IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA,
ORLANDO DIVISION

RE:
MARK E. SCHMIDTER and JULIAN HEICKLEN,
Plaintiff(s)

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA
Defendant

CASE #: 6:12-CV-1102-ORL-31-KRS

Heicklen and Schmidter v. State of Florida
Appellate Case # 5D113036
changed to 6:12-cv-01102-RBD-KRS

Re: Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of FL,
 in and for Orange and Osceola Counties
Case # 48–2011–CF–8856–O

PETITION FOR JUSTICE


_________________
Julian Heicklen
Plaintiff
Counsel Pro Se

_____________
Date       
MEMORANDUM OF LAW

ABSTRACT

    Plaintiff Julian Heicklen requests the U. S. District Court to overturn his conviction for Contempt of Court in Orlando, FL on August 22, 2011. The request is based on constitutional requirements, previous court decisions, unequal enforcement, an illegal trial, deprivation of rights, and perjury by the trial court judge and the three appellate court judges. Further Plaintiff requests suitable compensation for his expenses, harassment, and confinement associated with this case.

    Plaintiff Heicklen was arrested, as was Maek Schmidter on a separate occasion, for distributing pamphlets, of which Chief Judge Belvin Perry disapproves, which describe jury nullification.  Both were arrested for violating a court order.

    There are 2 issues here:
Is the courthouse plaza a non-public forum, in which case Plaintiffs could be legally arrested by the deputy sheriffs?
If the plaza is a public forum, can the Plaintiffs be arrested for violating a court order which regulates their freedom of speech?

    In spite of what he claims, Judge Perry agrees with Plaintiffs that the courthouse plaza is a public forum. That is why he established free-speech zones on the plaza and felt it necessary to issue a  court order forbidding the distributions elsewhere on the plaza.

    If judge Perry really believed that the plaza was not a free speech zone, he would not have done either of those things.  He would just have plaintiffs arrested for trespassing.

    The courts also agree that the courthouse plazas are free speech zones.  Every court decision known to Plaintiff Heicklen and introduced by the judges supports that view, except for the few opinions to the contrary overruled by a higher court.

    Judge Perry claims that he can control speech on the plaza by court order based on falsification of previous court decisions.  This is perjury.

    On appeal, the 3 appellate court judges agreed with the prohibition of speech, but based solely on their contention that the courthouse plaza is not a free-speech zone.  To do this they also falsified conclusions of previous court cases, making then also guilty of perjury.

    This MEMORANDUM OF LAWis a lengthy discussion of how the judges committed perjury, and why courthouse plazas are free speech zones.  Plaintiff Heicklen is requesting that the appellate court decision be overturned and his contempt of court conviction be reversed.  He also is requesting just compensation for his expenses and time lost because of the false arrest and improper practices of the trial court.

CONTENTS

Page

CITATIONS__________________________________________________________5

JURISDICTION_______________________________________________________8

STANDING_________________________________________________________10

CAUSES OF ACTION________________________________________________10

TRIAL HISTORY___________________________________________________19

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES_________________________________________28

PREVIOUS COURT DECISIONS_____________________________________32

IS THE COURTROOM PLAZA A PUBLIC FORUM?____________________56

PERJURY BY JUDGES____________________________________________62

COURT IRREGULARITIES________________________________________64

CLAIMS________________________________________________________65


RELIEF REQUESTED____________________________________________68

CONCLUSION__________________________________________________69


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE_____________________________________71

TABLE 1: HEICKLEN FIJA DISTRIBUTIONS______________________72
TABLE 2: OTHER FIJA DISTRIBUTIONS AT COURTHOUSES_______80

CITATIONS (BY PAGE NUMBERS)

Pages      
U. S. Constitution
Article III, Section 2_________________________________________________8
Amendment I__________________12-15,22,23,28,33,34,36,37,39,40,43,50-53,69
Amendment V__________________________________________8, 19, 28, 66, 78
AmendmentVI_________________________________________8, 19, 28, 33, 67
Amendment XIV_______________________________________8, 19, 29, 33, 39

Florida Constitution
Article 1, Section 4_________________________________________8, 23, 30, 69
Article 1, Section 14___________________________________________8, 31, 66
Article 1, Section 16_____________________________________8, 31, 19, 66, 67
Article 1, Section 22______________________________________________8, 67
Article 1, Section 24________________________________________________67
Article V, Section 2_________________________________________________47

U. S. Statutes
18 U.S.C. §111A_____________________________________________46, 59. 78
18 U. S. C § 1621___________________________________________________8
18 U. S. C § 3161__________________________________________________27
40  U. S. C. § 13k______________________________________13, 22, 33–36, 63
40 U. S. C. § 13l________________________________________________34, 37
40  U. S. C. § 6135 ________________________________________________41
42  U. S. C. § 1983_______________________________________________ 6, 8
41 CFR §102-71.20_____________________________________________26, 57
41 CFR 102–74.385_______________________________________________78
41 CFR. §102–74.390(c)___________________________________________78

41 CFR §102–74.415(c)____________________________________________78

Florida Statutes
Section 43.26_________________________________________16, 43, 47, 48. 60
Section 92.52______________________________________________________9
Section 837.02_____________________________________________________8

U. S. Court Decisions
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)_______________________________61
Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939)_______________________________35
 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US 536 - 1965___________________14, 15, 32, 36, 46, 56
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131, 142 (1966)__________________________34
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 145 - 1968______________________________33
Grace v. Burger, 214 U. S. App. D.C., 375, 665 F. 2d 1193 (1981)__________33
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969)___________________________________________34
United States v. Grace, 461 US 171 (1983)_______13, 22, 33, 37, 46. 56 , 63, 66
 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985_________________________________________14, 46
Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1370-71 (3d Cir. 1990)___13, 38
United States v. Kokinda, 497, U. S. 720 (1990)__________________________47
Swarner v. U.S., 937 F.2d 1478, 1482-83 (9th Cir. 1991)___________________14
Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2002)____13
Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F. 3d 53 (2004)_________12, 13, 22, 38-40, 56, 57, 63   
Comfort v. MacLaughlin, 473 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2006)_______13
 Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007)_________________14
Roe. v. Wade [Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)_________________________47
 Obamacare trials [567 U. S. ____ (2012)]. 
For the OPINIONS in the Obamacare trial see:
 /www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/11-393c3a2.pdf________________41, 47
United States v. Julian Heicklen, U. S.  District Court SDNY
10 CR 1154 (KMW)  April 19, 2012
Opinion and Order of Judge Kimba Wood at:
http://constitution.org/jury/pj/10-cr-01154-KMW_order.pdf_______24, 48, 59, 66
New Hamphire v. Doug Darrell, Barnstead, NH, (September 16, 2012)____16, 62

Court Rules
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.840, Indirect Criminal Contempt___19

 Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 9.210(f)______________________10
Times for Service of Briefs states in part:
“The times for serving jurisdiction and initial briefs are prescribed by rules 9.110, 9.120, 9.130, and 9.140.
 Unless otherwise required, the answer brief shall be served within 20 days after service of the initial brief;”

Other Documents
Thomas Regnier, 51 Santa Clara Law Review 775 (2011)
“RESTORING THE FOUNDERS' IDEAL OF THE
 INDEPENDENT JURY IN CRIMINAL CASES”_____________________43, 61

Deuteronomy 16:20 (1230 B.C.E.)__________________________________45, 60
Amos 5:15 (about 750 B.C.E.)________________________________________61

A. JURISDICTION

1. The U. S. District Courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide complaints of U. S. civil rights violations as specified in 42 U. S. C. § 1983.

2. Specifically 42 U. S. C. § 1983 states:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”

3. Plaintiff claims that his U. S. Constitutional rights granted in Article III, Section 2 and Amendments I, V, VI, and XIV of the U. S. Constitution have been violated by the State of Florida.

4. Plaintiff further claims that his Florida Constitutional rights granted in Article I Sections 4, 14, 16(a), and 22 have been violated by the State of Florida.

5. Plaintiff further claims that the judge in the trial court and the 3 judges in the appellate court have committed perjury in violation of U. S. Statute 18 USC § 1621 - Perjury generally and Florida Statute 837.02  Perjury in official proceedings: Sec (1) and (3).

(1)  Except as provided in subsection (2), whoever makes a false statement, which he or she does not believe to be true, under oath in an official proceeding in regard to any material matter, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2)  Whoever makes a false statement, which he or she does not believe to be true, under oath in an official proceeding that relates to the prosecution of a capital felony, commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) Knowledge of the materiality of the statement is not an element of the crime of perjury under subsection (1) or subsection (2), and the defendant's mistaken belief that the statement was not material is not a defense.

6. All the judges are under the following  oath while performing their duties

OATH OF OFFICE
 (Art. II. § 5(b), Fla. Const.)

STATE OF FLORIDA County of ___________________________
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, protect, and defend the Constitution and Government of the United States and of the State of Florida; that I am duly qualified to hold office under the Constitution of the State, and that I will well and faithfully perform the duties of
___________________________________________________ (Title of Office) on which I am now about to enter, so help me God.

[NOTE: If you affirm, you may omit the words “so help me God.” See § 92.52, Fla. Stat.]

7. The OATH requires that the judges “faithfully perform the duties...

8. Their most important duty is to see that justice is done, or at least to uphold the law.

9. When they falsified the law, they committed perjury.

10.Plaintiff claims that declaratory relief was not available, because all four Florida state  judges involved committed perjury.

11. Plaintiff further claims that the trial against him in the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of FL in and for Orange and Osceola Counties was constitutionally improper in many respects discussed below.

12. Plaintiff is not making a claim against any judicial officer in this complaint.  He is asking only for reversal of the Florida court decisions and for just compensation from the State of Florida.

13. Claims against the judges will be made with the appropriate Florida state agencies.

STANDING

14. Plaintiff has standing because he is the injured party.

CAUSES OF ACTION

Failure to respond by Appellee’s counsel
15. Appellant and his counsel both submitted briefs in June, 2012, supporting the appeal to overturn the convictions rendered by the trial court (http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/Orlando_Appeal,_5-19-12.html & http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/Sudbury_amended_brief_6-26-12.html).

16. Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 9.210(f) Times for Service of Briefs states in part:

“The times for serving jurisdiction and initial briefs are prescribed by rules 9.110, 9.120, 9.130, and 9.140. Unless otherwise required, the answer brief shall be served within 20 days after service of the initial brief;”

17. Appellee never filed an answer brief, nor did he request an extension of time to respond.  Appellent checked this by requesting all documents submitted by the defense in his letter to the Appeals Court of November 5, 2012 (http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/Request_for_information_11-5-12.html). 

18. No documents, including a Notice of Entry, were forthcoming.

19. The only correspondence received from the Appellee’s counsel was an E-mail from attorney Robert Moses of December 19, 2012 at 7:43:29 PM GMT+02:00.  This E-mail included a list of submissions by Mr. Moses, who presumably is the defense counsel.

20. The list does not include a notice of entry.

21. The list does not include the submission of any briefs.

22. The list states:

“The following jurors received pamphlets and were called to testify at the contempt hearing may have discoverable information in this cause:
Sumanbhai Nayee
Michele Crites
Kimberly Schaefer
Helen Killen
Christopher Torres
Edith Braddy
Irving Gerena”

23. The previous claim is incorrect. Only 2 of the above named jurors testified at the trial.  These were: Sumanbhai Nayee and Michele Crites.  Adem Hakan Ozoglu, another juror not listed above, did testify.  The other 5 jurors did not testify at the trial, so could not be cross-examined.

Perjury by Judge Perry
24. A defense of the conviction was submitted by Judge Perry on September 2, 2011.  In his brief, Judge Perry lied three times, thus committing three counts of perjury. See: http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/Perry_Reply_2_5_11.html and http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/Order_and_judgment_9_2_11.html
 
25. One lie was that Appellant Heicklen had approached and targeted jurors.  There was no testimony to that effect by recipients of the pamphlets or deputy sheriffs.  Heicklen never approached nor targeted anyone.  He stood on a public sidewalk and offered pamphlets to anyone passing by him.

26. The second lie was that a U. S. Circuit Court in Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F. 3d 53 (2004) had upheld a trial court’s decision to ban expressive speech in the court parking lot.  The district trial court found Judge Corsones guilty of violating Huminski’s First Amendment rights.  The Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Huminski’s right, but reversed the decision based on judicial immunity.

27. In the third claim, Judge Perry stated that in United States v. Grace, 461 US 171 - 1983, the Supreme Court upheld U. S. Statute 40 U. S. C. § 13k which permits banning pamphleteering on court plazas.  Actually the Supreme Court declared that statute unconstitutional.  Furthermore the Court proclaimed that free speech on court plazas could not be banned by court order.
 
28. Judge Perry knew that he was lying, because he had made these claims in another court decision ((http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/Perry_Reply_2_5_11.html).  Plaintiff had written to him at that time pointing out his errors (http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/Letter_to_Perry_5-17-11.html).

Perjury by the 3 appellate judges
29. The Opinion filed December 21, 2012 by the the 3 appellate court judges contains on pages 10-12 the statements:

“Contrary to Appellant's argument, this order does not apply to speech in a traditional public forum. This is because courthouses and courthouse grounds (with the exclusion of perimeter public sidewalks) have uniformly been treated as nonpublic forums for purposes of First Amendment analysis. See U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-79 (1983); Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2004); Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2002); and Comfort v. MacLaughlin, 473 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
A nonpublic forum "exists when publicly-owned facilities have been dedicated to use for either communicative or noncommunicative purposes but have never been designated for indiscriminate expressive activity by the general public." Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1370-71 (3d Cir. 1990). The standard for judging the constitutionality of regulation affecting First Amendment activity at a nonpublic forum has been concisely stated by the United States Supreme Court:
[I]t is also black-letter law that, when the government permits speech on government property that is a nonpublic forum, it can exclude speakers on the basis of their subject matter, so long as the distinctions drawn are viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.
Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007); see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985) (a "[g]overnment's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation").
"The reasonableness of the Government's restriction of access to a nonpublic forum must be assessed in the light of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809. "The government is not required to choose the least restrictive alternative, it need only choose one that reasonably fulfills a legitimate and demonstrated need." MacLaughlin, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 1029) (citing Swarner v. U.S., 937 F.2d 1478, 1482-83 (9th Cir. 1991)). Importantly, "[t]he First Amendment does not demand unrestricted access to a nonpublic forum merely because use of that forum may be the most efficient means of delivering the speaker's message. Rarely will a nonpublic forum provide the only means of contact with a particular audience." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809 (citation omitted).
    We have no difficulty upholding Administrative Order No. 2011-03 as a reasonable, viewpoint neutral regulation in light of the purpose of the forum (the courthouse). As recognized by the United States Supreme Court:
    There can be no question that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting its judicial system from the pressures which picketing near a courthouse might create. Since we are committed to a government of laws and not of men, it is of the utmost importance that the administration of justice be absolutely fair and orderly. This Court has recognized that the unhindered and untrammeled functioning of our courts is part of the very foundation of our constitutional democracy . . . [and that a] State may adopt safeguards necessary and appropriate to assure that the administration of justice at all stages is free from outside control and influence. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965). It seems obvious that allowing groups or individuals to disseminate materials to summoned jurors, at the courthouse, in an attempt to influence jurors' decisions in cases they are called upon to decide would interfere with the proper administration of the justice system. The order does not seek to bar any groups or individuals from getting their message out in other places or using other methods; it only restricts the delivery of messages aimed at influencing jurors' decisions on courthouse grounds. The court's responsibility is to provide for the orderly administration of justice and to ensure that all litigants have their "day in court" -- a day which is free from influences outside of the courtroom -- and the order is clearly reasonable in light of that aim.”

30. The above statements are a tissue of lies.  These are:

a. “Contrary to Appellant's argument, this order does not apply to speech in a traditional public forum. This is because courthouses and courthouse grounds (with the exclusion of perimeter public sidewalks) have uniformly been treated as nonpublic forums for purposes of First Amendment analysis.”
b. “We have no difficulty upholding Administrative Order No. 2011-03 as a reasonable, viewpoint neutral regulation in light of the purpose of the forum (the courthouse).”
c. “There can be no question that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting its judicial system from the pressures which picketing near a courthouse might create.”
d. “[and that a] State may adopt safeguards necessary and appropriate to assure that the administration of justice at all stages is free from outside control and influence. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965).”
e. “It seems obvious that allowing groups or individuals to disseminate materials to summoned jurors, at the courthouse, in an attempt to influence jurors' decisions in cases they are called upon to decide would interfere with the proper administration of the justice system.”
f. “The order does not seek to bar any groups or individuals from getting their message out in other places or using other methods; it only restricts the delivery of messages aimed at influencing jurors' decisions on courthouse grounds.”

31. Proof that these statements are lies will be given in the sections entitled

Constitutional issues and Previous court decisions below.
32. There is one statement that the court made which is true, but violated by almost every court in the country.  That is:

“The court's responsibility is to provide for the orderly administration of justice and to ensure that all litigants have their "day in court" -- a day which is free from influences outside of the courtroom. . .”

33. The judge lies twice to the jury when he instructs it to uphold the law as he gives it.  It is not the duty of the jury to uphold the law. 

34. It is the jury’s duty to see that justice is done, as stated in Section 43.26, Part e of the Florida Statutes which instructs the chief judge: “To do everything necessary to promote the prompt and efficient administration of justice in the courts over which he or she is chief judge.”

35. Informing juries that their duty is to administer justice is exactly what the statute requires and what the Appellant was instructing pedestrians, including jurors, to do. There have been at least four recent cases of jury nullification in state courts where the jury has done that: California, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and New Jersey.

a. The three-room pot farm's father-and-son proprietors were charged with marijuana cultivation for sale. They could have been sentenced to as much as three years in state prison apiece if convicted. But in 2010, the case went south and the two men, Thomas Chang, 62, and his son, Errol Chang, 30, were acquitted by a San Francisco jury. http://www.correntewire.com/jury_nullification_ca_grower)

b. In New Hamphire v. Doug Darrell, Barnstead, NH, September 16, 2012 (felony marijuana possession).  This case was particularly significant, since the judge advised the jury that it could overrule the law and acquit, if it felt that would be the just thing to do.

c. A Hennepin County, MN jury found Alvin Schlangen not guilty on September 20, 2012 of three misdemeanor counts of selling unpasteurized milk, operating without a food license and handling adulterated or misbranded food.(http://www.startribune.com/local/west/170521646.html?refer=y)

d. In New Jersey on about October 19, 2012, Ed Forchion was found not guilty of distribution of marijuana, even though he was found with 1 pound of it and $2000 in his car. (http://theintelhub.com/2012/10/19/nj-weedman-found-not-guilty-in-jury-nullification-victory/)

36. If the jury decides to uphold the law, it is not the law as given by the judge, but the law in the written constitutional statute.  If the jury is not provided the written statute, it must acquit based on reasonable doubt.

37. The conclusions of the Florida District Court’s OPINION, which is in the section entitled “Constitutionality of Administrative Orders,” is based entirely on the contention that the courthouse plaza is a non-public forum.

38.No-one involved in this case, especially Judge Perry and the appellate judges, believes that to be true.

39. Judge Perry’s ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER GOVERNING DESIGNATED PUBLIC SPEECH AREAS ON THE MAIN ORANGE COUNTY COURTHOUSE COMPLEX GROUNDS designates free speech zones on two spaces of the court plaza where there is little, if any, pedestrian traffic. 

40. If Judge Perry really believed that the courthouse plaza is not a public forum, he never would have designated free speech zones.  He does not have free speech zones inside the courthouse, which truly is a non-public forum.

41. There is no objection to distributing the pamphlets in the fee speech zones, thus indicating that the content of the pamphlets is not an issue. 

42. The discussion of the possible adverse effects by the appeals court of the content of the pamphlets is irrelevant, if not dishonest.

43. However the Appeals court argues that the public sidewalk that connects the parking garage to the courthouse, and has heavy pedestrian traffic, is not a public forum.

44. In effect the court’s position is that speech is allowed where it will not be heard, but not allowed where it will be heard.

45. Really? Plaintiff thought that “Alice in Wonderland” and the “Queen of Hearts” were fictional, but it appears that he was mistaken.

46. Furthermore, the pedestrians that take a brochure pass it on to other pedestrians.  They also pass newspapers, business cards, and other printed matter to each other in the forbidden areas.

47.  Finally the deputy sheriffs served the administrative orders in the same location, in violation of the administrative orders.  They were not arrested and tried. 

48. Selective enforcement was used.

49. The discussion concerning non-public forums is irrelevant to this case.

    TRIAL HISTORY

Arrest
50. Plaintiff distributed Fully Informed Jury Association (FIJA) literature at the Orange County Courthouse, deliberately challenging court orders prohibiting the distribution on the sidewalk connecting the parking garage and the courthouse, as well as on most of the courthouse plaza. 

51. As a result Plaintiff was arrested on August 22, 2011, for contempt of court.

52. His property was seized by the deputy sheriffs and still has not been returned.

Criminal trial
53.  Judge Perry was the accuser, trial judge, and the prosecutor, in violation of:

FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
XVI. INDIRECT CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
RULE 3.840.

(e) Disqualification of Judge. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, the judge shall disqualify himself or herself from presiding at the hearing. Another judge shall be designated by the chief justice of the supreme court.

54.  On the same day at the arraignment, Chief Judge Belvin Perry, Jr. for Orange County presided.  Plaintiff exercised his U. S. Constitution Amendment V right to remain silent. For this Plaintiff was punished.

55. Judge Perry charged him  with contempt of court.    He did not set bail, but confined him to the Orange County Jail for 22 days until he held a bail hearing. Judge Perry made no effort to provide Plaintiff with counsel as required by Amendments VI and XIV of the U. S Constitution.     
 
56. In addition, Article I, Section 16(a) of the Florida Constitution states:

“to have compulsory process for witnesses”
“to confront at trial adverse witnesses”
“to be heard in person, by counsel”
“to have a speedy and public trial by impartial jury”

57. Plaintiff  was denied all of those rights.    Three summoned jurors appeared to testify, but five others who filed statements with the Court were not called for cross examination.

58. Plaintiff’s trial was set for September 1, 2011. Judge Perry, the litigant accuser, presided at the trial and acted as the prosecutor.
59. Plaintiff was counsel pro se.
60. Three jurors summoned for other cases and two deputy sheriffs testified.

61. Plaintiff had no opportunity to confront any of these witnesses prior to trial.

62. None of the witnesses claimed that Plaintiff had approached them or targeted jurors, because, in fact, Plaintiff had done neither.   

63. Plaintiff had stood on the sidewalk and offered pamphlets to any passersby. Plaintiff could not distinguish potential jurors from anyone else.

64. Plaintiff was convicted of criminal contempt, even though Plaintiff was arrested for civil contempt, sentenced to 145 days in jail, and fined $200 plus court costs.

65. Then Plaintiff was returned to jail until his bail hearing on September 10, 2011, where Plaintiff was released on $12,000 bail pending appeal.

66. While in jail, his legal papers were confiscated and destroyed by prison guards on the  day he entered. 

67. Plaintiff was denied access to the law library during his whole stay of 22 days.
   
68. Since Plaintiff was acting as counsel pro se, this made it difficult to prepare a complete defense.

69. Three written requests to Judge Perry for a jury trial were ignored. Judge Perry claimed that he never received them.

Appellate Court
70. An appeal was filed on his behalf within 30 days after the trial by his counsel at that time,  Adam Sudbury.

71. Legal briefs for Appellants Schmidter and Heicklen were submitted both by Counsel Sudbury and Heicklen in June, 2012 (http://www.personal.psu.edu/ faculty/j/p/jph13/Orlando_contempt_trial.html).

72. A defense of the conviction was submitted by Judge Perry on September 2, 2011.

73. In his brief, Judge Perry lied three times, thus committing three counts of perjury. See: http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/ Perry_Reply_2_5_11.html and http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/ Order_and_judgment_9_2_11.html

74. One lie was that Appellant Heicklen had approached and targeted jurors. There was no testimony to that effect by recipients of the pamphlets or deputy sheriffs.   

75. Heicklen never approached nor targeted anyone.    He stood on a public sidewalk and offered pamphlets to anyone passing by him.

76. The second lie was that a U. S. Circuit Court in Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F. 3d 53 (2004) had upheld a trial court’s decision to ban expressive speech in the court parking lot.   

77. The district trial court had found Judge Corsones guilty of violating Huminski’s First Amendment rights.

78. The Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Huminski’s right, but reversed the decision based on judicial immunity.

79. In the third claim, Judge Perry stated that in United States v. Grace, 461 US 171 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld U. S. Statute 40 U. S. C. § 13k which permits banning pamphleteering on court plazas.   

80. Actually the Supreme Court declared that statute unconstitutional.

81. Furthermore the Court proclaimed that free speech on court plazas could not be banned by court order.

82. Judge Perry knew that he was lying, because he had made these claims in another court decision ((http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/ jph13/Perry_Reply_2_5_11.html).

83. Plaintiff had written to him at that time pointing out his errors (http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/ Letter_to_Perry_5-17-11.html).

84. In his brief, Judge Perry admitted that in the Schmidter trial, he asked: “WHERE DO WE END WITH FREE SPEECH?“ The  correct answer is NOWHERE! (U. S.
Constitution Amendment I and Florida Constitution, Article I, Section 4).   

85. No further pertinent correspondence at all has been received from Appellee except for an E-mail on December 19, 2012, requesting discovery material (http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/Moses_E-mail_12-19-12.html).

86. To make sure that Plaintiff did not overlook or miss anything, Plaintiff requested in his  letter of November 5, 2012 to the appeals court, with copies to all concerned parties, that all correspondence of the Appellee’s counsels with the court should be sent to him by November 20, 2012 (http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/ Request_for_information_11-5-12.html).

87. No response from any party.

88. Obviously, neither the counsels for the Appellee nor the Florida Attorney General have  contested the appeal.

89. Therefore the conviction should be automatically overturned.

90. All the relevant case documents in Appellant’s possession are posted at: http:// www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/Orlando_contempt_trial.html.

91. On December 21, 2012, the Florida appeals court judges filed an OPINION.

92. In the OPINION the court ruled that Administrative Order No. 2011-07 was unconstitutionally vague, and therefore invalid.

93. However it found that the other Administrative Order 2011-03 is valid, if it applies to a non-public forum.

84. Administrative Order 2011-03 states: “Anyone engaging in the type of expressive conduct as contemplated by this Order may be in violation of Section 918.12, Florida Statutes, and/or may be found in contempt of court.”

95. Florida Section 918.12 states:

“Tampering with jurors.—Any person who influences the judgment or decision of any grand or petit juror on any matter, question, cause, or proceeding which may be pending, or which may by law be brought, before him or her as such juror, with intent to obstruct the administration of justice, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.”

96. However Appellant Heicklen was indicted for jury tampering on the plaza of the U. S. District Court in Manhattan, NY. for doing exactly what he was doing in Orlando

97. The case was dismissed without trial, because the Court concluded that the distribution was not jury tampering (Kimba Wood Opinion and Order
10 CR 1154 (KMW, April 19, 2012). (http://constitution.org/jury/pj/10-cr-01154-KMW_order.pdf)

98. Therefore Florida Statute 918.12 cannot be applicable, even if the plaza is a non-public forum. . The contempt conviction must be dismissed.
 
99. The OPINION of the Florida Appeals Court concluded that the courthouse plaza was a non-public forum.

100. This is a remarkable conclusion, since even Judge Perry acknowledged that the courthouse plaza was a public forum when he established two free-speech zones.

101. These free speech zones were in two areas of the courthouse plaza where there was no pedestrian traffic.

102. Plaintiff distributed pamphlets on a public sidewalk connecting the parking garage to the courthouse, but the Florida appeals court claims that this is a non-public forum.

103. This line contains no content, so that you can have a moment to digest the previous conclusion.

104. No-one else makes this claim, at least not anymore.

105. Plaintiff has distributed Fully Informed Jury Association (FIJA) literature 65 times on 40 U. S. district courthouses and 15 times on 8 county courthouses, sometimes alone and sometimes with others (http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/FIJADemonstrations.html}

106. There actually is a federal regulation 410 CFR §102–74.415(c) prohibiting distribution of literature on federal property without a permit.

c) Distributing materials, such as pamphlets, handbills or flyers, unless conducted as part of authorized Government activities. This prohibition does not apply to public areas of the property as defined in § 102-71.20 of this chapter. However, any person or organization proposing to distribute materials in a public area under this section must first obtain a permit from the building manager as specified in subpart D of this part. Any such person or organization must distribute materials only in accordance with the provisions of subpart D of this part. Failure to comply with those provisions is a violation of these regulations.

 107. For these distributions, Plaintiff was cited 14 times, arrested and taken 9 times to 5 different hospitals, where he was tortured 7 times in 4 of these hospitals.

108. On August 27, 2010 (two days after the Newark arrest) during a medical exam with Dr. Kushner of Forest Health Care in Teaneck, NJ, he could see the bruises on Heicklen’s chest.  He was appalled.

109. Plaintiff did not pay the $100 fines nor attend scheduled court appearances.
 
110. Ultimately all the cases were dismissed because they were unenforcible.
 
111. On the other  51 appearances on federal courthouse plazas, he was left alone.
 
112. At the county courthouses, he was never arrested, except once in Orlando, FL, which led to this case.

113. In 2010, he was indicted for jury tampering for distributing FIJA pamphlets on the plaza of the U. S, District Court SDNY in Manhattan, NY.

114. The court did not commence the trial in the required 70 days after indictment [18 USC § 3161 - TIME LIMITS AND EXCLUSION, Section (c)], but waited 17 months before dismissing the case.

115. The case was dismissed, because the prosecution could not provide a witness, even though it tried to entrap Heicklen with undercover agents on at least 2 occasions.

116. Heicklen has tape recordings of these  conversations.
 
117.Heicklen is not the only one distributing FIJA literature at county courthouses without incident.

118. These include every county courthouse in NH, monthly distributions in Montgomery County, PA; Fort Worth, TX; and occasional distributions in Erie, PA; NJ; and  Miami, Fort Lauderdale, Tampa, Clearwater, and Osceola County, FL.
 
119. A list of some demonstrations with the participants is given in Table 2.
 
120. Undoubtedly there are other courthouses, particularly in northwestern United States, where the FIJA headquarters is, and these distributions occur without incident.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

U. S. Constitution A
mendment 1
121. Amendment I to the United States Constitution states in part: “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...”

122. Why is it that judges do not understand the word “NO”?

U. S. Constitution Amendment V
123. “...nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;”

124. Plaintiff was denied his rights to obtain counsel, to keep his legal documents in jail, or to have access to the law library in Jail, because he was confined in the Orange  County jail from the day of arrest until after his trial.

125. Furthermore, Judge Perry was a litigant, the trial judge, and the prosecutor at the trial.  This is not due process of law.

U. S. Constitution Amendment VI

126. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury, to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”

127.Plaintiff was tried and sentenced for criminal contempt. Yet he was denied a jury trial, even though he made 3 requests to have one.

128. There were 8 jurors who filed written statements against Plaintiff, but only 3 testified in court.  Thus Plaintiff was not confronted with 5 of the witnesses against him.

129. Since Plaintiff was kept in jail from arrest until trial, he had not opportunity to obtain witnesses in his favor.

130. Plaintiff was denied the assistance of counsel, as recognized by the appellate court.

U. S. Constitution Amendment XIV, Sec. 1
131. “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

132. Plaintiff was denied the rights listed in Amendment XIV and stated above.

U. S. Constitution Article III. Sec. 2

133. “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury;”

134. Plaintiff was denied a jury trial, even though he made 3 requests to have it.

Non-uniform enforcement
135. Enforcement in Orlando was on a public sidewalk with much pedestrian traffic, but not at the “free speech zones” where there is no traffic and might be considered a “non-free speech zone.”

136. Many people on the sidewalk near Plaintiff were passing business cards, FIJA flyers, and newspapers, but were not warned nor prohibited nor arrested.

137. The deputy sheriffs passed the administrative orders in the free speech zone and were not prohibited.

138. Plaintiff distributed flyers on 65 occasions in front of federal court houses.

139. He was not prevented from doing so on 51 such occasions.

140. On 14 occasions he was cited for violating U. S. Regulation 410 CFR §102–74.415(c).  However he did not pay the fines, nor appear at the court hearings.

141. 12 of the citations at 2 different courthouses (Manhattan and Newark) were dismissed.

142. The other 2 citations at Springfield, MA and Santa Ana, CA were never enforced, even though Plaintiff returned to each area on a future occasion.

143. A detailed discussion of these events is posted at: http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/FIJADemonstrations.html

Administrative orders at the Orange County, FL courthouse
144.Plaintiff was tried and sentenced for criminal contempt, but the orders are for civil contempt.

145. Furthermore Administrative Order 2011-07 was declared unconstitutional by the FL appeals court.

146. The appeals court wants Heicklen retried, but this just would be harassment.

Article I of Florida Constitution
147. SECTION 4

published with good motives, the party shall be acquitteFreedom of speech and press.—Every person may speak, write and publish sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for defamation the truth may be given in evidence. If the matter charged as defamatory is true and was d or exonerated.”

148. “No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech...” means that law cannot be invoked by any means, including administrative order.

149. SECTION 14. 

Pretrial release and detention.—Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions. If no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the accused may be detained.”

150. Plaintiff was not given any opportunity for pre-trial release in conflict with Article 1, Section 14 of the Florida Constitution.

151. SECTION 16(a).

“Rights of accused and of victims.— In  all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand, be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and shall be furnished a copy of the charges, and shall have the right to have compulsory process for witnesses, to confront at trial adverse witnesses, to be heard in person, by counsel or both, and to have a speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the county where the crime was committed....”

152. Plaintiff was furnished a copy of the charges, but they were confiscated and destroyed by prison personnel within a few hours of receipt.

153. Plaintiff was not given the right to have compulsory process for witnesses.

154. At trial, Plaintiff was only permitted to confront 3 of the 8 jurors who provided testimony.

155. Plaintiff did not have a trial by an impartial jury, or any jury at all.

156. SECTION 22. 

“Trial by jury.—The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed by law.”

157. Plaintiff was denied trial by jury.

PREVIOUS COURT DECISIONS

 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US 536 - 1965
158. MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court.

“Appellant, the Reverend Mr. B. Elton Cox, the leader of a civil rights demonstration, was arrested and charged with four offenses under Louisiana law—criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing before a courthouse. In a consolidated trial before a judge without a jury, and on the same set of facts, he was acquitted of criminal conspiracy but convicted of the other three offenses. He was sentenced to serve four months in jail and pay a $200 fine for disturbing the peace, to serve five months in jail and pay a $500 fine for obstructing public passages, and to serve one year in jail and pay a $5,000 fine for picketing before a courthouse. The sentences were cumulative.”

“In accordance with Louisiana procedure, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed the "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public passages" convictions on certiorari, and the "courthouse picketing" conviction on appeal. The Louisiana court, in two judgments, affirmed all three convictions. 244 La. 1087, 156 So. 2d 448; 245 La. 303, 158 So. 2d 172. Appellant filed two separate appeals to this Court from these judgments contending that the three statutes under which he was convicted were unconstitutional on their face and as applied. We noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals, 377 U. S. 921. This case, No. 24, involves the convictions for disturbing the peace and obstructing public passages, and No. 49 concerns the conviction for picketing before a courthouse.”


159. The court concluded:

“But here it is clear that the practice in Baton Rouge allowing unfettered discretion in local officials in the regulation of the use of the streets for peaceful parades and meetings is an unwarranted abridgment of appellant's freedom of speech and assembly secured to him by the First Amendment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. It follows, therefore, that appellant's conviction for violating the statute as so applied and enforced must be reversed.”
“For the reasons discussed above the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is reversed.”

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 145 - 1968
160. Duncan v. Louisiana is about jury trials for serious crimes. However Amendment VI to the U. S. Constitution does not say serious or felonies.  It says all criminal cases. Plaintiff was tried, convicted, and sentenced for a criminal offense, even though he was arrested for a civil offense.

Grace v. Burger, 214 U. S. App. D.C., 375, 665 F. 2d 1193 (1981)                     
161. The Court of Appeals determined that the District Court's dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was erroneous and went on to strike down 40 U. S. C. § 13k on its face as an unconstitutional restriction on First Amendment rights. 40 U. S. C. § 13k states:

 “§13k. Parades or assemblages; display of flags; Supreme Court Building and grounds

It shall be unlawful to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display therein any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.”


United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171–Supreme Court 1983
162. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court.

“In this case we must determine whether 40 U. S. C. § 13k, which prohibits, among other things, the "display [of] any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement"[1] in the United States Supreme Court building and on its grounds, violates the First Amendment.”

“Based on its provisions and legislative history, it is fair to say that the purpose of the Act was to provide for the protection of the building and grounds and of the persons and property therein, as well as the maintenance of proper order and decorum. Section 6, 40 U. S. C. § 13k, was one of the provisions apparently designed for these purposes. At least, no special reason was stated for its enactment.”

“We thus perceive insufficient justification for § 13k's prohibition of carrying signs, banners, or devices on the public sidewalks surrounding the building. We hold that under the First Amendment the section is unconstitutional as applied to those sidewalks. Of course, this is not to say that those sidewalks, like other sidewalks, are not subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, either by statute or by regulations issued pursuant to 40 U. S. C. § 13l.”


“The judgment below is accordingly affirmed to the extent indicated by this opinion and is otherwise vacated.”


163 JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring in part and dissenting in part

“I would hold 40 U. S. C. § 13k unconstitutional on its face. The statute in no way distinguishes the sidewalks from the rest of the premises, and excising the sidewalks from its purview does not bring it into conformity with the First Amendment. Visitors to this Court do not lose their First Amendment rights at the edge of the sidewalks any more than "students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Since the continuing existence of the statute will inevitably have a chilling effect on freedom of expression, there is no virtue in deciding its constitutionality on a piecemeal basis.”

“When a citizen is "in a place where [he] has every right to be," Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131, 142 (1966) (opinion of Fortas, J.,

joined by Warren, C. J., and Douglas, J.), he cannot be denied the opportunity to express his views simply because the Government has not chosen to designate the area as a forum for public discussion. While the right to conduct expressive activities in such areas as streets, parks, and sidewalks is reinforced by their traditional use for purposes of assembly, Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Black, J.), that right ultimately rests on the principle that "one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion." Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 416 (1943) (emphasis added). Every citizen lawfully present in a public place has a right to engage in peaceable and orderly expression that is not incompatible with the primary activity of the place in question, whether that place is a school,[1] a library,[2] a private lunch counter,[3] the grounds of a statehouse,[4] the grounds of the United States Capitol,[5] a bus terminal,[6] an airport,[7] or a welfare center.[8] As we stated in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972), "[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." "[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 163 (1939).”

“I see no reason why the premises of this Court should be exempt from this basic principle. It would be ironic indeed if an exception to the Constitution were to be recognized for the very institution that has the chief responsibility for protecting constitutional rights. I would apply to the premises of this Court the same principle that this Court has applied to other public places.”


“Viewed in this light, 40 U. S. C. § 13k is plainly unconstitutional on its face. The statute is not a reasonable regulation of time, place, and manner, cf., e. g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 87-89 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 575-576 (1941), for it applies at all times, covers the entire premises, and, as interpreted by the Court, proscribes even the handing out of a leaflet and, presumably, the wearing of a campaign button as well.[9]”


“Nor does the statute merely forbid conduct that is incompatible with the primary activity being carried out in this Court. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 116; Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 843 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). In contrast to 18 U. S. C. § 1507 (1976 ed., Supp. V) and the statute upheld in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965),[10] 40 U. S. C. § 13k is not limited to expressive activities that are intended to interfere with, obstruct, or impede the administration of justice. In Cox the Court stressed that a prohibition of expression "unrelated to any judicial proceedings" would raise "entirely different considerations." 379 U. S., at 567. The statute at issue here is a far cry from both 18 U. S. C. § 1507 (1976 ed., Supp. V) and the statute upheld in Cox, for it imposes a blanket prohibition on the "display" of any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement." (Emphasis added.) The application of the statute does not depend upon whether the flag, banner, or device in any way concerns a case before this Court. So sweeping a prohibition is scarcely necessary to protect the operations of this Court, and in my view cannot constitutionally be applied either to the Court grounds or to the areas inside the Court building that are open to the public.”

“I would therefore hold the prohibition unconstitutional on its face.[11] We have repeatedly recognized that a statute which sweeps within its ambit a broad range of expression protected by the First Amendment should be struck down on its face.[12] "The existence of such a statute . . . results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (footnote omitted). As JUSTICE BRENNAN stated in his opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963), First Amendment freedoms "are delicate and vulnerable," and "[t]he threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions." I would not leave visitors to this Court subject to the continuing threat of imprisonment[13] if they dare to exercise their First Amendment rights once inside the sidewalks.”

164. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

“On three occasions Zywicki distributed leaflets and handbills. I would not construe that activity as the "display" of any "flag, banner, or device." A typical passerby would not have learned Zywicki's message from the "display" of his literature. Only after the material left Zywicki's possession would his message have become intelligible.”

“On one occasion Grace carried a sign on which the text of the First Amendment was written. I agree that this was the "display" of a "device," but I do not agree that her device was "designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement." A typical passerby could not, merely by observing her sign, confidently link her with any specific party, organization, or "movement" as that term was understood when this statute was drafted.[*]”

“I see no reason to stretch the language of the statute to encompass the activities of either Zywicki or Grace. As a matter of statutory interpretation, we should not infer that Congress intended to abridge free expression in circumstances not plainly covered by the language of the statute. As a matter of judicial restraint, we should avoid the unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions.”

“Because neither of the appellees has violated the statute, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it requires that appellants be restrained from causing appellees' arrest for engaging in the activities disclosed by this record.”

165. It is noted that the opinion of the Supreme Court, as stated by Judge White, includes the statement:
 
“Of course, this is not to say that those sidewalks, like other sidewalks, are not subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, either by statute or by regulations issued pursuant to 40 U. S. C. § 13l.”

166. The previous statement accepts that time, place, and manner restrictions can be made either by statute or regulations, but not by court order.

167. Justice White also concluded that:

“Sidewalks, of course, are among those areas of public property that traditionally have been held open to the public for expressive activities and are clearly within those areas of public property that may be considered, generally without further inquiry, to be public forum property.”

168. Thus the conclusion that the sidewalk on which Plaintiffs were distributing pamphlets is a non-public forum is in direct conflict with that of the U. S. Supreme Court.

Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1370-71 (3d Cir. 1990)

169. Further court opinion that court plaza are public forums is given by Gregoire v. Centennial School District:

“A nonpublic forum "exists when publicly-owned facilities have been dedicated to use for either communicative or non-communicative purposes but have never been designated for indiscriminate expressive activity by the general public."

170. No evidence has been given that the sidewalk connecting the parking garage to the Orange County Courthouse in Orlando, FL has been dedicated to use for either communicative or non-communicative purposes.

171. Neither did Judge Perry’s Administrative Orders make such a claim.

Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F. 3d 53 - 2004
172. Judge Perry and the 3 appeals court judges claim that this case upholds judges rights to bar expressive opinion on courthouse property.

173.Actually the case did no such thing.


174 Huminski was attending a court case, not his own, as an observer.


175. He parked his vehicle in the court parking lot.

 
176. The vehicle was covered with signs derogatory of the court.

 
177. He was ordered to move his vehicle, but refused to do so.

 
178. He was evicted from the courtroom by order from Judge Nancy Corsones..

 
179. Huminski sued Judge Corsones in the U. S. District Court and was awarded damages by the District Court.

 
180. Corsones appealed to the U. S. Circuit Court of appeals.  Its opinion follows:

“The plaintiff, Scott Huminski, is a long-time critic of the Vermont justice system who has sought to disseminate his message using a wide variety of means and media. In 1997, he became infuriated by what he thought to be his mistreatment by Vermont judges and prosecutors in the course of criminal proceedings against him. He therefore began to include angry denunciations of them in his public communications. He apparently thought himself to be a legitimate gadfly — a quintessential example of what Justice White once referred to as the "lonely pamphleteer."[1] But Vermont judges and court personnel, against the background of then-recent acts of terrorism and violence, interpreted his behavior as a potential threat to personal safety, to court property, and to the orderly conduct of court business. Vermont officials therefore broadly prohibited Huminski's presence in and around certain state courthouses. Huminski complains that the restrictions are unconstitutional.”

“In traversing these waters, we must avoid foundering on either of opposing shoals. One is abridgment of the rights that the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, confers on members of the public and press to attend and report on judicial proceedings and to speak out on public issues. The other is impairment of the ability of courts effectively and efficiently to protect their personnel, property, and processes. We endeavor to chart a course between them.”

“We conclude that Huminski had an individual First Amendment right of access to court proceedings even though he was not a party to and had no other official connection with them. The right created a presumption that he was entitled to access, but one that could be overcome if court officials reasonably decided that he might pose a threat to persons, property, or proceedings and if the restrictions on his access were reasonably tailored to meet the legitimate goals of the exclusion. We conclude, however, that this individual right was not well-settled at the time of the events at issue here and that the defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity with respect thereto.”


“We also conclude that although the Rutland courthouses and grounds are nonpublic forums, singling Huminski out for a prohibition against his ability to express himself on any subject in those locations violated his First Amendment right to express himself.”


“In addition, we decide that defendants Sheriff Elrick, acting in his official capacity, and the Rutland County Sheriff's Department are protected by sovereign immunity from Huminski's lawsuit insofar as it seeks retrospective relief. We conclude, finally, that both Judge Corsones and Judge Zimmerman are entitled to judicial immunity with respect to these events.”


181. The Circuit Court stated that prohibiting Huminski “to express himself on those locations violated his First Amendment right to express himself;

182. However the Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the District Court verdict on the grounds ...”that both Judge Corsones and Judge Zimmerman are entitled to judicial immunity with respect to these events.”

183. Thus the U. S. Circuit Court did not argue that Judges Corsones and Zimmerman were correct, but only that they were immune from punishment.


184. On Aug. 21, 2002 Congress published a re-enactment of the law as 40 U.S.C. § 6135 : US Code - Section 6135: Parades, assemblages, and display of flags in the Supreme Court Building and grounds which states:

“It is unlawful to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display in the Building and grounds a flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice a party, organization, or movement.”

185. This law has not been enforced uniformly.

186. In 2012 there were demonstrators on the Supreme Court Plaza who were not arrested during Obamacare hearings.


187. Apparently the District of Columbia police enforce the law at its discretion.


188. Presumably this law is unconstitutional based on previous Supreme Court decisions.


189. In any event it only applies to the Supreme Court, but not to other courts.


190. Furthermore it does not apply either to single individuals nor to information dissemination.


191. Thus it has no pertinence in the current case involving Plaintiff Heicklen.


192. Edwin Fisher and Jamie Moses, the attorneys representing Judge Perry in this case, were the attorneys for Judge Perry in a previous similar court case.  Here follows a discussion of their previous memorandum of law.  (Fully Informed Jury Association, ETC, et al,. v. Honorable Chief Judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Case No. 5D11-708, March 25, 2011. submitted by John Edwin Fisher and Jamie Billotte Moses, Counsels for Judge Perry: posted at http://www.fija.org/docs/petitionresponse.pdf)


193. They admit in their brief that: “Ninth Circuit Administrative Order 2011-03, which is very narrowly drawn, restricts a specific, limited action by not allowing the influencing or attempted influencing of summoned jurors, while allowing such advocacy to everyone else.”


194. Of course that is exactly why the Administrative Order is unconstitutional–because it permits only some speech but not  all.


195. Furthermore the order permits the disallowed speech in the “free speech zones” where there is no public traffic, but not on the public sidewalk connecting the parking garage to the courthouse.


196. The Florida Appellate Court upheld this argument on the grounds that the sidewalk with many pedestrians who are passing literature (FIJA pamphlets, business cards, newspapers, court documents) and deputy sheriffs (who served Plaintiffs with the court orders) is not a public forum, while the free speech zones on the court plaza with no pedestrians are public forums.

 
197. Why is it that intelligent college graduates who understand the English language lose that skill after 3 years in law school?

 
198. Because the law schools teach how to avoid upholding the law.

 
199. The OPINION of the appeals court in this case is a classic example.

 
200. Fisher and Moses continue their explanation by claiming that “...it is more accommodating than what is required by the United States Constitution...”

 
201. Appellant Heicklen is under the impression that Amendment I to the United States Constitution states: “Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech.”


202. Why is it that lawyers do not understand the meaning of  “NO”?

 
203. The Petition goes on to state: “...it is apparent FIJA is not so much as attempting to ‘educate’ the public and jurors, but rather is simply attempting to espouse their views under free speech principles.”


204. Another lie.  Jury nullification is not our view.  It is the law of the land. (Thomas Regnier, 51 Santa Clara Law Review 775 (2811) “RESTORING THE FOUNDERS' IDEAL OF THE INDEPENDENT JURY IN CRIMINAL CASES”)

 
205. It  is required by the Constitutions of 24 states. 


206. Section 43.26, Part e of the Florida Statutes instructs the chief judge: “To do everything necessary to promote the prompt and efficient administration of justice in the courts over which he or she is chief judge.”


207. The Chief judge is not instructed to uphold the law.  He is instructed to see that justice is done. He can dismiss a case or grant a pardon

 
208. Other branches of government also can nullify the law.  The legislature can repeal a law. The executive can refuse to enforce the law or grant a pardon.  The police have the option of giving a citation or a warning.  If they give a warning, they have nullified the law.


209. Appellant Heicklen has personal proof of these statements.

210. In 1962, he was arrested for stealing a house in Wilmington, CA (a suburb of Los Angeles), which he acknowledged.  The charge was dismissed by the judge in the interest of justice.

211. In 1997, he was arrested twice for smoking marijuana in front of the Centre County Courthouse in Bellefonte, PA, and announcing it on a bullhorn.  On the recommendation of the district attorney, the cases were dismissed by the judge in the interest of justice.


212. In 2007, he was arrested for refusing to obey an order of a police officer to move from across the street of the UN Building in New York City.  On the recommendation of the NY County District Attorney, the judge dismissed the case in the interest of justice.


213. Plaintiff Heicklen has been cited 13 times at 3 U. S. District Court plazas for violating U. S. Regulation 410 CFR §102–74.415(c) against pamphleting on federal property. 

 
214. At 9 of these incidents he was taken into custody and transferred to 5 different hospitals, where he was tortured 7 times in 3 of these hospitals 

 
215. He did not pay any the fines, nor appear at any court hearings.  All 13 charges were dismissed by the U. S. Attorneys, who decided that the regulations were unconstitutional.

 
216. Plaintiff Heicklen was cited at the U. S. District Court in Santa Ana, CA.  on April 14, 2011 for failure to obey the order of a DHS officer to leave the property (Disobey: 18 U.S.C. §111A).  Plaintiff Heicklen did not pay the fine nor appear at the court hearing.  The citation has not been enforced, even though Plaintiff Heicklen made a public appearance and gave a speech with considerable publicity in Orange County, CA . (Freedom Law Conference, March 16-19, 2012).

 
    217. A complete description of the FIJA distribution events is given at http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/FIJADemonstrations.html

 
218. Nullification is even a religious commandment.

 
219. God’s commandment to the judges is: “justice, justice thou shall pursue” (Deuteronomy16:20).

 
220. In 2012 the New Hampshire legislature passed a law prohibiting punishment of a lawyer who informs the jury during trial of its duty.

 
221. In the case of Doug Darrell in New Hampshire, the judge informed the jury of its right to nullify.  The jury did just that.


222. Also in 2012, there were two other jury nullification cases:  (See p. 16.)


223. In support of its argument that a court can declare a court plaza a non-public forum attorneys Fisher and Moses quote Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788 (1985).

“Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.  Nothing in the Constitution requires the government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker’s activities.”

224. The previous statement has no relevance to this case.  Appellants were not giving speeches.  “The Constitution does not require the government to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech...”  It also does not give the government the right to deny free speech anywhere.  It may be reasonable to deny a random speech but the government does not have the right to arrest anyone for passing a pamphlet to his adjacent neighbor, even in a courtroom.

225. The bailiffs walk all over the courtrooms handing out documents and requesting signatures.

226. Contrary to what the Counsels for the Defendant claim, U. S. v. Grace found  the Courthouse plazas to be public forums.  It was Cox v. Louisiana that claimed otherwise, but were overruled by the U. S. Supreme Court in U. S. v. Grace.

227. In United States v. Kokinda, 497, U. S. 720 (1990), an organization was stopped from soliciting funds on a post office plaza.

228. Soliciting money is not speech, it is business.  That is not a protected right on a public forum.

229. The rest of the Fisher and Moses arguments are based on the incorrect conclusion that the courthouse plaza is not a public forum.
 
230. Massive demonstrations were held on the U. S. Supreme Courthouse plaza during the Roe. v. Wade [Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)] and Obamacare trials [567 U. S. ____ (2012)].  For the OPINIONS in the Obamacare trial see: /www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/11-393c3a2.pdf

Florida Appeals Court Opinion
231. The ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER GOVERNING EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT  TOWARD SUMMONED JURORS, ORANGE COUNTY  states:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Article V, section 2(d) of the Florida Constitution and section 43.26, Florida Statutes, the chief judge of each judicial circuit is charged with the authority and the power to do everything necessary to promote the prompt and efficient administration of justice;”

232. Unfortunately the judges violate their duty by lying to jurors twice when they instruct the jury to uphold the law as he gives it.  This is a deliberate act of perjury.

233. It is not the duty of the jury to uphold the law.  The juries duty is to see that justice is done (Florida 2011 Florida Statutes, Section 43.26, Part e).
234. Furthermore, if the jury decides to uphold the law, it must not be the law as given by the judge, but the law written in the statute. 

235. If the jurors do not have a written copy of the statute, they must acquit based on reasonable doubt.

236. It is the distributors of FIJA literature who are upholding Section 43.26, Part e of the 2011 Florida Statutes: “To do everything necessary to promote the prompt and efficient administration of justice in the courts...”

237. The FL Appeals Court proceeds to defend Administrative Order 2011–07 even though it has ruled that order unconstitutional.

United States v. Julian Heicklen, U. S.  District Court SDNY 10 CR 1154 (KMW)  April 19, 2012 Opinion and Order of Judge Kimba Wood at:
http://constitution.org/jury/pj/10-cr-01154-KMW_order.pdf
238. This case is discussed in great detail for 3 reasons;

a. It is the most recent decision regarding jury tampering.
b. Heicklen was the Defendant in the case for doing exactly the same things he did at the Orange County Courthouse.
c. The Opinion of Judge Wood is the most comprehensive of any previous opinion.

239. On November 18, 2010, Julian Heicklen was indicted by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of New York for jury tampering, because he distributed FIJA pamphlets and a flyer on the plaza in front of the U. S. District Court in Manhattan, NY, on at least 11 occasions.

240. The flyer read:

“THE JUDGE WILL TELL THE JURY THAT IT MUST UPHOLD THE LAW AS HE GIVES IT.

HE WILL BE LYING

THE JURY MUST JUDGE THE LAW AS WELL AS THE FACTS

JURIES WERE INSTITUTED TO PROTECT THE CITIZENS FROM THE TYRANNY OF GOVERNMENT

IT IS NOT THE DUTY OF THE JURY TO UPHOLD THE LAW

IT IS THE JURY’S DUTY TO SEE THAT JUSTICE IS DONE

241. The charge was violating 18 U. S. C. § 1504 by writing which reads:

Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury.

242. The opinion of Judge Wood states in part:

“The statute thus prohibits a defendant from trying to influence a juror upon any case or point in dispute before that juror by means of a written communication in relation to that case or that point in dispute.  It also prohibits a defendant from trying to influence a juror’s actions or decisions pertaining to that juror’s duties, but only if the defendant made that communication in writing.”

“Accordingly, the Court reads the plain text of the statute to require that a defendant must have sought to influence a juror through a written communication in relation either to a specific case before that juror or to a substantive point in dispute between two or more parties before that juror.”

“As discussed below, the holdings of federal cases brought under similar statutes indicate that a broad reading of 18 U.S.C. § 1504 could raise First Amendment problems because of its potential to chill speech about judicial proceedings. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”18    U.S. Const., Amend. I. The Supreme Court has emphasized that “the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. . . . It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (internal quotations omitted).”

“Although “political speech by its nature will sometimes have unpalatable consequences, . . . in general, our society accords greater weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995). The First Amendment reflects “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). “Indeed, the Amendment exists so that this debate can occur—robust, forceful, and contested. It is the theory of the Free Speech Clause that ‘falsehood and fallacies’ are exposed through ‘discussion,’ ‘education,’ and ‘more speech.’” Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S.Ct. 2806, 2835 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). That is because “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” Snyder,131 S.Ct. at 1215 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).”

“In Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), the Supreme Court addressed a situation in which petitioners had been found guilty of contempt by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for letters pertaining to pending litigation that they had published in local newspapers. Finding that the “unqualified prohibitions laid down by the framers [in the First Amendment] were intended to give to liberty of the press, as to the other liberties, the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly society,” the Supreme Court determined that the First Amendment protected out- of-court publications pertaining to a pending case just as much as it protected any other type of speech. Id. at 268. Given the significant impact of the contempt convictions on freedom of expression, the Court held that the convictions could be justified only in reference to a “clear and present danger” to the administration of justice, and it found that the facts of the case did not constitute such a danger.    Id. at 263-305.”

“In Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), the Supreme Court considered again “the scope of the constitutional protection to be enjoyed by persons when the publication of their thoughts and opinions is alleged to be in conflict with the fair administration of justice.” Id. at 376. In that case, a judge of the Bibb County Superior Court issued a charge to a grand jury to investigate public corruption. Wood, the elected sheriff in Bibb County, issued a press release attacking the judge’s charge. Wood then distributed to the grand jury a letter implying that the allegations in the charge were false and urging the jury to investigate instead the Bibb County Democratic Executive. Id. at 380. Wood was convicted of contempt. Id. at 380-81. Starting with the premise that “the right of courts to conduct their business in an untrammeled way lies at the foundation of our system of government,” the Court nevertheless found that when the contempt power is used to punish speech, especially speech outside the presence of the court, the contempt power is limited by the First Amendment. Id. at 383. The Court held that the facts in Wood did not constitute a clear and present danger to the administration of justice, and that, to the contrary, Wood’s speech was the very type of activity envisioned by the First Amendment as supplying “the public need for information and education with respect to the significant issues of the times.”20    Id. at 388.
Decisions applying the clear and present danger test articulated in Bridges and Wood have consistently held that speech may be restricted only if that speech “is directed to inciting or producing” a threat to the administration of justice that is both “imminent” and likely to materialize. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Turney v. Pugh, 400 F. 3d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 179 (2d Cir. 2006) (reiterating the salience of the “clear and present danger test” in a different First Amendment context).”

“Bridges and Wood establish the principal that in order to be restricted, speech about judicial proceedings must present a clear and present danger to the administration of justice.21  In Turney v. Pugh, the Ninth Circuit considered a prosecution under Alaska’s jury tampering statute and identified speech to jurors that did present a clear and present danger.22    400 F. 3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005).”

“In that case, a friend of Frank Turney’s was on trial for violation of a state criminal statute prohibiting a felon from possessing a firearm. Turney approached three members of the venire of that case, while they were inside the courthouse wearing badges identifying themselves as jurors, and he instructed them to call FIJA’s toll-free number, which greeted callers with a recorded message informing them about their “rights as jurors” and allowed them to leave their addresses in order to receive more information by mail. Turney v. State, 936 P.2d 533, 536-37 (Alaska 1997). In addition to focusing on the case because it involved his personal friend, Turney was also interested because he was a critic of that particular state statute, having himself been previously convicted under a similar statute in another state. Id. Two of the members of the venire that Turney approached were selected for the petit jury, and one of them announced to the other deliberating jurors that he had called FIJA’s toll-free number and that he was changing his vote in the case as a result. Id. at 537. The jury could not reach a decision and was excused. Id.”

“Prior to his trial for jury tampering, Turney raised an interlocutory appeal challenging the state jury tampering statute as unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness. Turney argued that the statute did not link the crime of jury tampering to communications intended to influence a juror’s actions with regard to a particular case and that therefore the statute had a “reach so wide that virtually any communication to a juror may be criminal.” Id. at 539 (internal quotation omitted; emphasis in original). Agreeing that there could be constitutional problems with such a far-reaching statute, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the statute was not overbroad because it required “a specific intention to influence how jurors decide a particular case” as well as knowledge that he or she is communicating with a juror. Id. at 541 (emphasis added). Turney was subsequently convicted at trial of three counts of jury tampering.”

“Turney’s habeas petition was denied. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that “the First Amendment, while generally quite protective of speech concerning judicial proceedings, does not shield the narrow but significant category of communications to jurors made outside of the auspices of the official proceeding and aimed at improperly influencing the outcome of a particular case.” Turney, 400 F.3d at 1203. Accordingly, the court held that the Alaska Supreme Court’s conclusion that the jury tampering statute was constitutional was not “a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Id. at 1205.”

“The relevant cases establish that the First Amendment squarely protects speech concerning judicial proceedings and public debate regarding the functioning of the judicial system, so long as that speech does not interfere with the fair and impartial administration of justice. In Wood, the Supreme Court held that even speech to a grand juror may be protected by the First Amendment if it does not present a clear and present danger to the functioning of the courts. 370 U.S. at 395. At the same time, the First Amendment does not create a right to influence juries outside of official proceedings, Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 366 (1946) (Frankfurter, J. concurring), because “[d]ue process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences.” Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966). Consistent with this interpetation, the court in Turney found that the narrow category of speech knowingly made to jurors outside of an official proceeding and “with the intent to influence the outcome of a specific case” was not protected by the First Amendment. 400 F.3d at 1201 (emphasis in original).”

“A broad construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1504 that encompassed speech to a juror on any subject that could be considered by a juror would arguably chill protected speech because it could sweep within its prohibitions speech that was not made with the intent of influencing the outcome of a particular case and that did not pose a clear and present danger to the administration of justice.”

“Based upon the plain meaning of the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1504, reinforced by relevant judicial interpretations and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Court holds that a person violates the statute only when he knowingly attempts to influence the action or decision of a juror upon an issue or matter pending before that juror or pertaining to that juror’s duties by means of written communication made in relation to a specific case pending before that juror or in relation to a point in dispute between the parties before that juror.

D. The Sufficiency of the Indictment as a Matter of Law
“Heicklen’s alleged actions do not violate 18 U.S.C. § 1504. The Indictment alleges that Heicklen “distributed pamphlets urging jury nullification, immediately in front of an entrance to the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York.” (¶ 1.) Both pamphlets discuss the role of juries in society and urge jurors to follow their consciences regardless of instructions on the law.”

“Heicklen’s pamphlets self-evidently pertain to a “juror’s duties,” satisfying the requirements for liability under the second element of 18 U.S.C. § 1504. To satisfy the requirements for liability under the third element of 18 U.S.C. § 1504, however, the pamphlets must have been written or distributed in relation to an “issue or matter” pending before that juror. The two pamphlets do not relate to an “issue” pending before a juror, because a juror’s duties are not a point in dispute between the parties to a suit. Understanding “matter” to mean “case,” the pamphlets could trigger liability under the statute’s third element if they were distributed in relation to a particular case pending before a juror. But unlike in Turney, there is no allegation that Heicklen distributed the pamphlets in relation to a specific case. Indeed, the Government concedes that it “does not allege that the defendant targeted a particular jury or a particular issue.” (Govt.’s Mem. at 28.)”

“The Government agrees that the pamphlets pertain to a juror’s duties but argues that they also relate to “an issue or matter” because they could encourage a juror to follow her conscience instead of the law, thus affecting the outcome of a case. Every aspect of how a juror renders a verdict has the potential to influence the outcome of a case, however, and thus any communication pertaining to a juror’s duties would also relate to an issue or matter. Such an expansive interpretation of “issue or matter” would render completely meaningless the distinction that the statute draws between “issue or matter” and “a juror’s duties.”24    “[A] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009); Aleynikov, 2012 WL 1193611 at *8. Indeed, it is possible to give effect to every word of 18 U.S.C. § 1504, by finding that influencing the actions or decisions of a juror “pertaining to his duties” means something distinct from influencing the actions or decisions of a juror “upon any issue or matter before such juror” and that both types of influence must have been made by means of a written communication in relation to a specific case or point in dispute before that juror in order to be punishable.”

“Because the Indictment does not allege that Heicklen attempted to influence a juror through a written communication made in relation to a specific case before a juror or in relation to a point in dispute before a juror, the Court finds that the Indictment fails to state all of the elements of the offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 1504 and must be dismissed as legally insufficient.”

“Even if the Court were to conclude that the second and third elements were susceptible to a broader reading, that reading would at most render 18 U.S.C. § 1504 facially ambiguous. See Aleynikov, 2012 WL 1193611 at *9. “[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity,” Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971), and courts should construe an ambiguous criminal statute so as to apply it only to conduct that is clearly covered. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961); Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266 (1997). Given the ambiguity in the statute, Heicklen could not have known that his actions would violate 18 U.S.C. § 1504.”

“The Court’s holding merely maintains the existing balance that federal courts have found between freedom of speech and the administration of justice. Attempts to tamper with a jury in order to influence the outcome of a trial or a grand jury proceeding are still clearly prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and 18 U.S.C. § 1504. Efforts to distribute leaflets to jurors in the immediate vicinity of courthouses may still be sanctioned through reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions such as those promulgated pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 1315 and 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.415(c). The Court declines to stretch the interpretation of the existing statute prohibiting communications with a juror in order to cover speech that is not meant to influence the actions of a juror with regard to a point in dispute before that juror or the outcome of a specific case before that juror.”

“CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Indictment is GRANTED. The Defendant's other motions are now moot and are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.”
The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. Any pending motions are moot
KIMBA M. WOOD United States District Judge

243. A comprehensive description of the case is given at: http://www.personal.psu.edu/jph13/US._v._JPH_in_Manhattan_NY_04_17_12.html

IS THE COURTHOUSE PLAZA  A  PUBLIC FORUM?

244. Judge Perry and the Florida Appellate judges claim that courthouse plazas are not public forums.

245. To support their position they cite Cox v. Louisiana, U. S. v. Grace et al. and Huminski v. Corsones.

246.  In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965) the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled that the property around the courts is not a public forum, and thus can be regulated. However in United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171–Supreme Court 1983, the U. S. Supreme court disagreed and stated: “For the reasons discussed above the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is reversed.”

247. A U. S. Circuit Court conceded in Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F. 3d 53 (2004) that Huminski had the right to protest on the court parking lot and plaza.
 
248. In spite of these conclusions, Judge Perry and the three appellate court judges (Lawson, Evander, and Cohen) willingly and with knowledge beforehand were willing to commit perjury to defend their incorrect interpretation of the court decisions.

249. Their decisions were intentional perjury, since all four judges had previously been notified by Plaintiff Heicklen of the correct opinions expressed in the above-mentioned court cases. http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/Letter_to_Perry_5-17-11.html and(http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/Punish_Judge_Perry_12-2-12.html).

250.  The judiciary is not the only law enforcement agency that violated its oath to uphold the U. S. Constitution.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had attempted to enforce U. S. Regulation 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.415 (c) which states:

“Distributing materials, such as pamphlets, handbills or flyers, unless conducted as part of authorized Government activities. This prohibition does not apply to public areas of the property as defined in § 102-71.20 of this chapter. However, any person or organization proposing to distribute materials in a public area under this section must first obtain a permit from the building manager as specified in subpart D of this part. Any such person or organization must distribute materials only in accordance with the provisions of subpart D of this part. Failure to comply with those provisions is a violation of these regulations.”

251. Plaintiff Heicklen, with the help of others, embarked on a mission to return courthouse plazas to open forums for dissemination of jury nullification literature.

252. On some occasions, Plaintiff was also cited for Impeding/Opposing Federal Officer, 18 U.S.C. §111A


FIJA demonstrations
253.  Plaintiff has distributed FIJA literature all over the country as shown in Table 1. In summary, Plaintiff has distributed jury nullification information 65 times at federal courthouses in 13 states and  17 times at state courthouses in 5 states during a 3 year period from October, 2009 to June, 2012.  These distributions occurred in 41 different cities.

254. InInitially Plaintiff was given 7 citations for distributing literature on federal property, 2 citations for disobeying a police officer, 1 citation for conformity (whatever that is). He was taken into custody 15 times in 5 states on these charges, as well as for no charge in one case, a warrant from a previous arrest when he refused to move from the sidewalk across from the UN building.  Once he was not charged with anything, just hauled away.  This current case resulted from his disobeying a court order in Orlando.

255. He was taken to 5 different hospitals on 10 occasions where he has been tortured in four of them.  Furthermore he was indicted for jury tampering by a grand jury in Manhattan.  In addition his photographer was cited for photographing on federal property.

256. Everyone of the charges against Plaintiff Heicklen, except for the current contempt charge, has been dismissed by the courts upon the recommendation of the U. S. Attorneys or by court order.  As shown by the table, the citations and arrests were done regularly at first in conformance with illegal regulations and improper arrests.  As time went on, the police were ordered to stop harassing our jury nullification education program and leave us alone.  Apparently law enforcement officials in Orlando did not get the message yet.

257. Plaintiff is not the only one sending the message.  Courts all over the country are receiving the message.  Table 2 lists some of the courthouses across the country that are receiving the message with the names of the messengers.

258. It should be clear that courthouses all over the country are being targeted without interference.  The same must hold in Orlando to avoid selective enforcement.  Courthouse plazas are public forums in fact.  Judges incorrect opinions to the contrary will not change that truth nor prevent the people from using the plazas as such.

JURY NULLIFICATION

259. No one involved in this case actually believes that the courthouse plaza is not a public forum.

260. The most recent and thorough U. S. District Court decision to affirm that courthouse plazas are public forums was given by Judge Kimba Wood in United States v. Julian Heicklen, U. S. District Court, Southern District of New York in Manhattan, Case # 10 CR 1154 (KMW) 27 pages “Opinion and Order”, April 19, 2012.

261. Even Judge Perry knows that the courthouse plaza is a public forum, or he would not have created free speech zones.  In fact he would have done everything to see that there were no free speech zones.

262.This case is not about courthouse plazas or free speech.

263. It is about control of the judiciary over the citizens.

264. Every time a judge instructs the jury that it must uphold the law as he gives it, he is committing perjury twice and violating his oath to uphold the Constitutions of the
U. S. and his state.

265. The Constitutions of 24 states instruct the jury that it has the right to not enforce the law, just as does any other organ of the government.

266. Section 43.26, Part e of the Florida Statutes instructs the chief judge: “To do everything necessary to promote the prompt and efficient administration of justice in the courts over which he or she is chief judge.”

267 Informing juries that their duty is to administer justice is exactly what the statute requires and what Heicklen was instructing pedestrians, including jurors, to do.
 
268. This is not only United States law, it also is God’s law (Deuteronomy 16:20)

"JUSTICE, JUSTICE THOU SHALL PURSUE”
 
269. It is not the duty of the jury to uphold thee law.  It is the jury’s duty to se that justice is done.

270. “Hate evil, love good; maintain justice in the courts:” (Amos 5:15)

271. If the jury decides to uphold the law, it must be the law in the written statute, not the often incorrect version that the judge provides.

272. If the jurors do not have copies of the written statutes, there is reasonable doubt.  Then the jury must acquit.

273. There is a long and glorious history for jury nullification in this country.  The most recent comprehensive discussion is given by Regnier (51 Santa Clara Law Review 775 (2011) “RESTORING THE FOUNDERS' IDEAL OF THE INDEPENDENT JURY IN CRIMINAL CASES.”)
 
274. The courts frowned on jury nullification, especially because it infringed on its power. Jury nullification did some marvelous things, such as give us freedom of religion and the press, as well as the repeal of the illegality of liquor, and refusing to return fugitive slaves to their masters.
 
275. The 1895 decision in Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) written by Justice John Marshall Harlan held that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws. It was a 5-4 decision.

276 This decision, often cited, has led to a common practice by United States judges to penalize anyone who attempts to present this legal argument to jurors, and to declare a mistrial if such argument has been presented to them.

277.  Of course, the Sparf decision does not outlaw jury nullification. It just demands that it be kept secret.
 
278. What a system of law!  Do you not understand why it must be corrected?

279. On June 18, 2012 New Hampshire Governor John Lynch signed HB 146, which reads:

"[A] Right of Accused. In all criminal proceedings the court shall permit the defense to inform the jury of its right to judge the facts and the application of the law in relation to the facts in controversy."

Jury nullification trials in 2012
280. In a felony charge against Doug Darrell for possession of marijuana in New Hampshire, the Judge actually informed the jury of its right to nullify, which it did. See: http://releaf.co/?tag=jury-nullification

281. In two other felony possession of marijuana cases, the juries nullified the law and acquitted the accused. One of these cases was in California (http://www.correntewire.com/jury_nullification_ca_grower)


282. The third case was in New Jersey (http://www.bing.com/search?q=Ed+forchion+acquited&form=APMCS1)


283. A fourth case was in Minnesota where a milk dealer is selling certified milk, to his customers who order it, in violation of Minnesota law (http://www.canadianconstitutionfoundation.ca/article.php/170)


PERJURY BY JUDGES

284. Both Judge Perry and the 3 appellate judges who wrote the court OPINION deliberately committed perjury with 2 known blatant lies.

285. One lie was that a U. S. Circuit Court in Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F. 3d 53 (2004) had upheld a trial court’s decision to ban expressive speech in the court parking lot. 

286. The district trial court found Judge Corsones guilty of violating Huminski’s First Amendment rights. 

287. The Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Huminski’s right, but reversed the decision based on judicial immunity.


288. In the other claim, Judge Perry stated that in United States v. Grace, 461 US 171 - 1983, the Supreme Court upheld U. S. Statute 40 U. S. C. § 13k which permits banning pamphleteering on court plazas. 


289.Actually the Supreme Court declared that statute unconstitutional. 


290. Furthermore the Supreme Court proclaimed that free speech on court plazas could not be banned by court order.


291. Judge Perry knew that he was lying, because he had made these claims in another court decision ((http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/Perry_Reply_2_5_11.html).  Plaintiff had written to him at that time pointing out his errors (http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/Letter_to_Perry_5-17-11.html)


292. Both lies were repeated and upheld by the appellate court judges in their OPINION of December 21, 2012.

COURT OPINION WASTED 2 PAGES CLAIMING THAT
THE PLAZA IS NOT A PUBLIC FORUM

293. The judges knew that they were lying, because Appellant had notified the Court by a letter of December 5, 2012, of the erroneous claims.

294. Why if it that young adults who speak and understand the English language spend 3 years in law school and lose the meaning of the language?


295. Because they are not taught in law school how to uphold the law.


296. They are taught how to avoid upholding the law.  That is why they will get paid.


297. As a result, they think that English words have the opposite meaning than that  used by the general public.


COURT IRREGULARITIES

298. In the opinion of Plaintiff, the appeals court made some strange procedural decisions.

299. Plaintiff submitted an opening brief in June, 2012, but the court refused to accept it.


300. Apparently the reason was because his attorney had submitted a brief, so  Plaintiff had no standing.


301. However, Judge Perry submitted a brief that was accepted, even though he has no standing in this case.

 
302. The Appellee is the State of Florida, not Judge Perry.

 
303. Furthermore the State of Florida has several lawyers representing it.

 
304. These include Attorney General Pam Bondi, Mr. Moses, and Mr. Fisher.


305.  However both Appellants were only allowed one lawyer for both of them.

 
306. DEFENSE DID NOT SUBMIT AN ANSWER, SO THE COURT ACTED AS THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY IN ITS OPINION.


CLAIMS


307. Contents of pamphlets are not an issue, since Judge Perry permitted their distribution in the free speech zones.

308. There is no doubt about the validity of jury nullification.


309. It is required by the Constitutions of 24 states and by several court decisions.


310. The New Hampshire governor signed a law [HB146 (2011)] on June 18, 2012 requiring the state’s judges to permit defense attorneys to inform jurors of their right to nullify the law.

 
311. At least 4 court cases were decided by jury nullification recently in 4 different states (CA, MN, NH, NJ).

 
312. Judges lie twice when they instruct jurors that they must uphold the law as they give it.


313. There is even a biblical command of  “Justice, justice, thou shall pursue.”


314. The U. S. attorneys have dismissed all citations for distributing literature or photography on federal courthouse plazas.

315.  There previously had been unequal enforcement, since most distributions were not prohibited on courthouse plazas (see Tables at the end of this MEMORANDUM OF LAW).

316. The indictment for jury tampering in the U. S. District Court SDNY was dismissed as without merit (Judge Kimba Wood in United States v. Julian Heicklen, U. S. District Court, Southern District of New York in Manhattan, Case # 10 CR 1154 (KMW) 27 pages “Opinion and Order”, April 19, 2012).

317. The “Free Speech Zones” established by Judge Perry was an act of bad faith, since there is no pedestrian traffic in those areas.

318. At the Orange County Courthouse in Orlando, the public sidewalk connecting the parking garage to the courthouse certainly is a public forum, since other people, including deputy sheriffs, were freely passing literature.

319. Furthermore the Grace decision bars enforcement through court orders.

320. When Plaintiff was arrested and brought to court, he exercised his Amendment V right to remain silent

321. For that, he was sentenced to 22 days in jail in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Florida Constitution.
 
322. At intake, all his papers, including legal documents were taken by the guards and destroyed In violation of the Florida Constitution, Article I. Section 16.

323. Plaintiff was denied access to the law library for the full 22 days in violation of the Florida Constitution, Article I. Section 24.  Access to public records and meetings.—

(a) “Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting on their behalf, except with respect to records exempted pursuant to this section or specifically made confidential by this Constitution. This section specifically includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government and each agency or departmenteated thereunder; counties, municipalities, and districts; and each constitutional officer, board, and commission, or entity created pursuant to law or this Constitut crion.”

324. During his stay in jail, he sent 3 messages to Judge Perry asking for a jury trial.

325. He was denied a jury trial in violation of Amendment VI of the U. S. Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Florida Constitution..


326. Furthermore Article I, Section 22 of the Florida Constitution states: “Trial by jury.—The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate;”

 
327. Plaintiff was denied the right to confront 5 of the 8 witnesses in violation of the Florida Constitution Article I, Section 16.

 
328. Judge Perry was the plaintiff and the prosecuting attorney, so it was not an impartial trial.


329. Judge Perry included incorrect information in his report to the appeals court not presented in the criminal  trial.


330. The trial judge and all 3 appellate judges committed perjury by purposely lying about two court decisions.


Appellate court errors

331. All three appellate court judges committed perjury as described above.

332. In particular their whole opinion is based on the contention that the courthouse plaza is not a public forum, in direct conflict with law, practice, and tradition.


333. This was malicious, since Judge Perry had already confirmed (or established)that the courthouse plaza is a public forum by establishing “Free Speech Zones.”


334. Plaintiff submitted a brief, but it was rejected, and he is a litigant.


335. Judge Perry submitted a brief, which was accepted, and he is not even a litigant in this appeal. The State of FL is the litigant.


336. The defense attorneys did not respond to Plaintiff’s opening brief, which essentially is a nolo contendere position. The conviction should have been overturned based on the failure to provide an answer.


RELIEF REQUESTED

337. Plaintiff Heicklen requests the following relief:

a. A monetary award of attorney fee of $5000,
b. Filing fee for this appeal, if any,
c. Return of expenses in the Orange County Jail,
d. Return of the bail bondsman fee of $1200,
e. An award of $22,000 for the time spent in jail,
f. An award of $100,000 for aggravation and time devoted to fighting this case.
g. Nullification of the FL Appeals Court Order, if issued.

CONCLUSION

338. This trial has been very unusual.

339. Both Plaintiffs Heicklen and Schmidter, as well as the trial judge, Belvin Perry, believe that a courthouse plaza is a public forum. even though Judge Perry may not admit it.

340. That is why the Plaintiffs distributed their information there and refused to desist when threatened with arrest.

341. Judge Perry disapproved of the information, because it was true, so he devised what he thought would be a method to prevent it.

342. He established free speech zones to claim that he had not violated Amendment I of the U. S. Constitution and Article  I, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution.

343. As a mechanism to prevent free speech elsewhere, he issued a court order, which he believed he could enforce.

344. It was selective enforcement, because he only arrested those distributing the specific FIJA literature.

345. No effort was made to prohibit dissemination of other literature, which was done freely by pedestrians, news agencies, photographers, and deputy sheriffs.

346. The appellate court judges unanimously disagreed with all the litigants and claimed that the courthouse plaza was not a public forum, in direct conflict with all the litigants and all previous court decisions that they mentioned which had not been reversed.
347. To support their position, they declared Administrative Order 2011-07 vague and unconstitutional, because it established free speech zones.
 
348. Ironically in the current complaint, it is really the appellate court judges who are on trial against both Plaintiff Heicklen and Chief Judge Perry who disagree with them.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

    Plaintiff Heicklen certifies that this document entitled memorandum of law has been submitted on January 15, 2013, by either E-mail or post office mail, as designated below, to the following:

Pamela R. Masters, Clerk, District Court of Appeal, State of Florida, 300 South Beach Street, Daytona Beach, FL 32114

Mark Schmidter mschmidter@gmail.com

John Edwin Fisher jfisher@fisherlawfirm.com, msheets@fisherlawfirm.com

Jamie Billotte Moses jmoses@fisherlawfirm.com, choward@fisherlawfirm.com

Adam Harold Sudbury adam@sudburylaw.net, inbox@sudburylaw.net



_________________
Julian Heicklen
Plaintiff
Counsel Pro Se

January 15, 2013
Date      


Table 1: HEICKLEN FIJA DISTRIBUTIONS
For a full discussion of these events see:
http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/j/p/jph13/FIJADemonstrations.html



TABLE 2: OTHER FIJA DISTRIBUTIONS AT COURTHOUSES

Mike Benoit
On Jan 4, 2013, at 9:44 PM, MB Libertarian7 wrote:

Julian, At the San Diego Superior Court both the downtown branch and our Vista branch we have passed out FIJA flyers approximately 5 times per year for the last 10 years. We do not have specific dates. I did this with my friend Dann (no last name) and Shawn Fox at the downtown branch and Mike Paster and Bill Hasty did it at the Vista branch approximately 20 times in the last two years.

Mike
______________________

David Lonier
On Jan 4, 2013, at 10:19 PM, David Lonier wrote:

circa November 2011.  Myself, David Lonier and four others held signs
critical of the judicial system and handed out FIJA flyers to anyone who
would take them…about 50%.
Law enforcement was aware of our presence, but did not interfere.
 
I can provide an affidavit if necessary.
 
Oakland County Michigan Court Building
1200 N. Telegraph Road
Pontiac, Michigan  48341
_________________________

Ian Freeman and others
On Jan 4, 2013, at 10:24 PM, Ian Freeman wrote:

Cheshire County Superior Court in New Hampshire
Been doing outreach at every jury selection date for the last several years.
Only a few minor encounters with police - once, they told us to stop being courteous and holding the door open for people.  We ignored their demand.  Here's video:
http://freekeene.com/2010/05/17/dont-be-courteous/

I have done jury nullification as has David Crawford, Conan Salada, Keith Carlsen, and many more.

We'll be out there again Monday morning.  We don't just do jury outreach any old time.  We do it in front of the court 40 minutes prior to when potential jurors arrive to 15 minutes past that time, so we hit everyone in that pool (as well as anyone else who happens to walk in)

Glad that helps,
Ian
From Ian Freeman: January 5, 2013 11:48:19 PM GMT+02:00
_______________________________

John Burton
On Jan 5, 2013, at 2:10 AM, john r burton wrote:

As you recall, Julian, you and I were arrested by Officer Ponce, then un-arrested by Sheriff Long, on the LA County Courthouse "steps" on April 15th two years ago.

Perhaps you could also show evidence of demonstrations staged on courthouse plazas by other interests that were not harassed, so as to argue "selective prosecution": demonstrations with messages that the reigning powers would have approved of, for example. Or anti-death penalty type demos that were not "permitted"... Of course if any demo there was ever permitted you could argue that it is indeed a public forum. be sure and show then Andrew Napolitano's YouTube vid too.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MetUKQqXO-o

John Burton

You and Mark are both good Americans.
Thanks for posting my letter to Belvin. 
___________________________________

Mark Axinn
On Jan 5, 2013, at 4:06 PM, Mark Axinn wrote:

Hi Julian.

I did FIJA demonstation with Bob Goodman (he's no longer LP) in 1994 or 95 in front of Brooklyn (Kings County, NY) Supreme Courthouse. Bob was arrested for tamering with a sequestered jury (trumped up charge).

I was not.

Mark Axinn
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry   
________________________________

Dann Libertarian and others
On January 5, 2013 9:37:01 PM GMT+02:00, Dann wrote:

julian, hi!
                   i saw the e-mail that you sent mike in re passing out fija material at court houses.

i, along with mike and others have passed out fija material at the courthouse on broadway in san diego, i have passed out fija material in el cajon, ca; i have passed out fija material in vista, ca; and i have passed out fija material here in new hampshire with other new hampshirites.    i have been doing this over about the last 10 years.

i can't remember any of the dates - or even what years i did it, but if i can offer any other help please let me know..?


yours in the struggle to restore juror’s Rights, and the S.u. Constitution,
                                                                                                                                            dann

From Dann LIBERTARIAN re: passing out fija material at courthouses  
___________________________________________

Mike Pastor
Mike Paster January 6, 2013 9:30:24 PM GMT+02:00a

Dear Julian,

This is Mike Paster. Every Monday from about 7:15am to 9:20am I offer FIJA flyers to anyone entering the San Diego Superior Court located in Vista, CA. (Northern San Diego County) I have never had any negative interaction with the police or court officials at this location. I offer anyone entering the building a flyer and simply say "Jury service information." If they ask me if I work for the court I honestly answer with "no". Bill Hasty and myself have been doing this for about a year at least. We used to rotate Mondays. Bill is an elderly gentleman with a family and hasn't been a participant for the past few months to the best of my knowledge.


Take care,

"Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness"
-Mike Paster January 6, 2013 9:30:24 PM GMT+02:00a
____________________________________________

Mark Schmidter and others
Mark Schmiter    , January 6, 2013 8:28:02 PM GMT+02:00

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=580036832010084&set=o.129070120451869&type=1&relevant_count=1
Mark Schmiter    ,January 7, 2013 4:12:17 PM GMT+02:00

Handed out 1000 flyers on Sunday 1-7-13

Mark Schmiter    ,January 7, 2013 4:12:17 PM GMT+02:00
______________________

<notification+zj4o_66y0zay@facebookmail.com>Hansws

    Mark Schmidter, January 7, 2013
____________________
Pictures from Mark Schmidter

https://www.facebook.com/pages/Seminole-County-Criminal-Justice-Center/102054356530258
_______________________

Bruce Toski
From Bruce Toski (alias Don Quixote) January 8, 2013 11:08:16 AM GMT+02:00

about a year ago, or more, I picketed INSIDE the BCJC in the waiting area of a Judge's chamber.
This judge had signed a totally bogus order that said it was ok for the Fort Lauderdale mafioso to bulldoze an elderly couple's property (where I was arrested).  About six BSO policemen and women and a dog came up to confront me.
The biggest guy asked my name.
I said Don Quixote de la Mancha
He said what are you doing ?
I said silent free speech
They left and did not bother me again until about an hour later and then left again ..
I was not arrested.
 
One of my proudest moments to tell ya the truth ..
 
I sent this out awhile ago ... but can't find my old email at the moment
 
DPQ


BCJC stands for Broward County Judicial Complex, 201 SE 6th Street, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301