In this lively and original book, Russell Winslow pursues a new
interpretation of logos in Aristotle. Rather than a reading of
rationality that cleaves human beings from nature, this new
interpretation suggests that, for Aristotle, consistent and dependable
rational arguments reveal a deep dependency upon nature. To this end,
the author shows that a rational account of a being is in fact subject
to the very same principle that governs the physical motion and
generation of a being under inquiry. Among the many consequences of
this argument is a rejection of both of the prevailing oppositional
claims that Aristotle's methodological procedure of discovery is one
resting on either empirical or conceptual grounds: discovery reveals a
more complex structure than can be grasped by either of these modern
modes. Further, Winslow argues that this interpretation of rational
discovery also contributes to the ethical debates surrounding
Aristotle's work, insofar as an ethical claim is achieved through
reason, but is not thereby conceived as objective. Again, the demand
for agreement in ethical/political decision will be disclosed as
superseding in its complexity both those accounts of ethical decision
as subjective (for example, "emotivist" accounts) and those as
objective ("realist" accounts).