows. In the face of that showing I cannot accept the
Court's highly strained construction, first, because I think it is in plain
contradiction of the facts disclosed by the history of Articles 15, 25 and 38
as well as their language; and also because that construction defeats at least
two of the ends General Crowder had in mind, namely, to secure
statutory recognition for every form of military tribunal and to provide for
them a basic uniform mode of procedure or method of providing for
their procedure.
Accordingly, I think Articles 25 and 38 are applicable to this proceeding; that
the provisions of the governing directive in § 16 are in direct conflict
with those Articles; and for that reason the commission was invalidly
constituted, was without jurisdiction, and its sentence is therefore void.
Section V.
The Geneva Convention of 1929.
If the provisions of Articles 25 and 38 were not applicable to the proceeding
by their own force as Acts of Congress, I think they would still be made
applicable by virtue of the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1929, in
particular Article 63. And in other respects, in my opinion, the petitioner's
trial was not in accord with that treaty, namely, with Article 60.
The Court does not hold that the Geneva Convention is not binding upon the
United States and no such contention has been made in this case. It
relies on other arguments to show that Article 60,
which provides that the protecting power shall be notified in advance of a
judicial proceeding directed against a prisoner of war, and Article 63, which
provides that a prisoner of war may be tried only by the same courts and
according to the same procedure as in the case of persons
belonging to the armed forces of the detaining power, are not properly invoked
by the petitioner. Before considering the Court's view that these Articles are
not applicable to this proceeding by their terms, it may be noted that on his
surrender petitioner was interned in conformity with Article 9 of this
Convention.
The chief argument is that Articles 60 and 63 have reference only
to offenses committed by a prisoner of war while a prisoner of war and not to
violations of the laws of war committed while a combatant. This conclusion is
derived from the setting in which these Articles are placed. I do not agree
that the context gives any support to this argument. The argument is in essence
of the same type as the argument the Court employs to nullify the application
of Articles 25 and 38 of the Articles of War by restricting their own broader
coverage by reference to Article 2. For reasons set forth in the margin, n37 I
think it equally invalid here.
Neither Article 60 nor Article 63 contains such a restriction of meaning as the
Court reads into them. In the absence of any such limitation, it would
seem that they were intended to cover all judicial proceedings, whether
instituted for crimes allegedly committed before capture or later. Policy
supports this view. For such a construction is required for the security of our
own soldiers, taken prisoner, as much as for that of prisoners we take. And the
opposite one leaves prisoners of war open to any form of trial and punishment for
offenses against the laws of war their captors may wish to use, while
safeguarding them, to the extent of the treaty limitations, in cases of
disciplinary offense. This, in many instances, would be to make the treaty
strain at a gnat and swallow the camel.
The United States has complied with neither of these Articles. It did not
notify the protecting power of Japan in advance of trial as Article 60 requires
it to do, although the supplemental bill charges the same failure to petitioner
in Item 89. It is said that, although this may be true, the proceeding is not
thereby invalidated. The argument is that our noncompliance merely gives Japan
a right of indemnity against us and that Article 60 was not intended to give
Yamashita any personal rights. I cannot agree. The treaties made by the United
States are by the Constitution made the supreme law of the land. In the absence
of something in the treaty indicating that its provisions were not intended to
be enforced, upon breach, by more than subsequent indemnification, it is, as I
conceive it, the duty of the courts of this country to insure the nation's
compliance with such treaties, except in the case of political questions. This
is especially true where the treaty has provisions -- such as Article 60 -- for
the protection of a man being tried for an offense the punishment for which
is death; for to say that it was intended to provide for
enforcement of such provisions solely by claim, after breach, of indemnity
would be in many instances, especially those involving trial of nationals of a
defeated nation by a conquering one, to deprive the Articles of all force.
Executed men are not much aided by postwar claims for indemnity. I do not think
the adhering powers' purpose was to provide only for such ineffective relief.
Finally, the Government has argued that Article 60 has no application after the
actual cessation of hostilities, as there is no longer any need for an
intervening power between the two belligerents. The premise is that Japan no
longer needs Switzerland to intervene with the United States to protect the
rights of Japanese nationals, since Japan is now in direct communication with
this Government. This of course is in contradiction of the Government's theory,
in other connections, that the war is not over and military necessity still
requires use of all the power necessary for actual combat.
Furthermore the premise overlooks all the realities of the situation. Japan is
a defeated power, having surrendered, if not unconditionally then under the most
severe conditions. Her territory is occupied by American military forces. She
is scarcely in a position to bargain with us or to assert her rights. Nor can
her nationals. She no longer holds American prisoners of war. Certainly,
if there was the need of an independent neutral to protect her nationals during
the war, there is more now. In my opinion the failure to give the notice
required by Article 60 is only another instance of the commission's failure to
observe the obligations of our law.
What is more important, there was no compliance with Article 63 of the same
Convention. Yamashita was not tried "according to the same procedure as in
the case of persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining Power."
Had one of our soldiers or officers been tried for alleged war crimes, he would
have been entitled to the benefits of the Articles of War. I think that
Yamashita was equally entitled to the same protection. In any event, he was
entitled to their benefits under the provisions of Article 63 of the Geneva
Convention. Those benefits he did not receive. Accordingly, his trial was in
violation of the Convention.
Section VI.
The Fifth Amendment.
Wholly apart from the violation of the Articles of War and of the Geneva
Convention, I am completely unable to accept or to understand the
Court's ruling concerning the applicability of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment to this case. Not heretofore has it been held that any human
being is beyond its universally protecting spread in the guaranty of a fair
trial in the most fundamental sense. That door is dangerous to open. I will
have no part in opening it. For once it is ajar, even for enemy belligerents,
it can be pushed back wider for others, perhaps ultimately for all.
The Court does not declare expressly that petitioner as an enemy belligerent
has no constitutional rights, a ruling I could understand but not accept.
Neither does it affirm that he has some, if but little,
constitutional protection. Nor does the Court defend what was done. I think the
effect of what it does is in substance to deny him all such safeguards. And
this is the great issue in the cause.
For it is exactly here we enter wholly untrodden ground. The safe
signposts to the rear are not in the sum of protections surrounding jury trials
or any other proceeding known to our law. Nor is the essence of the Fifth
Amendment's elementary protection comprehended in any single one of our
time-honored specific constitutional safeguards in trial, though there are some
without which the words "fair trial" and all they connote become a
mockery.
Apart from a tribunal concerned that the law as applied shall be an instrument
of justice, albeit stern in measure to the guilt established, the heart of the
security lies in two things. One is that conviction shall not rest in any
essential part upon unchecked rumor, report, or the results of the
prosecution's ex parte investigations, but shall stand on proven fact; the
other, correlative, lies in a fair chance to defend. This embraces at the least
the rights to know with reasonable clarity in advance of the trial the exact
nature of the offense with which one is to be charged; to have reasonable time
for preparing to meet the charge and to have the aid of counsel in doing so, as
also in the trial itself; and if, during its course, one is taken
by surprise, through the injection of new charges or reversal of rulings which
brings forth new masses of evidence, then to have further reasonable time for
meeting the unexpected shift.
So far as I know, it has not yet been held that any tribunal in our system, of
whatever character, is free to receive such evidence "as in its opinion
would be of assistance in proving or disproving the charge," or,
again as in its opinion, "would have probative value in the mind of a
reasonable man"; and, having received what in its unlimited discretion it
regards as sufficient, is also free to determine what weight may be given to
the evidence received without restraint.
When to this fatal defect in the directive, however innocently made, are added
the broad departures from the fundamentals of fair play in the proof and in the
right to defend which occurred throughout the proceeding, there can be no
accommodation with the due process of law which the Fifth Amendment demands.
All this the Court puts to one side with the short assertion that no question
of due process under the Fifth Amendment or jurisdiction reviewable here is
presented. I do not think this meets the issue, standing alone or in
conjunction with the suggestion which follows that the Court gives no
intimation one way or the other concerning what Fifth Amendment
due process might require in other situations.
It may be appropriate to add here that, although without doubt the directive
was drawn in good faith in the belief that it would expedite the trial and that
enemy belligerents in petitioner's position were not entitled to more, that
state of mind and purpose cannot cure the nullification of basic constitutional
standards which has taken place.
It is not necessary to recapitulate. The difference between the Court's view of
this proceeding and my own comes down in the end to the view, on the one hand,
that there is no law restrictive upon these proceedings other than whatever
rules and regulations may be prescribed for their government by the executive
authority or the military and, on the other hand, that the
provisions of the Articles of War, of the Geneva Convention and the Fifth
Amendment apply.
I cannot accept the view that anywhere in our system resides or lurks a power
so unrestrained to deal with any human being through any process
of trial. What military agencies or authorities may do with our enemies in
battle or invasion, apart from proceedings in the nature of trial and some
semblance of judicial action, is beside the point. Nor has any human being
heretofore been held to be wholly beyond elementary procedural protection by
the Fifth Amendment. I cannot consent to even implied departure from that great
absolute.
It was a great patriot who said:
"He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from
oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will
reach to himself."
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY joins in this opinion.