Recently in Presocratic Philosophy Category

Hannah L. Lewis
Dr. Christopher Long
Phil495
6 May 2010

The pre-Socratic philosophers, many scholars assert, represent a shift between mythology and philosophy, superstition and reason. A large reason for this belief is the idea that the pre-Socratics subscribe to a more empirically and rationally based ideology than the creative and religious ideology with which they are often contrasted. However, these arguments tend to be based on arbitrary distinctions and misconceptions. For example, to think of the pre-Socratics as physicists, who look at material reality as the basis of their metaphysical and cosmological ideas is only partially accurate. Much of the religious belief of the Greek culture, though scrutinized and criticized, ends up being appropriated in a new and different way in the pre-Socratics philosophy.

I feel like, after reading all the Ionians this semester, that Heraclitus makes a lot of the same assertions that we've seen, but I feel like, despite what Kirk, Raven and Schofield call "special difficulties of interpretation" (p. 185) Heraclitus actually makes some more explicit assertions than we've seen so far. Maybe this is because we have more fragments directly from him (or maybe I'm just imagining things), but I feel like a lot of the hypotheses we had about interpretations of other presocratic ideas can be made about Heraclitus, too, but with more supporting evidence. 

Reading about Xenophanes's sort of "doctrine" of uncertainty was very refreshing for me. From the beginning of the semester we've been trying to keep multiple interpretations in mind with regard to the Presocratic philosophers we've read thus far, rejoicing and lamenting over the fragmented way in which these philosophers' ideas come to us and the amount of room for interpretation they've left for us. But the people we've read have made declarations. With Thales we were told: the primary element IS water, all things rest on water, depend upon water, etc, and even if we can't come to a certain conclusion about which of these interpretations we should rely upon, Thales remains recorded as making a certain declarative statement. The same way, Anaxemander made declarations about the indefinite, and Anaxamines about air and about the composition of the earth. I think Kirk, Raven and Schofield referred to this attitude as "Milesian dogmatism," the same type of dogmatism we saw from Aristotle in his interpretations of the presocratic philosophers' ideas. But we do see with Xenophanes an acknowledgment that human knowledge is finite, dynamic, relative. It seems to me that this acknowledgment of his own limitations and human finitude generally,  is what allows Xenophanes to make such important theological observations that seem even compatible with contemporary thought. They seem two thoughts almost of the same breath to me--and indeed, one of his evidences of human finitude is that we cannot ever fully know anything about the gods, which comes from his idea that, to paraphrase, man creates god in his image. Not to place Xenophanes in a superior position by any means, but I think what we see with him is somewhat prophetic of Socrates and skepticism, all of which, I think, come from an acceptance that we don't know some things, and cannot know all things. Maybe I'm digressing somewhat, but I just found it somewhat refreshing.  

The pre-Socratic age seems to have been a ripe age for substance monism. Whether it be mythological explanations (see my last post Introduction) or a more 'rational' explanation--such as Thales water--origin, and specifically monist origin, seems to have been quite the important topic to many of the pre-Socratics. That being said, I would like to use this post to focus specifically on Anaximander's conception of the Indefinite/Infinite as the 'source.' To be more precise, I want to investigate the interpretations of Anaximander's Infinite: specifically the function as a singular substance, whether it is that which acts or that which is acted upon.

Before we begin this investigation, though, it is important to identify the fragments that this investigation stems from. There are four fragments, specifically, that I am drawing my investigation from: 101 A, B, and C. The fragments come from Simplicius, Hippolytus, and Plutarch, respectively. To avoid taking these quotes out of context, and for the benefit of any readers who do not have the text, the fragments read as follows:
While it is clear that Anaximander treats apeiron [the Infinite/Indefinite] as the physical origin of things--"he said that the material principle of existing things was some nature coming under the heading of the apeiron, from which come into being the heavens and the world in them" (101B), as well as a similar segment from 101A--it is entirely unclear as to whether this substance is view as that which acts, i.e. that which causes things to happen, or is that which is acted upon, or that which things happen to. The three fragments we have from Simplicius, Hippolytus, and Plutarch don't agree on this matter.

For Simplicius, while it is not entirely clear due to the wording, it appears that apeiron is that which is acted upon. The specific point of the fragment which creates this confusion reads as follows: "And the source of coming-to-be for existing things is that into which destruction, too, happens 'according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the assessment of Time', as he describes it in these rather poetical terms" (101A) [interestingly enough, the segment that beings with "according..." and ending with "of Time..." is the only known direct quote of Anaximander]. While it may, at first glance, appear that what is being said is that both 'coming-to-be' and 'destruction' come from the same source, the wording of the comment on destruction brings this interpretation into question. Notice how it reads "...into which destruction, too, happens..." as though apeiron is not the cause of the destruction (which is reinforced by the mention of Time as the assessor). Furthermore, 'source' does not, by any means, necessarily correspond to 'cause', as it may simply mean the material from which something is made. Thus, it would appear that for Simplicius, apeiron is that which is acted upon, it is a passive substance that appears to be acted upon from the outside (which is an interesting notion in itself, given that it would have to be an outside to the Infinite). By outside, I do not mean the physical exterior, but of that which is not necessarily and expression of the original substance, in this case the cause in the causal network. It is simply that in which things happen, and that which things happen to.

On the other hand, Plutarch seems to favor a reading of apeiron that implies a more active agent. Plutarch claims that Anaximander "said that the apeiron contained the whole cause of the coming-to-be and destruction of the world..." (101C). It is quite obvious that the Plutarch reading implies either an active substance, which is the whole cause, or a substance that contains the whole cause (which in the manner that it is inside, it remains active). This active substance, as opposed to the passive one, would function as the original cause to everything, and with a certain interpretation, act as the continuing cause of all things, in that it would be the cause upon itself, which would create an effect upon itself. In this way, it is not quite appropriate to view it as the active, because it is also the acted upon, but the importance isn't necessarily the function of cause and effect, but role apeiron plays in this function. This is a much more inclusive substance, in which there appears no real outside, everything is an expression of the apeiron.

Unfortunately, Hippolytus doesn't shed any more light on this issue, as his comments directly demonstrate neither an active substance nor a passive substance. Instead, he provides a further qualitative account for this substance, "This nature [apeiron] is eternal and unageing, and it also surrounds all the worlds" (101C). What is rather interesting, though, is the mention of Anaximander's discussion of Time: "He talks of Time as though coming-to-be and existence and destruction were limited" (101C). While this doesn't clarify which interpretation of Anaximander's substance is correct (as it doesn't clarify what is doing the limiting, thus we could have a Time that is limited by apeiron or an apeiron who's casual expression is limited by itself [the laws of nature]), it provides a glimpse at Anaximander's view of Time, and specifically at coming-to-be, existence, and destruction (the casual network). It appears as though Anaximander formulated a notion of limited time within a circular timeframe, meaning that, for Anaximander, the 'edges' of the circle (the laws of nature? Apeiron?) were limiting factors on Time.

While it is difficult to draw a clear picture of Anaximander's apeiron, it is important to understand the multitude of possible interpretation that can and have been drawn from what fragments we have. Personally, I'm more inclined to side with Plutarch's interpretation, as it lends itself to a simpler cosmological system, but that does not necessarily make it the correct interpretation, or even a correct interpretation of the Plutarch fragment. What does everyone else think?

Sorry it's taken me so long to finally post something, but hopefully it will be so awesomely thought-provoking that it will make up for lost time.

Material Monism and Cultural Values

As I was reading the introduction to the book, the section on the Ionian thinkers, and the chapter on Thales, I remember noticing the tendency of Ionian thinkers towards material monism,"[...E]ach dominated by the assumption of a single primary material, the isolation of which was the most important step in any systematic account of reality" (75), I wondered why Ancient Greek (I use the term "Ancient Greek/ Ancient Greece" throughout in order to link the thinkers we're studying together, but it shouldn't be interpreted as an indication of homogeneity--I'm certainly aware of the diversity between different parts of what we now call Ancient Greece) thinkers would understand reality in this way. They lived at a time long before the understanding of cells and atoms might have suggested common building blocks for all things, and matter and energy were established as intimately interrelated. Without the idea of atoms and energy/matter relationships, it's very hard for me to imagine how experience and observation might have led these thinkers to the idea that everything is made of one substance. Is it a question of simplicity? Did it seem simpler to them that everything must be different forms of the same thing? Or was it more a matter of necessity than simplicity? Did reason somehow imply to them that there must be a "single primary material"?

Of course, these questions are impossible to answer with certainty, since the Ionian thinkers like Thales are long dead, and we have very little of their work to examine. What intrigues me is not so much exactly what prompted them to think this way, but rather what kind of cultural values and interpretations of experience might have facilitated this way of thinking, how the worldview of many other civilizations with which we've already seen Ancient Greece interacting, might have contributed to this way of thinking as well as other competing ways of thinking, and how this type of thinking presents itself in Thales ideas.

So what sorts of values are implied by a belief that all things are made of a single substance, and what types of observations might lead someone to that belief? Of course, the Ancient Greeks were a community of trade and international contact, as we've already discussed. It's possible that the idea of one substance could unite the Greeks and other people from other societies that they encountered, but the idea of a single substance as unifying or equalizing doesn't seem likely to be that important to the Greeks, whose conception of the world and society was hierarchical, who had slaves and believed that different people had distinct roles and places in society. So what other values could lead one to devise a theory of a singular substance?

 I'm sure that observations probably had a lot to do with their speculation, and observations of the water cycle could certainly be interpreted as suggestive of a property of water that it might somehow be able to compose many different types of things. Furthermore, seeing material burn and change from wood to ash when burned might suggest something about an essentialness of fire. And the growth of trees and plants, as well as decomposition could suggest something similar about earth. It's hard for me to accept, though, that these interpretations were somehow unrelated to the other values and beliefs of the people of the time, so I feel like there must be something about the values of the societies that either influenced or was influenced by (or both) this belief in a singular substance. I just am having some trouble figuring out what that might be.

Thales's Pantheism vs. Abrahamic Monotheism

The question in Thales that we should consider might be able to shed light on this issue. Thales states that "the earth floats on water, which is in some way the source of all things" (88), and of course the ambiguity of this statement and the passages from which modern scholars have derived this conception of his philosophy make it subject for interpretation. But, if it is seen as part of the larger trend of material monism, it could be seen as making sense in terms of social values, not just because of the value placed on material monism as necessary to explain reality, but because of the social value placed on water by the Ancient Greeks, who traded heavily and derived both material and intellectual wealth from sea travel.

However, to take it to another level, the other cultures that the Ancient Greeks traded with, also must have valued water tremendously, being flourishing societies within vast expanses of desert--Egypt deriving its vitality from the Nile, and the Babylonians, I believe, from the Tigris/ Euphrates Rivers. In fact, Kirk, Raven and Schofield cite these societies as part of the reason that the Greeks thought of the earth as coming from water, being surrounded by water. So as the source of life and wealth, it makes sense why water would be valued so highly that Thales might think of it as the singular substance of all things. Of course, this is just one possible theory, but I think it's important to see how a person makes observations and interprets them based on his or her values, which are largely influenced by social values.

However, Thales went on to say that seemingly inanimate objects have life, which he determined based on magnetic movement, since the Ancient Greeks traditionally linked life and movement together as inseparable. Maybe this is something of a stretch, since it isn't the material substance, water, which Thales is cited as calling the source of life, but IF we interpret his statement about all things in some way relying on water to mean that water is the singular substance of all things, and IF we interpret his statement about the life of inanimate objects and the idea that "all things are full of gods" (95) to mean that ALL things are alive and ALL things are indwelled by god or a part of god in some way (both of which I concede to be POSSIBLE interpretations which could certainly be argued against), there is a lot to think about in terms of the different types of evolution that material monism could undergo. For example, under these interpretations, Thales thought is very similar to Hindu thought, which is "polytheistic" in that, like Greek mythology, asserts many gods, but is "pantheistic" in that the gods, as well as humans, animals, and all life, is a part of Brahman, which is God, but is also something like a singular spiritual substance. It might be difficult to argue that there is a direct relationship between Thales's material monism and his seeming pantheism, but to me it seems hard to deny that the two are in some way linked. However, that CANNOT mean that material monism necessarily leads to pantheism, because the same cultures that I'm arguing influenced the way Greeks viewed water and thereby influenced Thales idea of water as singular substance, Egypt and Babylon, also influenced other cultures. The three major monotheistic religions of the world have their roots in Egypt and Mesopotamia, where much of Ancient Hebrew history and myth takes place, and whose mythology certainly influenced Hebrew mythology and the formation of many of these religions' traditions. So it's interesting to me that the influence of Egypt and Babylon seems to have resulted in Ancient Greece (or at least in Thales) in material monism, but in Israel and Palestine (and later, a lot of other places) in a monotheistic religion. Certainly, the exchange of cultural ideas is a very complicated process, so I may be oversimplifying, but the eventual evolution of cultures that were heavily influenced by Egypt and Babylon certainly worked out very differently. Of course, Thales comes LONG before the Christian era, and even longer before Muhammad and Islam, but if we think of these three religions as branches of one (which makes sense to me, although I'm sure the idea might be deeply offensive to others--I'm not denying their significant differences, simply asserting a link between them), the Abrahamic religions place the birth and life of Abraham at around 1500 BC ( http://www.directessays.com/essay_search/bc_abraham.html), and the writing of Genesis somewhere in the 1200 BC neighborhood (http://www.directessays.com/viewpaper/28254.html ). While I'm sure these dates are far from established, it makes the development of the Abrahamic religions (Early Judaism) and the time of the Presocratics and even later Greek thought somewhat parallel as far as time goes. I'm probably getting at this in a pretty roundabout way, but I'm wondering what it is about singularity that seems so simple to us, why material monism is the philosophical answer and monism is the religious answer to what's presented by life, even though both systems of thought shared at least some cultural influences. I hope this is intelligible, and I hope I can get some dialogue going about what this relationship should be, or if I'm stretching things too far, or what.

I figured I would start this study off with a closer look at some of the concepts found in the introduction of the book. There's a great deal of information within this first chapter to flush out, but I wanted to specifically examine the notion of 'origin' and how it was applied in ancient mythological/pseudo-philosophical systems.

There are three specific representations of the Origin that I want to examine in my post (if we get into any of the others, we can do so in the comments): Okeanos (pg 13-17), Chronos (pg 24) and Chaos (pg 36-41). Before an examination of these concepts can be launched, though, it is important to examine the concept of Origin within the ancient context. As Dr. Long has mentioned several times, the ancients did not posses a linear conception of time--which clearly establishes the necessity and conception of an origin (and, coincidentally, asserts the possibility of an ending)--but a cyclical conception of time, in which there is no established beginning or end. That being said, it is surprising to see an origin point being established by Homer, the Orphics and other ancient thinkers. It seems to be culturally counter to the generally accepted view of time. That being said, I also don't feel that the conception of Origin is incoherent with the cyclical conception of time. We, as individuals who live in the contemporary linear conception of time, posses a different view of origin than the ancients must have. For an Origin to be coherent with a cyclical time, we must re-examine the conception of Origin.

As I don't intend this post to focus entirely on Origin, as a concept, I will simply posit what I think the ancients must have thought of as 'Origin,' and leave the rest to be flushed out in conversation: the view of Origin is that of "the peg which holds the wheel in place." It is the center of the cycle which allows it to flow and move. In this way, it is both outside the flow of time (as it does not flow itself), but within time (as it is, literally, "inside" of the wheel, though unmoving). In this way, the concept of Origin and of cyclical time are coherent, and gives us a framework to imagine the thinking processes of the ancients who were examining the concept of Origin.

Okeanos:
"For I am going to see the limits of fertile earth, Okeanos begetter of gods and mother Tethys..." (Pg 14).

The placement of a cyclically flowing river which surrounds all of Earth and Heaven at the Origin is rather fascinating. What is found at the Origin of any civilization often demonstrates the values of a civilization, and establishes the focus their thinking of takes. Placing a circular river at the center of reality (continuing with my peg idea) and at the Origin point clearly demonstrates the respect and values water (specifically flowing water) had for ancients. Of course, given that they were often sea travelers and traded both goods and ideas with desert civilizations, such as Egypt (pg. 11), it is not entirely surprising to see one of the most important aspects of everyday life find its way into the center of all creation. Even in later mythological development, Poseidon, the god of the sea, is one of the most important gods in the mythological establishment. Furthermore, the linking of water to Origin has a more practically experienced foundation: seamon. While the mechanics of reproduction were not clearly known at this time in history, the knowledge that sex and reproduction were linked was.

There is, of course, much more to say on this matter (and it ventures into Tales), but I think it would be better developed flushed out in conversation (and this goes for Chronos and Chaos as well).

Chronos:
"In these Orphic Rhapsodies, then, as they are known, this is the theology concerned with the intelligible; which the philosophers, too, expound, putting Chronos in the place of the one origin of all..." (Pg 23).

The placement of Chronos (time) at the origin of all things has a cultural foundation, as well as a logical one (though today, we would disagree with this line of logic). The cultural foundation is grounded in the conception of time itself. Time, theoretically speaking, dictates the lives of all people. Peoples lives, even in ancient times, very much orients around time. Time of year for harvesting, time of day for sleeping or awaking, time of the lunar month for tidal changes with regard to travel and trade, and the list goes on. Time can, easily,  be seen as that which governs all, and those it would be a simple cultural step to place Chronos at the Origin of all things.

The logical rational is just as compelling, and is quite simply grounded in experience. Given that it appears that for anything to occur (crops grow, travel, ext.), including the creation of the universe, time must necessarily pass, and for time to pass, time/Chronos must exist. Therefore, time/Chronos is, necessarily, the Origin/peg, as only through time/Chronos could anything come to pass.

Chaos:
"Verily first of all did Chaos come into being..." (Hesiod pg 35).

Chaos, in this sense, as the author points out, does not correspond with our current understanding of chaos (as the unordered). Instead, it is seen as a "gape, gap, yawn" (pg. 37). What exactly this means is not entirely clear, not even to the authors. Despite the ambiguity, the authors believe that it is possible that it is a reference to the gap between the earth and the sky (which is thought of as a solid sphere). The reasoning behind this is mostly likely that for things to happen, there most be something for them to happen in. So, before anything can happen, a space must first come into being.

Now, all of this is very speculative, for myself and for the authors. My thinking on these issues is still very much a work in progress. What do you think?