Some commentators have stressed that the first words of the
Gorgias are crucial for understanding the dramatic framing of the dialogue:
polemon kai machen (a war and a battle). Of course, this points out the fact that philosophy and rhetoric have conceived themselves as rivals that pursue antagonistic aims. To interpret those first words under the light of a battle that is going to take place between the rhetorician and the philosopher is not absurd. But still, it seems to me that Socrates' allusion to his being late for a feast shall not be interpreted in an ironical way, but rather as an acknowledgment that there is something to share and learn from Gorgias.
After Socrates blames Chaerephon of his late arrival he immediately states:
boulomai gar puthestai par autou, tis he dunamis ths techne tou andros (I want to find out from the man what is the function of his art. 447c1-3). If we take this statement seriously then there is something that Socrates desires from Gorgias. I take this desire to be either the concern of the philosopher to come into terms with some type of rhetorician, that is, the recognition that philosophy lacks something which rhetoric has, or that this dichotomy should be overcome in the name of a philosophical rhetoric. If it is the former, then the question is in what sense could rhetoric be helpful for the philosophical activity in the terms that Socrates understands it. Therefore I think that the framing of the dialogue has to be understood not only as a confrontation between two enemies in a war, but also as a feast share by friends that need each other. We have inevitably to ask the following question: Would real philosophers "naturally reject rhetoric for dialectics?"(Doyle 2006)
It's important to remember that the
Gorgias is a dialogue posterior to the Protagoras -in the dramatic temporal life of Socrates. This is crucial because we can only understand the outcome of the
Protagoras by relating it to the
Gorgias. The reason why I say this is because I think Socrates has, in certain degree, changed his perspective regarding certain rhetoricians. The agonistic conversation that Socrates had with Protagoras is transformed by a peaceful and harmonious conversation between he and Gorgias. If we conceive rhetoric in a non-technical and wider sense, then we can sustain that rhetoric has a motivational component that
allows somebody to move another toward a certain direction, without forcing her. In other words rhetoric opens the space to be receptive to the claims of others, it "opens the capacity to be moved by the other as a result of the persuasive appeal"(Colapietro 1988, 157).
Andrew Stauffer in his book
The Unity of Plato's Gorgias. Rhetoric, Justice and the Philosophic Life argues that the implicit analogy that Socrates poses at the beginning of the dialogue between rhetoric and weaving clothes, as well as that of rhetoric and music (449d1-5), reveal something essential to rhetoric: "[it] resembles an art that provides protection through the creation of cloaks and an art that sways men's passions than it does an art that clarify the path to true health" (Stauffer 2006, 21). This shows the tension that appears within rhetoric, on one hand, conceals something by protecting it, while on the other, moves us towards something else. In short, with the rhetorical art we are concealed and swayed, protecting us and at the same time giving ourselves to the other. Yet the fundamental thing here is that rhetoric cannot clarify the path to true health, that is, rhetoric cannot clarify the path towards the good.
Nevertheless, it can move us toward one path or the other. If Socrates is trying to turn individual souls toward the good and if,
as Ryan Pollock stated in his post couple of months ago, "those who practice virtue, whatever this would ultimately mean, cannot in advance of their undertaking have a precise conception of their final goal" (Pollock), then rhetoric becomes crucial for the practice of dialogue. Without a robust conception of the good and a determinate conception of what it would mean to turn individuals toward the good, rhetoric becomes fundamental. It allows that the people that engage in a dialogue are
open to be moved by the other, are open to sway their passions in the direction that the other suggests, in other words, allow themselves to hear the music of other's utterances but without giving away their cloak that protects them from blind sway of their passions. It seems to me that when Gorgias tells the anecdote of the one time that he went with his brother to the sick person that was not willing to take his medication, and then Gorgias declares: "the doctor being unable to persuade him,
I persuade him, by no other art than rhetoric" (456b4-5); the sick person was able to be receptive to the other, that is to say, he was open to be moved by the words of the other. It was the rhetorician who was able to move the sick person, not the doctor that had the knowledge of his illness. As I said in class, this kind of
interplay between rhetoric and dialogue is crucial for the exercise of the true political art, an art that aims to turn individuals towards the good, by being also open to be moved by the other. In short, this interplay can be conceived as overcoming the traditional prejudice of separating with an axe, using Peirce's metaphor, philosophy and rhetoric as two unrelated activities.
Perhaps the war and battle that was referred to at the beginning of the dialogue is more an anticipation of what would be the conversation between Socrates and Callicles. I think this is why Callicles was the one that expressed those words, and not Gorgias. While Socrates
really wanted something from Gorgias, maybe he knew that a feast was waiting for him, a feast that was going to be shared with a future friend, a friend from whom he would learn something important for his philosophical practice. It seems to me that the dialogue is not only about battle and war, but also about friendship, alliance, and community between two old enemies that might become future friends. Philosophy and Rhetoric have to come into terms; the alliance between the two can intensify both activities, and thus open new possibilities of meaning of what is the philosophical life.
Works Cited- Colapietro, Vincent. "Human Agency: The Habits of our Being." The Southern Journal of Philosophy XXVI, no. 2 (1988): 153-168.
- Doyle, James. "On the First Eight Lines of Plato's Gorgias." The Classical Quarterly 56, no. 2 (December 2006): 599-602.
- Plato. Gorgias. Great Britain: Loeb Classic Library, 1996.
- Stauffer, Andrew. The Unity of Plato's Gorgias. Rhetoric, Justice and the Philosophical Life. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
