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weight to the destruction of the myth of Russian peasant collectivity and is a landmark in the study of peasant legal culture.

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*Bonds of Civility: Aesthetic Networks and the Political Origins of Japanese Culture.* By Eiko Ikegami (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. xiv plus 460 pp.).

Through an analysis of aesthetic networks in Tokugawa Japan (1600–1867), Eiko Ikegami attacks “The stereotype of pre-modern Japanese people as submissive doormats trodden beneath the feet of militaristic despots” (p. 12). Unaware that this stereotype has any traction in academic circles (and Ikegami cites no examples), all I could imagine was Frank Capra’s 1945 propaganda film, *Know Your Enemy: Japan*. Similar statements occur throughout the book: “If we summarize Tokugawa society dismissively as a feudal pre-modern society because it lacked civil society, while ignoring the widespread networks of voluntary associations and the freedom they offered to those who were disenchanting with the political status quo, we are making a serious mistake” (p. 201). Again, I am unaware of any recent scholar guilty of such malfeasance, and Ikegami cites no specific examples.

To correct this mistaken view and present a more accurate portrayal of Tokugawa society, Ikegami’s argues that extensive horizontal social networks based on voluntary association in pursuit of the arts helped erode the official Tokugawa social order. The notion of a pervasive official social order is essential to this argument. Although it is rarely discussed in concrete terms and never systematically explained, we are told repeatedly that the Tokugawa bakufu institutionally segmented Japan’s population into status hierarchies. Therefore, Ikegami argues, Tokugawa Japan was not a “civil society,” which she defines as a “domain of private citizens that has a certain degree of autonomy from the state” (p. 19) and as “the democratic associational domain that reflected the rise of political power of the bourgeoisie” (p. 23). Nevertheless, Tokugawa society was imbued with civility as a result of the spread of “civilizing influences” across horizontal social networks of people from all walks of life engaged in artistic and aesthetic pursuits. Furthermore, people gradually came to derive a greater sense of identity from their network affiliations than from their “assigned,” “feudal” status categories. In this way, horizontal artistic networks helped undermine the Tokugawa polity. Moreover, the existence of these networks undercuts the “submissive doormats” view of Japan’s people mentioned above and, it qualifies Tokugawa Japan for proto-modern status: “having developed the domain of voluntary associational ties . . . this society truly deserves the name of proto-modern as far as its civic culture is concerned” (p. 368).

The topic of horizontal social networks in Tokugawa Japan is undoubtedly worthy of a book. Moreover, Ikegami’s analysis of the medieval roots of these networks, their connections with the growing market economy, their role in fostering the beginnings of a self-conscious national identity among Japanese,

and the rise of mass media is clear and insightful. The discussion of the various art forms as social practice is similarly excellent. Scholars of Japan will find much of value in this book. The main argument, however, often struck me as unconvincing in particular cases, owing to questionable premises plus a tendency to push beyond the evidence and to generalize from exceptional cases.

The bakufu and domains were military organizations at their core, designed to regulate *samurai* warriors. Ikegami sees commoners in Tokugawa Japan as subject to a degree of social control similar to that of *samurai*. While she repeatedly acknowledges that the Tokugawa state generally ruled the broader society in a decentralized, indirect manner, she seems nevertheless to regard village councils, neighborhood associations, trade associations, and other organizations that regulated commoner society as de facto extensions of the bakufu or the bakuhan state. Furthermore, these entities were hierarchical in nature and isolated major social groups from one another. Such a portrait of commoner society is required to set up the claim that the formation of organizations based on a radically different logic—horizontal, artistic ties—functioned in part to undermine the bakufu, or at least the social order it supposedly enforced. The Tokugawa state, however, was not omnipresent in society. It was an important background agent, to be sure, but there were vast areas of commoner social life over which the bakufu and domain governments exhibited little control. With but a few exceptions, the realm of culture and aesthetics was one of them. At some level Ikegami seems well aware of this point, and in discussing concrete details she frequently backs away from the premise of an all-pervasive *bakuhan* state.

Ikegami's quest to politicize Tokugawa popular culture sometimes results in attributing too much significance to disparate facts. One example is the discussion of popular fashion, which Ikegami portrays as a potential avenue of resistance to the *bakufu*. After discussing the crackdown on urban gangs during the initial decades of its rule we are told that "The shoguns and regional *daimyo* often arrested and publicly executed" those who "flaunted their deviant attire on the streets" (p. 268). The implication is that their attire contributed to or caused their executions. The evidence for this assertion is the arrest of violent gang members in 1612 by the bakufu and the Kaga domain. It was their violent behavior, however, especially the murder of a shogunal banner man, which led to the executions of these gang members. I doubt that anyone in Tokugawa Japan was ever executed for wearing outlandish clothing. Even the exceptional case of wealthy merchant Ichikawa Rokubei's wife, who in 1681 apparently tried publicly to upstage the shogun with a display of grandeur as he passed through the streets in procession, resulted in banishment from Edo and confiscation of family property—a severe penalty, but not a death sentence. To conclude her discussion of popular fashion, Ikegami points out that toward the end of the Tokugawa period, urban demand for clothing stimulated cloth production in rural villages. She then makes the unsupported claim that this new village economic activity was the cause of severe social unrest to set up the conclusion that "Popular cravings for fashion were thus partly responsible for eroding the foundation of the Tokugawa state" (p. 285).

Despite its excesses, Ikegami's search for political significance in popular culture does produce some valuable insights. In discussing the role of nativism (*kokugaku*) in Tokugawa *haikai* poetry networks, for example, Ikegami makes a

plausible case that “the social and cultural capital” local leaders acquired during the Tokugawa period through their networks permitted them to play a major role in the Freedom and Popular Rights (*jiyu minken*) movement of the early Meiji period (pp. 212–214).

*Bonds of Civility* is a vexing combination of excellent discussion of aesthetic practices in Tokugawa Japanese society hampered by an unwieldy main argument about their political significance. Scholars of Tokugawa Japan will benefit from it, but non-specialist readers should proceed with caution.

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*Democracy in Latin America, 1760–1900: Volume I, Civic Selfhood and Public Life in Mexico and Peru.* By Carlos A. Forment (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003. xxix plus 454 pp.).

This impressive work of both research and theory deserves to be read widely by scholars of political culture in various disciplines. Like the best historical sociology, Forment’s book combines a synthesis of historiography on nineteenth-century Latin America with a provocative interpretation. But Forment does not rely solely on the existing secondary literature; his compilation of a database of voluntary associations and analysis of the discourse of their members are significant original contributions. Strikingly, while most social historians of the period (including this reviewer) have focused on political society through the use of documents generated and archived by nation-states (even when reading these against the grain for glimpses into popular actions and mentalities), Forment has uncovered a rich associational life in civil society. Based on this evidence, he argues that scholars have overlooked how Latin Americans constructed and nurtured democracy outside of and often in opposition to political institutions.

To cover such a large theme, Forment has divided this book into several parts. (A second volume promises to extend the analysis to Cuba and Argentina.) The opening and concluding sections engage the theoretical literature on democratization and state formation. Forment’s approach is primarily Toquevillian, defining popular sovereignty as “the type of power citizens generate whenever they organize themselves into stable and cohesive groups and find ways of resolving their differences among themselves in a civic manner” (p. 21). But he is also critical of scholars in this tradition who see democratic habits as relatively static. Part Two provides context on late colonial society and the anticolonial movements for independence in Mexico and Peru, which faithfully renders the prevalent historical consensus. Readers who are not specialists in Latin America will find this helpful background, but should keep in mind that this brief overview is necessarily painted in broad strokes without the nuances that Forment brings to his detailed examination of the nineteenth century. The heart of the book is the empirical study of democratic practices across four arenas of public terrain: associations within civil and within economic society (which Forment analyses together), political society (including rebellions as well as political clubs and elections), and the public sphere (newspapers and other forms