UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

United States
  Prosecutor

        v.                  
                                                                       Case # 10 CR 1154 (KMW)

Julian Heicklen
   Defendant

DEFENDANT’S ADDENDUM TO REPLY TO GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS



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Julian Heicklen
Defendant
Counsel Pro Se

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Date

I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. U. S. Constitution
1. Amendment IX of the U. S. Constitution states:

“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

2. Amendment X of the U. S. Constitution states:

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, or to the people”

B. Jury Rights
3. The U. S. Constitution does not discuss, or even mention, the duties and rights of the jury.  Therefore those duties and rights are defined by the states.
4. There is NO FEDERAL Constitutional grant of power to government to determine the law in jury criminal cases.
5. Thus, as the federal government is a limited government, there is NO FEDERAL Preemption.
6. Defendant’s duty to the Federal Constitution requires him to assert the federal limits when opposed to state's rights.
7. In New Jersey, where the Defendant resides and is a citizen, the New Jersey Constitution Article I states:

 § 6. “Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.”  (Emphasis of last phrase by the Defendant.)

 § 9. “ The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate;”

  § 10. “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel in his defense. “

8. In New York, where the incidents are alleged to have occurred and where Defendant is a citizen by virtue of birth, the New York Constitution, Article I states:

§1.  “No member of this state shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his or her peers.”

§2. “Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever;”

§ 8 “Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.” (Amended by vote of the people November 6, 2001. Emphasis of last phrase by the Defendant.)


C. Jury Trial
9. The U. S. Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in ALL criminal cases in both Article III §2 and Amendment VI (emphasis added by Defendant).
10. In New Jersey, where the Defendant resides, the New Jersey Constitution, Article I, states:

“§ 9.  The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the Legislature may authorize the trial of civil causes by a jury of six persons. The Legislature may provide that in any civil cause a verdict may be rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury. The Legislature may authorize the trial of the issue of mental incompetency without a jury.”

§ 10. “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel in his defense.”

11.  In New York, where the incidents are alleged to have occurred, the New York Constitution, Article I states:

§2. “Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed by law. The legislature may provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case. A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases, except those in which the crime charged may be punishable by death, by a written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open court before and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court having jurisdiction to try the offense. The legislature may enact laws, not inconsistent herewith, governing the form, content, manner and time of presentation of the instrument effectuating such waiver.” (Amended by Constitutional Convention of 1938 and approved by vote of the people November 8, 1938.)

§8. "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact. "(Amended by vote of the people November 6, 2001.)

§11.” No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.” (New. Adopted by Constitutional Convention of 1938 and approved by vote of the people November 8, 1938; amended by vote of the people November 6, 2001.)

II. UNITED STATES STATUTES

12. Title 18 U.S.C. § 241: Conspiracy against rights states:

“If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same;
or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured - They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.”

13. Title 18 U.S.C. §242: Deprivation of rights under cover of law states:

“Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.”

III. FURTHER COMMENTS ON THE U. S. ATTORNEY’S RESPONSE

14. The United States Attorney’s reply admits on page 9 that a Court may try to prevent improper nullification, thus admitting that when nullification is within the province of the jury as trier of fact, the Court has no power and the United States no interest or authority in seeking otherwise (United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489,494(D. C. Cir. 1983) deeming nullification to be in essence a decision by the jury, ultra vires...
15. In Chinese, the terms "power" and "right" are essentially the same: “quan+li quan+li” equal “right+power right+interest.”
16. Is the U.S. Attorney arguing it would be OK to distribute information about the "power" of nullification, that stated there was no "right" to use of the "power”? Is that not a distinction without a difference?
17. Is the U. S. Attorney comparing the indictment to one for seditious speech? Amazing! Incredulous!
18. It has been decades since there was sedition indictment in the United States.
19. The U. S. Attorney is arguing that blog statements support their theory and constitute evidence in the matter.
20. On page 50 (actually page 47 in Defendant’s copy) of the Response Memorandum, the U. S, Attorney admits a jury has a "power" of nullification.
21. On pages 50–51 (actually page 47–48 in Defendant’s copy) the U. S. Attorney seeks to forbid a jury because Defendant might represent himself and advocate his own defense theory, thus seeking to deny him the right to represent himself as by statute authorized.
22. On the contrary, Defendant plans to argue forcefully to uphold the law: that silly little law of freedom of speech.

IV. THE DE LA BECKWITH CASE

23. The prosecutor's statements as to the de la Beckwith case are historically inaccurate. 
24. That was almost certainly not a jury nullification case.
25. In Defendant’s Reply to the U. S. Attorney’s Response, he pointed out that there was not an impartial jury.
26. An even more compelling explanation is given by Clay S. Conrad, "Jury Nullification: The Evolution of a Doctrine," Carolina Academic Press (1998) in a lengthy explanation where 2 police officers testified under oath that de la Beckwith was elsewhere when Medgar Evers was killed.
27. According to Conrad there was lots of disputed evidence.
28. In fact, the surprising thing given the evidence admitted is that de la Beckwith was not acquitted outright.

V. ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTES

29. It is clear that U. S. Attorney Preet Bharara, Assistant U. S. Attorney Rebecca Mermelstein, and the two undercover agents will be defendants in any prosecution proceedings.  Possibly Attorney General Eric Holder and U. S. District Court Judge Kimba Wood may also be defendants.
30. Ordinarily U. S. attorneys and judges have immunity to prosecution.  However 18 U.S.C. §242 specifically revokes that protection for the violations stated above
31. It is not clear who is to enforce the above statutes, since the crimes are allegedly being committed by the U. S. Attorneys, who ordinarily would be the prosecutors, but in this case would be the defendants.
32. Likewise, if a judge is involved, even if not a defendant, there would be a conflict of interest for the judiciary to officiate.
33. Perhaps the U.S. Congress should decide, as if it were an impeachment proceeding, which in fact it would be.
34. Another, or additional, alternative is to obtain a state court order to the State Department of Justice that the State intervene on behalf of the State Constitution and the People of the State under the State Constitution.

VI. FACTUAL ERRORS BY THE GOVERNMENT

34. The Government’s opposition to this jury trial would, perhaps, be more persuasive if it was at least accurate, but it is not.
35. The government, while entitled to its own opinion, is not entitled to its own facts, and fabricating a non-existent history in order to attempt to persuade this Honorable Court is not something that should go unnoticed, and is not something that this or any other Court should tolerate.
36. Take, for instance, the Government’s claim that the two hung juries in the trials of Byron De La Beckwith were the result of jury nullification. See Gov’t Response, Pg. 7.
37. The Government ignores the fact that at that first trial, several witnesses – including police officers – testified that they had seen Beckwith elsewhere the night of Medgar Evers’ murder. See Maryanne Vollers, Ghosts of Mississippi, 190-191 (1995).
38. There were unanswered questions regarding Beckwith’s ties to the murder weapon, Id. at 172-178, and a defense witness contradicted claims that Beckwith’s car was parked at a nearby restaurant, Id. at 186-187.
39. As one juror stated, "there were too many contradictions in the thing." See Adam Nossiter, Of Long Memory: Mississippi and the Murder of Medgar Evers, 44 (1994).
40. It is also interesting that in the Beckwith case, the State, through it’s "Sovereignty Commission," conducted jury analysis and investigation for the defense -- surreptitiously. See Vollers, supra, at 264.
41. In fact the prosecutor in those two 1964 trials, Bill Wallers, was a renowned segregationist – who went on to be elected Governor. See Reed Massengill, Portrait of a Racist, 180-181 (1991).
42. One can honestly question whether he "threw the case" in order to further his own political ambitions – it is difficult to imagine that a prosecutor who put Beckwith in prison would have much chance at election to higher office in 1960's Mississippi, during a time when few African-Americans dared exercise their right to vote.
43. Yet the Government presumes that the Beckwith cases resulted in hung juries due to jury nullification – in spite of the fact that there was ample room for reasonable doubt in the actual testimony presented.
44. Any review of the historical literature surrounding the trial would lead to the belief that some of the jurors believed that evidence – and others did not.
45. Yet it is easier to scapegoat the jury (see Clay Conrad, Scapegoating the Jury, 7 Cornell Jrl. Law and Pub. Pol’y 7 (1997)) than it is to actually examine the historical record.
46. The Government’s speculation that Roy Bryant and J.W. Milam were acquitted of the murder of Emmett Till due to jury nullification is equally ahistorical.
47. An examination of the record shows that Bryant and Milam were tried before an all-white jury in a county that was two/thirds African-American; that black reporters (and even Detroit Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr.) were welcomed into the courtroom by the Sheriff’s calls of "Hello, Niggers," and that the prosecution never attempted to move the case out of virulently Tallahatchie County (calling into question his sincerity in the rest of the prosecution).
48. The local Sheriff, Harold Clarence Strider, testified that the body was not that of Emmett Till, and refused to do any further investigative work for the prosecution. See Stephen J. Whitfield, A Death in the Delta: The Story of Emmett Till, 30-43 (1988).
49. Clearly, every aspect of the trial (every witness against Bryant and Milam was black; every witness for the defense was white) encouraged racism by the jury.
50. Racism during this trial was introduced not by the jurors, but by government officials at every level.
51. Perhaps, if the Government was to look at the actual historical facts behind examples they rely on, their own opposition to the exercise of jury nullification would evaporate.
52. Indeed, it is curious that the Government insists that, "no legal system could long survive" if juries retained the option of exercising their nullification prerogative (Government Memorandum, p. 8) flies in the face of the fact that the Anglo-American legal system has survived for nearly eight hundred years since the passage of the Magna Carta in 1215 – and that jurors have retained their nullification prerogative for at least this length of time.
53. It would seem that nearly eight hundred years would be considered a long period of survival for any legal system – the Government’s hand-wringing notwithstanding.
54. It cannot be gainsaid that, at its root, this is a free speech case. Defendent believes his speech is protected political speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
55. He believes that the operation of American courtrooms is a legitimate political issue, and that American juries have a legitimate political role.
56. He believes that it is a travesty of justice that more than 2 million Americans languish behind bars, often for non-violent, non-property crimes that are "malum prohibitum," not "malum per se."
57. He believes that juries have a legitimate role in bringing the criminal justice system back in line with the beliefs of the public. He shares these beliefs with millions of Americans.
58. The Government believes that advocating jury nullification is a criminal act if the advocacy could perchance reach a present or future juror.
59. This would necessarily mean that the only people this political message could be communicated to would be the hopelessly insane, those with felony records, illegal aliens ineligible for citizenship, and others who for one reason or another are permanently ineligible for jury duty.
60. It would mean that such advocacy could only be tolerated if it could effectively not be heard.
61. As a free speech case, this case should be heard by a jury.
62. Historically, juries have been uniquely suited for determining the limits of the government’s power to suppress free speech ever since the days of the Leveller John "Free Born John" Lilburne and before.
63. Lilburne in fact was the first to explicitly argue that jurors were judges of the law as well as the fact, during his 1649 trial for high treason. See Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial Jury 1200-1800 (1985); The Trial of Lt.-Colonel John Lilburne at the Guildhall of London, for High Treason, Howell’s State Trials 4:1269 (1649).
64. The Levellers, whose Agreement of the People was in many ways a precursor to the Constitution of the United States, see Colin Rhys Lowell, English Constitutional and English History, 338 (1962), have been credited with formulating "virtually all the ideas of the American Constitution and nineteenth -century democracy, including the theory of a written constitution and reserved powers, although the ideas were too new to gain widespread support immediately." M.N. Knapper, Constitutional and Legal History of England, 436 (1942).
65. The ideas of the Leveller’s should therefore be given some weight in determining the role of the Jury under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
66. Certainly, the case of William Penn and William Mead (The Tryal of Wm. Penn and Wm. Mead for Causing a Tumult... Howell’s State Trials, 6:951 (1670) was as much a free speech, as a freedom of religion, case – although today both would be covered under the First Amendment.
67. They were tried for preaching in Grace Church Street, London to a meeting of three to four hundred Quakers after the group had been locked out of their meeting-house by the police: in 1670, the Quaker religion was banned by the Conventicles Act.
68. The jury eventually acquitted both Penn and Mead, after enduring several days without food, drink, tobacco or toilet facilities.
69. The judges believed that this verdict amounted to what we would now call "jury nullification."
70. For their verdict, the jurors were fined and sentenced to prison until their fines were paid.
71. Eight of the jurors paid their fines; four went to prison and pursued a Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging their fines. See Bushell’s Case, Howell’s State Trials 6:999 (1670). The Writ was successful: Bushell’s Case determined, once and for all, that a juror cannot be punished for his or her vote. That is still good law today.
72. Bushell’s Case ushered in what historian John M. Beattie has referred to as "the heroic age of the English jury," in which "trial by jury emerged as the principal defense of English liberties." See J.M. Beattie, London Juries in the 1690's, 214, from J.S. Cockburn and T.A. Green, Eds., Twelve Good Men and True (1988).
73. Seditious Libel cases became the focus of the inevitable conflict between the government and juries, as the Crown attempted to isolate juries to determining merely the fact of publication, while the judge was to determine whether the publication was libelous.
74. Many cases found the bench and the jury at loggerheads, as juries stubbornly insisted on returning general verdicts of "Not Guilty" in seditious libel cases such as Rex v. Harris, Howell’s State Trials, 7:925 (1680) and Rex v. Care, Howell’s State Trials 7:1111 (1680).
75. What is curious is that during this period, pamphlets – not essentially different from those this Defendant stands accused of circulating – were circulated widely, as Penn and Lilburne also had done. Some of these pamphlets would include Harris, Twenty Four Sober Queries Offered to be Seriously Considered by all Juries in City and Country (1680); Sir John Hawles The Englishman’s Right: A Dialogue Between a Barrister at Law and a Jury-Man, (1680), Care, English Liberties: or the Free Born Subject’s Inheritance, A Guide to Juries, Setting Forth their Antiquity, Power and Duty (1699), first published as A Guide to English Juries (1682), Lord John Somers, The Security of Englishmen’s Lives or the Trust, Power and Duty of the Grand Jurys of England (1681), and Sir John Hawles, The Grand-Jury-Man’s Oath and Office Explained, and the Rights of English-Men Asserted (1680).
76. It would appear that pamphlets of the sort the Government complains of herein have been in circulation for nearly five-hundred years! Sir John Hawles wrote that:

“As juries have ever been vested with such power by Law, so to exclude them from, or disseize them of the same, were utterly to defeat the end of their institution. For then if a person should be Indicted for doing any common innocent act, if it but be clothed and disguised in the Indictment with the name of Treason, or some other high crime, and prov’d by Witnesses to have been done by him, the Jury though satisfied in Conscience that the fact is not such offense as ‘tis called, yet because (according to this fond opinion) they have no power to judge of the law, and the fact charg’d is fully prov’d, they should at this rate be bound to find him guilty. And being so found, the Judge pronounce sentence upon him; and he finds a convicted Traytor, &c. by his peers. And thus a certain Physician boasted, that he had kill’d one of his patients with the best method in the world; So here we should find an innocent man hang’d, drawn, and quartered, and all according to law.”  Sir John Hawles, The Englishman’s Right, p. 12.

77. It would appear this Defendant would be no less at risk for having circulated copies of Sir John’s pamphlets. Yet even the English, in the peak days of the Bloody Codes, never saw fit to prosecute anyone for circulating any of the pamphlets listed herein!
78. The primary free speech case in Colonial New York was that of John Peter Zenger, a German printer responsible for producing the New York Weekly Journal. Rex v. Zenger, Howell’s State Trials 17:675 (1735).
79. Zenger’s Journal had published numerous pieces critical of William Cosby, the royally appointed Colonial Governor of New York, and of his appointments to the Supreme Court of New York.
80. Unable to establish the authorship of the articles, the Attorney General sought to convict Zenger of Seditious Libel. Unable to obtain an indictment from a Grand Jury, the Attorney General was forced to proceed by information.
81. Zenger was represented at trial by Andrew Hamilton, the only American admitted to the prestigious Inns of Court in London, and the original Philadelphia Lawyer.
82. Hamilton was also the family lawyer for the William Penn family, and was one of the architects responsible for designing the building which is now known as Independence Hall. Yet he argued that:

“I know [the jury] have the right, beyond all dispute, to determine both the law and the fact; and where they do not doubt of the law, they ought to do so. This of leaving it to the judgment of the Court, whether the words are libelous or not, in effect renders juries useless (to say no worse) in many cases.”
“Gentlemen, the danger is great, in proportion to the mischief that may happen through our too great credulity. A proper confidence in a court is commendable; but as the verdict (whatever it is) will be yours, you ought to refer no part of your duty to the direction of other persons. If you should be of opinion, that there is no falsehood in Mr. Zenger’s papers, you will, nay (pardon me for the expression) you ought to say so; because you don’t know whether others (I mean the Court) may be of that opinion. It is your right to do so, and there is much depending upon your resolution, as well as upon your integrity.”

83. The jury acquitted, and the transcript of the case not published and became one of the best read books in Colonial America and, according to one recent edition, was "the most famous publication in America" during that period. See James Alexander, A Brief Narrative on the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger, Stanley Katz, ed., 37 (2nd Ed. 1972).

84. And what was the final outcome of this battle royale between bench and jury in seditious libel cases? The jury eventually prevailed, in the passage of Mr. Fox’s Libel Act in 1792, which established that the determination of whether a writing was libelous was to be left to the jury. St. 32. Geo. III c 60 (1792). Mr. Fox personally argued for the bill on the grounds that:

"[I]f a power was vested in any person, it was surely meant to be exercised"; that ‘there was a power vested in the jury to judge the law and fact, as often as they were united, and, if the jury were not to be understood to have a right to exercise that power, the constitution would never have intrusted them with it;’ ‘but they knew it was the province of the jury to judge of law and fact, and this was the case, not of murder only, but of felony, high and of every other criminal indictment;’ and that ‘it must be left in all cases to a jury to infer the guilty of men, and an English subject could not lose his life but by a judgment of his peers.’

85. See Sparf et al. v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 136 (1895), citing 29 Parl. Hist. 564, 565, 597. Fox’s Libel Act represents a clear case in which jurors forced the Government of England to change what had been considered an uncontroversial legal rule supported by a long line of precedent, and establishes the importance of juries in free speech cases such as this.
86. Similarly, herein, only a jury can dispassionately determine the guilt or innocence of Defendant; this Honorable Court’s verdict will never carry the authority that the verdict of a jury would carry.

VII. THE NEED FOR A DISPASSIONATE ARBITER

87. For this Court to determine for itself to what extent an individual can advocate for juries to act independently will never carry the moral weight that the verdict of a jury would necessarily carry.
88. This Court will necessarily be seen as less than neutral in a case deciding whether an individual could communicate to people eligible for jury duty that they may vote according to their conscience if they believe, for whatever reason, that a conviction in the case before them would be unjust.
89. It could be viewed merely as a judge "protecting her own turf," and would never carry the moral weight that the verdict of a fairly selected jury would carry.
90.The simple fact is that everybody who makes their living in a courtroom is, to some extent, self-involved in a case of this nature. It is impossible for this Court, or any Court, to be entirely dispassionate (or perhaps, more importantly, to be seen as entirely dispassionate) in this case.
91.Perhaps more importantly than that legal cases be resolved is the need for the general public to believe that they were resolved fairly – that confidence is crucial to the stability of the legal system; to the willingness of potential jurors to appear for jury duty; for people to turn their problems to the courts and not to resort to self-help; and for individuals to be motivated to follow and respect the law.
92. Then these proceedings will engender respect for the law because, as Justice Louis Brandeis observed, "for the law to be respected it first must be respectable."
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

    Defendant certifies, under penalty of perjury, that DEFENDANT’S ADDENDUM TO REPLY TO GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS was sent by certified U. S. mail on December 6, 2011, to the following:

Pto Se Clerk, U. S. District Court, Southern District of New York, 500 Pearl Street,  New York, New York, 10007

Judge Kimba Wood, U. S. District Court, Southern District of New York, U. S. Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007


Assistant S. Attorney, Rebecca Mermelstein, S. D. N. Y., U. S. Courthouse, 300 Quarropas Street, White Plains, NY 10601

U S. Federal Public Defender Sabrina Shroff, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., Southern District, 52 Duane Street–10th Floor, New York, NY 10007

Attorney Adam Sudbury, 404 E. Central Boulevard, # 307, Orlando, FL 30801–1923

Mark Schmidter, 3609 Shader Road, Orlando, FL 32808

Clay S. Conrad, 11767 Katy Freeway, Houston, TX 77079


______________________
Julian Heicklen
Defendant
Counsel Pro Se

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Date