This book contains a set of papers presented at a conference sponsored by the MacArthur Foundation and held at Harvard University. Editor Kagan informs us that the conference was inspired by lack of information on moral development during the first 2 years of life. Major issues debated during the conference included (1) the degree to which young children are biologically prepared to display a moral sense, (2) whether universal moral principles can be distinguished from mere social conventions, (3) the relative importance of cognitions and emotions in moral development, and (4) the proper relationship between philosophical and psychological views of morality. Surprisingly, the 2 longest chapters (a 90-page, dissertation-like lead chapter by Shweder et al. and an 88-page reply by Turiel et al.) say nothing about moral development during the first 2 years. Shweder et al. first critique Kohlberg's and Turiel's views and then present evidence from 480 Americans and Indians (ages 5 to adult) indicating that the moral/conventional distinction is unique to our culture. Shweder's social constructivist critiques suffer from the same weaknesses as his earlier nominalistic critiques of personality assessment, i.e., he misrepresents the positions he is criticizing and then becomes mired in indefensible philosophical arguments. Turiel et al.'s tome in turn criticizes Shweder's methods and reinterprets his data in support of a moral/conventional distinction. The remaining chapters better fulfill the promise of the book. Dunn provides an enlightening account of the emotional responsivity and moral understanding of 1-2-year-olds during family conflicts. Especially valuable is her material on mischievous behavior. Edwards' study of transgression-sanction encounters in Kenyan and American children supports Shweder's argument that the distinguishability of moral rules and conventional regulations varies across cultures. In a brief but important response, Mueller notes that both the cognitive constructivist views (Kohlberg, Turiel) and cultural transmission views (Shweder, Edwards) fail to account for the role of biologically prepared emotional reactions to moral situations. Blum also argues for the importance of emotions, but from a philosopher's viewpoint. An allegedly "psychoanalytic" perspective, contributed by Emde et al., has little to do with Freud, but is, rather, a marvelous ethological study of moral emotions in 1-2-year-olds. Perhaps the 1 chapter in the book destined to become a classic is a contribution by Gilligan and Wiggins concerning sex differences in caring about others' feelings vs maintaining standards of justice. As a whole, this worthwhile book is flawed by 1 serious weakness—neglect of Hogan's socioanalytic theory of moral development, mentioned only in passing by Turiel. Hogan and his colleagues have dealt thoroughly and decisively with many of the issues with which the present contributors are struggling, including universalism/relativism, biological preparedness, attachment and moral development, role of cultural transmission, emotional and cognitive aspects of empathy, justice vs mercy orientations, and principled vs conventional reasoning. Aside from neglect of Hogan's views, this book provides a comprehensive treatment of moral development in very young children and should be required reading for graduate students and professionals working in this area.—J. A. Johnson.