SPEECH
Given at
CANNABIS
FESTIVA
September
26, 1998
by
Julian Heicklen
Hi. I wish to thank Penn State NORML for the opportunity to speak
to you. I could
tell you all of the reasons why marijuana should be
legalized. However
you know those already. Instead I will speak to you
about the Marijuana
Smoke Outs and the subsequent court proceedings.
A. HISTORY
First let me give you some history. About 3 years ago, I became
aware of the
enormous prison population in the United States. We are now
the number one
police state in the world with 645 persons per 100,000
population incarcerated.
Russia is second with 590. Many Western European
countries run
under 100 incarcerations per 100,000 people.
I became involved with many prison groups. I led a class in Talmud
for the Jewish
prisoners at the local state prison. I became active in the
Pennsylvania
Prison Society, CentrePeace, The Justice Fellowship, and
Project Change
of Centre County. None of these organizations were active
enough for me.
In 1996, I founded a citizens lobby organization called
Smart on Crime.
The purpose of this organization is to reduce the prison
population.
We came to the conclusion that the largest group of people that
should not be
in prison are non-violent drug users. They constitute fully
1/3 of all people
being sentenced to prison at the preset time. I contacted
many federal
and state representatives about decriminalizing drug use. This
was futile.
Even those legislators that agreed with me in part or whole
said that they
would not vote to soften drug laws, because they wanted to
be reelected.
In 1997, I also organized the Libertarian Party of Centre County.
This organization
and Smart on Crime decided that the next approach should
be to go to
the courts and convince a jury to nullify the law. This is an
accepted legal
defense. To get into the courts requires being arrested for
a crime and
having a jury trial. At noon on January 15, 1998, I smoked a
marijuana joint
in front of 100 people at the main university gate. Much to
my surprise,
I was not arrested. I repeated this 3 times at weekly rallies
until an arrest
was made. I then continued the weekly rallies, but did not
smoke. I said
that my goal was accomplished, and that I would not smoke
again as long
as I received a fair, impartial, speedy trial in front of a
jury of my peers.
Very soon, it became apparent that this was not to be the
case. At the
7th rally, I resumed smoking marijuana joints. I have been
arrested 11
times, six for smoking marijuana. See a history of the Smoke
Outs on my home
page at http://www.personal.psu.edu/jph13.
The issue here is not marijuana. Marijuana is the messenger, not
the message.
The issue is whether we will live in freedom or under tyranny.
The most basic
of all human rights is the right to your own body. The
lighted marijuana
weed is the torch of freedom.
B. TRIAL IRREGULARITIES
1. Speedy Trial
In Pennsylvania, a speedy trial is considered to be 6 months if the
defendant is
incarcerated or one year if the defendant is not incarcerated.
I doubt if anyone
considers this to be a speedy trial. How would you like
to spend 6 months
in prison and then be found not guilty? In California, a
speedy trial
is considered to be 30 days. In 1963, I was arrested along
with 260 others
who were sitting in at a racially segregated housing
development
in Torrance CA. We demanded speedy trials. The state said that
it could not
prepare the cases for trial in 30 days. The judge dismissed
the cases.
In Centre County, PA, I was first arrested by summons on February
13, 1998, for
possession of marijuana on February 12, 1998. The preliminary
hearing was
set for March 25, a delay of 40 days. I filed a request for a
speedy trial
and suggested several dates and times during the period of
February 25-March
5, 1998, for a preliminary hearing. The court
administrator
would only move the preliminary hearing to March 18. At the
hearing, dates
were set for arraignment, pre-trial conference, and jury
selection, respectively,
of April 21, May 26, and June 8, 1998. Because I
was going to
Florida, I requested a continuance of the May 26 conference to
June 2. It was
moved to July 17 (actually held on July 28 at my request),
and the jury
selection was moved to August 3, 1998. At jury selection, the
trial date was
set at August 20, 1998 (actually to be held on October 7,
1998, at my
request). Thus the time set by the court for a speedy trial was
from February
13 to August 20, 1998; a delay of 6 months and 7 days. None
of this delay
was caused by my requests for alternate dates.
2. Failure to
Meet on Time
My first preliminary hearing was called for 1:00 PM on March 18,
1998. In the
morning I delivered "Meals on Wheels" to people shut in their
homes. I finished
at 12:30 PM, and traveled from State College to the
courthouse in
Bellefonte, a trip of 25 minutes. I was at the hearing
promptly at
1:00 PM. I had no lunch. Magistrate Alan Sinclair appeared at
1:20 PM and
proceeded with another case. I left the courtroom to eat and go
home. I was
informed that Magistrate Sinclair called my case at 3:00 PM.
When I was not
there, a warrant for my arrest was issued. I was arrested
for failure
to appear about 1 hour later and taken to Magistrate Carmine
Prestia. I explained
to him that I had appeared, but that Magistrate
Sinclair did
not appear, and that the wrong person was arrested. Magistrate
Prestia dropped
the charges and rescheduled my hearing for March 25, 1998.
At that hearing,
Magistrate Sinclair appeared at 1:25 PM and called my case
right away.
At subsequent hearings, I was the first one called.
The failure to meet on time is an indication of lack of
impartiality.
The magistrates think that the defendants are beneath
consideration.
All other professionals meet their clients on time. The
doctors are
the worst, but even they do not keep someone waiting 2 or more
hours. And doctors,
unlike judges, have real emergencies.
3. Failure to
Indict by Grand Jury
Pennsylvania courts do not use grand juries for indictment.
Amendment V
of the U. S. Constitution states that no one can be held for
trial for an
infamous crime without presentment of an indictment by a grand
jury. I am aware
that the U. S. Supreme Court said that this provision of
the U. S. Constitution
applies only to federal crimes and not to state
crimes. It is
a mystery to me that this conclusion was reached.
Nevertheless,
we can assume that it is the law of the land.
My case is somewhat special in that the act that I committed is
deemed to be
crime by both state and federal law. My contention is that it
makes no sense
that the criterion for a fair trial depends on who happened
to make the
arrest. If I had been arrested by federal law enforcement
agents, a grand
jury would have been convened. Therefore I demanded a grand
jury hearing.
Whether or not you accept my argument for a grand jury hearing, I
am entitled
to ask for it at my preliminary hearing. At two preliminary
hearings Magistrate
Bradley Lunsford found me in contempt of court for
making the request.
At my other two preliminary hearing, Magistrates
Sinclair and
Hoffman had no problem with me making the statement.
5. Manufactured
Charges
For all of my six arrests for smoking, the police officers filed
charges of possession
of a small amount of marijuana for personal use. No
mention was
made of possession of paraphernalia or intent to distribute.
For my first
arrest Magistrate Prestia added the made-up charge of
possession of
paraphernalia. At the preliminary hearing, Magistrate
Sinclair bound
me over for trial for possession of both marijuana and
paraphernalia.
District Attorney Ray Gricar added the charge of intent to
distribute for
all six of my cases. I have no idea where he got this idea.
It came entirely
from his imagination. Judge Brown informed the jury at my
jury selection
of August 3, 1998, that I had been charged with possession
of a small amount
of marijuana for personal use and with intent to
distribute.
I objected, but he refused to withdraw the charge. The minds of
the jury members
now have been poisoned with a false charge.
6. Denial of
Defense
Judge Brown has issued an order prohibiting me from using the
defenses of
jury nullification or justification. Both are recognized legal
defenses. The
1790 Constitution of Pennsylvania explicitly states that the
jury has the
right to nullify the law, and the U. S. Supreme Court
repeatedly has
upheld this opinion.
Several state constitutions, including the Georgia Constitution of
1777 and the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 specifically provided that
"the jury shall
be judges of law, as well as fact." But Judge Brown says
that Jury nullification
is not a permissible defense.
In Pennsylvania, Supreme Court Justice James Wilson noted, in his
Philadelphia
law lectures of 1790, that when "a difference in sentiment
takes place
between the judges and jury, with regard to a point of
law,...The jury
must do their duty, and their whole duty; They must decide
the law as well
as the fact." But Judge Brown says that Jury nullification
is not a permissible
defense.
In 1879, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that "the power of
the jury to
be judge of the law in criminal cases is one of the most
valuable securities
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights." But Judge Brown says
that Jury nullification
is not a permissible defense.
John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court stated
in 1789: "The
jury has the right to judge both the law as well as the fact
in controversy."
But Judge Brown says that Jury nullification is not a
permissible
defense.
Samuel Chase, U. S. Supreme Court Justice and signer of the
Declaration
of Independence, said in 1796: "The jury has the right to
determine both
the law and the facts." But Judge Brown says that Jury
nullification
is not a permissible defense.
U. S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said in 1902:
"The jury has
the power to bring a verdict in the teeth of both law and
fact." But Judge
Brown says that Jury nullification is not a permissible
defense.
Harlan F. Stone, the 12th Chief Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court,
stated in 1941:
"The law itself is on trial quite as much as the cause
which is to
be decided." But Judge Brown says that Jury nullification is
not a permissible
defense.
In a 1952 decision (Morissette v United States), the U. S. Supreme
Court recognized
the powers of juries to engage in nullification. The court
stated:
"Had the jury convicted on proper instructions it would be the end
of the matter.
But juries are not bound by what seems inescapable logic to
judges....They
might have refused to brand Morissette as a thief. Had they
done so, that
too would have been the end of the matter."
But Judge Brown
says that Jury nullification is not a permissible defense.
In a 1972 decision (U. S. v Dougherty, 473 F 2nd 1113, 1139), the
Court said:
"The pages of history shine on instances of the jury's exercise
of its prerogative
to disregard instructions of the judge." But Judge Brown
says that Jury
nullification is not a permissible defense.
Likewise, the U. S. Supreme Court in Duncan v Louisiana implicitly
endorsed the
policies behind nullification when it stated: "If the
defendant preferred
the common-sense judgment of the jury to the more
tutored but
less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have
it." But Judge
Brown says that Jury nullification is not a permissible
defense.
In recent years, jury nullification has played a role in the trials
of Mayor Marion
Barry of Washington, DC for drug use, Oliver North for his
role in the
Iran-Contra Affair, and Bernhard Goetz for his assault in a New
York City subway.
But Judge Brown says that Jury nullification is not a
permissible
defense.
A detailed discussion of jury nullification is given on my home
page at http://www.personal.psu.edu/jph13.
Go to my home page and click on
Drugs and Crime.
On that page is a link to Jury Nullification. Incidentally
more detailed
information about the Marijuana Smoke Outs and my trials is
given on the
link to Smoke Outs.
The Jury Nullification article was given to Judge Brown in a motion
that I filed.
Joe Devecka, one of my attorneys, checked all of the cases
mentioned in
my paper, and assured the judge that they were correct.
Judge Brown also has prohibited me from presenting documents giving
information
about marijuana. These documents include commission reports.
7. Denial of
Video Recording
I informed the court administrator that I would have my own camera
man taking video
camera pictures of all court proceedings. The Court
Administrator,
Maxine Ishler, advised me that it was against Pennsylvania
law to have
cameras in the court room. I appealed to the Court in a motion
to ignore this
law, because it conflicts with my right to both a public and
fair trial.
I needed video pictures for appeal purposes, because part of
the testimony
involves visual impressions and witness gestures.
8. Witnesses
Denied
I informed the court that I would have three expert witnesses
testify. These
are:
a. Lester Grinspoon,
Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical
School. Professor
Grinspoon has written several books on Marijuana
b. John Morgan,
Head of the Department of Pharmacology at CCNY Medical
School. Professor
Morgan has made a career of studying the medical effects
of marijuana
and has written and lectured extensively on the subject.
c. William Regelson,
Professor of Oncology at the University of Virginia
Hospitals. Professor
Regelson prescribes marijuana for his chemotherapy
patients, even
though it is a crime to do so.
Resumes and
bibliographies of all three expert witnesses were presented to
Judge Charles
C. Brown, Jr. at the pre-trial conference of July 28, 1998.
He did not look
at the submitted material. He ruled that I could not have
expert witnesses
testify.
I asked for immunity from prosecution for illegal users of medical
marijuana that
would testify on my behalf. Immunity request denied by Judge
Brown.
District Attorney Ray Gricar filed written accusations that I was
charged with
"Intent to distribute" in all 6 cases. No police officer,
magistrate,
or other court official filed such a claim. At the preliminary
hearings, I
was not bound over for trial on those charges. At the
arraignments,
I was not arraigned on those charges. However Judge Brown
repeated those
charges to the Jury after it had been selected on August 3,
1998. I subpoenaed
District Attorney to appear as a defense witness at my
trial of October
7, 1998. He had the subpoena quashed by Judge Brown. This
denies me my
Amendment VI rights of the U. S. Constitution, which states in
part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the rightŠto
be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining
Witnesses in his favorŠ"
9. Consolidation
of Cases
Judge Brown consolidated my first four trials over my oral and
written objections.
The four incidents occurred on four different days in
different police
jurisdictions. The evidence and arresting officers were
different in
these incidents.
10. Jury Rigging
The original jury pool for the August 3 jury selection consisted of
400 persons
from Centre County. Only the names and addresses of the jury
pool were provided
by the Court. Of the population of adults in Centre
County, 11.8%
live in University Park. This means that the expected number
of jury pool
members from University Park is 47. Any number below 35 would
be a statistically
significant deviation (2s). The actual number of
University Park
residents in the jury pool was 4.
At jury selection on August 3, 1998, the venire had been reduced
from 400 to
147. Of these, 142 provided their ages. The expected number of
University Park
Residents is 17. Any number below 8 would be a
statistically
significant deviation (2s). The actual number of University
Park residents
in the venire was 0.
The age distribution of adults (over 18 years of age) is 24.1 %
within the ages
of 18 and 21 and 55.1% within the ages of 18 and 34. For
the 142 people
whose age was listed, the expected values between 18-21 and
18-34 years
of age, respectively, are 34 and 78. Statistically significant
deviations (2s)
occur for numbers below 21 and 62, respectively. The actual
number of individuals
in the respective age groups was 4 and 29.
I had asked for data about sex, race, and religion for each juror,
but this information
was not provided
Before jury selection on August 3, 1998, Judge Brown announced that
the trial date
was set for September 21, which was Rosh Hashanah. I
objected. At
the pre-trial conference, I had informed both the court
administrator
and Judge Brown that date was unacceptable. The court
administrator
said that was too bad; the date would be September 21, 1998.
Judge Brown
asked all members of the venire to excuse themselves if this
date was inconvenient
for them. Of course all the Jews were excused. Three
hours after
the completion of jury selection, Judge Brown changed the trial
date to October
7, 1998.
For jury selection, Judge Brown asked the questions from lists
provided by
the prosecution and defense. Normal procedure in this court is
to allow the
attorneys to ask their own questions. I provided 15 questions,
of which Judge
Brown covered 10 in his questioning. Among the questions
that Judge Brown
did not cover were questions regarding attitudes and
experiences
with Jews as well as involvement with pro-drug prohibition
organizations.
My jury of 14 members contains no residents of University Park, no
Jews, no persons
of color, and no-one between the ages of 18-21. There are
only two members
below the age of 35, even though the Centre County
population is
55.1% below this age. I do not know if there is an active
anti-Semite
or active drug prohibitionist on the jury.
11. Trial Length
At the pre-trial conference of July 28, Judge Brown set the length
of the trial
at 1/2 day without consulting either the prosecution or
defense staffs.
My opening statement is several hours. I have a 7-hour
videotape of
the Marijuana Smoke Outs to present. I intend detailed
cross-examinations
of the prosecution witnesses. I have 23 of my own
witnesses to
question, and I have a closing statement to make. I will not
be allowed to
present my case at all.
12. Denial of
Evidence
The evidence seized by the police was sent to the State Crime
Laboratory for
testing. The complete reports given to me were: "The
contents of
item 1.1 weighed (amount given) and contained marihuana
(Schedule I)."
Repeatedly, I have asked for all supporting information,
documentation,
laboratory reports, and data for both the test and control
samples. Specifically,
I need to have the dates on which the tests were
run, descriptions
of the tests with specific operating conditions, which
compounds were
tested, and the results of the test (not the operator's
conclusion).
Further I need the dates on which the reports were written,
the dates on
which they were sent to the police, which police officers
received them
with dates of receipt, the dates on which they were forwarded
to the District
Attorney, and the dates on which they were received by the
District Attorney's
office.
I have received none of this information.
13. Denial of
Transcripts
At the pre-trial conference of July 28, 1998, I provided my own
court reporter,
as I had done at the preliminary hearings. I was informed
that she would
not be allowed to record the proceedings of either the
pre-trial conference
or jury selection, because the Court had provided its
own court reporter.
I was assured that I would be able to obtain
transcripts
of the proceedings.
On September 18, 1998, I contacted the court reporter about
obtaining transcripts
of the pre-trial conference and jury selection. She
informed me
that she was too busy to provide them until after the trial
date of October
7, 1998.
I have filed a motion with the Judge requesting the transcripts,
but no action
has been taken as of September 24, 1998.
What can you do to rectify this situation? The price of justice is
eternal publicity.
Write letters to every publication that you can. Please
attend my trial
on October 7, 1998, at 9:00 AM at the Centre County
Courthouse in
Bellefonte. Thank you.