Some
commentators have stressed that the first words of the Gorgias are crucial for
understanding the dramatic framing of the dialogue: polemon kai machen (a war and a battle). Of course, this points out
the fact that philosophy and rhetoric have conceived themselves as rivals that
pursue antagonistic aims. To interpret those first words under the light of a
battle that is going to take place between the rhetorician and the philosopher
is not absurd. But still, it seems to me that Socrates' allusion to his being
late for a feast shall not be
interpreted in an ironical way, but rather as an acknowledgement that there is
something to share and learn from Gorgias. After Socrates blames Chaerephon of
his late arrival he immediately states: boulomai
gar puthestai par autou, tis he duvamis ths techne tou andros (I want to
find out from the man what is the function of his art. 447c1-3). If we take
this statement seriously then there is something that Socrates desires from Gorgias. I take this desire
to be either the concern of the
philosopher to come into terms with some type of rhetorician, that is, the
recognition that philosophy lacks something which rhetoric has, or that this dichotomy should be
overcome in the name of a philosophical rhetoric. If it is the former, then the question is in what
sense could rhetoric be helpful for the philosophical activity in the terms
that Socrates understands it. Therefore I think that the framing of the
dialogue has to be understood not only as a confrontation between two enemies
in a war, but also as a feast share by friends that need each other. We have inevitably
to ask the following question: Would real philosophers "naturally reject
rhetoric for dialectics?"
It's
important to remember that the Gorgias
is a dialogue posterior to the Protagoras -in the dramatic temporal life of
Socrates. This is crucial because we can only understand the outcome of the Protagoras by relating it to the Gorgias. The reason why I say this, is
because I think Socrates has, in certain degree, changed his perspective
regarding certain rhetoricians. The agonistic conversation that Socrates had
with Protagoras is transformed by a peaceful and harmonious conversation
between he and Gorgias. If we conceive rhetoric in a non-technical and wider
sense, then we can sustain that rhetoric has a motivational component that allows somebody to move another toward a
certain direction, without forcing her. In other words rhetoric opens the
space to be receptive to the claims of others, it "opens the capacity to be
moved by the other as a result of the persuasive appeal"
Andrew
Stauffer in his book "The Unity of
Plato's Gorgias. Rhetoric, Justice and the Philosophic Life" argues that
the implicit analogy that Socrates poses at the beginning of the dialogue
between rhetoric and weaving clothes, as well as that of rhetoric and music
(449d1-5), reveal something essential to rhetoric: "[it] resembles an art that
provides protection through the creation of cloaks and an art that sways men's
passions than it does an art that clarify the path to true health"
Nevertheless,
it can move us toward one path or the other. If Socrates is trying to turn
individual souls toward the good and if, as Ryan Curtis stated in his post
couple of months ago, "those who practice virtue, whatever this would
ultimately mean, cannot in advance of their undertaking have a precise
conception of their final goal" (Curtis), then rhetoric becomes crucial for the
practice of dialogue. Without a robust conception of the good and a determinate
conception of what it would mean to turn individuals toward the good, rhetoric
becomes fundamental. It allows that the people that engage in a dialogue are open to be moved by the other, are open to
sway their passions in the direction that the other suggests, in other
words, allow themselves to hear the music of other's utterances but without
giving away their cloak that protects them from blind sway of their passions.
It seems to me that when Gorgias tells the anecdote of the one time that he
went with his brother to the sick person that was not willing to take his
medication, and then Gorgias declares: "the doctor being unable to persuade
him, I persuade him, by no other art than
rhetoric" (456b4-5); the sick person was able to be receptive to the other,
that is to say, he was open to be moved by the words of the other. It was the
rhetorician who was able to move the sick person, not the doctor that had the
knowledge of his illness. As I said in class, this kind of interplay between rhetoric and dialogue is crucial for the exercise
of the true political art, an art that aims to turn individuals towards the
good, by being also open to be moved by the other. In short, this interplay can
be conceived as overcoming the traditional prejudice of separating with an axe,
using Peirce's metaphor, philosophy and rhetoric as two unrelated activities.
Works Cited
-Colapietro, Vincent.
"Human Agency: The Habits of our Being." The Southern Journal of Philosophy XXVI, no. 2 (1988): 153-168.
-Doyle, James. "On the First Eight Lines of Plato's
Gorgias." The Classical Quarterly
56, no. 2 (December 2006): 599-602.
-Plato. Gorgias.
Great Britain: Loeb Classic Library, 1996.
-Stauffer, Andrew. The
Unity of Plato's Gorgias. Rhetoric, Justice and the Philosophical Life.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
