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Listed below you will find information about my publications as well as abstracts of my current working papers. A downloadable version of my complete curriculum vitae is also available in Adobe Acrobat format. If you have any questions about my work, please contact me at tpollock@psu.edu. Thank you for your interest.
Chen, G., Hambrick, D.C. & Pollock, T.G. 2008. "Puttin on the ritz: Pre-IPO enlistment of prestigious affiliates as deadline-induced remediation." Academy of Management Journal, forthcoming. Full Text PDF.
Detert, J.R. & Pollock, T.G. 2008. "Values, interests and the capacity to act: Understanding professionals' responses to market-based improvement initiatives in highly institutionalized organizations." Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 44(2): 186-214. Full Text PDF.
Wade, J.B., Porac, J.F., Pollock, T.G. & Graffin, S.D. 2008. "Star CEOs: Benefit or burden?" Organizational Dynamics, 37(2): 203-210. Full Text PDF.
Pollock, T.G., Rindova, V.P. & Maggitti, P.G. 2008."Market Watch: Information and Availability Cascades in the U.S. IPO Market." Academy of Management Journal, 51(2): 335-358. Full Text PDF.
Pollock, T.G. & Gulati, R. 2007. "Standing out from the crowd: The visibility enhancing effects of IPO-related signals on alliance formations by entrepreneurial firms." Strategic Organization, 5(4): 339-372. Full Text PDF.
Baker, T. & Pollock, T.G. 2007. "Making the marriage work: The benefits for strategic organization from strategy's takeover of entrepreneurship." Strategic Organization, 5(3): 297-312. Full Text PDF.
Wade, J.B., O'Reilly, C.A. & Pollock, T.G. 2006. "Overpaid CEOs and Underpaid Managers: Fairness and Executive Compensation" Organization Science, 17(5): 527-544. Full Text PDF. Business Press coverage of the study
Wade, J.B., Porac, J.F., Pollock, T.G. & Graffin, S.D. 2006. “The Burden of Celebrity: The Impact of CEO Certification Contests on CEO Pay and Performance” Academy of Management Journal, 49(4): 643-660. Full Text PDF. Business Press coverage of the study
Rindova, V.P., Pollock, T.G. & Hayward, M.L.A. 2006. “Celebrity Firms: The Social Construction of Market Popularity.” Academy of Management Review, 31(1): 50-71. Full Text PDF. Business Press coverage of the study
Mishina, Y., Pollock, T.G. & Porac, J.F. 2004. "Are More Resources Always Better for Growth? Resource Stickiness in Market and Product Expansion" Strategic Management Journal, 25: 1179-1197. Full Text PDF
Pollock, T.G. 2004. "The Benefits and Costs of Underwriters' Social Capital in the U.S. IPO Market" Strategic Organization, 2(4): 357-388. Full Text PDF
Fischer, H.M. & Pollock, T.G. 2004. "Effects of Social Capital and Power on Surviving Transformational Change: The Case of Initial Public Offerings" Academy of Management Journal, 47: 463-481. Full Text PDF
Hayward, M.L.A. Rindova, V.P. & Pollock, T.G. 2004. "Believing One's Own Press: The Antecedents and Consequences of Chief Executive Officer Celebrity” Strategic Management Journal, 25(7): 637-653. Full Text PDF. Business Press coverage of the study
Pollock, T.G., Porac, J.F. & Wade, J.B. 2004. "Constructing Deal Networks: Brokers as Network ‘Architects’ in the U.S. IPO Market and Other Examples" Academy of Management Review, 29(1): 50-72. Full Text PDF
Pollock, T.G. & Rindova, V.P. 2003. "Media Legitimation Effects in the Market for Initial Public Offerings." Academy of Management Journal, 46(5): 631-642. Full Text PDF. Business Press coverage of the study
Carpenter, M.A., Pollock, T.G. & Leary, M.M. 2003. "Governance, the Experience of Principals and Agents, and Global Strategic Intent: Testing a Model of Reasoned Risk Taking." Strategic Management Journal, 24: 803-820. Full Text PDF
Pollock, T.G., Fischer, H.M. & Wade, J.B. 2002. "The Role of Power and Politics in the Repricing of Executive Options." Academy of Management Journal, 45: 1172-1182. Full Text PDF. Business Press coverage of the study
Pollock, T.G., Whitbred, R.C. & Contractor, N. 2000. "Social Information Processing and Job Characteristics: A Test and Integration of Two Theories with Implications for Job Satisfaction." Human Communication Research, 26(2), 292-330. Full Text PDF
Thomas, H. & Pollock, T.G. 1999. "From I-O Economics’ S-C-P Paradigm Through Strategic Groups to Competence-Based Competition: Reflections on the Puzzle of Competitive Strategy" British Journal of Management, 10(2), 127-140. Full Text PDF
Porac, J.F., Wade, J.B. & Pollock, T.G. 1999. "Industry Categorizations and the Politics of the Comparable Firm in CEO Compensation," Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(1), 112-144. Full Text PDF
Thomas, H., Pollock, T. & Gorman, P. 1999. "Global Strategic Analysis: Frameworks and Approaches," Academy of Management Executive, 13(1), 70-82. Full Text PDF
Wade, J.B., Porac, J.F. & Pollock, T.G. 1997. "Worth, Words and the Justification of Executive Pay," Journal of Organizational Behavior, 18, 641-664. Full Text PDF
Wade, J.B., Porac, J.F., Pollock, T.G. & Meindl, J. 1997. "Hitch Your Wagon to a CEO Star? Testing Two Views about the Pay, Reputation and Performance of Top Executives," Corporate Reputation Review, 1:1-2, 103-107. Full Text PDF
Lee, P.M., Pollock, T.G. & Jin, K. 2007. "Substance, symbolism and the 'signal strength' of venture capitalist prestige" Best Papers Proceedings, Academy of Management Annual Meeting, BPS.
Pollock, T.G., & Baker, T. 2005. "Who's Minding the Store? Venture Capitalist Styles and the Replacement of Founder-CEOs" The Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, Proceedings of the Babson/Kauffman Entrepreneurship Research Conference, 403-415.
Pollock, T.G., Gulati, R. & Sadler, A. 2002. "Relational
and Market-Based Legitimation of Internet IPOs." Best Papers Proceedings,
Academy of Management Annual Meeting, BPS 11-16. Full
Text PDF
Fund, B.R., Pollock, T.G., Baker, T. & Wowak, A. 2008. Who's the new kid? The process of becoming central in venture capitalist deal networks. In J.A.C. Baum & T.J. Rowley (Eds.) Advances in Strategic Management, 25: 563-593. Full Text PDF
Porac, J.F., Mishina, Y. & Pollock, T.G. 2002. "Entrepreneurial Narratives and the Dominant Logics of High Growth Firms" in Anne Huff & Mark Jenkins (Eds.) Mapping Strategic Knowledge, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage: 112-136. Full Text PDF
Pollock, T.G. 2000. "Interview with OMT Distinguished
Scholar Howard Aldrich" OMT Newsletter, Fall. http://www.aom.pace.edu/omt/newsletter/aldrichinterviewfall00.htm
Pollock, T.G., Chen, G., Jackson, E.M. & Hambrick, D.C. "Just how much prestige is enough? Assessing the value of multiple types of prestigious affiliates for young firms" Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Business Venturing
Abstract: Young, unproven firms can signal their worthiness, or potential, through affiliations with various types of prestigious parties. Drawing from signaling theory, we present a formal consideration of the implications of multiple numbers and types of prestigious affiliates for IPO valuations. We argue that increasing numbers of prestigious affiliates help to increase a firm’s value but at a diminishing rate. Moreover, we argue that alternative forms of prestige – in the firm’s upper-echelons, venture capital firms, and underwriters – are partially redundant in the value they convey. Based on a sample of 257 software IPOs, we find some support for our expectations. The benefits of prestigious executives and directors accumulate in a linear, more is better, fashion, while VC and underwriter prestige accumulates in the predicted curvilinear fashion. Underwriter prestige also mediates the effects of the other prestigious affiliates to varying degrees. We discuss the implications for theory and practice, and we propose an agenda for future research.
Mishina, Y., Block, E.S., Johnson Sykes, B., & Pollock, T.G. "Why good firms do bad things: The effects of high aspirations, performance, reputation and visibility on the incidence of corporate illegality" Revise and Resubmit, Academy of Management Journal
Abstract: Researchers have long argued that strong performance and good reputations decrease the need and desire for firms to engage in illegal activities. However, the recent history of high-profile corporate scandals involving firms with strong performance and/or reputations cast some doubt on these assertions. In this study, we explore this paradoxical organizational phenomenon by applying research on prospect theory and hubris to examine the propensity of a sample of S&P 500 manufacturing firms to engage in illegal behavior. Our results demonstrate that internal performance aspirations, external performance expectations, market visibility, and firm reputations interact in particular ways to increase the likelihood of illegal behavior by corporations.
Pollock, T.G., Baker, T. & Fund, B.R. "Dance with the one that brought you? Venture Capital Firms and the Retention of Founder-CEOs" Under first review, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal
Abstract: We consider how a venture capital firms’ perceived uncertainty in new and uncertain environments affect its decisions to retain founder-CEOs at companies they take public. We consider how two potential sources if uncertainty, their prior experience retaining founder-CEOs and market uncertainty, affect these perceptions, and how their cumulative performance experience and ownership power moderate the relationship between these sources of perceived uncertainty and founder-CEO retention. We explore these issues in the context of 401 venture capital firm investments in 225 Internet sector start-ups that went public between 1995 and 2000. We find evidence that both types of uncertainty affect the founder-CEO retention decision, and that performance and ownership power moderate the effects of market uncertainty, but not in the way we anticipated.
Boivie, S., Graffin, S.D. & Pollock, T.G. "'Good' corporate governance characteristics as negative screening criteria in the director labor market" Under first review, Administrative Science Quarterly
Abstract: We use screening theory and a director labor market perspective to argue that firm-level corporate governance practices and characteristics designed to improve board effectiveness by increasing independence may actually contribute to decreasing the overall human and social capital available from boards of directors. Our results indicate that higher proportions of outside directors and blockholders lead to boards with lower levels of human and social capital, and that governance practices which protect directors (such as poison pills, staggered boards and indemnity protection) may insulate firms from losing qualified directors, particularly after being sued by shareholders. These findings contribute to the governance literature by using a director labor market, rather than a financial investor market perspective to identify the unintended consequences of common governance prescriptions suggested by agency theory.
Lee, P.M., Pollock, T.G. & Jin, K. "Getting the biggest bang for the buck: The contingent value of Venture Capitalist Reputation"
Abstract: This study explores the extent to which VC reputation influences the first-day valuation and post-IPO operating performance of the firms they take public. Specifically, we examine whether the value of VC reputation is contingent on the timing of VC involvement in the portfolio firm, the VC firms' industry-specific experience and their geographic proximity. We develop a time-varying, multi-item composite measure of VC reputation and use a sample of VC-backed IPOs between 1990 and 2000 to test our hypotheses. Our results suggest that the value of a VC’s reputation is significantly enhanced if VCs are involved early in the IPO firm's development. We also find that the industry specialization of early-round VCs, regardless of their reputation, enhances post-IPO operating performance. Finally, we find that while the geographic proximity of VCs to their portfolio firms has no effect on the benefits of their reputation for the firm's post-IPO operating performance, investors nonetheless discount the value of VC reputation when VCs are more geographically distant from their portfolio firm.
Fund, B.R., Pollock, T.G. & Tsai, W. "Social capital transfer between individuals and organizations"
Abstract: We investigate how social capital can be transferred between individuals and organizations. We develop a typology of social capital transfer based on the locus of social capital mobilization and the cooperative orientation of individuals and organizations. Extending the notion of transitivity, we analyze the processes and mechanisms underlying each type of social capital transfer. This research promises to provide new insights into multi-level theorizing that can aid future research in studying more dynamic and process-oriented models of social influence.
Baker, T., Pollock, T.G. & Sapienza, H. J. "Winning an unfair game: How a resource-constrained player uses bricolage to maneuver for advantage in a highly institutionalized field"
Abstract: In this study we examine how resource-constrained organizations can maneuver for competitive advantage in highly institutionalized fields. Unlike studies of institutional entrepreneurship, we investigate competitive maneuvering by an organization that is unable to alter either the regulative or normative institutions that characterize its field. Using the “Moneyball” phenomenon and recent changes in Major League Baseball as the basis for an intensive case study of actions taken by the Oakland A's, we found that the A’s were able to maneuver for advantage by using bricolage and refusing to enact baseball’s cognitive institutions, and that they continued succeeding despite ongoing resource constraints and rapid copying of their actions by other teams. These results contribute to our understanding of competitive maneuvering and change in institutionalized fields, and expand notions of bricolage to encompass human resources. Our findings also reposition bricolage from its prior characterization as a tool used primarily by peripheral organizations in less institutionalized fields by uncovering its role in generating the survival and success of resource constrained participants at the center of a mature and economically and culturally important field.
Pfarrer, M.D., Pollock, T.G. & Rindova, V.P. "The power of love? The effects of firm reputation and celebrity on earnings surprises and investors' reactions"
Abstract: Despite growing interest in the value of intangible assets in strategy and organizational research, the consequences of possessing different types of intangible assets are not well understood. In this study we compare the cognitive bases and strategies for constructing two intangible assets — firm reputation and celebrity—and how they influence 1) the likelihood that a firm will experience a positive or negative material earnings surprise, and 2) how investors react to positive and negative earnings surprises. We find that high-reputation firms announce fewer surprises than other firms. Both high-reputation and celebrity firms reap greater market rewards for positive surprises and lesser market penalties for negative surprises relative to firms that do not possess these assets, with celebrity firms benefiting the most. Our study contributes to organizational research a more nuanced understanding of the value of the different types of social approval associated with intangible assets.
Mishina, Y., Pollock, T.G., Porac, J.F., Rao, H. & Wade, J.B. "Symbolic Protests in Delegitimizing Attacks on Organizations: The Use of Shareholder Resolutions by Corporate Gadflies"
Abstract: In this paper, we examine the effects of a number of organizational attributes on the number of shareholder resolutions on corporate governance submitted in the annual proxy statements for a sample of S&P 500 firms during the period from 1991 through 1994. We find that the size of the firm and the presence of an investor relations department increase the number of resolutions filed against a firm, while CEO reputation and company performance are negatively associated with the number of resolutions filed. We also found that the visibility of the organization, as measured by the size of the company and the number of analysts following the firm, and the levels of the CEO’s base compensation diminish the buffering effects of company performance. We discuss these results within a general approach to understanding shareholder activism as a social movement with distinct symbolic forms of voice.
