The jacket of Social Cognition claims that it is the only explicitly developmental book on the topic. This statement is not true; Carolyn Shantz, for example, has a nice monograph on the subject. Nonetheless, books on the development of social cognition are rare, and Social Cognition does fill a gap in our knowledge of child development. The book is an elaboration of a set of papers originally presented at a conference of the British Psychological Society, and this leads to several effects. First, the book's style is distinctly "British." It is more conceptual than empirical, with intelligent, thoughtful, carefully reasoned (but sometimes wordy) discussions of important theoretical issues. Many references are to British and European works—a useful feature for those of us who do not keep up with that literature. Finally, the authors know each other's work and cite each other throughout the book, giving the book more coherence than is usually found in a collection of papers from a conference. The book is organized into 4 sections: conceptual issues (chapters 1-4), origins of social cognition in infancy (chapters 5-7), social cognition and affect (chapters 8-9), and social cognition and intellect (chapters 10-11). In chapter 1, co-editor George Butterworth introduces the book by examining a number of "creative conflicts" in the study of social cognition (e.g., sources of logico-mathematical vs. social knowledge). The only important omission in this excellent chapter is a discussion of the ultimate origin of these conflicts (which concerns how social-motivational and cognitive psychology derive from 2 distinct philosophical enterprises: ethics and epistemology). In chapter 2, philosopher David Hamlyn attempts to demonstrate that knowing presupposes experiencing correction by other persons. Although the chapter makes several interesting points, overall, it is verbose and the arguments are unconvincing. Chapter 3 is "wild and woolly," attempting to integrate into an "ecological" view of social cognition such diverse ideas as Gibsonian direct perception and Bohm's implicit order. Marvelously, this theoretical excursion ends with a concrete application: explaining spontaneous interactions between mothers and children. Chapter 4 critically reviews different theories of imitation (Genevan, social-learning, sociobiological, among others) and argues persuasively for an active, algoristic model of imitation. Chapter 5 is a lengthy, detailed account of the emergence of motives during the first 100 weeks of an infant's life. Reminiscent of Gesell, Trevarthen describes motivational development as a cycle revolving between social involvement and social withdrawal. Chapter 6 discusses how infants come to understand pointing and looking gestures—a crucial achievement for the development of language. Chapter 7 presents a number of experiments demonstrating that a child's conceptual understanding of physical objects is constrained by social meanings as well as physical properties of the objects. Chapters 8 and 9, both on cognition and affect, are the best organized and most clearly written chapters in the book. Chapter 8 discusses the role of cognitive factors in infant attachment, particularly the child's ability to predict and therefore influence another's behavior. Smith also argues effectively against Bowlby's monocentric view of attachment by specifying the conditions under which multiple attachment relationships can be formed. Chapter 9 documents how children develop from an S-R to a more mentalistic understanding of emotions. Harris and Olthof show that 11-year-olds, but not 6-year-olds, realize that emotions are not restricted to a particular eliciting situation, and that people do not always express an experienced emotion. They also discuss how cross-cultural research is necessary to explain these developmental changes and to determine whether these changes occur at all in non-Indo-European cultures. Chapter 10 summarizes some recent work on how social interaction affects children's performance on Piagetian tasks. The implications of this chapter are substantive as well as methodological. Chapter 11 concerns itself with cognition and peer interaction. Fifty years ago, Piaget suggested that peer interaction stimulates cognitive development, but more recently he had abandoned or at least neglected the idea. Glachan and Light marshalled evidence from recent studies and their own unpublished studies to show that Piaget's half-century-old idea was indeed correct. Interaction between even equally incompetent partners can, under certain circumstances, lead to improved performance in cognitive tasks.—J. A. Johnson.