Socratic Politics in Digital Dialogue

Love at the Movies

Tue, 24 Nov 2009 23:46:40 -0500

As an avid film-goer, I couldn't help but think of Love in movies while reading about Love in the Phaedrus and The Symposium. Since we are technically on vacation, I thought it would be a nice time to take a slight break from Platonic Love and discuss our favorite Romantic Movies. Therefore, I have listed four of my personal favorite Love stories in movies:

WARNING: I tried to keep out any spoilers from the movies, but some potential spoilers may be present.

4. Tom (Joseph Gordon-Levitt) and Summer (Zooey Deschanel) in (500) Days of Summer (2009) - I think its fitting to start the list about Love with a movie that is almost an anti-Love story. Tom falls in love with Summer and over the course of the movie we watch as their relationship develops, becomes stagnant, and implodes. Tom never stops loving Summer, although she becomes bored with him and can't return that love. This is a film that everyone - especially guys - can relate to on a very real level. You become emotional invested in Tom's character, and through him you also fall in love with Summer, fall out of love, and feel that cruel hard sting of rejection and love lost. This is a chick-flick for guys and a tale of love that is, at times, brutally honest.

3. Damiel (Bruno Ganz) and Marion (Solveig Dommartin) in Wings of Desire (Der Himmel über Berlin - 1987) - This is my Film Snob movie pick. Wings of Desire was a German movie that premiered at the Cannes Film Festival. Damiel is an Angel who falls in love with the profoundly lonely Marion who is a beautiful trapeze artist at a local circus. The movie is a slow, thoughtful mediation of love that transcends the mortal and immortal. Damiel, a creature of pure empathy and understanding, watches over Marion throughout the movie, and decides to give up his own immortality in order to become human and experience love. The final meet face-to-face introduces one of the most artistically beautiful expressions of Love in which Marion talks directly into the camera, addressing Damiel and the audience directly. She's never met Damiel directly, and yet she feels a connection to him that is beyond anything that she has ever felt to anyone on earth. This is a story of Love that transcends even human existence. A gripping, if somewhat methodical, movie that is one of my favorites of all times.

2. Buttercup (Robin Wright) and Westley (Cary Elwes) in The Princess Bride (1987) - This is a story of young Love, Love lost, Love found again to only be kidnapped by an evil King and a six fingered man, and a happy ending all around. It's a glorious 1980s Fairy Tale. This film hits all the clichés of fairy tale movies - love at first sight, true love, doing anything for love - without it coming off as sappy and pretentious. Rather it engages such fairy tale topics with a biting wit and sense of humor while still making the romance believable. And come on - you've totally said "As you wish" at least once while dating, whether they got the reference or not. This movie made me fall in love with fairy tale romances all over again.

1. Rick (Humphrey Bogart) and Ilsa (Ingrid Bergman) in Casablanca (1942) - I didn't want to pick the obvious choice, but I couldn't help it. Besides being one of the greatest movies ever made, it features a complicated love story between Rick and Ilsa that takes place from Nazi-occupied Paris, France to Casablanca. First Ilsa has to leave Rick even though she loves him, breaking his heart in the process. Ilsa reappears with her husband on the run from the Nazis and in desperate need of Rick's help in eluding them. Drama, romantic tension, Nazis, on-screen chemistry, and some of the most memorable movie quotes of all time ("Of all the gin joints, in all the towns, in all the world, she walks into mine..." and "Here's looking at you kid.") and that song "As Time Goes By," which will stay in your head long after the movie ends. You'll marvel at Bogart, who has to be the coolest actor of all time, and you'll fall in love with Bergman, from those sad dark eyes to that hot Swedish accent. Any Romantic movie list is incomplete without this marvel in Film History.

What is your favorite Romances in Film? What is your least favorite? And what can Hollywood's portrayal of Love inform our opinion on Platonic Love in the dialogues we are reading?

Digital Dialogue 19: Politics After Rights

Tue, 24 Nov 2009 21:13:01 -0500

Adriel Trott, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas, Pan American joins me for episode 19 of the Digital Dialogue. Adriel received her PhD in Philosophy from Villanova University in 2008 with a dissertation entitled "The Challenge of Physis: Reconciling Nature and Reason in Aristotle's Politics."

Her areas of specialization are Ancient Greek Thought and Social and Political Philosophy. Her work is informed by the continental and feminist traditions. She has come to the Digital Dialogue to talk about the recent paper she delivered at SPEP entitled: "The Wrongs of Rights: The Onto-Political Logic of Human Rights from Arendt to Badiou."

Digital Dialogue 19 with Adriel Trott: Politics After Rights

To subscribe to the Digital Dialogue through iTunesU, click here.

Socrates the Champ

Tue, 24 Nov 2009 13:51:51 -0500

"With Socrates, gentlemen, my ploy won't succeed. No matter how much anyone orders him to drink, he drinks it and still never gets drunk..." (214a)

"Moreover, when there were feasts, he was the only one who really enjoyed them, and although he never wanted to drink, when he was compelled to so he outlasted everyone -- and what is most amazing of all, nobody has ever seen Socrates drunk!" (220a)

Has anyone else noticed that as the dialogue goes on and other characters get more and more intoxicated, Socrates seems unaffected by the wine?

What reason would Plato have to make Socrates such a tank, to put it bluntly? Is it symbolic? Perhaps being impervious to alcohol symbolizes being impervious to something else...?

What do you all think? It's a bit disappointing, no? While Alcibiades' drunken antics are entertaining, I'd like to see Socrates with a bit of a buzz going as well.

And I tried to get a pretty picture for this post, this is the best I could come up with:

I hope everyone has a good thanksgiving as well!

Socratic Eye for the Philosopher Guy

Tue, 24 Nov 2009 12:25:57 -0500

As Apollodorus recounts the symposium to the companion, it starts out with Aristodemus describing Socrates looking beautiful (174b) :

"He said he met Socrates, who was coming from the baths and waring sandals, which he rarely did, and he asked Socrates where he was going looking so beautiful."

Socrates responds with

" To dinner at Agathon's... I stayed away from the victory feasts yesterday, because I was concerned about the crowd, but agreed to be there today. I'm dressed up this way so that beauty may approach beauty."

With this passage he displays his knowledge of the importance of appearance. This is something that hasn't really been hit on heavily with this dialogue because inner beauty of knowledge, wisdom and the pursuit of the good have all been underlying themes of Socrate's method. It appears to be contradictory to past notions where it seemed it didn't matter how aesthetically pleasing Socrates was, the only important aspect of him was how his oration skills performed.

Going into further of why Socrates would have been "done up" I was further perplexed at the fact that most of the characters that he's going to meet at this party or festivity are people whom he has already had dialogue with, so first impressions had already been made. With his statement of beauty approaching beauty he reveals his self awareness of his normal attire, and that this is unsuited for this particular occasion. Does this mean he is trying to impress his colleagues? Or is this just Plato's way of foreshadowing what the speeches are goign to discuss later; love and the pursuit of what is beautiful

My opinion it is both. Its Plato's way of foreshadowing what the coming dialogue is about and a way of painting Socrates in a light that makes him more suited to talk of beauty when he is beautiful. As a counter argument this may coincide with the popular saying "when in Rome". It could be Socrates is dressed nicely as with the custom of the time and the type of occasion. This notion would project the certain cultural awareness that sometimes is seen absent from the "aloof" Socrates because he's seen as to not care how he appears to others, only how he sounds.

My question for further discussion is this: Is Socrates simply following custom and bringing fine linens to an occasion or does he have other underlying objectives in mind?

Gorgias and Socrates: The Feast of Friendship

Mon, 23 Nov 2009 18:18:09 -0500

Some commentators have stressed that the first words of the Gorgias are crucial for understanding the dramatic framing of the dialogue: polemon kai machen (a war and a battle). Of course, this points out the fact that philosophy and rhetoric have conceived themselves as rivals that pursue antagonistic aims. To interpret those first words under the light of a battle that is going to take place between the rhetorician and the philosopher is not absurd. But still, it seems to me that Socrates' allusion to his being late for a feast shall not be interpreted in an ironical way, but rather as an acknowledgment that there is something to share and learn from Gorgias.

After Socrates blames Chaerephon of his late arrival he immediately states: boulomai gar puthestai par autou, tis he dunamis ths techne tou andros (I want to find out from the man what is the function of his art. 447c1-3). If we take this statement seriously then there is something that Socrates desires from Gorgias. I take this desire to be either the concern of the philosopher to come into terms with some type of rhetorician, that is, the recognition that philosophy lacks something which rhetoric has, or that this dichotomy should be overcome in the name of a philosophical rhetoric. If it is the former, then the question is in what sense could rhetoric be helpful for the philosophical activity in the terms that Socrates understands it. Therefore I think that the framing of the dialogue has to be understood not only as a confrontation between two enemies in a war, but also as a feast share by friends that need each other. We have inevitably to ask the following question: Would real philosophers "naturally reject rhetoric for dialectics?"(Doyle 2006)

It's important to remember that the Gorgias is a dialogue posterior to the Protagoras -in the dramatic temporal life of Socrates. This is crucial because we can only understand the outcome of the Protagoras by relating it to the Gorgias. The reason why I say this is because I think Socrates has, in certain degree, changed his perspective regarding certain rhetoricians. The agonistic conversation that Socrates had with Protagoras is transformed by a peaceful and harmonious conversation between he and Gorgias. If we conceive rhetoric in a non-technical and wider sense, then we can sustain that rhetoric has a motivational component that allows somebody to move another toward a certain direction, without forcing her. In other words rhetoric opens the space to be receptive to the claims of others, it "opens the capacity to be moved by the other as a result of the persuasive appeal"(Colapietro 1988, 157).

Andrew Stauffer in his book The Unity of Plato's Gorgias. Rhetoric, Justice and the Philosophic Life argues that the implicit analogy that Socrates poses at the beginning of the dialogue between rhetoric and weaving clothes, as well as that of rhetoric and music (449d1-5), reveal something essential to rhetoric: "[it] resembles an art that provides protection through the creation of cloaks and an art that sways men's passions than it does an art that clarify the path to true health" (Stauffer 2006, 21). This shows the tension that appears within rhetoric, on one hand, conceals something by protecting it, while on the other, moves us towards something else. In short, with the rhetorical art we are concealed and swayed, protecting us and at the same time giving ourselves to the other. Yet the fundamental thing here is that rhetoric cannot clarify the path to true health, that is, rhetoric cannot clarify the path towards the good. Nevertheless, it can move us toward one path or the other. If Socrates is trying to turn individual souls toward the good and if, as Ryan Pollock stated in his post couple of months ago, "those who practice virtue, whatever this would ultimately mean, cannot in advance of their undertaking have a precise conception of their final goal" (Pollock), then rhetoric becomes crucial for the practice of dialogue. Without a robust conception of the good and a determinate conception of what it would mean to turn individuals toward the good, rhetoric becomes fundamental. It allows that the people that engage in a dialogue are open to be moved by the other, are open to sway their passions in the direction that the other suggests, in other words, allow themselves to hear the music of other's utterances but without giving away their cloak that protects them from blind sway of their passions. It seems to me that when Gorgias tells the anecdote of the one time that he went with his brother to the sick person that was not willing to take his medication, and then Gorgias declares: "the doctor being unable to persuade him, I persuade him, by no other art than rhetoric" (456b4-5); the sick person was able to be receptive to the other, that is to say, he was open to be moved by the words of the other. It was the rhetorician who was able to move the sick person, not the doctor that had the knowledge of his illness. As I said in class, this kind of interplay between rhetoric and dialogue is crucial for the exercise of the true political art, an art that aims to turn individuals towards the good, by being also open to be moved by the other. In short, this interplay can be conceived as overcoming the traditional prejudice of separating with an axe, using Peirce's metaphor, philosophy and rhetoric as two unrelated activities.

Perhaps the war and battle that was referred to at the beginning of the dialogue is more an anticipation of what would be the conversation between Socrates and Callicles. I think this is why Callicles was the one that expressed those words, and not Gorgias. While Socrates really wanted something from Gorgias, maybe he knew that a feast was waiting for him, a feast that was going to be shared with a future friend, a friend from whom he would learn something important for his philosophical practice. It seems to me that the dialogue is not only about battle and war, but also about friendship, alliance, and community between two old enemies that might become future friends. Philosophy and Rhetoric have to come into terms; the alliance between the two can intensify both activities, and thus open new possibilities of meaning of what is the philosophical life.

Works Cited

Colapietro, Vincent. "Human Agency: The Habits of our Being." The Southern Journal of Philosophy XXVI, no. 2 (1988): 153-168.
Doyle, James. "On the First Eight Lines of Plato's Gorgias." The Classical Quarterly 56, no. 2 (December 2006): 599-602.
Plato. Gorgias. Great Britain: Loeb Classic Library, 1996.
Stauffer, Andrew. The Unity of Plato's Gorgias. Rhetoric, Justice and the Philosophical Life. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Perspectives

Thu, 19 Nov 2009 23:26:56 -0500

In continuing another philosophical conversation with my roommate, we began talking about perspectives. Every person in the world is raised in a different environment, having different embarrassing adolescent moments, family life, skills, hobbies, etc. We become a product of the triumphs and failures that we experience throughout our lives. It seems fascinating to us that we all can participate in a seemingly similar world (i.e. 9-5 jobs, getting married, raising a family). Obviously, there are instances where different perspectives on life can lead to a harmonious existence, and other types where they can cause epic disasters.

Being a political science major, I attempted to relate this idea to something that is going on in the world currently. One example that comes to mind is the situation in Zimbabwe. Mugabe, the current (co-)leader there, has displaced thousands of people in order to give larger amounts of land to more elite natives, by forcibly removing the poor. This has caused severe inflation, and the inability to produce any exports because the poor have no land to settle and cultivate upon.

As Schuyler had pointed out, in the Symposium, Phaedrus believes that "if a man who loves someone is discovered doing something shameful or failing through cowardice to defend himself against some shame, he would not be as distressed at being seen in such circumstances by anyone, not his father, his companions, nor anyone else, as he would be at being seen by his darling.... He likewise is thoroughly ashamed before his lovers should he be observed engaging in something shameful." He then continues to say that " a city or an army composed of lovers and their darlings... there could be no better way of organizing their city, since they would abstain from everything shameful and would be jealous of their honor in front of each other." (178d-e)

Would Mugabe's behavior be different if he had a lover that he did not want to appear shameful towards? Turns out, Mugabe is actually married, and both seem to benefit from his practice of "stealing from the poor to give to the rich". In his perspective, as well as that of his wife, and of the elite that are gaining from this, I would imagine that Mugabe does not appear to be doing a shameful thing. Meanwhile, the impoverished cannot possibly feel the same way.

So this may seem like a lot of random thoughts, but basically what I am asking is this: Who is to say that one is acting honorably in front of their lover? Is it the lover his/herself? Is it society? Also, how can one definitively say that a society is "succeeding", as Phaedrus said?

I am tempted to believe that this all comes down to one answer- perspectives.

Bertrand Russell and Plato: The Misreading of Platonic Texts in "An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish."

Thu, 19 Nov 2009 12:51:56 -0500

I like Bertrand Russell. I enjoy his critiques of religion, superstitions, and governments. Even more so, I enjoy his essay An Outline to Intellectual Rubbish: an essay depicting the history of superstitions corrupting and corrosive influence on society, governments, individuals, and philosophy. Here's a link to an online edition of the essay, http://www.solstice.us/russell/intellectual_rubbish.html .

The issue that I take with Russell is his portrayal of several philosophers and philosophies; a portrayal that, ultimately, adds up to a straw-man argument and fails to stand up under any sort of real reading. Of course, at this point in time, I could go on about the failures in his reading of Spinoza, as I am well versed in his philosophy, but instead I want to focus on the occasions that he mentions Plato. Here's the exerts in which he mentions Plato:

1: "Aristotle and Plato considered Greeks so innately superior to barbarians that slavery is justified so long as the master is Greek and the slave barbarian."

2: "Infanticide, which might seem contrary to human nature, was almost universal before the rise of Christianity, and is recommended by Plato to prevent over-population."

3: "There is no nonsense so arrant that it cannot be made the creed of the vast majority by adequate governmental action. Plato intended his Republic to be founded on a myth which he admitted to be absurd, but he was rightly confident that the populace could be induced to believe it."

4: "You may find your colored help making some remark that comes straight out of Plato-not the parts of Plato that scholars quote, but the parts where he utters obvious nonsense, such as that men who do not pursue wisdom in this life will be born again as women. Commentators on great philosophers always politely ignore their silly remarks."

5: "Plato thinks it a grave objection to the drama that the playwright has to imitate women in creating his female roles."

6: "Magic, however, was a crude way of avoiding terrors, and, moreover, not a very effective way, for wicked magicians might always prove stronger than good ones. In the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, dread of witches and sorcerers led to the burning of hundreds of thousands convicted of these crimes. But newer beliefs, particularly as to the future life, sought more effective ways of combating fear. Socrates on the day of his death (if Plato is to be believed) expressed the conviction that in the next world he would live in the company of the gods and heroes, and surrounded by just spirits who would never object to his endless argumentation. Plato, in his "Republic," laid it down that cheerful views of the next world must be enforced by the State, not because they were true, but to make soldiers more willing to die in battle. He would have none of the traditional myths about Hades, because they represented the spirits of the dead as unhappy."

Now, aside from the obvious racism involved in statement 4, there are many issues to be had there. First, there is a distinctive lack of citation within the text, so it's impossible to find exactly Russell is referring to. This makes it nearly impossible to properly critique this work, as he fails to account for the location of the remarks that he speaks of, making it very difficult to check his references. He does the same thing with Spinoza, though I am lucky enough to be well-versed in Spinoza's texts, so I generally know what he is most likely referring to, and can refute his readings.

Secondly, in statement 4 he claims that Plato's statements on women are silly remarks, yet he doesn't seem to be nearly as fair towards any of the other statements that he speaks of. He fails to consider that it is possible that he is misreading Plato, and that the ideas that he refers to for the other 5 points are also silly, and because he doesn't give us citations, it makes it difficult to check him on this.

There is much more to refute and dispute here, but I will leave it for the time being, to see what others think of these statements, and the essay as a whole.

A Quick Update on the End of the Year Podcast

Thu, 19 Nov 2009 12:25:58 -0500

I just want to remind everyone who's interested in the podcast that we are currently taking a poll to see what times fit the best for the most people. Professor Long has set up this site to help facilitate this process: http://www.doodle.com/3bxpy77s9buncv4g

Right now it looks like December 9th at 11:00 AM-1:00PM is the best fit so far, but please put in your available times if you wish to do the podcast. The list of possible discussion points are as follows:

1. Pursuit of the Good - The swan, effect on the soul, what is it?

2. The Nature of dialogue -- Agonistic (Protagorus, Gorgias) vs. Harmonic (Phaedrus)

3. Gorgias -- Rhetoric in pursuit of the Good, Callicles' leaky jars

4. Protagorus -- Can ethics be taught?

5. Do the ends justify the means?

6. The Soul -- The Chariot Allegory, punishment as a means of cleansing one's soul, its relationship with "the good"

7. Erotic Love and the role of the lover in Phadreus

8. Piety -- the role it plays in informing one's soul

9. Socrates' use of story and metaphor in Gorgias and Phaedrus.

If you have any additional questions or concerns feel free to shoot out an email to me at cjy5020@psu.edu

Update: Professor Long has locked in the December 9th 11:00 AM -1:00PM time slot for the podcast. This is the last call for anyone interested in the podcast to vote at http://www.doodle.com/3bxpy77s9buncv4g

The Lover and the Darling

Thu, 19 Nov 2009 12:13:00 -0500

While reading all of these speeches concerning love, I noticed there is an ongoing discussion of lovers and the darling. In the Symposium, Pausanias's speech reiterated some of the ideas brought up in the Phaedrus, but he also brought to the forefront some of the questions I had been having. Why is there such a strict dichotomy between the beloved and the lover? Why is it that it is never an equal loving relationship?

Pausanias seems to attribute "custom".

"Our custom aims at testing well and properly whom to gratify and whom to avoid. For this reason, it encourages one to pursue and the other to flee, setting up a sort of contest and putting to the test which of the two kinds the lover and the beloved are," (184a).

While this seems to approach my questions, it merely poses more. Why are loving relationships characterized by a chase? Why is it not a complementary relationship between two people?

Additionally, in characterization of those to love and be loved, I have serious questions about Pausanias's idea that heavenly love completely excludes the female sex. He quickly glosses over this attributing it to the fact that it is the weaker sex and less intelligent. While this may have been an understood cultural norm, does this suggest that the most powerful kinds of love that were known in their society strictly male - male? What then of the example of Alcestis and Orpheus?

A War on Love

Wed, 18 Nov 2009 21:46:12 -0500

I am really intrigued by the exchange in the Symposium between Eryximachus and Aristophanes after Eryximachus' speech. While exchanging roles--exchanging positions, from audience to speaker, from speaker to audience--they exchange strangely polemical lines.

After Aristophanes jokes at Eryximachus' expense, Eryximachus says, "Aristophanes, my good man, watch what you're doing! Though you're supposed to be giving a speech, you're making jokes, and forcing me to be on my guard against your speech in case you say something funny, when you could march out to speak in peace" (189a6-189b1, emphases mine).

Aristophanes responds, "...Don't be on your guard against me; what I'm afraid of is not that I may say something funny (that would be a good trick and natural for my Muse), but rather that I may say something ridiculous" (189b3-5).

"Do you think you can make me a target and get away with it, Aristophanes?" asks Eryximachus (189b6-7, my emphasis).

As you might note by my emphases, the war imagery is explicit here, but its signficance is less apparent. I find it interesting: first, that the topic of discussion here is love, and yet it is a polemics (an argumentative discussion, a war of words) on love; and second, that the rules of discussion seem to be so innately oriented around war metaphors. Even in jest, Eryximachus must be on his guard, for even the most pleasant of exchanges, in this case, joking, hides the potential for violence.

What to say about this war on love? A more general question: Does every discussion hold the potential for war? Is every a discussion a polemics-in-disguise? Perhaps a question to get us started on the latter: Does every speaker/interlocutor feel threatened (like the object of attack) when another participant compromises his/her position, or jokes at his/her expense, however lightheartedly?

Circular loving...awkward.

Wed, 18 Nov 2009 20:22:05 -0500

When doing the reading for tomorrow's class, I was puzzled by the end result of Pausanias' speech at 185b.The speech discusses the idea that "loving and Love are not in every case noble and deserving of praise, but the loving that points us in a noble direction is" (181a) before ending with this idea:

"This youth has demonstrated for his part that he would eagerly do anything at any for the sake of virtue and in order to become a better person, and that is the noblest and most beautiful thing of all. Thus, to gratify someone for the sake of virtue is entirely noble. This is the Love of the heavenly goddess, and he is heavenly and of much worth, both in public and in private matters. For he compels both the lover and himself and his beloved to care deeply about virtue. All other Loves are connected with the other goddess, the common one. "

So, Pausanias is saying that the only good type of Love is the one that brings you towards a virtuous end. Does this mean that according to his theory, the only real Love that exists is a selfish one? If this is so, isn't that circular- virtue is achieved out of acts towards others, which actually benefit the self. This is a philosophical theory, but I can't remember to whom it belongs. Thoughts?

What do we learn from Moderation?

Wed, 18 Nov 2009 17:33:28 -0500

As I have been reading through The Symposium, I came across a passage that caught my attention. From this passage, I believe there are several different topics that may arise from this; mainly, I wish to focus upon human desires. As I believe we are all aware, Socrates is an advocate of moderation, temperance, and self-control. Certainly, there are times when these impulses are subdued, possibly when that person approaches the situation with generous intentions and a clear conscious of what is good. What I wish to focus on, though, is what we truly gain from restraining ourselves from these precarious situations. I wish to use the conversation about drinking in The Symposium as the topic of my post.

"Well now, gentleman," Pausanias said, "what will be the most moderate way for us to drink? I can tell you that I myself am in quite dreadful condition from yesterday's drinking, and I need some relief. I suspect most of you do, too. You were present yesterday. So, let's look for a way to drink as moderately as possible."...

"Then, it seems it would be a bit of luck from Hermes," Eryximachus continued, "for me, Aristophanes, Phaedrus, and the others, if you hardiest drinkers would stop now, since we always fall short by comparison. Socrates I exempt from the account; he'll be satisfied either way, and it will be alright with him whatever we do... I probably will provoke less displeasure when I tell you the truth about the nature of intoxication. I believe it has become clear from medical practice that intoxication is a harmful thing for human beings..."
(Symposium, 176a- 176d).

Why I bring this matter up is because it has a direct correlation with how we carry ourselves as students. I'm sure everyone knows that Penn State is the #1 party school in the nation; The Collegian ran an article about how student's blood alcohol content (BAC) has been on the rise when they are admitted into the hospital. Whatever you may take from this, it seems fairly obvious to me: we are not a society who bases itself on moderation. Because of this, it may be viewed that the philosophy of Callicles (the Leaky Jar Analogy) has become a dominant force in our time. As we can see, Pausanias and the fellow men are unable to drink because of how terrible they feel from the previous day. If they are drinking in a moderate way, should they have a hangover? Does moderation rely upon the impulses of indulging for a person to learn what is truly moderate - in a good sense?

So, I leave to question, why is this? Is it that our human desires are so powerful and self-gratification is that great? Is it because we are spoiled and have many objects readily available whenever one wants? Any other ideas?

Eryximachus

Wed, 18 Nov 2009 10:11:02 -0500

Since we have a few discussions going on with Pausanias' speech I figure it is only fair to put Eryximachus' idea of love to the test as well, perhaps get a few points to discuss on Thursday -

Eryximachus, at least by my reading, takes an extremely biological view of love. Love, to him, is much like a basic need, something that we need to have to be healthy. He encourages people to be temperate in their love and take things only in moderation, trying to find a harmony between them.

While I am normally one that is all for doing things in moderation and not taking things to extremes, this doesn't settle well with me. He takes a view that fits what he does perfectly; he is a man of medicine, and (it seems to me) sees Love as some sort of basic need, something that only needs to be fulfilled when it is depleted.

"In sum, the medicinal art is a knowledge of the activities of Love in the body in terms of filling it up and emptying it out." (186d)

I feel like this is terribly reductionist to the nature of Love, by boiling it down to the 'mechanical properties' of what it does for oneself. If you are looking for love to satisfy yourself, as if you were going out to a restaurant to nourish your need to eat, how can we really say you are being passionate about it? Is passion not a desperately important part of what we think of as Love?* While there is obviously a sort of passion that is bad (the kind that overtakes you), the sort that seems good (one that helps you excel) isn't exactly temperate.

Thoughts on this? Am I not giving the poor doctor enough credit?

* - A less rhetorical question: Should it be?

"I wish I were that glove upon her hand..."

Tue, 17 Nov 2009 22:45:23 -0500

We have begun the reading for our final dialogue in Phil 200: Plato's Symposium. Having just concluded a dialogue that spoke about the nature of love (the Phaedrus), we now see a similar look at the beauty and greatness of love. Furthermore, the nature of love surfaces once again as Apollodorus recounts the speeches praising love that were told to him by Arisodemus.

Erycimachus observes that "isn't it terrible that hymns in honor of each of the other gods have been written by the poets, but none of the many poets that have existed has ever composed a single poem or hymn of praise for Love, who is such a great and ancient god?[.....] On the contrary, this great god has been ignored!" (177a-177c).

However, if we reflect on our society today, would you all agree that Love and praise for it has been ignored? Like Erycimachus says, on the contrary, I think Love has NOT been ignored. Today, there are so many songs, books, films, magazine articles, and even educational classes that are about Love (love with a capital 'L' as we know it). In fact, admiration and pity for love is voiced so much in our culture that I think it has turned into an icon, so to speak, with no meaning behind it anymore because it is so overused. Even in everyday language, when we greet or bid farewell to one, many of us, I have noticed, say 'I love you," for example, without truly meaning it. It is more of a phrase that has become a habit of saying. And on the radio, there are an overwhelming amount of songs "in the name of love," that it's almost pitiful. Our culture is so tied to the concept of love that we further lose ourselves in being able to truly grasp what Love is - we may just be in love with the idea of being in love.

In our last couple of classes we have been trying to understand what the nature of love is as both the Phaedrus and the Symposium inevitably raise this question. To me, personally, love is more than what binds two lovers together. Love can encompass many things, and a song I know, ironically, voices it well. It is a Greek song titled "Αγαπη Ειναι," that is, "Love Is." Here is my translation of the song:

Love is to cry and to laugh
Love is, my friend, love you should spread
And whenenver you can, others you should help
And all those who helped you forget them never.
Love is...
Grandma's food
And that flavor of the village that you will always carry.
Love is...
A divine night
And nine months after a baby to fill with kisses
Love is life itself, only him that respects it will come to understand that.
Love one feels who can forgive
Love is truth and truth is need
Don't leave her [love], believe in something
She is everywhere and on her own she will come, love is:

Faith and belief together, it is to live life for every moment,
Love is....
The light that the sky gives
Love is a god.

Love is a sunny day, happiness in the air.
It is my eyes that look on wanting to be the best for you,
Love is to give blood because in the end you may need it too,
Someone of yours, or maybe even me.
Love is, can happen to anyone.
It is the caress and the hug of a mom, only she will love whatever you do, and wherever you go.
It is dad's advice to understand the mistake from right.
.......
Love is a song like this where I mean what I say,
Love is to do that which is simple that will bring a smile to another's face.
.....

(The song goes on...Here is the link to the song on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OnAovInMNtQ)

So, to everyone out there, what is the nature of love for you?

Digital Dialogue 18: Political Unconscious

Tue, 17 Nov 2009 22:32:32 -0500

Noëlle McAfee, Research Professor at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University, joins me for episode 18 of the Digital Dialogue which is another special SPEP edition.

Noëlle has numerous publications in the area of democratic political theory, social/political philosophy, feminist theory and American pragmatism including three books, Habermas, Kristeva, and Citizenship by Cornell University Press, 2000, Julia Kristeva, publish by Routledge in 2003, and a text that Shannon Sullivan and I discussed in episode 8 of the Digital Dialogue entitled Democracy and the Political Unconsious. She is here today to talk further about her book and to explore the transformative possibilities digital media opens for politics.

This year at SPEP, there was an excellent book panel on Noëlle's book in which Shannon Sullivan, of Penn State University and Robyn Marasco, of Hunter College, commented and Noëlle responded. A number of issues that grow out of that conversation frame some of our discussion on this episode of the Digital Dialogue.

Digital Dialogue 18 with Noëlle McAfee: Political Unconscious

To subscribe to the Digital Dialogue through iTunesU, click here.

Related Links

The Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
Noëlle's excellent blog, Gone Public.
Noëlle has posted on her appearance on the Digital Dialogue here on Gone Public.
Global Voices Online: http://globalvoicesonline.org/