UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Case # 10 CR 1154 (KMW)
DEFENDANT’S ADDENDUM TO
REPLY TO GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN RESPONSE TO
Counsel Pro Se
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. U. S. Constitution
1. Amendment IX of the
U. S. Constitution states:
“The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.”
2. Amendment X of the
U. S. Constitution states:
“The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States, or to the people”
B. Jury Rights
3. The U. S.
Constitution does not discuss, or even mention, the duties and rights
of the jury. Therefore those duties and rights are defined by the
4. There is NO FEDERAL
Constitutional grant of power to government to determine the
law in jury criminal cases.
5. Thus, as the
federal government is a limited government, there is NO FEDERAL
duty to the Federal Constitution requires him to assert the federal
limits when opposed to state's rights.
7. In New Jersey,
where the Defendant resides and is a citizen, the New Jersey
Constitution Article I states:
§ 6. “Every
person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall
be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.
In all prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in
evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives
and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury
shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.”
(Emphasis of last phrase by the Defendant.)
8. In New York, where
the incidents are alleged to have occurred and where Defendant is a
citizen by virtue of birth, the New York Constitution, Article I states:
9. “ The right of trial by jury shall remain
10. “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury; to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel in his
member of this state shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the
rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law
of the land, or the judgment of his or her peers.”
C. Jury Trial
9. The U. S.
Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in ALL criminal cases
in both Article III §2 and Amendment VI (emphasis added by
10. In New Jersey,
where the Defendant resides, the New Jersey Constitution, Article I,
“Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate
§ 8 “Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his
or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions or
indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury;
and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous
is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to
determine the law and the fact.” (Amended by vote of the people
November 6, 2001. Emphasis of last phrase by the Defendant.)
“§ 9. The right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the Legislature may
authorize the trial of civil causes by a jury of six persons. The
Legislature may provide that in any civil cause a verdict may be
rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury. The Legislature may
authorize the trial of the issue of mental incompetency without a
11. In New York,
where the incidents are alleged to have occurred, the New York
Constitution, Article I states:
§ 10. “In
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury; to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor;
and to have the assistance of counsel in his defense.”
§2. “Trial by jury in
all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional
provision shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be
waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed
by law. The legislature may provide, however, by law, that a verdict
may be rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury in any civil
case. A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal
cases, except those in which the crime charged may be punishable by
death, by a written instrument signed by the defendant in person in
open court before and with the approval of a judge or justice of a
court having jurisdiction to try the offense. The legislature may enact
laws, not inconsistent herewith, governing the form, content, manner
and time of presentation of the instrument effectuating such
waiver.” (Amended by Constitutional Convention of 1938 and
approved by vote of the people November 8, 1938.)
citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law
shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the
press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for libels, the
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to
the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published
with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be
acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and
the fact. "(Amended by vote of the people November 6, 2001.)
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this
state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race,
color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his or
her civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or
institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the
state.” (New. Adopted by Constitutional Convention of 1938 and
approved by vote of the people November 8, 1938; amended by vote of the
people November 6, 2001.)
II. UNITED STATES STATUTES
12. Title 18 U.S.C.
§ 241: Conspiracy against rights states:
“If two or more persons
conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any
State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so
exercised the same;
13. Title 18 U.S.C.
§242: Deprivation of rights under cover of law states:
If two or more persons
go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with
intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right
or privilege so secured - They shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from
the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include
kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an
attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, they
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or
for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.”
“Whoever, under color of
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects
any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or
District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such
person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are
prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily
injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or
if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a
dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results
from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts
include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or
an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill,
shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or
for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.”
III. FURTHER COMMENTS ON THE U.
S. ATTORNEY’S RESPONSE
14. The United States
Attorney’s reply admits on page 9 that a Court may try to prevent
improper nullification, thus admitting that when nullification is
within the province of the jury as trier of fact, the Court has no
power and the United States no interest or authority in seeking
otherwise (United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489,494(D. C. Cir.
1983) deeming nullification to be in essence a decision by the jury, ultra vires...
15. In Chinese, the
terms "power" and "right" are essentially the same: “quan+li
quan+li” equal “right+power right+interest.”
16. Is the U.S.
Attorney arguing it would be OK to distribute information about the
"power" of nullification, that stated there was no "right" to use of
the "power”? Is that not a distinction without a difference?
17. Is the U. S.
Attorney comparing the indictment to one for seditious speech? Amazing!
18. It has been
decades since there was sedition indictment in the United States.
19. The U. S. Attorney
is arguing that blog statements support their theory and constitute
evidence in the matter.
20. On page 50
(actually page 47 in Defendant’s copy) of the Response
Memorandum, the U. S, Attorney admits a jury has a "power" of
21. On pages
50–51 (actually page 47–48 in Defendant’s copy) the
U. S. Attorney seeks to forbid a jury because Defendant might represent
himself and advocate his own defense theory, thus seeking to deny him
the right to represent himself as by statute authorized.
22. On the contrary,
Defendant plans to argue forcefully to uphold the law: that silly
little law of freedom of speech.
IV. THE DE LA BECKWITH CASE
23. The prosecutor's
statements as to the de la Beckwith case are historically
24. That was almost
certainly not a jury nullification case.
Defendant’s Reply to the U. S. Attorney’s Response, he
pointed out that there was not an impartial jury.
26. An even more
compelling explanation is given by Clay S. Conrad, "Jury Nullification:
The Evolution of a Doctrine," Carolina Academic Press (1998) in a
lengthy explanation where 2 police officers testified under oath that
de la Beckwith was elsewhere when Medgar Evers was killed.
27. According to
Conrad there was lots of disputed evidence.
28. In fact, the
surprising thing given the evidence admitted is that de la Beckwith was
not acquitted outright.
V. ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTES
29. It is
clear that U. S. Attorney Preet Bharara, Assistant U. S. Attorney
Rebecca Mermelstein, and the two undercover agents will be defendants
in any prosecution proceedings. Possibly Attorney General Eric
Holder and U. S. District Court Judge Kimba Wood may also be defendants.
30. Ordinarily U. S.
attorneys and judges have immunity to prosecution. However 18
U.S.C. §242 specifically revokes that protection for the
violations stated above
31. It is not clear
who is to enforce the above statutes, since the crimes are allegedly
being committed by the U. S. Attorneys, who ordinarily would be the
prosecutors, but in this case would be the defendants.
32. Likewise, if a
judge is involved, even if not a defendant, there would be a conflict
of interest for the judiciary to officiate.
33. Perhaps the U.S.
Congress should decide, as if it were an impeachment proceeding, which
in fact it would be.
34. Another, or
additional, alternative is to obtain a state court order to the State
Department of Justice that the State intervene on behalf of the State
Constitution and the People of the State under the State Constitution.
VI. FACTUAL ERRORS BY THE
Government’s opposition to this jury trial would, perhaps, be
more persuasive if it was at least accurate, but it is not.
35. The government,
while entitled to its own opinion, is not entitled to its own facts,
and fabricating a non-existent history in order to attempt to persuade
this Honorable Court is not something that should go unnoticed, and is
not something that this or any other Court should tolerate.
36. Take, for
instance, the Government’s claim that the two hung juries in the
trials of Byron De La Beckwith were the result of jury nullification.
See Gov’t Response, Pg. 7.
37. The Government
ignores the fact that at that first trial, several witnesses –
including police officers – testified that they had seen Beckwith
elsewhere the night of Medgar Evers’ murder. See Maryanne
Vollers, Ghosts of Mississippi, 190-191 (1995).
38. There were
unanswered questions regarding Beckwith’s ties to the murder
weapon, Id. at 172-178, and a defense witness contradicted claims that
Beckwith’s car was parked at a nearby restaurant, Id. at 186-187.
39. As one juror
stated, "there were too many contradictions in the thing." See Adam
Nossiter, Of Long Memory: Mississippi and the Murder of Medgar Evers,
40. It is also
interesting that in the Beckwith case, the State, through it’s
"Sovereignty Commission," conducted jury analysis and investigation for
the defense -- surreptitiously. See Vollers, supra, at 264.
41. In fact the
prosecutor in those two 1964 trials, Bill Wallers, was a renowned
segregationist – who went on to be elected Governor. See Reed
Massengill, Portrait of a Racist, 180-181 (1991).
42. One can honestly
question whether he "threw the case" in order to further his own
political ambitions – it is difficult to imagine that a
prosecutor who put Beckwith in prison would have much chance at
election to higher office in 1960's Mississippi, during a time when few
African-Americans dared exercise their right to vote.
43. Yet the Government
presumes that the Beckwith cases resulted in hung juries due to jury
nullification – in spite of the fact that there was ample room
for reasonable doubt in the actual testimony presented.
44. Any review of the
historical literature surrounding the trial would lead to the belief
that some of the jurors believed that evidence – and others did
45. Yet it is easier
to scapegoat the jury (see Clay Conrad, Scapegoating the Jury, 7
Cornell Jrl. Law and Pub. Pol’y 7 (1997)) than it is to actually
examine the historical record.
Government’s speculation that Roy Bryant and J.W. Milam were
acquitted of the murder of Emmett Till due to jury nullification is
47. An examination of
the record shows that Bryant and Milam were tried before an all-white
jury in a county that was two/thirds African-American; that black
reporters (and even Detroit Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr.) were
welcomed into the courtroom by the Sheriff’s calls of "Hello,
Niggers," and that the prosecution never attempted to move the case out
of virulently Tallahatchie County (calling into question his sincerity
in the rest of the prosecution).
48. The local Sheriff,
Harold Clarence Strider, testified that the body was not that of Emmett
Till, and refused to do any further investigative work for the
prosecution. See Stephen J. Whitfield, A Death in the Delta: The Story
of Emmett Till, 30-43 (1988).
49. Clearly, every
aspect of the trial (every witness against Bryant and Milam was black;
every witness for the defense was white) encouraged racism by the jury.
50. Racism during this
trial was introduced not by the jurors, but by government officials at
51. Perhaps, if the
Government was to look at the actual historical facts behind examples
they rely on, their own opposition to the exercise of jury
nullification would evaporate.
52. Indeed, it is
curious that the Government insists that, "no legal system could long
survive" if juries retained the option of exercising their
nullification prerogative (Government Memorandum, p. 8) flies in the
face of the fact that the Anglo-American legal system has survived for
nearly eight hundred years since the passage of the Magna Carta in 1215
– and that jurors have retained their nullification prerogative
for at least this length of time.
53. It would seem that
nearly eight hundred years would be considered a long period of
survival for any legal system – the Government’s
54. It cannot be
gainsaid that, at its root, this is a free speech case. Defendent
believes his speech is protected political speech under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
55. He believes that
the operation of American courtrooms is a legitimate political issue,
and that American juries have a legitimate political role.
56. He believes that
it is a travesty of justice that more than 2 million Americans languish
behind bars, often for non-violent, non-property crimes that are "malum
prohibitum," not "malum per se."
57. He believes that
juries have a legitimate role in bringing the criminal justice system
back in line with the beliefs of the public. He shares these beliefs
with millions of Americans.
58. The Government
believes that advocating jury nullification is a criminal act if the
advocacy could perchance reach a present or future juror.
59. This would
necessarily mean that the only people this political message could be
communicated to would be the hopelessly insane, those with felony
records, illegal aliens ineligible for citizenship, and others who for
one reason or another are permanently ineligible for jury duty.
60. It would mean that
such advocacy could only be tolerated if it could effectively not be
61. As a free speech
case, this case should be heard by a jury.
juries have been uniquely suited for determining the limits of the
government’s power to suppress free speech ever since the days of
the Leveller John "Free Born John" Lilburne and before.
63. Lilburne in fact
was the first to explicitly argue that jurors were judges of the law as
well as the fact, during his 1649 trial for high treason. See Thomas
Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the
English Criminal Trial Jury 1200-1800 (1985); The Trial of Lt.-Colonel
John Lilburne at the Guildhall of London, for High Treason,
Howell’s State Trials 4:1269 (1649).
64. The Levellers,
whose Agreement of the People was in many ways a precursor to the
Constitution of the United States, see Colin Rhys Lowell, English
Constitutional and English History, 338 (1962), have been credited with
formulating "virtually all the ideas of the American Constitution and
nineteenth -century democracy, including the theory of a written
constitution and reserved powers, although the ideas were too new to
gain widespread support immediately." M.N. Knapper, Constitutional and
Legal History of England, 436 (1942).
65. The ideas of the
Leveller’s should therefore be given some weight in determining
the role of the Jury under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
66. Certainly, the
case of William Penn and William Mead (The Tryal of Wm. Penn and Wm.
Mead for Causing a Tumult... Howell’s State Trials, 6:951 (1670)
was as much a free speech, as a freedom of religion, case –
although today both would be covered under the First Amendment.
67. They were tried
for preaching in Grace Church Street, London to a meeting of three to
four hundred Quakers after the group had been locked out of their
meeting-house by the police: in 1670, the Quaker religion was banned by
the Conventicles Act.
68. The jury
eventually acquitted both Penn and Mead, after enduring several days
without food, drink, tobacco or toilet facilities.
69. The judges
believed that this verdict amounted to what we would now call "jury
70. For their verdict,
the jurors were fined and sentenced to prison until their fines were
71. Eight of the
jurors paid their fines; four went to prison and pursued a Writ of
Habeas Corpus challenging their fines. See Bushell’s Case,
Howell’s State Trials 6:999 (1670). The Writ was successful:
Bushell’s Case determined, once and for all, that a juror cannot
be punished for his or her vote. That is still good law today.
Case ushered in what historian John M. Beattie has referred to as "the
heroic age of the English jury," in which "trial by jury emerged as the
principal defense of English liberties." See J.M. Beattie, London
Juries in the 1690's, 214, from J.S. Cockburn and T.A. Green, Eds.,
Twelve Good Men and True (1988).
73. Seditious Libel
cases became the focus of the inevitable conflict between the
government and juries, as the Crown attempted to isolate juries to
determining merely the fact of publication, while the judge was to
determine whether the publication was libelous.
74. Many cases found
the bench and the jury at loggerheads, as juries stubbornly insisted on
returning general verdicts of "Not Guilty" in seditious libel cases
such as Rex v. Harris, Howell’s State Trials, 7:925 (1680) and
Rex v. Care, Howell’s State Trials 7:1111 (1680).
75. What is curious is
that during this period, pamphlets – not essentially different
from those this Defendant stands accused of circulating – were
circulated widely, as Penn and Lilburne also had done. Some of these
pamphlets would include Harris, Twenty Four Sober Queries Offered to be
Seriously Considered by all Juries in City and Country (1680); Sir John
Hawles The Englishman’s Right: A Dialogue Between a Barrister at
Law and a Jury-Man, (1680), Care, English Liberties: or the Free Born
Subject’s Inheritance, A Guide to Juries, Setting Forth their
Antiquity, Power and Duty (1699), first published as A Guide to English
Juries (1682), Lord John Somers, The Security of Englishmen’s
Lives or the Trust, Power and Duty of the Grand Jurys of England
(1681), and Sir John Hawles, The Grand-Jury-Man’s Oath and Office
Explained, and the Rights of English-Men Asserted (1680).
76. It would appear
that pamphlets of the sort the Government complains of herein have been
in circulation for nearly five-hundred years! Sir John Hawles wrote
“As juries have ever been
vested with such power by Law, so to exclude them from, or disseize
them of the same, were utterly to defeat the end of their institution.
For then if a person should be Indicted for doing any common innocent
act, if it but be clothed and disguised in the Indictment with the name
of Treason, or some other high crime, and prov’d by Witnesses to
have been done by him, the Jury though satisfied in Conscience that the
fact is not such offense as ‘tis called, yet because (according
to this fond opinion) they have no power to judge of the law, and the
fact charg’d is fully prov’d, they should at this rate be
bound to find him guilty. And being so found, the Judge pronounce
sentence upon him; and he finds a convicted Traytor, &c. by his
peers. And thus a certain Physician boasted, that he had kill’d
one of his patients with the best method in the world; So here we
should find an innocent man hang’d, drawn, and quartered, and all
according to law.” Sir John Hawles, The Englishman’s
Right, p. 12.
77. It would appear
this Defendant would be no less at risk for having circulated copies of
Sir John’s pamphlets. Yet even the English, in the peak days of
the Bloody Codes, never saw fit to prosecute anyone for circulating any
of the pamphlets listed herein!
78. The primary free
speech case in Colonial New York was that of John Peter Zenger, a
German printer responsible for producing the New York Weekly Journal.
Rex v. Zenger, Howell’s State Trials 17:675 (1735).
Journal had published numerous pieces critical of William Cosby, the
royally appointed Colonial Governor of New York, and of his
appointments to the Supreme Court of New York.
80. Unable to
establish the authorship of the articles, the Attorney General sought
to convict Zenger of Seditious Libel. Unable to obtain an indictment
from a Grand Jury, the Attorney General was forced to proceed by
81. Zenger was
represented at trial by Andrew Hamilton, the only American admitted to
the prestigious Inns of Court in London, and the original Philadelphia
82. Hamilton was also
the family lawyer for the William Penn family, and was one of the
architects responsible for designing the building which is now known as
Independence Hall. Yet he argued that:
“I know [the jury] have
the right, beyond all dispute, to determine both the law and the fact;
and where they do not doubt of the law, they ought to do so. This of
leaving it to the judgment of the Court, whether the words are libelous
or not, in effect renders juries useless (to say no worse) in many
danger is great, in proportion to the mischief that may happen through
our too great credulity. A proper confidence in a court is commendable;
but as the verdict (whatever it is) will be yours, you ought to refer
no part of your duty to the direction of other persons. If you should
be of opinion, that there is no falsehood in Mr. Zenger’s papers,
you will, nay (pardon me for the expression) you ought to say so;
because you don’t know whether others (I mean the Court) may be
of that opinion. It is your right to do so, and there is much depending
upon your resolution, as well as upon your integrity.”
83. The jury acquitted, and the transcript of the case not published
and became one of the best read books in Colonial America and,
according to one recent edition, was "the most famous publication in
America" during that period. See James Alexander, A Brief Narrative on
the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger, Stanley Katz, ed., 37 (2nd Ed.
84. And what was the
final outcome of this battle royale between bench and jury in seditious
libel cases? The jury eventually prevailed, in the passage of Mr.
Fox’s Libel Act in 1792, which established that the determination
of whether a writing was libelous was to be left to the jury. St. 32.
Geo. III c 60 (1792). Mr. Fox personally argued for the bill on the
"[I]f a power was vested in any
person, it was surely meant to be exercised"; that ‘there was a
power vested in the jury to judge the law and fact, as often as they
were united, and, if the jury were not to be understood to have a right
to exercise that power, the constitution would never have intrusted
them with it;’ ‘but they knew it was the province of the
jury to judge of law and fact, and this was the case, not of murder
only, but of felony, high and of every other criminal
indictment;’ and that ‘it must be left in all cases to a
jury to infer the guilty of men, and an English subject could not lose
his life but by a judgment of his peers.’
Sparf et al. v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 136 (1895), citing 29 Parl.
Hist. 564, 565, 597. Fox’s Libel Act represents a clear case in
which jurors forced the Government of England to change what had been
considered an uncontroversial legal rule supported by a long line of
precedent, and establishes the importance of juries in free speech
cases such as this.
86. Similarly, herein,
only a jury can dispassionately determine the guilt or innocence of
Defendant; this Honorable Court’s verdict will never carry the
authority that the verdict of a jury would carry.
VII. THE NEED FOR A
87. For this Court to
determine for itself to what extent an individual can advocate for
juries to act independently will never carry the moral weight that the
verdict of a jury would necessarily carry.
88. This Court will
necessarily be seen as less than neutral in a case deciding whether an
individual could communicate to people eligible for jury duty that they
may vote according to their conscience if they believe, for whatever
reason, that a conviction in the case before them would be unjust.
89. It could be viewed
merely as a judge "protecting her own turf," and would never carry the
moral weight that the verdict of a fairly selected jury would carry.
90.The simple fact is
that everybody who makes their living in a courtroom is, to some
extent, self-involved in a case of this nature. It is impossible for
this Court, or any Court, to be entirely dispassionate (or perhaps,
more importantly, to be seen as entirely dispassionate) in this case.
importantly than that legal cases be resolved is the need for the
general public to believe that they were resolved fairly – that
confidence is crucial to the stability of the legal system; to the
willingness of potential jurors to appear for jury duty; for people to
turn their problems to the courts and not to resort to self-help; and
for individuals to be motivated to follow and respect the law.
92. Then these
proceedings will engender respect for the law because, as Justice Louis
Brandeis observed, "for the law to be respected it first must be
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Defendant certifies, under penalty of perjury, that DEFENDANT’S ADDENDUM TO REPLY TO
GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S
MOTIONS was sent by certified U. S. mail on December 6, 2011,
to the following:
Clerk, U. S. District Court, Southern District of New York, 500 Pearl
Street, New York, New York, 10007
Judge Kimba Wood, U. S. District Court, Southern District of New York,
U. S. Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007
Assistant S. Attorney,
Rebecca Mermelstein, S. D. N. Y., U. S. Courthouse, 300 Quarropas
Street, White Plains, NY 10601
U S. Federal Public
Defender Sabrina Shroff, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., Southern
District, 52 Duane Street–10th Floor, New York, NY 10007
Attorney Adam Sudbury,
404 E. Central Boulevard, # 307, Orlando, FL 30801–1923
Mark Schmidter, 3609
Shader Road, Orlando, FL 32808
Clay S. Conrad, 11767
Katy Freeway, Houston, TX 77079
Counsel Pro Se