IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

MARK E. SCHMIDTER, individually,
and JULIAN P. HEICKLEN,individually,
CASE NO.:6:12-CV-1102-ORL-31-KRS
DIVISION CIVIL
Plaintiffs,

vs.

BELVIN PERRY, JR., as Chief
Judge of the Ninth Judicial
Circuit Court of Florida,

Defendant
___________________________________/

DEFENDANT'S AMENDED ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

    Defendant, BELVIN PERRY, JR., by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby
files this Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Complaint of Plaintiffs MARK
E. SCHMIDTER and JULIAN P. HEICKLEN as follows:

1. Defendant admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 for jurisdictional
purposes only.
2. Defendant admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 2.
3. Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 3.  Heicklen filed a
statement with the Fifth District Court of Appeal wherein he claims to have "moved
permanently to Jerusalem."
4. Defendant admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 4.
5. Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 5, because the
Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction in
suits brought against a state by a citizen of that state or of another state.
6. Defendant admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 6.
7. As a result of the eleventh Amendment, Defendant denies this Court has
subject matter jurisdiction over this action and, thus, denies venue is proper in this Court.  To
the extent the eleventh Amedment does not apply to this action, Defendant admits venue
would br proper in this Court.
8. Defendant admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 8.
9. Defendant admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 9, but states some
violations of Administrative Orders or Local Rules of Court are punishable by means other
than contempt.
10. Defendant admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 10.
11. Defendant admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 11.
12. Defendant admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 12.
13. Defendant admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 13
14. Defendant iswithout knowledge as to the allegations contained in Paragraph
14.

COUNT I

15. Defendant incorporates his answers to Paragraph 1 through 14 above as if set
forth fully herein.
16. Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 16.
17. Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 17.
      Defendant denies Plaintiffs are entitled to any remedy requested by the Wherefore
Clause of Count I.

COUNT II

18. Defendant states no response is required for Paragraph 18, because Count II
has been dismissed by the Court.

19. Defendant states no response as required for Paragraph 19, because Count II
has been dismissed by the Court.

20. Defendant states no response for Paragraph 20, because Count II
has been dismissed by the Court.
    Defendant denies Plaintiffs ae entitiled to any remedy requested by the Wherefore
Clause of Count II.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1. The Expressive Conduct order is content neutral.
2. The Expressive Conduct Order is a valid time, place, and manner restriction
on free speech.
3. The Expressive Conduct Order serves a significant government interest, is a
narrowly gailored means of achieving that interest, and provide for ample alternative avenues
of expression.
4. Plaintiffs' claims regarding the Expressive Conduct Order are now moot,
given the recent decision in Schmidter v. Florida, 2012 WL 6629772 (Fla. DCA Dec. 21,
2012), a copy of which is atached hereto as Exhibir "1,", whereby Florida's Fifthe District
Court of appeal held the Expressive Conduct Order is constitutional.
5. The Expressive Conduct Order is not overbroad.
6. The Expressive Conduct Order is not vague.
7. Courthouses and  courthouse grounds (with the exclusion of perimeter public
sidewalks) are nonpublic forums for purposes of the First Amendment, thus, the Expressive
Conduct Order is not subject to a "strict scrutiny" analysis but, instead, is only required to
reasonably fulfill a legitimate and demonstrated need, which it does.
8. The Expressive Conduct Order is constitutionally permissible.
9. Defendant, as a state court judge, is protected from all liability in this action
by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity because, at all times relevant herein, he was
acting in his judicial capacity and had jurisdiction to issue the orders at issue.
10. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and the doctrine
of sovereign immunity bar this action against Defendant.  The Eleventh Amendment prohibits
federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction in lawsuits brought against a state,
or against a state officer in his official capacity, by that state's own citizens or by citizens of
another state.
11. Defendant is protected from liability in his individual capacity by virtue of the
doctrine of qualified immunity because, at all times relevant herein, Defendant was acting
within the scope of his discretionary authority, and his allegedly wrongful acts did not violate
clearly established law measured under an objective standard.  Defendant's actions were
objectively reasonable under the circumstances presented and wee implemented for lawful
purposes, including, but not limited to the preservation of jury integrity and the maintenance
of effective and efficient operations of the courthouse.
12. To the extent Plaintiffs seek a review of the determinations made by Florida
appellate or circuit courts, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review those claims by virtue of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
13. Plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief concerning
Defendant's actions because they have an adequate remedy at law (i.e., appellate review of
Defendant's contempt orders which they are, in fact, pursuing).
14. Given the recent decision by the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal in
Schmidter v. Florida, 2012 WL 6629772 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 21, 2012), Plaintiffs' claims in
this lawsuit are barred by the Full Faith and Credit law, 28 U.S.C. 1738.
15. Given the recent decision by the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal in
Schmidter v.  Florida, 2012 WL 6629772 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 21, 2012), Plaintiffs' claims are
barred by the doctrine of comity.
16. Given the recent decision by the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal in
Schmidter v. Florida
2012 WL 6629772 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 21, 2012), Plaintiffs' claims are
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and/or res judicata.
17. Given the recent decision of the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal in
Schmidter v. Florida,
2012 WL 6629772 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 21, 2012), there is no longer an
"actual controvery" between the parties; accordingly, Plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory
relief and have, thus failed to state a claim uponn which relief can be granted.
18. Any damages suffered by Plaintiffs wre caused solely by reason of one or
moe of their own wrongful acts and conduct and their willful resistance to the orders of
Defendant in the discharge and attempt to discharge the duties of his office.
19. Plaintiffs failed to act reasonably in mitigating any damages they allegedly
suffered; thus, their claims should be reduced or barred.
20. Defendant, in his individual capacity, is immune from suit pursuant to Florida
Statute §768.28(9)(a).

Respectively submitted_______day of April, 2013.

s/John Edwin Fisher
JOHN EDWIN FISHER
Florida Bar No. 091677
JAMIE BILLOTTE MOSES
Florida Bar No. 009237