AQUINAS ON THE NAMES OF GOD by Gary L. Morella
he ultimate aim of metaphysics is knowledge of God as the human mind can
acquire. Aquinas uses analogous names to give an account of the divine
attributes such as wisdom, justice, mercy, being, one, true, good, etc. He
asks how such terms can be common to God and creature. The reason for this is
that we name things as we know them with our first knowledge being a function
of the sensible things around us. Since there is no language that is proper to
God, our knowledge of God is indirect gained from the knowledge of creatures
whose language is extended to talk of God.
Aquinas distinguishes three categories of divine names: the negative, the
relative, and the affirmative in order to see how unlike the things of our
immediate experience God is. Negative terms like infinite (not finite),
timeless (not temporal), incorporeal, immobile, and immaterial are used to
express this by denying of God the limiting features of His effects. Terms
like Lord and Creator are said of God because of a real relation of creatures
to Him. There are certain things that we affirm of God to which the doctrine
of analogous names applies in that God is good, just, wise and loving which are
learned in speaking about human beings with the same qualities. We recognize
that in applying analogous names to God, it is the perfection of these that we
have in mind, not the limited way in which they are applied to man or
creatures. This is necessary because God is "Perfect Simplicity" versus Man
being "Corrupted Complexity", i.e., the Former is "All-everything"; the latter
is "all-nothing." Thus, any of the aforementioned affirmative terms can be
said to be analogically common to God and man with the first condition of
analogous names met as there is a plurality of meanings which are partly the
same and partly different. In regard to the second condition according to
which the plurality of meanings of analogous terms make an ordered set with one
taking priority over the others, the controlling meaning of these terms is
their application to man. It's from this meaning that variations are
introduced in order to make the terms applicable to God. For example, likeness
and equality are said of God not because there is quality and quantity in Him,
but because we predicate of God that which in us signifies quality and
quantity, as when we call God great, wise, etc. Boethius said that when
categories other than relation are used in divine predication, they all change
into substance like "just" which, although it seems to signify a quality,
signifies substance, and similarly "great" and other such descriptors. But
these names mentioned are said of creatures by way of participation. When they
are used to refer to God as the First Cause, they must be said of God
essentially since they signify His Divine Substance - not perfectly according
as it is, but rather imperfectly as it is understood by us. That is why the
name "He Who Is" belongs especially to God because it doesn't determine any
form of God but signifies existence indeterminately.
The controlling feature of analogous names can be seen as follows. The names
we apply to God express God Himself so far as we know Him. Even though our
natural knowledge of God's perfection is acquired by considering the
perfections of creatures, it justifies our names for God. We realize that
these perfections of creatures are all in God as First Cause since it's God Who
bestows perfections on creatures and, as such, He must have them in Himself to
bestow. Hence, when we use a name expressing a perfection as a name for God,
this name is applied to God Himself in His essence and substance. Terms or
names which express perfections such as life, knowledge, wise, good, apply
primarily to God, and secondarily to creatures. But in our human use of such
terms, the controlling feature, they refer primarily to creatures since our
knowledge of perfection, and, in fact, all our knowledge begins with the
knowledge of creatures. We rise from this knowledge of creature perfections to
the knowledge of infinite perfection.
Names of God such as Creator, Preserver, Provider, involve a relation between
creatures and God. For creatures, this is a real relation as they depend
essentially upon God Who, if He forgot them for but a nanosecond, would cause
them to cease to exist. God, on the other hand, in no way whatsoever depends on
creatures. God would be God in complete and infinite perfection regardless of
whether He created anything to preserve and provide for, in which case the
names Creator, Preserver, Provider, Protector et al. wouldn't actually apply to
God. The distinction is that the names or terms expressing the relation of God
to creatures don't apply to God eternally as indicating His Essence, but
temporally as expressing the dependence of creatures on God, i.e., we more
properly talk of creatures related to God as opposed to vice-versa in this
context. It follows on the supreme simplicity of God that infinite relations
exist between creatures and Him, insofar as He produces creatures different from
Himself, but like Him in some way. Formally, although God is not in the same
genus as creature, excluding univocal connotations as though contained in a
genus, He is in every genus as its principle. On that basis we say that there
can be a relation between creature and God as between the caused and The Cause.
Aquinas in ST Ia, Q13, A2 addresses whether any name can be applied to God
substantially. He says that the negative names applied to God signifying His
relation to creatures manifestly don't at all signify His substance, but
rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to
something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to God. This is
illustrative of the fact that the nonexistence of a formal language for God
necessitates a comparison between God and His creation by showing the distance
between Something "All-everything" and something "all-nothing." In regard to
the affirmative names for God, Aquinas says that these names signify the divine
substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of
a full representation of Him. The names signify the divine substance in an
imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say,
"God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or, "God is
not evil;" but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures,
pre-exists in God, in a more excellent and higher way." Again, the controlling
order of analogous names can be seen here as creatures to God.
In regard to univocal and equivocal predication, Aquinas says that whatever is
predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is
predicated equivocally. Peter Kreeft in the Summa of the Summa notes that if
Aquinas held that terms could be univocally predicated of God and creatures
i.e., mean the same thing when used to describe God and creatures as
predicates, he would have an anthropomorphic conception of God and a
rationalistic conception of the human mind. If he held that all terms
predicated of God and creatures were equivocal, he would be agnostic about God
and skeptical about the human mind. Analogical predication fits between these
two extremes. Univocal terms about God are negative, and positive terms about
God are analogical. Per Kreeft, "equivocal" is used in this article in a broad
sense meaning simply "not-univocal." "Equivocal" here can include
"analogical." We continue with Aquinas's observation that no name belongs to
God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures. For example, wisdom in
creatures is a quality but not in God. A different genus changes an essence
since the genus is part of the definition with the same applying to other
things. Thus, whatever is said of God and creatures is predicated equivocally.
Aquinas magnifies the distance between God and creatures by stating that God
is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But
this distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them
impossible as in the case of those having different genera. The conclusion is
that much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures, and
so only equivocal predication is applicable to them.
Maritain, in the Degrees of Knowledge, tackles this distance by observing that
our knowledge of God doesn't proceed merely via intellection by analogy but
adds that this analogy is uncontaining, uncircumscriptive. He describes the
deity, the Divine Essence considered in Itself, as infinitely more above the
angels than is the angelic essence above bodies. Concepts and names which
designate perfections belonging to the transcendental order, belong to God
intrinsically and in their proper sense, they don't fade away, they don't fly
to pieces but rather retain their proper significance when applied to God. But
while they are realized in God better than in things, they don't enclose or
delimit the Divine Reality; they leave it uncontained and uncircumscribed. Per
Maritain, the Divine Essence is, therefore, really attained by our metaphysical
knowledge, but without delivering itself; it's known, but its mystery remains
intact, unpenetrable in this life. To the very degree that we know it, it
escapes our grasp, infinitely surpassing our knowledge. For the faithful,
there is the hope of the following prayer:
"O God, Who in creating man didst exalt his nature very wonderfully and yet
more wonderfully didst establish it anew: by the mystery signified in the
mingling of this water and wine, grant us to have part in the Godhead of Him
Who hath vouchsafed to share our manhood, Jesus Christ, Thy Son, Our Lord, Who
liveth and reigneth with Thee in the unity of the Holy Ghost, God; world
without end. Amen."
[The Offertory, Mass of Pope Saint Pius V, Tridentine].