This September I will be presenting at the Designs on e-Learning Conference held here at Penn State.  My presentation is entitled Blogging and Podcasting the Liberal Arts.  

The abstract is as follows:

Over the past two years, I have worked to incorporate podcasting and blogging into my First-Year seminars in Philosophy. This session will present some of the best practices I have found to be particularly effective in the effort to use technology to expand the classroom experience and encourage the active engagement of my students in their own education. The presentation will touch upon my valiant failures as well as substantive successes. Some of the issues discussed will include: integrating podcasting and blogging, using RSS feeds to facilitate online community, example blog and podcast assignments and a discussion of the place of technology in the classroom. Attendees should come prepared to engage in a substantive discussion of both the concrete, practical issues associated with blogging and podcasting in the classroom and the more theoretical questions surrounding the use of technology in the pedagogical process.
FREIBURG, GERMANY - Today I present a paper entitled Ontological Response-Ability and the Ethics of Truth at a conference jointly organized by the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg and the Pennsylvania State University.

The paper will outline some of the basic idea underlying my book project entitled The Saying of Things: The Nature of Truth and the Truth of Nature in Aristotle.  The central argument of the paper is that the question of truth is fundamentally a matter of doing justice to the expression of things.  Justice in this case is ontological: it concerns the logos at work in everything that is.  Thus, to do justice to the expression of things is shown to involve an ability to respond to the ways things speak that is rooted in an ethical community of communication with nature.  
In April, I will give a paper entitled "The Duplicity of Beginning: Schürmann, Aristotle and the Origins of Metaphysics" at the Eighth Annual Independent Meeting of the Ancient Philosophy Society, which will meet this year at my alma mater, the New School for Social Research in New York City.

The paper is a engagement with the work of Reiner Schürmann, a former professor of mine at the New School, who died in 1993.  Schürmann tends to read Aristotle as the father of a way of thinking he derisively dubs "metaphysics" in which being is understood primarily in terms of technological production.  I seek to show how such a reading of Aristotle does not do justice to Aristotle's own attempts to address nature on its own terms.  

In the process, the paper suggests that Aristotle was himself more attuned to the ways principles function both as forces of domination and principles of beginning.  The paper ends with an attempt to shift Schürmann's emphasis upon the trait of mortality and the nature of human tragedy in order to recognize also the significance of the trait of natality and the more comic dimensions of human-being. 
My paper on Woodbridge's reading of Aristotle entitled "The Natural History of the Soul" has been accepted for the 2008 meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. The paper is part of a panel with Daniel Brunson, a graduate student here at Penn State and Rose Cherubin of George Mason University. The panel is entitled American Philosophy and the Legacies of Greek Thinking. The panel abstract is below:

Greek thinking has historically been engaged by American philosophers in at least three (not always mutually exclusive) ways. Roughly speaking, the first involves the discussion and interpretation of specific Greek texts. The second involves the development, often in new contexts, of ideas inspired by or rooted in Greek ideas, but not necessarily identical to them. The third way is the apparently independent development of ideas and ways of thinking that parallel those found in Greek thought, where there is no evidence of direct influence. The papers in this panel illustrates all three modes by which Greek thinking has been engaged by American philosophers.

The first paper, entitled The Natural History of the Soul, takes up the first and second modes by focusing on a set of lectures Fredrick Woodbridge gave in 1930 on Aristotle's De Anima in which he reads Aristotle as concerned primarily with the being and meaning of nature. The paper is divided into three sections. The first considers Woodbridge's innovative account of Aristotle's method, which is guided by Aristotle's own theoretical practice of attempting to put the natural phenomena he encounters into words. This methodological commitment to the articulation of things suggests the importance of Aristotle's own ontological orientation toward language, which is the focus of the second section of the paper. Finally, drawing on Woodbridge's account of how, for Aristotle, it is natural for things to go into language the paper will conclude with a discussion of Aristotle's understanding of the intelligibility of things that links Aristotle's naturalism to both Woodbridge's conception of cooperation and Dewey's understanding of transaction.

Illustrating the first and third modes, Peirce's Account of Pythagoras explores the speculative biography of Pythagoras written by Peirce on multiple occasions. Primarily, Peirce offers it as a methodological example of abduction based upon meager evidence, and which offers few predictions regarding possible future experience. Peirce considers his method both distinctive and superior to others because it demands an explanation of all the evidence, even, or especially, known falsehoods. That is, one should explain why a false testimony would be asserted as true, and why in one way rather than another. More broadly, Peirce implicitly argues that we should engage with the ancients seriously, rather than assigning them to the “infancy” of thought. In fact, Peirce's account concludes with an intriguing hypothesis as to the secret behind Pythagorean "mysticism," based largely on a supposition regarding Pythagoras' travels outside the Greek world.

The final paper of the panel, Inquiry, Truth, and Normativity in Parmenides and Peirce, addresses the second and third modes of the American engagement with Greek thinking by drawing Peirce's conception of philosophical inquiry into dialogue with that of Parmenides. In his search for alternatives to aspects of modern philosophy he found to be misguided, Peirce often independently took up Greek notions also used by Parmenides. The thematic study of inquiry was central to Peirce's conception of philosophy. In this his closest philosophical precursor was Parmenides. Both investigated what it is that inquiry might enjoin and require, and what its success might consist in and imply. Both also explored the normative or evaluative dimensions of the search for truth. This paper looks at these two areas of common interest. The paper examines the convergences and divergences between Peirce and Parmenides on the theme of inquiry, with the aim that the reflection of each on the other might illuminate both and further our understanding of the questions they addressed.

Long, Christopher P. "Is there Method in this Madness? Context, Play and Laughter in Plato's Symposium and Republic." In Philosophy in Dialogue: Plato's Many Devices, edited by Gary Alan Scott. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007.

Philosophy in Dialogue: Plato's Many DevicesFor modern philosophy, method is designed to set forth objective rules of procedure so as to establish philosophy as a rigorous science. For Plato, however, method cannot be divorced from the contingent contexts in which philosophy is always practiced. While modern method permits no madness, there is madness in Plato's method. This article traces three strategies that constitute the method of madness that operates in the Symposium and Republic. The first is a distancing strategy in which Plato systematically distances himself from the content of the ideas expressed in the dialogues in order to provoke the sort of critical self-reflection required for philosophy. The second is a grounding strategy whereby Plato embeds philosophical debate in determinate social and political contexts so as to anchor philosophy in the concrete world of human community. The third is a demonstrative strategy in which Plato models philosophy as an activity intent on weaving a vision of the good, the beautiful and the just into the contingent world of human politics. Together these three strategies function methodologically to show the powerful conception of philosophy embodied in the dialogues.

“The Daughters of Metis: Patriarchal Dominion and the Politics of the Between.” The Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 28, 2 (2007).

By attending closely to three ancient stories concerned with the origin and effect of patriarchal dominion, this essay seeks at once to discern the tragic dialectic according to which patriarchal authority operates and to open new possibilities for politics beyond the logic of domination and force. The stories of Zeus’s consumption of Métis in the Theogony, of Agamemnon’s sacrifice of Iphigeneia in the Agamemnon and of Athena’s attempt to establish a just human community in the Eumenides articulate something of the logic of force that underlies and undermines patriarchal dominion at its very origins. These stories also, however, suggest another possibility for politics insofar as they give voice to the transformative political intelligence known to the Greeks as metis. This habit of thinking is dynamic and open in such a way that it can actualize what Hannah Arendt has designated as genuine political power: the ability to bring words and deeds together to cultivate relations and create new realities. The power of metis, it is suggested, is a habit of thinking capable of weaving difference into community with an eye toward justice. This essay turns to these ancient stories in order to draw out the possibilities metis holds for a new politics in the face of the chronic, pathological failures of the logic of force that has historically animated patriarchal politics.

The The Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal has generously allowed me to make the full text of this article available in .pdf format: Click this link to download the full text of the article.

The Descent of Socrates
I wrote a review of The Descent of Socrates: Self-knowledge and Cryptic Nature in the Platonic Dialogues, by Peter A. Warnek (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006) in The Continental Philosophy Review, (forthcoming).

Long, Christopher P. "Aristotle's Phenomenology of Form: The Shape of Beings that Become," Epoché 11, no. 2 (2007), 435-448.

Scholars often assume that Aristotle uses the terms morphē and eidos interchangeably. Translators of Aristotle’s works rarely feel the need to carry the distinction between these two Greek terms over into English. This article challenges the orthodox view that morphē and eidos are synonymous. Careful analysis of texts from the Categories, Physics and Metaphysics in which these terms appear in close proximity reveals a fundamental tension of Aristotle’s thinking concerning the being of natural beings. Morphē designates the form as inseparable from the matter in which it inheres, while eidos, because it is more easily separated from matter, is the vocabulary used to determine form as the ontological principle of the composite individual. The tension between morphē and eidos—between form as irreducibly immanent and yet somehow separate—is then shown to animate Aristotle’s phenomenological approach to the being of natural beings. This approach is most clearly enacted in Aristotle’s biology, a consideration of which concludes the essay.

Long, Christopher P. "Socrates and the Politics of Music: Preludes of the Republic," Polis 24, no. 1 (2007).

At least since the appearance of Aristotle’s Politics, Plato’s Republic has been read as arguing for a politics of unity in which difference is understood as a threat to the polis. By focusing on the musical imagery of the Republic, and specifically on its compositional organization around three “preludes,” this essay seeks an understanding of Socratic politics that moves beyond the hypothesis of unity. In the first “prelude,” Thrasymachus and his insistence that justice is the self-interest of the stronger threatens to subject the harmony of the community to the tyrannical whims of the individual. In the second, the perfected justice of Adeimantus’s city threatens to destroy the erotic rhythm of difference that is the very condition for the possibility of the polis. It is only in the song of dialectic, which itself is called a “prelude,” that the tension between the rhythm of plurality and the rational homophony of unity is dynamically tuned in such a way that both the anarchic politics of self-interest and the totalitarian politics of rationalized oppression are equally muted. This conception of politics is embodied in the relationship that emerges between Glaucon and Socrates. Ultimately, the true political community is established here, between rational, erotic individuals seeking justice in concrete, living dialogue.

Long, Christopher P. "Saving ta legomena: Aristotle and the History of Philosophy," The Review of Metaphysics 60 (2006): 247-267.

By taking seriously the extent to which Aristotle understands the things said (ta legemona) by his predecessors as genuine phenomena that express something of the truth about beings, this essay challenges the orthodox understanding of Aristotle’s approach to the history of philosophy as merely a thinly veiled attempt to legitimize the authority of his own philosophical ideas. Drawing on both the continental phenomenological approach to Aristotle and the Anglo-American analytic and pragmatic recognition of the important role an orientation toward ta phainomena play in Aristotle’s method, this article turns to two specific texts—the Physics and the Parts of Animals—to articulate how Aristotle’s engagement with his historical predecessors is itself an integral moment of his philosophical investigation into the being of natural beings. John Herman Randall and Hans Georg-Gadamer provide the conceptual vocabulary through which Aristotle’s engagement with his predecessors can be best understood; for each in his own way expresses the view that genuine philosophy opens new possibilities for the future by critically engaging the past. The essay concludes by suggesting at once the limitations of Aristotle’s approach to his predecessors and the continuing importance of his recognition that philosophy cannot be pursued in isolation from its history.


The Review of Metaphysics has generously allowed me to make the full text of this article available in .pdf format: Click this link to download the full text of the article.