A THOMISTIC APPROACH TO THE SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL SCIENCES DISTINGUISHED FROM MORAL VIRTUES
by Gary L. Morella

ristotle observed that the theoretical or speculative use of the mind aims at the perfection of mental activity as such, i.e., it aims at truth. The practical use of the mind seeks truth but in order to direct and perfect activities other than thinking. For example, the artist's knowledge is not sought for its own sake but rather to direct his activities into producing a piece of art which is the perfection of such productive and practical thinking as opposed to the thinking responsible for the production. Practical sciences are the reflective and general knowledge about things to be made or done, remote from their actual use or application but having that application as the end goal. Speculative sciences, e.g., metaphysics, are the awareness of what is so contrasted with the practical's awareness of what to do. The end of theoretical knowledge is the perfection of thinking itself, namely, truth. Once we know everything about a thing, i.e., the answers to what it is, how it is, its properties and activities, our intellectual search is complete. If this knowledge about the way things are does not suffice and we want to apply the knowledge learned, then we are in the realm of practical knowledge. An analogy would be the comparison between a theoretical and applied mathematician. The former formulates abstract principles in relation to objects which may or may not exist; the latter builds upon these principles to design a particular application totally unrelated to the former's initial inquiry. This distinction between the different ends formulates the basic way to distinguish the theoretical from the practical.

The ST Ia q.14 a.16 passage talks about degrees of practical thinking. The article asks whether God's knowledge of creatures is theoretical or practical. Aquinas talks of three criteria involved, 1) the nature of the objects known; 2) the way objects are known; and 3) the intent, purpose, or aim of the knower.

With respect to objects, Aquinas speaks of theory and operation with the latter comprising what we do or make - the application of the theory. If what we are thinking does not come within the range of human realization, it is a theoretical object which may be a natural object or God.

With respect to the mode of knowing, it can be an operation in regard to objects like a house which we can think about in several ways. We can describe them as natural or physical objects or think about them as the end results of human effort and design - blueprints for construction in an applied, practical sense.

With respect to the intent, purpose or aim of the knower, practical knowing is making or doing while theoretical knowing is the possession of truth. You can know an operation, an operable object in a practical way with no intention toward an end, putting that knowledge to use which is theoretical or speculative. If action is performed regarding doing or making, this is practical.

Degrees of practical knowledge become a function of the aforementioned three criteria designated 1), 2), and 3). We can talk about virtually practical knowledge with 1) practical, 2) theoretical, and 3) theoretical. We can talk about formally practical knowledge with 1) practical, 2) practical, and 3) theoretical. Finally, we can talk about completely practical knowledge with 1), 2), and 3) all practical.

In the context of moral philosophy, both virtual and formal practical knowledge are involved. In defining good and bad, what is required in a moral sense, we necessarily must define virtue, voluntary and involuntary, deliberation and intention. We call this process virtually practical knowledge. Moral judgment are instances of formally practical knowledge. Complete practical knowledge, the absolute application of same, is presupposed by moral philosophy and is what it does.

Aquinas says that practical knowledge is ordered to activity as its end. Knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing known is speculative alone. However, what is speculative in one sense can be practical in another. When ordered to the end of an operation, it is simply practical.

From a metaphysical or Divine science standpoint, God has knowledge of Himself that is speculative alone; He has speculative and practical knowledge of other things, speculative in manner as God knows perfectly what we know speculatively. Aquinas says, "It should be said that God's knowledge is cause, not of Himself, but of other things; of some actually, namely those which at some time come to be, of others virtually, namely those He can make yet never makes." Since God's knowledge is in every way perfect, He must know things doable by Him and not only insofar as they are speculative. He has speculative and practical knowledge of all things.

How are practical sciences distinguished from moral virtues? Aquinas answers that since every virtue is ordained to some good, a habit may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, it confers the right use of it. The latter condition belongs to those habits alone which affect the appetitive part of the soul since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses. He then concludes since the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues insofar as they confer aptness for a good work, via the consideration of truth since this is the good work of the intellect. Yet they are not called virtues in the second way as though they conferred the right use of a power or habit. Prudence would be an example of the virtue in the second way as it confers the use of right reason. If a man has a habit of speculative science, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge. The fact that he makes use of the knowledge which he has is due to the motion of his will. A virtue which perfects the will such as charity or justice confers the right use of these speculative habits. And in this way there can be merit in the acts of these habits if they are done out of charity. Gregory in Moral. vi. says that the "contemplative life has greater merit than the active life."

Aquinas tells us that work is of two kinds, exterior and interior. Accordingly, the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with the speculative faculty is concerned with exterior work to which the speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. In this way it is an operative habit. Thus, because the speculative faculty is ordained to consider the truth, it becomes an operable habit, a virtue which is the perfection or excellence of activity. Intellectual virtue owes its genesis to teaching as reason requires experience and time. Moral virtues, resulting from habit, are related to acts as a function of rational activity because they obey reason.

The good, if anything, is its end. Truth is the end of the intellect. To know truth becomes a good act of the intellect ordered to right will via prudence. But the intellect must be perfected so that it has a chance of recognizing truth. This is a habit, a virtue. This perfection is analogous to acquiring an informed conscience with the truth as opposed to a conscience acting on personal opinion. We are constantly searching for the higher rung on the ladder with the progression from the natural sciences to moral philosophy to metaphysics to theology. For Aquinas the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of this search for truth. The habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such truth is called "understanding" which is the habit of principles.

A virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is no way referable to evil. The good of the intellect is truth and falsehood is its evil. Those habits alone are called intellectual virtues whereby we tell the truth and never a falsehood. But opinion can be both truth and falsehood, not an intellectual virtue. This distinguishes the difference between virtues ordained to the truth and non-virtue which suffers from not being ordained to the truth. The latter is seen in the recognized uncertainty of the practical, natural sciences which promote postulated theories as fact, e.g., evolution, in the face of widely documented critical evidence to the contrary. Such error is not virtuous.

Aquinas says that truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. The truth of the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the thing. Since the intellect cannot be infallibly in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, no speculative habit about contingent things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary things. On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite which has no place in necessary matters which are not affected by the human will but rather only in contingent matters which can be affected by us whether they be matters of interior action or the products of exterior work. Hence, it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect.

With respect to the moral virtues, the mean or measure is conformity with right reason. The mean or measure of intellectual virtues of the speculative order is truth. The mean or measure of intellectual virtues of the practical order is prudence. These measures impact the judgment of reason on the morality of a proposed act which is called conscience.

Considered in themselves, intellectual virtues are more excellent than moral virtues since intellect (contemplation) is something to be sought as opposed to regulation of passions which is demanded of necessity if anarchy is to be avoided. Considered from the standpoint of service to man, moral virtues carry more precedence as they more directly determine a man's last end.

In order for practical science to reach its goal true knowledge is needed of the good and the agent has to be appetitively related to the true good - it has to be his good. This is Aquinas's meaning of practical truth. He goes on to say that truth is had in the practical intellect in a different way than in the speculative or theoretical intellect. The speculative intellect realizes truth by way of conformity of the mind to reality as opposed to the practical intellect through conformity with rectified appetite. Intellect is not infallibly conformed to contingent things but rather only to necessary things. As such there is no speculative habit of contingent things that is an intellectual virtue. This is reserved only for necessary things. The end of the speculative use of intellect is the perfection of thinking, namely truth. In contrast when we use our mind practically, we seek a truth for the guidance of activities other than thinking, e.g., the true good that the will should seek, the good in actions that involve emotions, the good in activities in which we relate to other people. This then becomes the distinction between theoretical and practical truth.

The judgment of prudence is true, not because it is in conformity with the way things are in a moral relativistic politically correct sense, but because it is in conformity with moral virtue. The restriction becomes only if we are habitually ordered to the good (truth), to the ends of the particular moral virtues, are we free to see how these ends can be achieved. The notion of practical truth arises from the observation that prudence or practical wisdom determines how the moral ideal can be realized presently. Because of prudence, we deliberate, judge, and command as to how to achieve the end.

The acquisition of moral virtues disposes one for the intellectual virtues and for climbing the ladder with metaphysics on the highest rung preceding theology. Moral virtue is a will-virtue. It does not belong to the order of speculative or practical intellect, but to the will, the appetitive part of reason. Moral virtue has to do, not with knowing, but with acting or choosing in the light of knowledge. An intellectual virtue belongs to the order of knowing. Even the virtues of the practical intellect, which regard action, are truly intellectual virtues; they are not appetites or tendencies to action; they merely show the way to action. And when, through prudence, they recommend or command action, they cannot enforce the command. They give knowledge of what ought to be done. But the tendency, desire, and decision in the matter belong to the will. Every virtue is either an intellectual or moral virtue. The intellectual virtues of understanding and prudence are required for every moral virtue. On the other hand, the intellectual virtue of prudence cannot exist unless moral virtue accompany it. Thus, prudence is often listed as a moral virtue since without presupposing the corresponding moral virtues, prudence cannot appraise what is to be done. The judgment is that this action is what the good demands now and only one whose mind is guided by an appetitive orientation to that good can perform this action with ease and certainty. Practical sciences operate on a general and universal level with a degree of abstraction less affected by the thinker's appetite.