October 2009 Archives

At the time of writing, I'm sitting on a train. It's Friday evening, and almost exactly three hours later than intended. Luckily I have no particular place to be at any particular time, as Halloween is tomorrow, but the entertainment I packed for what I assumed would be a four hour trip will not extend the seven hours it will end up becoming... so, in truly philosophical fashion, I'll contemplate my situation and pose a question to all of you.

The cause of the delay was a train wreck (derailing, technically) just outside of Philadelphia. My train, as well as many others, were caught behind such and the flow of traffic was stalled until the problem could be fixed. Apparently this process took about three hours. My thoughts wander to two things in particular regarding this situation. The first being responsibility, the reasons for which are probably more than apparent. The second is a big more obscure, and revolves around the nature of dialogue and how it is effected by our surroundings - but I think I'll save that for another post entirely, as this could get rather lengthy on its own.

So, responsibility. Why am I three hours and four minutes behind schedule?

Is it the fault of the driver? Perhaps, but it could just as easily be the fault of the person who stacked the materials within the crates, pushing off their center of balance. But perhaps they were hung over at the time? Although it would be fair to claim that they shouldn't be jeopardizing themselves and others for a night of revelry, I wonder. Do we get off so easily, just saying it was their fault? We, as a society, are one that promotes late-night heavy drinking. A hangover is something akin to a Badge of Honor, a triumph over the night previous.

But maybe it was the driver. Let's say they were going too fast, as it seems reasonable enough. That seems an easy enough place to put the blame, they broke the rules, therefore they should get in trouble and carry the responsibility and repercussions of such. But again I get this nagging feeling in the back of my head, why were they breaking the rules? Once again I'll go to our society. We live in a generation where it's not uncommon to hear a complaint about how one's phone isn't downloading the latest Rhianna album fast enough (this complaint is usually heard if it takes more than about thirty seconds, in my experience).

As a friend of mine put it to me, when we were talking about this same thing: "That shit is coming from outer space!" I find it odd that we would put blame on someone for going too fast when most of us aren't patient enough to go the Speed Limit.

So if this driver (or whomever) is punished, it's a distinct possibility that it is for something we, as a society in general, have few qualms with. If that's the case, why are they getting in trouble? Because their bad action had a negative consequence for others? Seems plausible enough, but again there seems to be something strange about this. If that's the case, if we look at two people who do exactly the same thing (let's say drunk driving), and one gets into a car crash while the other doesn't, isn't it practically just a matter of luck who got in the car crash and who didn't (for the sake of discussion, let's assume they are both equal in all other respects)?

Is it bad to be unlucky?

Going past that - ideally speaking let's say we can find two people who were driving drunk. I think it would be fairly common opinion (although correct me if I'm wrong, please) to say that the person who got in the car crash deserves a higher penalty (if you don't think so, what if that car crash killed someone?). Again, in this example at least, I feel like we are punishing them harder for something they had no more control over than the other person (if they were both equally skilled drivers, and both equally drunk, they both had the same chance of getting in a wreck as one another). So are we punishing them for mere circumstance and how lucky they are?

So two questions:
The first: Is it bad to be unlucky? If not, how do we get around the pitfalls I mentioned above (if, of course, they are even legitimate)?
The second: How much is the singular person solely responsible for what goes on? Do we, as a collective, share some part (if small) in the actions of others? If so, how far does this extend?

I've got a few thoughts on this, but I'd like to hear from all of you first.

While reading the Phaedrus, I found myself struggling with the story of the soul. The charioteer was easy enough to grasp, but Socrates story of the soul and its journey throughout time left me scratching my head at a few points. Around 245d, Socrates begins making distinctions of what is mortal and immortal.

"That which is always changing is immortal. In the case of what changes other things or is changed by other things, when that stops changing, it stops living."

This particular section made me wonder about the plasticity of the soul and what that may imply? From what he was saying, Socrates seems to suggest that a constantly changing soul is healthy. Yet time and time again, Socrates warns of allowing your soul to be changed by those who may not be just (rhetoricians...) and often says how important it is to be set in your ways so that you may not be corrupted. Interesting contradiction?

The remainder of the paragraph I found to be rather confusing. Socrates discusses the origins of things and how they can not be created, and uses this to more aptly define the soul.

Socrates tells of how souls in the heavens follow around gods of their choice and beginning around 246c, he begins to tell of how these souls "lose their wings" and become mortal as they fall from the heavens. The goal of any soul so that it might return to join the gods is also discussed, and Socrates goes on to detail the journey of a soul that has lost its wings.

He tells of a hierarchy, with the eighth choice of placement being one of a sophist or demagogue (this particular detail makes me wonder if this is simply a system endowed by the gods, or one that Socrates has created and reflected his judgments in). He also tells of the time souls must wait (thousands of years) and how they will be judged and punished or rewarded accordingly with their future assignments.

What struck me most about this was how strongly it correlated with the idea of reincarnation and a hierarchical caste system. I was reminded of Hinduism while reading it and I was rather surprised. Also the idea of judgment of the soul and corresponding punishment or reward was rather consistent with traditional Christian ideas.

Later, when Socrates asserts that the eyes are the gateway to the soul, he begins talking about beauty (and specifically the beauty of an individual that inspires love). I found it very interesting that one's soul (and its previous preference for a particular god) is the cause of who one finds attractive (and eventually who one loves). Each individual finds characteristics that coincide with the god of their preference and that causes them to love another mortal. (This also made me think about how this affects gender. If one is attracted to certain traditionally masculine characteristics, would the mortal manifestation in another necessarily be male? Perhaps this speaks to the apparent lack of traditional gender roles and boundaries present in their culture?)

While the story poses many many ideas, what stuck out the most was the underlying piety. The gods in the heavens are attributed with almost everything. The gods (and their characteristics) is what souls pursue. Souls originated from the heavens and it is to the heavens that they are striving to return. This divine construct is at the root of who each soul is born into (and their place in the world), and who (and what) one loves. The pervasiveness of the divine (and the role of piety) is apparent throughout.

I'm sorry there are so many ideas thrown around! The particulars of this story pulls in many directions...

As we have discussed, this dialogue is very different from the previous dialogues we have examined. One of the biggest differences is the tone of the dialogue. In the Gorgias especially, there was a very agonistic atmosphere. With Socrates and Phaedrus, however, we have an intimate, playful style of dialogue.

The way that Phaedrus and Socrates speak to one another makes me wonder what is really going on? While they are engrossed with the topic of love and madness and speeches, there also seems to be some sort of play back and forth between the two characters. With terms of endearment (like "lucky fellow", "you are... truly golden", and so forth) thrown in pretty frequently, it causes me to wonder. While Socrates is often playful in dialogue, this seems to be an entirely different kind of play. More often Socrates is the one complimenting Phaedrus in a way that is almost flirtatious.

Furthermore, Socrates seems to dramatize instances in the dialogue that doesn't seem to be his usual style of strictly playful dialogue. When he is goaded to make a speech, he insists on covering his head and calls Phaedrus names for forcing him to proceed. Later, when he has finished his speech, he dramatically blames Phaedrus for making him do such a dreadful thing. While Socrates is often playful in his dialogues, this exchange seems to take it to another level. At times it seems like there is an underlying flirtation going on between him and Phaedrus. I wonder if this is the case or if perhaps the content of the dialogue (love...) is merely paralleling the style of the dialogue. Or perhaps this is just how Socrates is when in the private company of a friend?

Alright, guys, I've jumped ahead by a tiny bit here, but I thought this was an interesting tying together of several points in the text thus far, or I guess, I'm wondering why it doesn't, but prompted me to think about its potential to.

In previous sections of the text, and in the blog, the rationality of lovers has been discussed. In class we talked about gratifying the non-lover, as opposed to the lover. At 275a, Socrates is reciting parts of a speech by Thamus, talking about the ill use of letters and writing, as it will make people forgetful. He says that Theuth is telling a falsehood in his ideas about using text, due to his love for them:

 

S: [...] 'Now you, the father of letters, as a result of your affection for them, are stating just the opposite of what their effect will be. If people learn them it will make their souls forgetful through lack of exercising their memory. They'll put their trust in the external marks of writing instead of using their own internal capacity for remembering on their own. You've discovered a magic potion not for memory, but for reminding, and you offer your pupils apparent, not true, wisdom. After they have heard many things from you, but without instruction, they will seem to be very knowledgeable when they are for the most part ignorant, and they will be hard to get along with, since they will have only the appearance of wisdom instead of being really wise.' [...]

 

S: Back then, since they weren't wise the way you young people are today, people were content in their simplicity to listen to an oak tree or a rock, if it spoke the truth. For you perhaps it makes a difference who the speaker is and where he comes from. You don't just consider whether what's said is so or not.

 

P: You rightly rebuke me. I think the situation regarding letters is just as the Theban says.

 

My question about this quote is then, why doesn't Socrates discuss the accusation of Theuth being blinded by love, if he is making the point that one should consider the message being given, as opposed to its source?

In Socrates' second speech it seems to me the foundation of his argument rests upon the idea that madness cannot be bad because it is representative of the presence of divinity, or godly influence, within the human. Without attempting to open up a figurative can of worms by debating its merit based on whether or not a higher power or powers actually exist, I am led to wonder why artists and poets, according to Socrates, are so celebrated if they are merely providing a medium for divine expression. Is it that they are viewed as more able or more successful in channeling the gods directly?

Similarly, in the past I've heard people attempt to define the word art through an explanation that it is the effort to recapture or portray a creation that humans are not capable of: representations of nature or influence beyond the scope of humanity. Considering the fact that the word art may be the hardest to define or most debated word in the entire english lexicon, is it possible that this is because it is intrinsically linked to an intangible component, one beyond human mastery? I certainly don't have any answers on this topic, I'm interested to hear what you all think.

Thanks, again, Chris, for arranging for me to post entries. I encourage students from both of our classes to post in response.

In today's class, we discussed more of Socrates' claims about the nature of philosophical rhetoric. Among the many criteria that he mentions for good rhetoric, we talked about two in class: first, that the artful rhetorician understands the nature of soul, whether it is one or has parts, and knows how to lead it; and second, that the artful rhetorician possesses knowledge, rather than only having probable opinion, about where the soul ought to be led.

This led to several questions: Do we see contemporary political or media speeches concerned with the whole of the soul, or only some of its parts? Advertising seemed to be a case where often speeches are oriented toward one part of the soul (usually the appetites, or spirit/honor-seeking part) but not the whole person. What might a speech that addressed the whole of the soul: intellect, spirit, and appetites, look like?

We also discussed the claim that speeches are better when the rhetorician grounds them in an understanding of the soul as naturally that which seeks knowledge of the forms. For example, would a good speech on war attend to the nature of justice itself, rather than only to specific goals to be accomplished in a particular scenario? In determining whether to go to war, only to discuss whether to invade on strategic grounds might be like the person who knows how to raise or lower a fever, without knowing whether this patient would benefit (268b) while the Socratic ideal would be to understand something of justice--such as whether and when war is a just response to injustice.

But is such knowledge of the nature of souls, or of justice possible, and can this ideal guide our contemporary political speeches?

Okay, as this debate has basically taken over Tony's post, I'm going to move it out and into it's own post, that way we can expand upon it more and we don't have to overpower what Tony was trying to say with the Other. I'm also going to include an essay I wrote last semester, because I'm interested in the reactions to it:

Anthony Zirpoli
Medical Ethics
Dr. Pluhar
10/24/08


In the past centuries, a boom in the advancements of medical research and technology has occurred. Once untreatable illnesses and life threatening diseases often crippled and destroyed the lives of many, today a simple trip to the office of a doctor can cure many once deadly aliments. This advancement is continuing today, as we are on the verge of eradicating many genetic disorders with gene therapy, failing organs can be replaced with organic replacements and cancer may soon be a frightening shadow of the past. Human lives are being saved everyday by these magnificent advancements in modern medicine. Yet, rarely was it human kind who had to pay the price for these achievements. Looking in the laboratory of today, one can expect to find mice, dogs, cats, chimpanzees and many other species of non-human animals. These achievements, which rarely benefit the experimented upon animal, have all been brought about by experimentation on countless helpless animals.

The justifications of these atrocities have been clever and inventive. One of the most widely used is that non-human animals, unlikely human beings, do not posses the moral rights that humans do. While it would be unethical to experiment on human beings, under this view, it would be entirely within human kinds right to experiment on the "lesser" beings. Carl Cohen defended this view by claiming that moral rights come not from the life of a being nor the sentience, by the ability to make claims of these rights. He later goes on to explain that this requirement does not really apply to humans who do not posses this ability, such as infants or severely mentally retarded individuals, due to the fact that they have the capabilities to make and appreciate these claims, thus shooting down that objection. Yet, something Cohen seems to overlook is that fact that all animals, human beings included, are along the same point on the evolutionary track. We have branched, some have fought their way to the top of the food chain or picked up tools to use, yet we are all at the same point in evolution. With our knowledge of the evolutionary process deepening every day, could it not be said that all animals could have the potential for the same kind of thinking and understanding of morality that human beings have the potential for, with just a simple evolutionary tweak? Edwin Converse Hettinger later responds to him by making the claim that he didn't properly defend his arguments, only stating these justifications as if they were facts. Yet, there is an objection that was not raised that seems obvious and quite blaring: Why is the ability to claim moral rights a requirement to have moral rights? Hettinger touches on this subject lightly, but seems wary to follow it. This objection is not an issue of the logistics or inconsistency of Cohen's argument, but an objection to the very basic foundations of his argument. Why must the claim to moral rights be made to justify our own moral value?

One could argue, instead, that moral rights are derived from not the ability to make a claim to them, but the appreciation of ones existence, in short, sentience. It is quite obvious that all sentient animals have the ability to experience life in its most basic ways. They experience pain, joy, affections, love and a plethora of other basic, comprehensible emotions. Dogs wag their tails when you rub their bellies, monkeys cry out in pain, pandas have life-long mates, lions remember their old friends and mice learn to avoid pain-inducing routes in mazes. All animals experience these emotions and have the capacity to enjoy life and fear pain. Thus, as beings that posses the ability to empathize, we can understand the plight of other sentient creatures on a basic level. It can be argued that due to the unique, so it seems, ability to empathize, that it is the place of humans to care for other beings (the principle of beneficence) and to avoid causing pain to these creatures (the principle of nonmaleficence). During the process of experimentation, animals are often exposed to extremely high levels of pain and suffering. They are injected with diseases, radioactive material and limbs are removed. They live painful existences and at the end of their miserable lives are murdered in the name of human medicine and science.

Two other common objections to treating nonhuman animals as moral equivalents are the arguments that if we were to stop, medical science would come to a halt, and if we did not want medical improvement to stop, humans would be used as replacement for the other missing animals. These two arguments are intricately intertwined and are often given in the same breath, so they can be approached and refuted as such. The first point can be readily conceded, for the time being. First, the later argument must be dealt with. The argument that it is either nonhuman animals or humans is a false dichotomy. To use humans for experimentation is just as bizarre and wrong as using nonhuman animals is. Instead, we must look at the alternatives. Today, computer emulations can be created to emulate what may happen with certain drugs or procedures. Donated skin graphs, organs, and bodies could easily be used for such experimentation, though they would be in high demand. Petri dish experimentation is good way to watch cell reactions to drugs and medical procedures against such diseases as cancer or other cellular diseases. Yet, Cohen makes the point that any procedure or drug would have to be used for the first time eventually and, as of right now, they are tested on animals. Yet, these experiments are to benefit human beings. Other animals rarely see results from these experiments, yet they are the ones making the sacrifice. To compound this, nonhuman anatomy is drastically different than human anatomy, so the results are sketchy at best. So, why shouldn't these procedures be tested on human beings, as they would be therapeutic and would benefit human beings? Yet, there is still an alternative to early testing on humans, and this brings back the first point. Instead of focusing all efforts on the advancement of medicine, focus instead on the advancement of laboratory experimentation. If the advancement in laboratory experimentation is as accelerated as the advancement in medical and other sciences, it would be a simple feat to accomplish in a relatively short amount of time. If this was done, we would not have to perform early testing on any animal species, including human beings.

 

Before stating my thesis, I would like to discuss the personalities of Socrates. Though he himself does not leave any written work to us, we could still have a pretty good guess of his characteristics from the works done by the others. For example, according to Plato, his student, he wonders around place to place to argue with different people in a process he thinks different philosophies collide. This is actually how he gets himself killed in the end: he simply enjoys talking too much. From Plato's works such as Protagoras and Gogias, it's clear that he really likes to argue with clever or knowledgeable people; in addition, he also enjoys talks to normal people, such as his friend. In Protagoras, he wakes his friend up in the night just to tell him his debate with Protagoras. In Phaedrus, he also spends a whole day discussing love with his friend, which is very odd because he is an adult and normally adults do not do that.  As a conclusion, he is a man who enjoys debating and refuting. This is why my question rises: in Phaedrus, he spends his third speech talking about how his previous one is biased. But does he do that in order to discuss the art of speech with Phaedrus, or is he simply want to be a rhetor and makes him believe in his words?

Socrates plans a good trap overall.

First, in the opening scene, it is very clear that it is Socrates who insists in "please speak"(227). Then Phaedrus agrees to give him his first speech of why we should gratify non lovers than lovers. However, after this, Socrates not only does show admiration, but also says the speech is not that good, for it " repeated the same things two or three times, as though he didn't find it every easy to say much about the subject or perhaps wasn't really interested in. indeed, he appeared to me to be indulging in youthful extravagant, showing off his ability to say the same thing in two different ways"(235a). This certainly lures Phaedrus in hearing why. Just imagine if you suddenly get an A in your test and shows it to your friends, you naturally expect them to say "wow!" And if they just snores at you and say "it's not good enough", you would also naturally want to know why. In this case, Socrates obviously understands psychology and knows how to interested his audience.

Second, before he delivers his second speech, he repeatedly tell Phaedrus that he is actually not the one who telling it; in other words, he distances himself from the speech. This interested Phaedrus even more and explains why he asks Socrates to "speak!"(236e) again and again and again. Just before his interests reached max level, Socrates says "I'm going to speak with my head covered, so that I can rush through my speech as quickly as possible and, by not looking at you avoid faltering through being shamed"(237e). This is a very odd action. I did not understand why he does it initially until Mr. Long talks about "prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona"(244b). When god processes those people, they are not themselves anymore and lost their mind. Similarly, if someone lost his mind and tells something that logical, reasonable as if he is still awake, this person is somehow considered divine. Socrates uses this mindset well. This furthermore lures Phaedrus's attention to his talking.

Lastly, he gives his last speech, starting by explaining how his previous "speech is not true which says that when a lover is at hand one ought instead to gratify someone who does not love, on the grounds that the former is mad and the other is in command of his senses"(244b). In 257b, there's a conclusion. Socrates asks his audience to " forgive what occurred earlier" because he does not want "let anger take away or diminish the skill in the art of love"; he does not mean to blame Lysias. This reminds us of what speech really is and how destructive it could be sometime. In this terribly long speech, he really illustrates how a rhetor could use language to convince his audiences but this is not what I am trying to argue here. This is when he really captures Phaedrus's attention, making him ready to hear him talking about the art of speech.

As a conclusion, he does plan a trap well to make Phaedrus hear him talking. He does everything on purpose because he knows that normally nobody would not stay and discussing something like "love" "can virtue be taught" and so and so. In fact, you can also see how he forces Protagoras discussing with him: by giving him a chance to show off in public.

There are some other details, which could prove my point. Let me grab me and use it as my conclusion paragraph.  In Protagoras, Socrates claims that virtue cannot be taught whereas Protagoras thinks it "is something you get people to acquire by taking trouble over them and teaching them"(324a). Socrates clearly holds his place the whole book. He firmly states that it cannot be taught again and again. On the other hand, in Phaedrus, he says, "whenever someone sees beauty in this world he is remained of true beauty and his wing-feathers grow." This is an ancient metaphor that compares soul and body, in which the winged soul means "noble, wise, good"(246a). The soul lost its wings because " shame, evil, and other things of the opposite sort are detrimental can even destroy them completely"(246e). The wings draw "its nourishment from intelligence and pure knowledge"(247d). In other words, the wings have to learn virtue and others before it can fly back to the heaven. This contradicts his position in Protagoras and is very thoughtful. The only reasonable explanation is: he is indeed a very good talker who enjoys brainwashing people.

 

I am very happy to welcome students from Marina McCoy's course at Boston College entitled, Rhetoric: Truth, Beauty, Power. Professor McCoy is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Boston College who has written a wonderful book entitled Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists.

She joined me on the Digital Dialogue for episode 6: Attentive Listening in which we discussed the Protagoras and the idea of sympathetic listening she develops in her book.

To the students of Rhetoric: Truth, Beauty, Power, I would like to extend a warm welcome on behalf of myself and my students.

As you will experience, the students in my PHIL200 Ancient Philosophy course have cultivated a very welcoming and lively community of dialogue and learning.  I see already that some students from BC have joined the dialogue - thanks to Steph Fernandes and Chris Kirby for jumping right into the discussion.

We look forward to expanding our discussion of the Phaedrus with you, particularly as I know that you have been reading the dialogue too over the course of the past few class sessions. 

Please don't hesitate to establish an account with the service that handles our comments, Intense Debate.  If you make a profile with them, you can upload a picture and we can subscribe to your comments. You can also, if you are so moved, leave a video comment.

This post will hopefully work off of Anna's on the subject of love, but a thought occurred to me today in class - In all the discussions we have had of class about the different 'types' of love, it feels like they can be categorized into the following four 'sets' - and a descriptor often seems attached to them.

- Thought only for the other - Obsession
- Thought only for the self - Lust
- Thought only for the relationship - Misguided Love
- Care for both self and other - Love

Those words I put afterwards aren't exactly dictionary-ready, I hope that's obvious enough, but as a starting point I think it's fair enough. I think it would be interesting to talk about the types of love we are running into with Socrates, Phaedrus, and eventually the Symposium that we will read.

So the first - Thought only for the other being obsession. However romantic it might be that we consider the other person of utmost importance, I think we can all see situations in our daily lives where this is very pointedly harmful to the people involved (at least in some). In relationships like this I feel the emotions are very much one-sided, and the expectations of both partners varying drastically. Even considering two people who hold each other as most important seem to try to 'out-do' one another in what they give. It's not malicious, but to me it doesn't feel like love.

On the second - Thought only for the self. Then there is the opposite extreme of the above, which I've characterized as lust. Personally I feel this one is much more straightforward. When one only cares for the self and not the other, it can scarcely be called any decent form of love. This is often harmful to the other person involved, and examples are abound - the most obvious of which is respect. When you only care about another person to the extent that they can gratify you, respect for that person's personhood is rather shattered.

And the third - Thought for the relationship. This is where I think most people find their medium between the above two. They focus on the relationship with the person. These sorts of relationships work, certainly, but I feel as though they aren't equiped with the ability to handle a variety of issues that arise. Personally I can imagine a slew of relationships, both my own and of other people's, that focused on this, and many decisions during the relationship were made solely for the sake of 'keeping us together' that harmed both of the people involved. The inability to be completely honest with the other person, while dishonest to them, keeps the relationship together, and under this view is more or less justified (to that person). Similarly there are people that feel like they absolutely must be in a relationship - their partner is rather irrelevant. There are many more aspects of that, but at the end of the day, it almost seems like an excuse to love, rather than a reason.

So finally - Care for both self and other. While I'm completely open to changing my mind about this, it's as far as I've gotten to having a truly dynamic and powerful understanding of love. By taking into consideration yourself, by both understanding what you are looking to get out a relationship, as well as what you are willing to give into one, you don't have that overarching worry of breaking up, because it's not the relationship itself that is important. With the idea of the relationship being the important thing being tossed aside, this leaves room for more unbridled compassion towards the other person. Under this view you might very well end up splitting with your significant other, but only because that's what would be best for the both of you. With this I feel a successful relationship is one that is cultivated, not forced, and generally leads to a more loving couple.

I could elaborate more on this, but I think it might be best to just toss it in and see the responses. Hopefully from there I can clarify.

Holly Moore, who defended her dissertation, entitled "Plato's Analogical Thought" at DePaul University on October 12th, 2009, joins me for episode 15 of the Digital Dialogue. Dr. Moore is a graduate of Penn State's Undergraduate Program in Philosophy. She did her honors thesis with Professor Mark Munn, who joined me for episode 12 of the Digital Dialogue in which we discussed his project on the relationship between eros and democracy.

Holly is currently a faculty fellow at Colby College. Her dissertation argues for the intimate connection between Plato's use of images and his ultimate philosophical teaching. More specifically, she insists that the images Plato articulates and the story his philosophy has to tell about images are inextricably connected. For Holly, Plato is an analogical thinker because the self-reflection and relational structure of analogies expresses something decisive about Platonic thinking.

Digital Dialogue 15 with Holly Moore: Plato's Analogical Thinking

To subscribe to the Digital Dialogue via iTunesU, click here.

Related Resources

• The Sun-Good analogy and divided line: Republic, Book VI, 505a-511e
  
• The Third Kind and "Chorology": Timaeus, 48e-53c
  
• Division and Definition of Weaving: Statesman, 279c-283a
  
• Application of weaving as a mode for statescraft: Statesman, 305e-311c
  

Jack and Jingting wrap up this week's discussion.

Listen here to Weekly Roundup #7

Certainly, the Phaedrus dialogue is one about eros; the dialogue's mood is friendly and loving, the setting at the outskirts of the city is intimate. Phaedrus and Socrates have given speeches supporting that a lover should gratify a non-lover, though Socrates reshapes his first speech into a more passionate lecture on whom a lover should truly gratify. However, at the conclusion of his lengthy recantation that one should in fact gratify a lover rather than a non-lover, Socrates and Phaedrus transition, somewhat unexpectedly, into a discussion of rhetoric and politics.

At 260a, Phaedrus responds to Socrates' question as to whether one who makes speeches should have knowledge of that which he speaks. Phaedrus replies, "I've heard that it isn't necessary for one who intends to be an orator to understand what's really just, but only what would seem so to the masses who'll be passing judgment, nor what's really good or beautiful but what will seem so. It's from the latter, and not from the truth, that persuasion derives."

In Phaedrus' response, the question of the power of rhetoric surfaces once again. Socrates goes on to reply by asking whether "we have abused the art of making speeches more roughly than we should?" (260d). We have discussed in class that Socrates is critical of rhetoric in its lack of being used towards the Good. Along with discussing why Socrates is critical of rhetoric and orators that use persuasion to gain the support of the masses, I think it is important we take a closer look at Socrates himself.

Socrates is a contradictory man. He could be described as the ideal patriotic Athenian citizen who would never break the city's laws, yet also the most critical and self-regarding citizen of Athenian society. Socrates is a strong advocate of Athenians being true and faithful citizens, urging them to free themselves from their ignorance and instead seek knowledge. Yet, for Socrates, what does it take to be a good citizen? Moreover, what exactly shapes Socrates' politics? Does he completely reject Athenian democracy?

Certainly, Socratic politics rejects rhetoricians' attempt to persuade mass audiences, contrary to the standard practice of Athenian politicians. Persuasive public speeches that guaranteed social control was essential for the rhetorician and the politician. Furthermore, democratic order was founded on this power of rhetoric that persuaded the masses. Yet Socrates' politics seems to reject this kind of persuasion and furthermore involves personal development. We have read thus far many segments in which Socrates refers to the good of the soul, and this is just what he aimed for. Some philosophers would argue that Socrates was only concerned about his own soul, but I do not think that is valid, or else he would have made no attempt of defense at his own trial if he were not also concerned with the souls of his fellow citizens.

If we look back on Gorgias, we can remember that Socrates argues that philosophy can be used as a political force. Some questions that arose while reflecting on the dialogues we've read thus far - Protagoras, Gorgias - and now Phaedrus with its brief reflections on politics (thus far, brief), I can fairly sum up that some of the themes that have arisen are:

a) education,
b) the goodness of the soul,
c) democracy,
d) knowledge,
e) and the uses of religion

In Protagoras, there is a discussion on education and democracy, in Gorgias, we have a theme of the "alienation" of politics, and now in the Phaedrus, we are seeing a theme of eros. Perhaps now is an appropriate time to ask ourselves what is the connection of eros and knowledge, moreover, eros and its role in politics.

In the Digital Dialogue 12: Eros and Democracy, Prof. Long and Prof. Munn discussed eros and its role in politics during around Socrates' time. Eros was not just a desire, it was a desire for something good, and for Socrates, eros was a desire for/towards the Good. In politics, the competitive and agonistic aspects in the political arena offered erotic aspects of success and approval of the crowd. Once again, the power of rhetoric surfaces, as rhetoric riles the people, "catering to the opinions of the masses" (260c, Phaedrus) as Socrates describes it. Thus, in the Phaedrus, we are introduced to a concept of eros in relationship to the theme of tyranny, not only in love and the relationship between two lovers, but also politics.

When I heard the story, A 'Collision' of Beliefs: Atheist Vs. Theologian, this evening on All Things Considered about the new documentary, Collision, in which Christopher Hitchens and Pastor Douglas Wilson debate the question: "Is Christianity Good for the World," I immediately thought of all of you and the robust discussions we have been having this semester concerning the question of piety and the role it plays in philosophy.

The link under Collision above points you to a shorter video clip, here I have also embedded a longer clip of the movie.


As we continue to think and talk about the Phaedrus and, following on Tony's post on the Face of the Gods..., the role a certain piety plays in Socratic dialogue, I thought it would be interesting to link to this story to underscore at least two points.

First, note how Hitchens and Wilson embrace the vocabulary of "collision" even as they undertake a thoughtful, vigorous and respectful debate. Clearly, each thinks the other absolutely wrong, and yet they are able to engage one another in ways that are illuminating and thoughtful. After our reading of the Gorgias, where the central metaphor for discussion was that of war, I wonder if the model of respectful collision offers a different perspective on dialogue in which differences are exposed without the ultimate goal being reconciliation...

Second, a theme that has emerged in this course and on our blog is that of piety. Posts on piety and religion consistently receive the most comments and the most passionate responses.  Socrates himself, of course, was charged with impiety by the Athenians in 399 BCE even as he insists, in the Apology, that he has lived a life in service of the god (Apollo) who spoke through the oracle at Delphi, saying that no one was wiser than Socrates (Apology, 21a-23c). Socrates found this strange and sought to prove it false by engaging others in dialogue concerning knowledge. (This, indeed, might be thought to be rather impious - attempting to prove the god wrong!) What Socrates reports having discovered, however, is that his wisdom involved the recognition that "when I do not know, neither do I think I know ... I do not think I know what I do not know" (Apology, 21d). Socrates is thus able to justify his life-long activity - philosophy - as a service to the god in which he shows anyone who thinks they know, that they do not know (see, Apology, 23b5) in order to prove that the wisdom he possesses is that of the knowledge of his own ignorance - a deeply human form of wisdom.

What sort of piety is involved here?  Hitchens rejects Wilson's suggestion that Hitchens is acting with a sense of piety when he appeals to science and reason. Wilson insists that Hitchens has faith in science and religion. For his part, Hitchens sounds very Socratic in his recognition of the finitude of human understanding even as he rejects the idea that his is a position of faith. Surprisingly, Wilson appeals to human finitude as the source of faith, both his and that of Hitchens (at least as Wilson sees it).

As we have discussed, the Phaedrus is situated in a highly ritualized context, with Socrates and Phaedrus both barefoot (229a2) under the plane tree, by a stream with the cicadas singing overhead (230b-c; for more on the cicadas, see, 258e-259e). Socrates himself introduces the Delphic inscription, Know Thyself, and interprets it in terms of his own lack of knowledge (229e-230a): what, then, is the relationship between piety and human finitude and how does it inform the philosopical life Socrates undertakes?

In sections 246a - 254e of Phaedrus, Socrates uses the Chariot Allegory to explain his view of the human soul: "Compare it to the combined capacities of a team of winged horses and their winged charioteer. Now, all the horses and charioteers of the gods are good and of good stock, but in other cases they are of mixed quality.

In our case, the driver holds the reins of a pair of horses, one of which is noble and good and of similar stock, while the other is of the opposite stock and opposite in character. Thus, the driving in our case is inevitably difficult and troublesome..." He then goes on to distinguish the two horses that make up our soul: One horse is white and long necked, well bred, well behaved, and runs without a whip. The other is black and short-necked, badly bred, troublesome.

You can read 253c-254e to get the entire description, but I think Wikipedia sums it up rather nicely:

--The Charioteer represents intellect, reason, or the part of the soul that must guide the soul to truth.
--The White Horse represents rational or moral impulse or the positive part of passionate nature (e.g., righteous indignation)
--The Black Horse represents the soul's irrational passions, appetites, or concupiscent nature.

And it is the job of the charioteer to keep both of these horses in order, as they often try to go in separate directions. He  must, apparently, guide these horses down a "heavenly journey" or path of enlightenment. If the charioteer cannot keep the dark horse in check, "it sinks down and drags him toward the earth, where hard toil and an ardous testing await the soul" (246e-249e).

What do you think of this psychology? I think it's a fair assessment of human nature. Humanity, it seems, has a "good side" and a "bad side." And it is up to our own rationality to keep them both (namely the bad side/dark horse) in check. It reminds me of that Native American myth I brought up in class a couple weeks ago. I found the actual myth online:

One evening an old Cherokee told his grandson about a battle that goes on inside all people. He said, 'My son, the battle is between two 'wolves' inside us all. One is Evil. It is anger, envy, jealousy, sorrow, regret, greed, arrogance, self-pity, guilt, resentment, inferiority, lies, false pride, superiority, and ego. The other is Good. It is joy, peace, love, hope, serenity, humility, kindness, benevolence, empathy, generosity, truth, compassion and faith.'

The grandson thought about it for a minute and then asked his grandfather: 'Which wolf wins?' The old Cherokee simply replied, 'The one you feed.'

So, what do you guys think? Is this an accurate portrayal of the human soul?

It's also interesting that Socrates suggests that the good horse always cooperates with the charioteer (254a). Does that mean that our souls are naturally inclined towards the Good, but it's an uncontrolled "bad horse" that takes us off that path? And the commentary in our book points out the bad horse's attraction to "the delights of sexual activity" and "terrible, unlawful things" (254a) as another negative connotation towards sexual intercourse and pure lust (p.154).

We have all noticed a general fixation on piety in the Platonic dialogues; for instance, in the Gorgias, piety is included as an indispensable part of the good.  We have also argued (both ways) religion as a part of the good.  But I am curious if there is a different way in which to interpret piety and/or reverence for the gods.

Humans are often considered divine-like or as possessing a trace of the divine.  The Abrahamic traditions depict humans as being made in God's image, and the Greek gods and mortals are often scarcely discernible, even procreating at times, as in the case of Thetis and Peleus bearing Achilles or of Zeus and Alcmena bearing Hercules.  In Greek hospitality, hosts are encouraged to accept without reservation and to treat well any guest who seeks to cross the threshold because that guest might be a god or goddess in mortal dress; therefore, it would be pious to be hospitable.  (In the Abrahamic traditions, the hospitality of Abraham is emblematic of this reasoning for hospitality.)  Moreover, part of Zeus' title, Zeus Xenios, the god of strangers, implies a respect for the xenos, the foreigner or stranger who always holds a trace of the divine.

Since we are constantly speaking of ideals in this class, especially ethical ideals, I ask: Is piety an ethical ideal in that, by recognizing the trace of god (that is, our common humanity, the "image" in which we were created, the prototypically human, outside of all organized religion) in the face of the Other, we are implicitly encouraged to treat others divinely?  Is piety an unconscious assertion of mutual human respect?  How does this new conception of piety inform our conception of Socratic politics?  Might it provide a new openinng in the discussion of the myth, in that the myth is in fact the human-all-too-human in the guise of religious allegory?

I know the tempting argument here is, "Well, humans shouldn't need a 'religious' ideal to encourage ethical behavior," but, if we assume that we're not all naive enough to think that all or even most humans could cultivate an ethical outlook without any extrinsic guidance, then one would have to make recourse to another type of ideal or myth--perhaps the ideal of cognitive neuroscience--in order to support this opinion.

I am looking forward to hearing from you all.  Have a great Tuesday.    

Listen to Weekly Roundup Podcast #6

During both Phaedrus' and Socrates' speeches they discuss different types of equalities in love.  Socrates claims

In his speech to Socrates, Phaedrus makes a strong statement: "...I am not the slave of love but my own master," (233c).

According to Socrates, one who is in love, or rather a lover, is one who is not in the realm of reason and not in possession of his mind. Furthermore, lovers are "untrustworthy, peevish, jealous, disagreeable, harmful to one's property, harmful to one's physical condition, and above all harmful to the education of one's soul, that which there neither is nor ever will be anything that is truly more valuable to human beings or to the gods," (241c). (On a side note, it is interesting that Socrates relates human beings with gods by stating that both share the most valuable aspect of being - the education of one's soul). This is a strong statement, putting one off love for life, no? Who would want to be deprived of the education of one's soul if being in love places them at the hands of one who will harm the most important aspect of one's being - their soul?

Socrates goes on to compare a lover's longing with "the desire for a satisfying meal." This brings to mind that love is almost nothing but greed. Certainly, envy is the most tragic and self-destructive element that all lovers experience, that which will cause all harm. Envy itself is arguably intertwined with greed. According to Socrates, a lover is compulsive, "driven by a tormenting compulsion that leads him on by giving him continual pleasure from seeing, hearing, touching, and experiencing his beloved through all his senses..." (240d). The image of "continual pleasure" brings to mind the Gorgias dialogue in which Callicles suggests it is more fulfilling to have "a leaky jar" - metaphorically speaking - in which the pleasures of life can continually re-fill us so that we experience a never-ending cycle of "good," harmless pleasure. What Callicles suggests and Socrates' description of lovers wanting continual pleasure, is an image of greed. Though Socrates is referring to more than just the sexual pleasures between two lovers, the idea of sex and how people even today are driven by the need for sex is in large part a mindset that focuses only on an individual's satisfaction. The fact that some of us cannot control ourselves would serve for Socrates as evidence of our lack of reason, how we do not possess our minds. Is Socrates suggesting that lovers, moreover, love, is in the long run not beneficial to all or to humanity if one is not "their own master?"

I'm sure many of us have experienced relationships in which another's love was harmful in their greed to have us all to themselves. Would you all agree that we can be slaves to love?
 

The previous post "Why Should We Be Good?" made me think about something I've experienced recently. I'm sure some of you have heard about the Sierra Club, and its attempts to close down the coal plant on campus. From what some members have told me, it seems that the University is going to review whether to renovate the coal plant, or to replace it with something else.  I have to say that I'm not fond of fossil fuels, and I don't feel it's a bad thing.

However, my problem lies with their methods.  I've been pestered, bothered, and to an extent forced to help them act.  I've seen first hand members of the Sierra Club fail to leave people who want nothing to do with the petition alone.  The Sierra Club member got on my nerves just because I had to listen to him harass people like this.  In other instances I've been delayed on my way to class because they wanted to take my picture with a sign.  Instead of leaving me be when I say, "No, I'm late for class" I'm trailed.  I eventually ended up letting them take the photo out of exasperation.

I'm sure we've discussed whether the means justifies the end, however when I thought about the Sierra Club I began wondering what Socrates would say to them.  Would he approve of what they were doing and how they were doing it, or would he condemn their methods as not being oriented towards the Good.  Has anyone else experienced anything like this?

The first thing I noticed when reading the opening pages of Phaedrus was the intimateness of the dialogue. As opposed to both Gorgias and Protagoras, where the setting was public with multiple observers and participants, this setting is two individuals sitting in the grass beside a stream. The content of their dialogue (thus far) is incredibly playful. There seem to be small jabs, and jokes made towards each other which are common among people who are comfortable together. Socrates says, "I believe that I know Phaedrus about as well as I know myself" (228a). Further, Socrates makes the remark: "My dear Phaedrus, you have been an admirable guide." (230b). There is a conversation between Socrates and Phaedrus about how Socrates never leaves the city, and effectively about why Socrates should get out more.

All of this establishes friendship between the two characters. I know nothing of the dialogue beyond the opening pages, but at this point the conversation seems very accommodating and playful, to a much larger extent than the previous dialogues. I think that perhaps the nature, or setting, of this dialogue can tell us something important. Friendly conversations are helpful. Being able to dialogue within the safety of a intimate relationship has a completely different effect on the individuals involved, than a public debate.

From personal experience, I know that my opinion is swayed, corrected, or perpetuated by comments, discussions, and arguments with close friends. Very seldom am I convinced of anything I hear at a public discussion. There is probably a side I already agree with, but chances are my opinions are going to leave the event virtually identical to before the event. Perhaps this sort of private dialogue will allow for more self-awareness in the thought processes of Socrates and Phaedrus.

Perhaps this will lead to discussion about relations between the individuals involved in dialogue. In my philosophy of religion class just recently discussed Martin Buber dichotomy of I-it and I-thou relations. Whereas Socrates seems to always be oriented towards the I-thou, he is concerned with peoples disposition towards the good, justice etc, I have a feeling that his companions are seldom interested in dialogue in the context of an I-thou relationship. Among the sophists there seems to be a complete disregard of the opponent as a person. The emphasis seems to be on delivering beautiful speeches, and convincing ones opponent(s) of some rhetorical point, and objectifies other individuals through I-it relations.

I'm interested to see if the content of this dialogue will display more openness due to the apparent relationship between Phaedrus and Socrates

In another Philosophy class that I'm currently taking, we had an in-class debate. The question was "how do you bring about social change?" The four points one could choose from were

1.       Violence - force

2.       Non violence - disruption

3.       Persuasion

4.       Changing the laws

No one side was allowed to take into account the idea that the four ideas might be intertwined, and thus maybe the way to succeed is through a combination of all four sides. I give full credit to Dr. Harvey for this, but I'm curious to find out the viewpoints of other people, and see how we can tie this in with Plato. After all, Socrates was eventually charged with corrupting the youth. Gandhi was often put in jail on the grounds of disruption of society.  Maybe we could even connect this debate to the Phaedrus. I had one quote in particular in mind:

 

Now, if prevailing convention makes you fear that you will be criticized if people find out [that one has a lover], consider that lovers, since they believe others take them to be as worthy of emulation as they themselves do, are likely to get carried away in telling stories and will boastfully proclaim to everyone that their efforts have not been in vain, but those who do not love are in control of themselves and will choose what is best rather than a public reputation. (232a)

 

Now, if we take this quote as a basis for analyzing many of the movements in society, it would mean that many of the people starting revolutions and making waves for peace, cannot possibly be sane, or they're incapable of feeling love as an emotion. The idea of love for one's country, religion, god, etc. wouldn't imply insanity or sickness, but if any of these people had a long term spouse or partner, that would. So how could we say, for example, that Gandhi's movements were controlled, since he had a wife? To contradict myself a bit, in his autobiography he discusses the idea of moving away from lust, and forming a more helpful union with his wife, but he never denies their love. So, with that being said, is Gandhi a less appropriate example than other figures in society? He was no doubt a more controlled person than some political figures. What is everyone's opinion on the debate topic?

As a transition from the Gorgias to the the Phaedrus I think it may be worth while to look at the role of myth in rhetoric.  The end of the Gorgias finds Socrates explicating a myth about the after life.  Entering the Phaedrus we are greeted with another discussion of myth.  In either case, Socrates subscribes to them, the myths, as complete truth.  This is most likely the case with most of Socrates contemporaries, as these myths were at the foundation of their religious and deistic beliefs.  Since there was general assent to these myths, presumably they were a viable, accessible, and compelling tool for use by an orator in persuading the masses.  Due to the myriad possibilities in interpretation, chicanery aimed at the masses could be easily accomplished through mythical manipulation.  I find it surprising then, that after admonishing poetry as a reliable medium for philosophic debate in the Protagoras Socrates employs myth as such.  We could take the modern example of the Bible, the myths that lay at the foundation of Christianity, and look at how often the Bible is used to support contentious arguments.  Is myth a realistic, reliable, viable source of evidence or support in our philosophic inquiries?

Hey Everyone,

So I was going to put this up last week but I didn't get around to it, sorry I know everyone is just shocked (as I chuckle quietly to myself). So in the text Socrates talks with Polus on the nature of illness in an economical, physical and spiritual sense. He says that poverty, physical illness and injustice may be cured by; money-making, medicine and justice respectively. He goes on to say that if we must have an ailment cured, we go to a physician, and if we have injustice upon our soul, we go to a judge to receive punishment,

"477e Soc: Now then what art releases one from poverty? Isn't it money making? Pol: Yes Soc: And what art releases one from sickness? Isn't it medicine? 478a Pol: Necessarily Soc: and what art releases one from baseness and injustice? if you're not well-supplied with answers just like that, consider it this way: where, and to what people, do we lead those who are sick in their bodies? Pol: To doctors, Socrates Soc: And where do we lead those who do injustice and are intemperate? Pol: Do you mean, to judges? Soc: Is it so that they will pay the just penalty? Pol: I say so Soc: Now then, don't those who punish correctly punish by using a certain justice? Pol: That's clear, surely."

So from this we can see the argument for why we have punishment: that it is to cure our souls, or consciences if you would rather, of injustice or the corruption of wrong doing. So for instance, someone who does something wrong and does not understand its wrong such as the child who takes a candy bar from the grocery store (I cite 2:31 - 2:45, All rights go to Fox Networks and creators of Family Guy, I use this for educational purposes which I believe classifies as 'fair use' of copyright materials provided in section 107 of the US Copyright Law, in accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107 the material in this video is cited without the intention to acquire profit from its use)

 

If this child were to go unpunished, they might not understand the impact that they are having on others lives, such as the clerk and manager who will be reprimanded for shrink (a term that describes loss of products, namely stolen products) or even the company who still to some degree takes a loss. Clearly we wouldn't expect a child to understand this innately, that is why a parent might explain to them why their actions are wrong and why they should not do them again (or in court, letting them off with a warning for instance). In this example punishment inevitably benefits the moral identity of the individual. But then, this only holds true if both the laws themselves are just, and the Judge is non-biased and is truly pursuing the development of the individual in question and the protection of society. So then, why do we try to avoid punishment as a society, and view it as a bad thing, why do we shy away from it? On another note, if we view a law to be unjust or the judge biased, is it just that we should avoid punishment until we can determine the law to be correct, and/or acquire a Judge that we see as fit for their task?

Also I didn't want this to go this long but as Socrates states at 481a, "Soc:... if the enemy does injustice to someone else, one must provide in every way, by acting and by speaking, that he not pay the just penalty nor go to the judge. And if he does go, one must contrive that the enemy get away and not pay the just penalty, but if he has stolen much gold, that he not give it back but keep it and spend it unjustly and godlessly on himself and his..." and so on. What are your thoughts on this, if someone did you wrong, would you really see that they go without punishment in order to get revenge? Or, would you see to them be punished not for revenge or out of anger, but because you care for them and feel compassion for them? Thoughts, feelings, concerns?

Go ahead and get back to me on this when you can, until then Peace and Safety, Take Care.

When we think of self-injury and self-harm we think bulimia, anorexia, cutting, etc. But have you ever considered sex to be a means of self-inflicted violence. Girls go through sex sprees for the same reasons that girls cut their wrists; for attention, for love, to release stress and anger, to find a thrill, a high. We talk about how our souls are leaky jars and how the pleasure comes from filling back up. That is exactly how girls use sex to harm themselves, they feel pretty and loved and wanted while having sex but then go back to their somehow messed up, unfulfilling lives, and then cycle back to sex again.

When we think of sex we think of pleasure, love, affection, and being held. But in some cases the "good" in sex can be turned right around to bite us. One girl can have sex with 5 guys and be completely ok with it, confident, on good terms with it; and in this case we would refer to her sex as "good" and full of healthy pleasure. However, another girl may have sex with 5 guys and regret it, make up excuses to cope with her not being ok with what she did, maybe say "it's just sex, whatever". These are signs of "bad" unhealthy sex habits. And in this case, an act which is usually full of pleasure, becomes "bad".

At what point is pleasure like sex "good"? In the act of having sex, both girls could argue that they are having fun and all is well, but it's the reasons for having sex, and the feelings afterwards that make each situation different. Sex can be healthy and justified and it can be addicting, where do we draw the line? Where is the distinction between "good" sex and "bad" sex?

John Christman, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Political Science and Women's Studies here at Penn State joins me for episode 14 of the Digital Dialogue.

John's research focuses on contemporary social and political philosophy, moral philosophy and feminist theory. He has published widely in these areas including, most recently, articles entitled "Autonomy, History, and the Subject of Justice" in Social Theory and Practice 2007, and "Saving Positive Freedom" published in Political Theory in 2005.

He has edited and co-edited a number of volumes, including Social and Political Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction, published by Routledge in 2002, Autonomy and the Challenges of Liberalism, co-edited with Joel Anderson for Cambridge University Press in 2005, and Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, co-edited with Thomas Chistiano for Blackwell in 2009. His first book, The Myth of Property: Toward an Egalitarian Theory of Ownership was published by Oxford University Press in 1994.

But it is his latest book, which focuses on the social-historical self and the role autonomy plays in legitimating principles of justice, that brings him to the Digital Dialogue today. That book, entitled The Politics of Persons: Individual Autonomy and Socio-historical Selves, was recently published by Cambridge University Press. In it, John argues compellingly that autonomy, when properly conceived, can continue to play a central role in legitimating principles of justice in democratic societies even when the self is recognized as socially and historically conditioned in a rich and nuanced way.

Digital Dialogue14 with John Christman: The Politics of Persons

To subscribe to the Digital Dialogue via iTunesU, click here.

In this episode of the Digital Dialogue, we discuss the social-historical conception of the self, John's view of autonomy as it relates to deliberative democracy and the account of public reason and deliberation at the root of John's project.

Related Resources

• We touched upon the use of the word "autonomos" in Sophocles's Antigone, at line 821.
• Some of Judith Butler's work was mentioned, including: Antigone's Claim and Giving an Account of Oneself.
  

Christa, Drew and Kit wrap up this week's discussion.

Listen to weekly roundup podcast #5.mp3

The end of the Gorgias, Socrates finishes with his Myth (523a-527e) of the three brothers and death.

What I want to look into are the implications of such thinking, and normally I would leave this for class, but it's been bothering me ever since I put down the text. My basic understanding was that, at death, you would be judged for the actions you took in life. Your intrinsic characteristics, rather than your extrinsic, were what was to be put to the test, and you were sorted into an effective 'pass/fail' place of existence depending on your actions in life.

This is something I have to say I have quite a serious problem with.

By putting actions as a way of acting at stake for something, it could always be perceived that what we do is really only selfish, and often is. I'm currently taking a class on religion, one which recently went over Hinduism, and I'm sure we are all fairly familiar with the idea of Karma. Karma, to me, runs into the same issue, and I hope to use it as an analogy, or perhaps show that it's not just this isolated incident. In a video we were shown, an interviewed Hindu said that she gave food to wandering monks because it would lead to a better rebirth. She didn't mention anything about them being helped, it was purely self. It was set in logical form, and a basic one of them at that, Modus Ponens, centered on the self. If I help them, then I will be bettered for it. I believe that something along the lines of - If I help them, then they will be bettered for it - is more in line with this ellusive Good (capital G) we have been talking about, even if it sounds silly and redundant.

Maybe 'silly' has a place in all this?

But back to my main point, it seems in Socrates mindset, the major reason to do good acts wasn't to benefit others, but so that you wouldn't end up in the effective Hell to have your deeds tortured out of you. Perhaps this is simply the case because he was trying to appeal to Gorgias' logical mind, but if that's the case, is it even in the realm of logic to find a reason for being good? I'm not saying that it's not, I'm posing a legitimately curious question.

Certainly shaming people into doing good things, or bribing them (which are often interconnected) will cause more people to act good, but how many truly internalize it if that's the reason? Do we need a reason to be good? Should we even try to make one?

So, in yet another overlap between my classes this semester, we learned a little about Gorgias the Sophist in my rhetorical theory class. We read an excerpt from Plato's dialogue, but what I'm here to talk about is Gorgias' skeptic philosophy.

The man Gorgias lived between 485-380 B.C.E. What we know about him is that he was obviously a Sophist (traveling from his homeland Sicily). He was a legendary teacher of rhetoric and boasted of being able to persuade anyone of anything. Supposedly he persuaded the Athenians to actually build a gold statue of him at Delphi, an unheard of honor for a foreigner. Gorgias also believed that the skilled rhetorician can prove any proposition. He has a couple famous rhetorical works, notably including Encomium of Helen, which Cody posted about earlier.

I'm here to talk about Gorgias' skepticism though. While Protagoras was a relativist ("man is the measure of all things"), Gorgias was a skeptic. He is famous for his three-part formulation of skeptical philosophy:
 
1. Nothing exists.
2. If anything did exist, we could not know it.
3. If we could know that something existed, we would not be able to communicate it to anyone else.

In context of Plato's famous cave metaphor, Gorgias would say that a) there is nothing outside the cave; b) even if there was, you couldn't get out of the cave to see it; c) even if you could get out of the cave, you couldn't communicate what you saw to the people still in the cave. The Matrix movies kind of illustrate this idea, as Keanu Reeves' character couldn't explain the reality of the matrix to the unknowing people on the outside.

Now my question to you guys is, have you noticed any passages in the text that reveal Gorgias' famous skepticism? I've been keeping it in mind as I read, and I haven't seen any real references to it. Maybe I've missed some.

If not, then I wonder why it didn't make it into the dialogue. You'd think it come up when talking about the Good and the nature of justice and morality. Or even when Callicles goes on a rant about people wasting time with frivolous philosophy, saying there is no harm in young men engaging in useless banter, but that it is unattractive in older men like Socrates (484c-485e). See Taylor's post about that discussion.

But either way obviously Plato would disagree strongly with this idea of skepticism - he would say that not only do truths exist, but through philosophy we can both know and communicate them. This is yet another beef that Plato had with the Sophists that I thought was worth noting.

P.S: For my CAS class we had to write a response paper about who we agreed with: Protagoras (relativism), Gorgias (skepticism) and Platoism (absolute truths and view of rhetoric as a sham art). Who do you guys agree with?

Although we were deprived of a display of rhetoric because of the tardiness of Chaerephon, we are fortunate that we do have an example of rhetoric by Gorgias in the form of Gorgias' Encomium of Helen. Gorgias' epideictic ("praise rhetoric") speech attempts to defend Helen of Troy, who eloped with Prince Alexander (Paris) of Troy, sparking a destructive war between Greece and Troy, and sparking a literary tradition of blame on Helen. Gorgias attempts to refute such claims. He does this by laying out the four reasons why Helen would leave Greece, then refutes each point, and by the end admonishes Helen of all blame. The four points presented are by the gods, by force, by persuasive speech (logos) and because of love. Notice how Gorgias uses different techniques from our readings of Gorgias to persuade his audience, borrowing from Socrates and Callicles.

The first point Gorgias disseminates is that Helen left Greece because of divine intervention. Helen surely cannot be blamed for this because she is powerless to prevent the will of the gods. Gorgias argues, "...for god's predetermination cannot be hindered by human premeditation. For it is the nature of things, not for the strong to be hindered by the weak, but for the weaker to be ruled and drawn by the stronger, and for the stronger to lead and the weaker to follow. God is a stronger force than man in might and in wit and in other ways. If then one must place blame on Fate and on a god, one must free Helen from disgrace" (6). In this argument Helen cannot be held accountable for her actions because she was influenced by a force stronger than herself. This is consistent with Callicles opinion that the strong should rule the weak, and he would agree that Helen had no other choice, and therefore must not be held accountable.

The second point is that if she were removed by force, then, again, she cannot be held responsible: "But if she was raped by violence and illegally assaulted and unjustly insulted, it is clear that the raper, as the insulter, did the wronging, and the raped, as the insulted, did the suffering" (7). This is very similar to what Socrates was arguing in Gorgias, that those who suffer injustice experience less shame then the one who committed the injustice. Gorgias continues, "It is right then for the barbarian who undertook a barbaric undertaking in word and law and deed to meet with blame in word, exclusion in law, and punishment in deed. And surely it is proper for a woman raped and robbed of her country and deprived of her loved ones to be pitied rather than pilloried. He did the dread deeds; she suffered them. It is just therefore to pity her but to hate him" (7). Helen cannot be held responsible for being taken kidnapped and sexually abused. The shame belongs to Alexander of Troy, not Helen.

The third point is Helen left under the influence of speech. Here Gorgias is consistent with himself in the Platonic Gorgias. Gorgias recognized the power of rhetoric saying, "Speech is a powerful lord, which by means of the finest and most invisible body affects the divinest works: it can stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity (8)....All who have and do persuade people of things do so by molding a false argument (11)... The effect of speech upon the condition of the soul is comparable to the power of drugs over the nature of bodies" (14). This passage should be very ironic for readers of Socrates. Here Gorgias actually admits that persuasion is molding a false argument. This was Socrates' biggest problem with rhetoric; how do you know the rhetorician is in pursuit of "the good," or for that matter even truthful? Gorgias acknowledges Socrates argument in this point, saying poor Helen was taken in by persuasive language of a person who surely was not truthful. Therefore, she must not be at fault because she cannot be blamed for her ignorance, "So that on most subjects most men take opinion as counselor to their soul, but since opinion is slippery and insecure it casts those employing it into slippery and insecure successes" (11).

The last point explained by Gorgias is Helen was motivated by love to leave. Here Gorgias argues, "For the things we see do not have the nature which we wish them to have, but the nature which each actually has. Through sight the soul receives an impression even in its inner features." (15) This is similar (yet admittedly a bit of a stretch on this author's part) to Callicles and Socrates' discussion of the idea of power, specifically how it relates to the difference between what one wishes and what one think seems best. Helen was torn about whether she should stay in Greece, or follow her infatuation to Troy. Her ability to distinguish the two was blurred by the sight of the prince of Troy, seeing not an enemy of Greece but a physically and intelligently attractive man. After all, explains Gorgias, "If, therefore, the eye of Helen, pleased by the figure of Alexander, presented to her soul eager desire and contest of love, what wonder? If, being a god, Love has the divine power of the gods, how could a lesser being reject and refuse it? But if it is a disease of human origin and a fault of the soul, it should not be blamed as a sin, but regarded as an affliction. For she came, as she did come, caught in the net of Fate, not by the plans of the mind, and by the constraints of love, not by the devices of art" (19). Helen should not be responsible for being under the influence something as powerful as love. Love (or infatuation) is not something that can be controlled, and it obscured her better judgment.

For Gorgias, his Encomium of Helen is nothing more than an exercise in rhetoric. Gorgias' Encomium of Helen is an excellent example of Gorgias borrowing ideas from many different sources in order to support his argument. Gorgias is not concerned with following a certain philosophy per se, but rather will use whatever philosophy he needs to persuade. When Gorgias delivered the Encomium of Helen, Greek literary tradition had already come to the conclusion that Helen was at fault to the Trojan War. If ancient Greeks accepted his argument, this would run counter to the dominant thought of the era. Gorgias loved the paradoxical, and even admits at the end of the speech, "I wished to write a speech which would be a praise of Helen and a diversion to myself" (19). Gorgias' Encomium of Helen is a great example of rhetoric in action, and also demonstrates the power of persuasive speech, something that is just as relevant now as it was back during Gorgias' time.

So the question is, how can one separate fact from fiction when faced with as persuasive an individual as Gorgias? Is there truly no right or wrong answers? Can every point of view be defended as rationally and logically as the Encomium of Helen? And do you agree Helen is at fault for the Trojan War?

And thank you Professor Long, who provided the Link to Encomium of Helen by Gorgias.

Our society is very structured as far as age goes. We have standards and beliefs of what is appropriate and how to act a certain age. Callicles argues for this structure and further depicts these standards of society. Of course, when we see a little child at play, we are enlightened because it is the norm of society, it is what young children are supposed to do. They are supposed to explore. When we see an adult doing such things, we find ourselves confused and perhaps looking down upon them. But is exploring and learning only okay as a youth? Where is the certain point when one must learn all there is to know about life and explore no further? I don't think it is fair to set a time range on this aspect of life. Callicles relates philosophy to growth and articulation:

Callicles: It is fine to partake in philosophy to the extent that it is for the sake of education, and it is not shameful to philosophize when one is a lad. But when a human being who is already rather older still philosophizes, the thing becomes ridiculous, Socrates, and I feel toward those who philosophize something very much like what I feel toward those who mumble and play around childishly. For whenever I see a small child, to whom it is still proper to talk in this manner, mumbling and playing around, I rejoice and it appears graceful to me... whereas when I hear a little boy talking distinctly, the thing seem to me to be rather disagreeable, vexes my ears... but whenever one hears a man mumbling or sees him playing around childishly, it appears ridiculous, unmanly, and deserving of a beating. So then, I feel this same thing toward those who philosophize, too. For seeing philosophy in a young lad, I admire it, and it seems to me fitting, and I consider this human being to be a free man... But whenever I see an older man still philosophizing and not released from it, this man, Socrates, surely seems to me to need a beating (485b- 485c).

As humans, I believe we never stop growing. We can never stop learning. After all, wisdom only comes with age. But is philosophy an exception? Callicles is saying that it is ridiculous to see older people still philosophizing because they should be educated and aware of mostly all there is to know about life at the point they are at. If they still need to philosophize, perhaps they are incapable or unsuccessful human beings. Since they did not fully benefit or grow from philosophizing in their youth when it is the prime time to do so, perhaps their life thus far has been meaningless, and this is why it is looked down upon by Callicles.

This passage is a reflection of this aspect of society that the Tom Hanks movie "Big" portrays as well. In the movie, thirteen year old Josh wishes to be older, and the next morning finds himself trapped inside a thirty year old body. If you have never seen the movie, watch the trailer, and think about the things Josh does as a thirty year old that we may see as strange or odd for someone of that age to do, and how the people around him in the movie react. Think about if you saw someone of that age in real life acting as a child and doing childish things. How would you react? We are alerted and feel uncomfortable when we older people act this way because our eye is not trained to see such things. It is not the norm of our society.
 
 

There will probably never be a day in which this mold of society, regarding what is okay and what is not okay for people to do at certain stages throughout life, will be broken. But should philosophy, like articulation, be learned and well known after a certain point in someone's life? Do you agree with Callicles and his metaphor? Or is philosophy an ongoing discovery that one can explore throughout their entire life?

In the Protagoras, does Protagoras live up to everything negative that Socrates accuses of the sophists?  Surely he does use grand, flowery speeches--and these do distract his audience at times--but is it clear that his desire truly is to win the argument at the expense of truth and justice?  

In the Protagoras, the Socrates presents his audience (including his readers) with a negative image of Protagoras as a sophist before the reader first meets him.  Early in the dialogue, Socrates narrates his attempts to dissuade the young Hippocrates from becoming a pupil of Protagoras: "Wouldn't you be embarrassed, going around Greece presenting yourself as a sophist?" (312a-b.)  

There is a seeming tension between Socrates' generally negative attitude towards Protagoras as a sophist, exhibited in this scene (and accompanied by his possible evident desire to win the argument) and the (possibly ironically) positive ways that Socrates speaks to and of Protagoras.  Repeatedly, Socrates refers to Protagoras as a great intellectual and verbally conveys his respect for Protagoras as a thinker--usually to Protagoras's face, but also at 309d when speaking to his group of friends ("that is, if you think the greatest living intellectual is...") but his remarks carry a suggestion of irony and even sarcasm.  We as readers are left unsure about Socrates' full intentions when he makes comments such as "I look on you as someone of wide experience and great learning, and as an original thinker as well" (320b-c).  I believe that in these remarks there is a mixture of irony and seriousness that is important to our understanding of Socrates and Protagoras' role.

Over the course of the dialogue, the reader, who is probably accustomed to identifying with Socrates as the protagonist (or so the conventional reading of Plato goes) is struck by Socrates' behavior in the dialogue.  In many places, Socrates' behavior borders on -or simply is--unfair, obnoxious, self-important, and unsympathetic to most or all of what Protagoras argues.  Protagoras' face analogy, as we discussed in class (which if examined sympathetically as an analogy might be compelling and in certain respects does work, if we treat it for what it is) is one important example of this.  Once Protagoras conveys his analogy, Socrates immediately goes to work finding its limits, and using these to make the whole analogy appear faulty--a move that does convey some of the limits of the analogy, but that simultaneously obscures some of its important deeper insights.

Plato's attitude and treatment of Protagoras becomes even more striking when we examine Protagoras in a wider context.  According to Schiappa, Protagoras was well-respected as a philosopher in fifth and fourth century Greece.  "It is appropriate to classify Protagoras' interests as philosophical as long as it is kept in mind that the term is used in a modern sense" (14).  He had an influence on Aristotle, who for the most part refers to Protagoras in a positive light (14) and who agrees with Protagoras on issues such as "civic training" and "civic virtues" (193).  And according to Classen (as referenced by Schiappa), Aristotle avoids referring to Protagoras as a Sophist out of respect (14).  Schiappa continues to say that

Protagoras has been called the first positivist, the first humanist, the forerunner of pragmatism, a skeptic, an existentialist, a phenomenalist, an empiricist, an early utilitarian, a subjective relativist, and an objective relativist (15) (In a long footnote here, Schiappa cites thinkers who analyze Protagoras in each of these respective lights.)

In the end, as Schiappa argues, Protagoras does have an influence on Plato.  This influence is, in part, Protagoras as a thinker to be refuted--in particular, in his relativistic "human measure" argument.  In this, Plato and Aristotle both argue that Protagoras' statement contradicts itself, as for them it implies that one thing could be at the same time both good and bad (or both beautiful and ugly, etc.) if as Protagoras suggests it is the person that measures the goodness or badness of the thing.   But for Schiappa, "Both Plato and Aristotle argue from an either/or logic, whereas Protagoras used a both/and logic. To him experience was rich and variable enough to be capable of multiple--and even inconsistent--accounts" (italics mine, 193).  (And this is perhaps one of the regards in which Protagoras is argued to be a "forefunner of pragmatism.")  Schiappa argues that in all likelihood both Plato and Aristotle were ultimately aware that they had not sufficiently refuted Protagoras--but they did succeed in diminishing the prestige and popularity of his philosophies (193).  Ultimately, however, as Schiappa argues, Protagoras provided Plato and Aristotle with tools and methods, his relativism was influential (194), and, ultimately, Plato and Aristotle did assimilat certain aspects of Protagoras' philosophies in important ways--especially Aristotle (193-194).

The Protagoras ends unresolved and unconcluded.  We have no answers as to whether arête is teachable, or what an apt metaphor for it would be.  And in this regard, we the readers are, like Plato and Aristotle, left with the option of assimilating Protagoras' perspectives, in spite of the ways in which Socrates takes them down. Because in the end we are left with an image of a Protagoras who offers some compelling arguments and analogies, and who appears to have good intentions: his desire to make the youth better people seems to be genuine, and he appears to be less focused on winning the dialogue than Socrates. In this text, Socrates' negative mannerisms and his role as a dislikable protagonist may function as an aid to cultivating the reader's sense of sympathy for Protagoras and his arguments, whether or not that was Plato's intention.

Happy Friday everybody.

As some of you may have heard, the Nobel Committee recently announced U.S. President Barack Obama to be winner of the Nobel Peace Prize.  Here is an article from the New York Times that provides insight into the choice: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/10/world/10nobel.html?_r=1&hp.

When asked why Obama was chosen instead of candidates from less developed and more turbulent nations, where the work to be done is both immediate and difficult, Norwegian Thorbjorn Jagland, the committee's chairman, responded, "Obama has as president created a new climate in international politics. Multilateral diplomacy has regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the United Nations and other international institutions can play."  Jagland cites specifically Obama's reaching out to the Muslim world from a rostrum in Cairo, his commitment to revive Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, and his desire to realize a globe free of the ominous shadow of nuclear arms.  Despite the situations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Nobel Committee chose to focus on Obama's present and recent impact, rather than "what may happen in the future."

I would like to focus here on what peace might look like in the eyes of the Nobel Committee and possibly the world population.  It seems that Obama, rather than brokering an enduring treaty or tangible de-escalation of violence, has simply carved a space for dialogue.  Is this what peace looks like in our time?  Jagland himself has cited Obama's diplomacy, which is often merely the approach to and act of dialogue, often without tangible results.  Perhaps Obama has positioned individuals in a dialogical context where they can set aside differences and at least converse in the face-to-face manner intrinsic to Socratic politics.  Jagland also cites Obama's moves to focus the UN and other international organizations as potential mediums for conflict and disagreement.  Are these not political, if not dialogical, international agoras, where even an international pariah such as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad can take the rostrum?

I am curious, is this what peace looks like in our time?  The mere provision of the space for conversation?  Is peace a trajectory, or a telos--a result?  Please give your opinions.  I feel that there is not a more timely moment than now to discuss this.

Have a great weekend everyone.

So, as was mentioned in class today, it seems as though Gorgias is doing exactly what he claims to be doing, "In my opinion, Socrates, he'll also learn about morality from me, if he really doesn't already know" (460A). Gorgias is teaching a type of morality, a 'justice', so to speak, to those who come to him.

Now, further on in the dialogue, Callicles jumps into the argument. He claims that "Geracles drove off Geryon's cattle without paying for them and without Geryon giving them to him, presumably because it was natural justice for him to do so, in the sense that all the belongings of worse, inferior people--not just their cattle--are the property of a man who is better and superior" and later that "in my opinion, that's what natural right is--for an individual who is better (that is, more clever) to rule over second-rate people and to have more than them" (484c and 490a). While these two claims seem to be contradictory at first, as one can have mental power without physical power, I have come to believe that Callicles is not arguing contradictory ideas, but his overarching argument is that power, whether mental or physical, is the deciding factor of justice/morality (something he doesn't say outright, which irks Socrates, which is more than likely the reason why he doesn't say it outright).

Now, we have also established that Gorgias believes rhetoric to be a kind of power, "rhetoric is the only area of expertise you need to learn. You can ignore all the rest and still get the better of the professionals" (459c). A power so strong, in fact, one is able to convince the ignorant masses that one is better at medicine than an actual doctor.

That all being said, is seems to me that the claim that Gorgias makes, of teaching justice/morality to his students, is absolutely true in the eyes of someone like Callicles. He is learning the art of mental power, which, for Callicles, seems to create justice. This, in fact, creates a consistency between the points Gorgias and Callicles are making, which Socrates seems to overlook.

I would like to critique this idea and claim of justice made by the combined forces of Callicles and Gorgias.

It seems to me as though the ultimate flaw in this argument can be found in the text itself. Socrates goes to great length to explain how those at the head of a state, specifically a dictatorship, are in fact lacking the power they think they posses. While I find flaw in Socrates's line of reasoning, I think that a clear dichotomy is being made: the difference between outer expressive 'power' and inner 'power'. Socrates claims that we do not really do what we want when we commit 'unjust' acts, but only what we think is best. On the other hand, when we commit 'just' acts, we do what we want. The problems that I have with this line of reasoning is that Socrates makes the assumption that justice is an outer, creatively judging force which determines the right and wrong of an action, and the basic assumption of many of Socrates's claims, that all human beings are somehow oriented towards this outer 'Good' which we all want to make decisions in. But I think that we can easily extrapolate the idea of inner and outer power from the division between what we want and what we think is best, as to do what we really want (the 'Good') we must overcome the inner desires to do what we think is best (as this is how most live). Therefore, we can replace these two categories: what we really want becomes the inner power to overcome desires---and what we think is best becomes the power of outward expression over others.

Therefore, it seems as though Socrates is supporting a kind of 'true', eternal power over ourselves. Outer power over others is completely arbitrary, and depends on the existence of others as well as the weakness of others, but power over ourselves is something which is eternal, for if one gains true control over oneself and is able to quell instinctual desires, one is able to access a type of pure reason, untainted by desires such as vengeance and lust.

What do you guys think?

Today's class discussion covering conventional mores and nature reminded me of a scene from the movie "Conan the Barbarian," where a Mongol general asks Conan, sitting before the general as a slave, "What is best in life?".   Anyway, here is the clip that I am referring to:

 

 

What I think the movie clip points out is the aggressive nature of the power desired by Callicles and Polus.   And this desired power seems not to be just involved with custom and environment but also human nature.

Callicles believes that power seems to be a means by which a person's unlimited desire may be both satisfied and extended: "the man who will live correctly must let his own desires be as a great as possible and not chasten them, and he must be sufficient to serve them, when they are as great as possible, through courage and intelligence, and to fill them up with the things for which desire arises on each occasion" (492a).  So, with convention and nature set aside, is Callicles' own concept of power, then, even a position or a philosophy?   It seems--to me, at least--to be closer to a commentary on how pleasure is best attained and enjoyed than a conception of either the good or bad.

If Callicles' position were implemented, were allowed to be actually executed, how could it be applied to the whole state?   If desire is boundless, it would seem that one person's desires alone would be enough to smother any attempt of striving toward the good or of building something substantial.   That is, like Socrate's sieve, Callicles' own position in the quoted lines is nothing more than the relinquishing of human nature and the attainment of desire, with human nature being the escaping liquid (493c).   If a man or a woman is always striving to satisfy his or her own desires through power, what is left of human nature for that man or woman?  After all, if desire is always expanding and never diminishing, how can the possible good even be considered?  Callicles' position does not allow for reflection or contemplation of the good--moreover, contemplation of anything substantial beyond the whimsical.

It is interesting that prior to the quoted line of Callicles Socrates states that maybe the just ruler is a ruler over himself, his own human nature: "...but just what the many mean: being moderate and in control of oneself, ruling the pleasure and desires that are in oneself" (491e).   Socrates wants moderation and temperance; Callicles, neither.   Socrates' emphasizing the individual ruling over his or her own interior is the primary emphasis here.   It seems that maybe there is an order to the self that is above both external nature and social convention and that can be addressed by an inquiry that does not consume the individual with insatiable desire.

            In class and online, we discussed the nature of Gorgias' rhetoric, and whether or not it is oriented toward the "good." The conversation then moved off of rhetoric and on to the idea of Justice. However, let's go back to the idea of rhetoric for a moment. We were unfortunate in the reading to not be able to read Gorgias' speech, which was an example of rhetoric in action (and all because of tardy Chaerephon, wasting too much time at the agora). The result is that we hear about the nature of rhetoric, but never see it actually used by the master Rhetorician Gorgias himself.

            The closest I think we can get to Gorgias is by looking at actor Aaron Eckhart's character in the movie Thank You For Smoking Nick Naylor. For those unfamiliar, this is a comedy starring Eckhart as a Tobacco lobbyist who is very skilled at manipulation and persuasion. Naylor in the movie has no morals or ethics in conducting his job. His job requires him to manipulate facts about smoking in order to get more people hooked. His manipulation knows no bounds, and he's very good at it. How is he so good? He explains the reasons to his son in this dialogue exchange:

 

Joey Naylor: ...so what happens when you're wrong?
Nick Naylor: Whoa, Joey I'm never wrong.
Joey Naylor: But you can't always be right...
Nick Naylor: Well, if it's your job to be right, then you're never wrong.
Joey Naylor: But what if you are wrong?
Nick Naylor: OK, let's say that you're defending chocolate, and I'm defending vanilla.

Now if I were to say to you: 'Vanilla is the best flavor ice-cream', you'd  

say...

Joey Naylor: No, chocolate is.
Nick Naylor: Exactly, but you can't win that argument... so, I'll ask you: so you think

chocolate is the end all and the all of ice-cream, do you?

Joey Naylor: It's the best ice-cream, I wouldn't order any other.
Nick Naylor: Oh! So it's all chocolate for you is it?
Joey Naylor: Yes, chocolate is all I need.
Nick Naylor: Well, I need more than chocolate, and for that matter I need more than

vanilla. I believe that we need freedom. And choice when it comes to our ice-cream, and that Joey Naylor, that is the definition of liberty.

Joey Naylor: But that's not what we're talking about
Nick Naylor: Ah! But that's what I'm talking about.
Joey Naylor: ...but you didn't prove that vanilla was the best...
Nick Naylor: I didn't have to. I proved that you're wrong, and if you're wrong I'm right.
Joey Naylor: But you still didn't convince me
Nick Naylor: It's that I'm not after you.... I'm after them.
[points into the crowd]

 

            The scene is played for comedic laughs, but this is a really accurate portrayal of the art of rhetoric. Nick Naylor's goal is to persuade the audience listening to him by any means necessary, even reframing the original question. Naylor preys upon people's ignorance and gullibility; if it sounds good and affirms what they already know, they're going to agree. He also points out that in a debate, his goal is still the minds of the audience, not the other debater. The truth here is blurred; we are unsure as to what the truth is, so we're going to agree with whoever is the most persuasive. Naylor doesn't have to be right; he just needs to prove the other debater wrong to the audience and by doing that, the audience will automatically assume that Naylor is therefore correct.

            This and other dialogue exchanges are a good contemporary example of Gorgias' use of rhetoric for "unjust" purposes. This is the problem Socrates has with Gorgias' rhetoric. Persuasion, by its very nature, has a certain amount of manipulation to it, no matter if you're arguing for the tobacco industry or for Justice. Socrates wants the truth; Gorgias merely wants to persuade you to his point of view, whether it's the truth or not. I argue that in order to be truly persuasive in anything, you need to employ a little bit of manipulation in order to convince the other person you are correct. Manipulation is surely not part of the good, so that would mean that persuasion, fundamentally, is also not part of the good. I can see why Socrates may have a problem with this, although he himself may have engaged in a certain amount of persuasion in his dialogues; manipulation he would've called the "truth."

So the question is: Can persuasion ever be done without manipulation? Or is manipulation necessary in order to change a person's mind? Should persuasion be part of the "good"? And where can I be taught this art of rhetoric...?

 

Source: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0427944/

Hey Everyone,

So today while discussing what Socrates was saying about the difference between doing what we want opposed to what seems to be right, I may have brought up a question about something like 'Sure, but what if this was a culture (can't spell culture without cult) oriented on killing as a social norm and as they view it striving towards the ultimate Good'

I think what Chris said about that simply being what seems to be right for them, it's actually the result of misinformation, and I would agree with him in that. But what I wanted to get across was not whether or not we see it as ultimate Good or un-Good, but rather to shift to the perspective of someone else completely. Surely, we see not killing as a step in the direction of the Good, but is that because we know it to be a step towards the Good?

If the presence of Knowledge or Ignorance is the defining factor between doing what we want (moving towards the good) or doing what seems best (moving towards a warped view of the good), who is to say what is Knowledge truly. If its information that is correct, how do we know it is correct? Who determines what is correct and therefore Knowledge, and that actions based on that is moving towards the Good?

Is it relative to our culture? I'd like to think that what I perceive as the representation of the Good to be correct, one aspect of which being moving towards a Path of Peace and Knowledge, but then again I'm not raised to worship the Blood God who asks for sacrifices of blood and things, like I don't know first born children, then if you piss him off, curses you to walk around in deserts for forty years. But I do like the one who asks you to drink his blood and eat his flesh so that when you fall dead you may rise again and live for eternity, he had a lot of good messages, he's my homeboy, oh and the Divine, that's my favorite, it loves everyone because it is everyone and everyone is it.

But most importantly, please, what do you think? Can we base what makes a decision truly moving towards the Good on relative variables like knowledge (not Knowledge, in that knowledge varies in degrees of correctness and perspective)? (ps. God has a sense of humor too, just look at the platypus)

Here you will find Kiery and Sam on the fourth edition of the weekly roundup podcast.

Listen to the Weekly Round-up 4 for the Week of Sept 29 & Oct 1

This post will be a little bit more exploratory than argumentative in nature, so I hope people are feeling a bit more comfortable with one another so they can open up. My question is simple - "Why are you here?"

We have seen the theme of learning and experience crop up in many different forms in the various dialogues, and each of them seems to pose a slightly different question, but always with the same urgency. Socrates seems to really push the idea that his discussions are some of the post important things in the world, as they are talks about the outcome of the rest of ones life. If this is true, or even relevant, it might not be a terrible idea to have some personal introspection and understanding into both our own and other peoples experiences.

As the trend seems to suggest with the class, dialogue doesn't necessarily mean argument. We can learn quite a bit from stories, accounts, and personal 'tokens of wisdom' we gather from other people and cultures. I also think by having a bit more 'personal' account of things can truly aid the progress of understanding the posts and stances of one another, which could very likely promote understanding of one another views.  

So, back to the main question. What are some of the goals you want to complete by the time you graduate? Why did you go in the first place? Who are you here for? Has anything significantly changed your outlook on all this? Is it really just the classes that matter?  Do you care?

Considering myself a modest observer to the political occurrences, I get a sense that all to often the people that have the power to make the decisions that influence the many are grossly under qualified in the area of knowledge and intelligence. Don't get me wrong, I believe a lot of elected officials are very smart people but have a very narrow viewpoint or lack of 'intelligence' concerning certain issues that they deliberate about.

As Socrates points out to Polus, (467a)

"Will you therefore show that rhetors have intelligence and that rhetoric is an art, but not flattery, having refuted me? If you leave me unrefuted, rhetors who do what seems good to them in the cities and tyrants will have acquired nothing good by this. And power is, as you say, a good thing, but you too agree that doing what seems good without intelligence is a bad thing; don't you?"

 To me this is backwards and dangerous, because the people making the decisions that impact the multitudes have a different type of intelligence. To me, they have a self serving intelligence that spews out rhetoric without actually saying anything; speaking in circles.

Another dismal occurrence in our current political arena is the agonistic stance many elected officials take during deliberations. This really goes nowhere and back because it just concentrates who won or succeed in besting the opponents argument. Actually analyzing the facts and making a concerted effort to find the best possible solution for a problem has taken a back seat to mud throwing and slander. Apparently you can win an election better not with  your viewpoints on issues, but by the attacking of the reputation of your opponent. 

Socrates sets, what I feel, to be a great example (470c):
" I shall feel much gratitude to the child then, and equal gratitude to you too, if you refute me and release me from drivel. So don't tire of doing good to a man who's a friend, but refute."

There is a huge lack of ethics and openness to correction. Politicians should have to take a humility test before allowed to go into office. They should show willingness to be corrected and have the courage to change their previous viewpoint if shown faulty.

As I have been reading through the Gorgias, I have come across several scenarios where I have felt that Gorgias is withholding impertinent information from Socrates, and us.  The basis of argument for this post is drawn from the beliefs that Socrates philosophy is too "black and white"; that Socrates will not let philosophical ideologies mix; individual opinions of what is good for one person will not always be good for the other person.  I have drawn upon this subject matter in a previous post, but since I feel it is of much importance (especially when attempting to define what is "just" or "good") I will a try to describe it in this passage in more detail.         

In 452a, we can see a heated debate take place: Socrates is attempting to define Gorgias' craft in relation to those of doctors, trainers, and moneymakers.  He then asks Gorgias to define the greatest good of his craft, Gorgias responds, "That which is in truth, Socrates, the greatest good and the cause both of freedom for human beings themselves and at the same time of rule over others in each man's own city." (452d).  I have come to show this quote because it has a direct relation with why Socrates believes the mixing of words is dangerous.  If we dissect this quote, we can see that Gorgias is stating that rhetoric alone gave people freedom and at the same time gave others dominance.  If we view this in a situational example, I would find it comparable to a teenager who just passed his drivers license test: he/she was awarded the freedom of driving, but to what extent?  What stipulations are attached that may limit his/her capabilities?  More than that, who was given the power to decide why this teenager passed his exam, and why?

To help answer these questions, I have come to the segment of the post where the teacher will become involved.  "... And, I think, if someone has become a rhetorician and then does injustice with this power and art, one must not hate the man who taught him and expel him from the cities.  For that man imparted it for just use, and the other used it in the opposite way.  It is just, then, to hate, expel, and kill the one who uses it not correctly, but not the one who taught it." (Gorgias 457b).  Gorgias, Gorgias, Gorgias...  It's as if he's already stating that what he is truly teaching isn't justice.  "Don't take it out on him, he's just the messenger!"  I have brought this up because, as we saw in the first quote, he is stating the "greatest good" of rhetoric is something that left people divided; this has wound up with Gorgias defending himself against the injustice that his teachings might be doing.  So, this begs to ask, did Gorgias ever really care about the "greatest good" of his "art" seeing as how he was so giddy to profess his innocence?  Or, has he been attempting to teach a philosophy in which those who are powerful with words will be able to rule and dominate?  

In the Gorgias, Socrates attempts to articulate his own position concerning rhetoric in response to Polus.  He says that he understands it to be "an image of a part of politics" (463c).

The chart below is an attempt to lay out the account Socrates offers to Polus at 464b-ff:



What differentiates an art (techne) from an experience (empeiria)? Socrates seems to suggest that a techne involves the ability to offer a reasoned account with respect to the thing it administers, it is said to involve an understanding of the nature of that which it administers and an ability to state causes (465a).

What is the result of this elaborate analogy?  What is its effect on Polus, on us?

Is it worse to be a wrongdoer or a victim?

In Gorgias, we witness the ongoing discussion between Socrates and Polus about "injustice", where the two debate whether it is better to suffer the consequences of unjustness from one viewpoint over the other. Socrates says, "I for one would wish neither; but if it were necessary to do or to suffer injustice, I would choose rather to suffer than to do injustice" (469 c).

Later, Socrates asks:

Socrates: ...as if I were asking you from the beginning, [w]hich to you, Polus, to be worse, doing injustice or suffering injustice?

Polus: Suffering injustice, as far as I'm concerned.

Socrates: And now what about this? Which is more shameful, doing injustice or suffering injustice? Answer!

Polus: Doing injustice. (474c)

I would think that for most humans, this would be their initial response as well. Of course we would not want to feel the guilt of committing injustice; if we are the sufferers feelings of distraught may exist, but not those of guilt. Being the sufferer, the blame is not on us. We are the victims. Of course many of us would say it is more shameful to be in the position of the one who destructs an aspect of society and brings the unjust upon others.

But I wonder, if this answer seems to be such a "given" among human beings, why would this conversation even be brought up and so in depth? Why is Socrates instigating Polus and provoking thought in him to perhaps get him to answer something differently and perhaps more truthfully? I want to explore the angles of both sides.

Committing acts of injustice all go back to the root of conscious. Maybe doing injustice isn't as bad as suffering from it because those who do it genuinely don't feel bad. Deep down we do things that we know are bad, but we do them because we want to. Why? Because it gives us pleasure or makes us feel good. Our conscious is what makes us feel the guilt. Perhaps sometimes all of the pleasure that is gained overcomes any feeling of possible guilt. Take tyrants or kings for example. They may enforce laws and rules upon people that aren't fair and that cause them suffering, but they may be blinded by that because of how good they feel from all of the power they have over others.

And on the other side, why would feelings of shame from suffering injustice even be a question? Of course Polus answers that it is more shameful to do injustice because you cause others to suffer. Maybe, however, we can feel shameful for undergoing the suffering. Maybe it is shameful because we allow others to make us feel that way and we do not take a stand for ourselves to prevent it; we allow others to undermine us. That feeling of being beneath another or lower than someone else can be shameful, perhaps because we cannot amount.

Socrates repeats this question for a reason. Although the answer may seem blunt and obvious (as it may be many of our initial reactions), maybe it is not always right. Maybe if we were put in both positions in reality we would feel differently. So now I ask, which would be worse?

Which would be more shameful? To do or to suffer?