When I heard the story, A 'Collision' of Beliefs: Atheist Vs. Theologian, this evening on All Things Considered about the new documentary, Collision, in which Christopher Hitchens and Pastor Douglas Wilson debate the question: "Is Christianity Good for the World," I immediately thought of all of you and the robust discussions we have been having this semester concerning the question of piety and the role it plays in philosophy.
The link under Collision above points you to a shorter video clip, here I have also embedded a longer clip of the movie.
As we continue to think and talk about the Phaedrus and, following on Tony's post on the Face of the Gods..., the role a certain piety plays in Socratic dialogue, I thought it would be interesting to link to this story to underscore at least two points.
First, note how Hitchens and Wilson embrace the vocabulary of "collision" even as they undertake a thoughtful, vigorous and respectful debate. Clearly, each thinks the other absolutely wrong, and yet they are able to engage one another in ways that are illuminating and thoughtful. After our reading of the Gorgias, where the central metaphor for discussion was that of war, I wonder if the model of respectful collision offers a different perspective on dialogue in which differences are exposed without the ultimate goal being reconciliation...
Second, a theme that has emerged in this course and on our blog is that of piety. Posts on piety and religion consistently receive the most comments and the most passionate responses. Socrates himself, of course, was charged with impiety by the Athenians in 399 BCE even as he insists, in the Apology, that he has lived a life in service of the god (Apollo) who spoke through the oracle at Delphi, saying that no one was wiser than Socrates (Apology, 21a-23c). Socrates found this strange and sought to prove it false by engaging others in dialogue concerning knowledge. (This, indeed, might be thought to be rather impious - attempting to prove the god wrong!) What Socrates reports having discovered, however, is that his wisdom involved the recognition that "when I do not know, neither do I think I know ... I do not think I know what I do not know" (Apology, 21d). Socrates is thus able to justify his life-long activity - philosophy - as a service to the god in which he shows anyone who thinks they know, that they do not know (see, Apology, 23b5) in order to prove that the wisdom he possesses is that of the knowledge of his own ignorance - a deeply human form of wisdom.
What sort of piety is involved here? Hitchens rejects Wilson's suggestion that Hitchens is acting with a sense of piety when he appeals to science and reason. Wilson insists that Hitchens has faith in science and religion. For his part, Hitchens sounds very Socratic in his recognition of the finitude of human understanding even as he rejects the idea that his is a position of faith. Surprisingly, Wilson appeals to human finitude as the source of faith, both his and that of Hitchens (at least as Wilson sees it).
As we have discussed, the Phaedrus is situated in a highly ritualized context, with Socrates and Phaedrus both barefoot (229a2) under the plane tree, by a stream with the cicadas singing overhead (230b-c; for more on the cicadas, see, 258e-259e). Socrates himself introduces the Delphic inscription, Know Thyself, and interprets it in terms of his own lack of knowledge (229e-230a): what, then, is the relationship between piety and human finitude and how does it inform the philosopical life Socrates undertakes?
The link under Collision above points you to a shorter video clip, here I have also embedded a longer clip of the movie.
As we continue to think and talk about the Phaedrus and, following on Tony's post on the Face of the Gods..., the role a certain piety plays in Socratic dialogue, I thought it would be interesting to link to this story to underscore at least two points.
First, note how Hitchens and Wilson embrace the vocabulary of "collision" even as they undertake a thoughtful, vigorous and respectful debate. Clearly, each thinks the other absolutely wrong, and yet they are able to engage one another in ways that are illuminating and thoughtful. After our reading of the Gorgias, where the central metaphor for discussion was that of war, I wonder if the model of respectful collision offers a different perspective on dialogue in which differences are exposed without the ultimate goal being reconciliation...
Second, a theme that has emerged in this course and on our blog is that of piety. Posts on piety and religion consistently receive the most comments and the most passionate responses. Socrates himself, of course, was charged with impiety by the Athenians in 399 BCE even as he insists, in the Apology, that he has lived a life in service of the god (Apollo) who spoke through the oracle at Delphi, saying that no one was wiser than Socrates (Apology, 21a-23c). Socrates found this strange and sought to prove it false by engaging others in dialogue concerning knowledge. (This, indeed, might be thought to be rather impious - attempting to prove the god wrong!) What Socrates reports having discovered, however, is that his wisdom involved the recognition that "when I do not know, neither do I think I know ... I do not think I know what I do not know" (Apology, 21d). Socrates is thus able to justify his life-long activity - philosophy - as a service to the god in which he shows anyone who thinks they know, that they do not know (see, Apology, 23b5) in order to prove that the wisdom he possesses is that of the knowledge of his own ignorance - a deeply human form of wisdom.
What sort of piety is involved here? Hitchens rejects Wilson's suggestion that Hitchens is acting with a sense of piety when he appeals to science and reason. Wilson insists that Hitchens has faith in science and religion. For his part, Hitchens sounds very Socratic in his recognition of the finitude of human understanding even as he rejects the idea that his is a position of faith. Surprisingly, Wilson appeals to human finitude as the source of faith, both his and that of Hitchens (at least as Wilson sees it).
As we have discussed, the Phaedrus is situated in a highly ritualized context, with Socrates and Phaedrus both barefoot (229a2) under the plane tree, by a stream with the cicadas singing overhead (230b-c; for more on the cicadas, see, 258e-259e). Socrates himself introduces the Delphic inscription, Know Thyself, and interprets it in terms of his own lack of knowledge (229e-230a): what, then, is the relationship between piety and human finitude and how does it inform the philosopical life Socrates undertakes?
