Recently in Phaedrus Category

What have we learned?

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In the Phaedrus, Socrates offers us a quote that he uses to define himself:
"Now, I am a prophet, not a very serious one, but, like people who are barely literate, good enough for my own purposes..." (Phaedrus, 242c).

I bring this quote up because I find it interesting and fitting for the end of this class.  For 15 weeks, 30 classes, we came together and discussed what we thought of certain philosophical dialogues, religious posts that drew over 70 comments, scenarios in life, and anything else that came to mind.  In a certain way, we were philosophers for a semester - philosophers who were good enough for our own purposes. 

What I wish to ask is something that may seem difficult because of its vagueness, but if thought about for a short amount of time, should be capable of drawing an answer: What have we learned from this class?  What will we take from it into our future aspirations?

Certainly, we all have different goals in life and many of us aren't going to sit down and read any of Plato's books again, but that is irrelevant. Are we students who talked about what is Good just because we had to, or are we actually interested in pursuing a similar lifestyle?  Are we a community who banded together when a problem arose because Dr. Long would be happy, or did we truly believe what we were saying?

Good luck with all your future ambitions... 

Myers-Briggs Persuasion

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So I know we've moved passed the Phaedrus but I had a conversation with a friend the other day that reminded me of an issue in that text.

My friend pressured me into taking one of those Myers Briggs personality tests.  In the ensuing discussion we commented on the possibility of better communication through the recognition of the different personality types defined by the test.  This reminded me of the section of the Phaedrus wherein Socrates claims that truly good speech making requires the knowledge of the different types of souls and how different sorts of speeches may persuade them (271d-272b).  Relating this back to the personality test, there were some personality types that relied on reason as their mode of thought where as others were most affected by emotion, etc.  If one could identify someone's personality I feel it would be possible to tailor one's rhetoric to either emphasize logos or pathos, logic or emotive force, when the occasion calls.  Anyway, I thought this made for an interesting practical application of Socrates' ideas of speech making.

Now what have you learned?

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In concluding our discussion on The Phaedrus, one of the topics we hoped to explore but didn't really have time to delve into was how we were supposed to interpret Phaedrus's growth, or lack thereof, throughout the text, so I'd like to open up this topic for discussion. In the beginning Socrates seemed to use Lysias's speech as well as his own two speeches to demonstrate to Phaedrus the danger of obsessing over a well-written or particularly persuasive speech and thus taking it as the truth. By presenting a speech Phaedrus praised highly and then revealing his true opinion by delivering a speech taking the opposite stance, Socrates reveals Phaedrus's inability to pass rational judgment upon an argument before accepting it as correct or true. After thinking and discussing critically with Phaedrus for the rest of the dialogue, it appears that one of Socrates' main goals was to teach his young friend to critically engage topics himself and come to his own conclusions rather than accept the first thing he hears. But is this goal achieved? On one hand, the text at line 276e seems to suggest through Phaedrus's words that he finally is engaging the discussion critically and expanding upon what Socrates has said:

 P: "You refer to a very noble kind of play, Socrates, in contrast to a worthless kind, that of the person who is able to play with speeches, telling tales about justice and the other things you mention."

Immediately following, however the exchange beginning at 277a4 seems to reveal quite the opposite:

S: Now that we've agreed about these matters, Phaedrus, we can decide about those others.

P: What are they?

S: We've gotten to this point because we wanted to know about the following: what we were going to make of the criticism of Lysias as a writer of speeches, and, with regard to speeches themselves, which were written in an artful manner and which not. It seems to me that what is artful and what is not has been made abundantly clear.

P: I thought so, but remind me again how it went."

If it had really also been made so abundantly clear to Phaedrus, would he actually have forgotten already? Or is it just that he is still relying on another to make the difficult and intelligent conclusions for him? It seems to me like this moment is Phaedrus's golden opportunity to demonstrate that he has actually gained something from this exchange and present an idea or conclusion from his own interpretations. Instead, Phaedrus is reduced to simple one line responses or questions aimed at gaining a response from Socrates, just as the other rhetors we have thus far encountered. I'm interested to see if you all agree or if there are different interpretations regarding Phaedrus's growth throughout the dialogue.

The Farmer Analogy

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Is there a difference in value of a work that is written as opposed to one that is orally expressed? Once an argument or articulation is written down on paper does it lose some of it's worth?


Socrates uses an analogy that relates serious farming (as opposed to farming for the sake of amusement) to dialectical expression (as opposed to written speeches, which are also merely for the sake of amusement):


Now, tell me this. Would a sensible farmer who had some seeds he cared about and who wanted to produce a crop plant them with serious intent in the heat of summer in gardens for Adonis and enjoy seeing them bloom beautifully in eight days? If he did such things at all, wouldn't he do them for the sake of amusement and at festivals? In those cases where he was serious, wouldn't he use the farmer's art and plant in suitable ground and prefer having what he has sown reach maturity in the eighth month?... Shall we say that the person who has a knowledge of what's just, beautiful, and good is less sensible about his seeds than the farmer?... Then, when he's serious he won't write them in ink, using a pen to sow speeches that are unable to defend themselves in discussion and unable to teach truth effectively... He'll sow his gardens for amusement, it seems, and will write, when he does write, to store up reminders for himself, and for all who follow the same track, against the forgetfulness that may come with old age. (276b-276d)


Socrates makes it clear that speeches which are written down cannot possibly attain as much value as oral ones because they cannot be "implanted" or understood by the reader nearly as well. He relates writing speeches to farming for "the sake of amusement and festivals" because he says the only purpose for one to write it down is for "reminding", because one who truly has knowledge of things like "goodness" and "justice" has no need to write them down.

I would like to disagree with Socrates.


I think that putting something in writing is ballsy and it exhibits knowledge just as well as oral speech does. I think that writing is just as capable of affecting the audience as dialect is. In fact, I think that one can show "seriousness" in writing even more so than in dialect. This is because someone has to make the effort to actually put down what they want to express rather than just simply saying it. When something is in writing, it is out there for multiple people or even for the whole world to see. Something you say can be heard by others for that instant, but when something is in writing it is out for the world and can rarely be taken back.


Socrates also relates writing to painting, in that the "[c]reations stand there as though they were alive, but if you ask them anything, they maintain a quite solemn silence... they always just continue to say the same thing... it isn't able to help or defend itself" (275 e). He complains about the value of these works and says that these forms of art are less purposeful perhaps because they are not directed towards a specific person for a specific reason, in order to teach or change them. Instead, they are spread and shared equally among everyone, people who have no true reason to see them. This is another reason I think writing is just as powerful as oral speech, BECAUSE it has no one to defend it; the creator puts it out there for the world regardless of the many various interpretations, hoping it will reach and change them. The writer is put in a position that is able to make them feel much more vulnerable than the speech giver.

 
I do not believe writing, like planting for "festivals", is purely for amusement. I believe it is very important, not only in building history but in changing the world and the people in it. Any art in written or frozen form is powerful.

Rising above our compositions

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In the closing scene of the Phaedrus (278b-e) Socrates finally lays out the distinction between individuals who peruse the appearance of wisdom, and those who peruse wisdom. I have a feeling this distinction is Socrates' primary objection to the vocational sophists:

S: "...to all of them we are to say that if their compositions are based on knowledge of the truth, and they can defend or prove them, when they are put to the test, by spoken arguments, which leave their writings poor in comparison of them, then they are to be called, not only poets, orators, legislators, but are worth of a higher name, befitting the serious pursuit of their life."

These people Socrates labels as philosophers.

S: "And he who cannot rise above his own compilations and compositions, which he has been long patching and piecing, adding some and taking away some, may be justly called a poet or speech-maker or law-maker"

There seems to be an unspoken label here: Sophists.

It seems as though Socrates likens the ability to engage with (or relate to) another individual to the pursuit of the highest good. This seems to suggest that dialogue cannot be static. In other words, when you relate to another individual about knowledge of the truth you cannot be an 'objective' spectator. You need to get your hands dirty and be affected by the dialogue. The sophists attempt to avoid actual engagement; their "dialogues" are not genuine responses to questions but pre-composed answers. And Socrates seems to be suggesting that the "art" of dialogue is more important, and more difficult, than the "art" of composition.

My first thought when processing this text was dissertations. It's not enough that you wrote a dissertation, but you need to defend (or as Socrates would say "rise above your composition") your dissertation to a group of individuals. This personal event is something quite different from merely composing a paper. I wonder if the requirement for dissertations to be defended is influenced at all by Socrates' emphasis on personal interaction.

Is dialogue more difficult (or even more important) than mere composition? Is the ability to "rise above" written words a clear indicator of a philosophical mind?

Weekly Round Up #9

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Weekly Round Up 9.mp3

Olivia and Ed discuss the Memory vs. Intelligence, static vs. dynamic dialogue, and the growth of Pheadrus.

Sex and the Human Psyche

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What role does sex play in a relationship? Does sex act as threat which corrupts a relationship or rather as an agent which allows one to flourish? Socrates portrays exactly what occurs in the human mind and body (through the charioteer metaphor) in the occasion that a person sees their loved one: So, when the charioteer sees the vision of his beloved, his entire soul is warmed by the perception and filled with longing's tickling and prickling. The horse that is obedient to the charioteer, constrained now as always by a sense of what is respectable, restrains itself, not leaping upon the beloved; but the other no longer heeds the charioteer's whip and goad. It leaps forward powerfully, giving its yoke-mate and charioteer all kinds of trouble, and forces them to approach the darling and mention to him the delights of sexual activity. At the first the two indignantly resist being compelled to do terrible, unlawful things, but they finally give in to the unending harassment and go where they are being led, agreeing to do what is demanded. (254b) Unlike the "obedient" horse, which is always led by a sense of "respectability", the other, in contrast has an instinct to "leap forward powerfully" while provoking the loved one with the "delights of sexual activity". But why are the two even contrasted? Why does wanting sexual activity dwell from the disobedient part of the human mind and further, why is it disrespectful to the other person or to the relationship? In this passage which portrays the different realms of the human psyche, the realm in which sex is aroused and wanted is the "bad" one. I don't understand why constraining oneself and holding back from sex is a way to gain or maintain a healthy relationship between two lovers. I do understand that if two people do not TRULY love each other than yes, sex could be an agent which damages the relationship, and should be resisted as portrayed in Socrates' metaphor. However, in this particular case, I believe Socrates is talking about an event in which you encounter the person you are truly in love with. So, in that case, I do not believe this portrayal of the horses is right nor fair to the human species. Sex is one of the rare, essential pleasures of life. According to Freud, the three basic needs of humans are: water, warmth, and sex. Sex allows two people in love to connect and be united on a whole new level of being. It is a gift that can be celebrated and shared between these two "lovers", and I cannot see why it is portrayed as "terrible and unlawful". The reason I say this passage does not give the human race any justice is because it is as if we have to fight something that is only natural to us. I understand Socrates revolves his discussions around the central idea of reaching the "good", but we should not have to fight nature along the way of getting there.

Amish Understanding

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While reading the last part of the Phaedrus, I was looking for a connection with a lecture I attended last night, by Dr. Trudy Huntingdon. Dr. Huntingdon spent many years living with various Amish, Mennonite, and Hutterite communities in the United States and Canada, while studying their culture and methods of land conservation, to receive her doctorate.

In the lecture, she shared many different aspects of Amish culture, and explained to the audience what she had learned from her research. Her main message to the listeners was the idea of common misperceptions about the Amish community. So, I felt that it tied in perfectly with this passage from the text:

S: We've gotten to this point because we wanted to know about the following: what we were going to make of the criticisms of Lysias as a writer of speeches, and, with regard to speeches themselves, which were written in an artful manner and which not. It seems to me that what is artful and what is not has been made abundantly clear.

P: I thought so, but remind me again how it went.

S: Until one knows the truth about each of the topics one speaks or writes about and is able to define each in its own terms; and until after defining them, one knows how to cut them up again in accordance with their forms until one reaches what's indivisible; and until one comes to an understanding of the nature of the soul in the same way, discovering the form that fits each nature, and arranges and organizes one's speech accordingly, offering to a complex soul complex speeches that cover all the musical modes and simple speeches to a simple soul; only then will one be able, insofar as it's in accord with its nature, to deal with the race of speeches in an artful manner, either in connection with teaching or in connection with persuading - as the entire preceding discussion has reminded us. (277b-d)

So, from both Dr. Huntingdon's speech and the text of the Phaedrus, it's easy to draw the idea that one should not attempt to speak or write about something until it's been completely defined. Socrates then goes on to talk about the correct information to speak about depending upon the soul of the listener. Dr. Huntingdon also mentioned some information about cultural sensitivity. She had to conform to Amish ways of dress and living in order for to build their trust and be able to communicate with them. Only after certain proofs of intelligence or understanding, would certain women in the Amish community speak to her.   

The question that stems from this second parallel, however, is that of what complexity means. Do we take complexity to mean intelligence, and the ability to understand complex things, or do we take complexity to mean something altogether different? Have we already defined complexity and I missed the boat on that conversation?

Playing and Knowledge (Playing with Knowledge)

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In PHIL 200 today, we talked about knowledge and its relation to writing and speaking.  For example, we asked the question several times whether the memorization implicit in the primacy of speech is identifiable with knowledge.

However, we also talked about play and its relation to knolwedge, and how the distinction between play and seriousness is not so strict with Socrates, e.g., the "very noble kind of play" that Socrates suggests near the end of the Phaedrus (276e1).  My question is: Is this the kind of "knowledge" Socrates and Plato would wish us to attain--a playful knowledge?  For instance, play is almost always a playing with, whether it be an object, another, or oneself.  Play could be seen as an interaction with proposed truths and ideals in an attempt to flesh them out: in that way it is not a definite object or article of knowledge.  Is play, being a trajectory and not an object, suggested by Socrates in his dialectical approach and his ironic procedure of fleshing out opposing viewpoints?  Indeed, play rarely has a goal--it is done most often for its own sake.  Is Plato, in his literary and dialogical approach, doing the same?  Is Plato hoping that, like his dialogue's namesake, Phaedrus, we will come to a certain mode of self-sufficiency (a good example of this being the exchange at 263c-d that Dr. Long highlighted in class) in engaging and playing with knowledge?

Plato sleeps in Rwanda

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Alright, guys, I was so moved (I'm generally moved by all speeches I hear, I don't really know why.) by this speaker that I went to see tonight that I really wanted to post about it and share it with everyone. I couldn't come up with a connection to Plato/Socrates until I did the reading for class. What perfect timing! Anyway, the speaker's name was Carl Wilkens. He was the only American to stay in Rwanda during the genocide of 1994, that still continues today.

Here's the blurb that was sent out over the philosophy list-serv:

'Carl Wilkens stayed.

The only American to choose to stay in Rwanda after the genocide began in April 1994, Carl Wilkens prevented the massacre of hundreds of children and many adults over the course of the genocide.

Featured in Frontline's Ghosts of Rwanda and The Few Who Stayed: Defying Genocide, an American Radio Works documentary, Wilkens' story reminds us of the profound connection between history and the moral choices we face each day.

His experience with the power of human relationships as the difference between life and death challenges us to explore our own biases against those we characterize as "OTHER."'

So, we could obviously connect this speech and what I heard to morality, but I actually focused on the happiness of his speech. It's ironic that we're talking about genocide, and I'm struck by the happiness of Carl Wilkens' and Socrates' remarks:

S: Then when he's serious, he won't write them in ink, using a pen to sow speeches that are unable to defend themselves in discussion and unable to teach the truth effectively.

P: That's not likely.

S: No, it isn't. He'll sow his gardens of letters for amusement, it seems, and will write, when he does write, to store up reminders for himself, and for all who follow the same track, against the forgetfulness that may come with old age, and he'll enjoy watching their tender shoots grow. While others resort to other kinds of play, refreshing themselves with drinking parties and whatever is related to these, this person, it seems, instead of indulging in these kinds of play, will engage in those I'm speaking of.

P: You refer to a very noble kind of play, Socrates, in contrast to a worthless kind, that of the person who is able to play with speeches, telling tales about justice and other things you mention.

S: So it is, Phaedrus my friend, but far more noble, I think, is the serious treatment of these subjects when someone uses the dialectical art and, selecting an appropriate soul, plants and sows in it speeches that are accompanied by knowledge, speeches that can defend both themselves and the one who planted them and that are not barren but contain a seed from which others grow up in other abodes, so that this process is rendered eternal and immortal. Such speeches make the person who possesses them as happy as a human being can be. (277a)

In the speech by Socrates, we are discussing the idea of taking speeches seriously, and the treatment of such a serious topic - what is mature, what is the correct way to handle the knowledge bestowed upon the bearer of it. If one correctly bestowed this knowledge upon others, he would become the happiest he can possibly be.

I felt this is a perfect tie with Carl Wilkens' speech. He witnessed the murders, bombings, and maiming of people in a country fraught with civil unrest. Yet, his response to this horrific action was not to flee the country and help from the outside, but to do what he could from within. He spoke of the need to focus on the happiness that was still occurring day to day in Rwanda. Being amazed at the possibility of children giggling under gunfire was just one of the personal anecdotes he shared. He communicated his happiness that he could be there and function correctly, and then share his experience and awareness of this issue with various American schools and people. A quote of his that really stuck with me and goes along with some of Socrates' debates, is that "the most powerful weapon we all have is a story."

Let me know if you guys think this parallel...isn't. Hahah. Thanks for listening/reading. Passion and happiness about a cause is definitely one means to a positive end, in my logic.

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