Parkman's historical interpretation. Well into the twentieth century, *Montcalm and Wolfe* gave the aura of historical respectability to the creative representations of Benjamin West and the other eighteenth-century artists. Until recently, many American history textbooks included an illustration of Benjamin West's *The Death of Wolfe*.

This book left me with the impression that what happened on the Plains of Abraham was less important than what occurred in the studios and drawing rooms of England, where artists, sculptors, poets, and their patrons fashioned heroic images of James Wolfe. It is not that the battle and Wolfe's death are irrelevant, as they are less important than the meaning society attaches to them. McNairn's reconstruction of the events that led from the battlefield outside Quebec City to the salons of London serves as useful reminder to historians. When it comes to creating heroes, the brush, chisel, and pen are indeed mightier than the sword.—Charles D. Dutrizac


This study of Irish parliamentary politics continues the work of the new historiography launched in 1992 with Sean Connolly's *Religion, Law, and Power*. It interrogates the assumptions, definitions, and myths informing the work of earlier historians, and undertakes a labor-intensive return to the archives, discovering in state papers and letters a rich supply of significant detail underlying the reconstruction of complex political developments.

McNally considers two recent historiographic models: is eighteenth-century Ireland best understood as a colony or as a society akin to contemporary ancien regime states? Both models have merit, but actual historical circumstances do not always fit theoretical templates. Ireland's relations with England do not match the pattern of constitutional dependence of colony upon metropole, nor does the usual racial disparity (government by a racially distinct metropolitan elite) occur. While class and socioeconomic status did determine social relations in the ruling Anglican community, a stable hierarchy of patronage and deference is less easy to trace in Anglican-Catholic-Anglican-dissent relations. Irish landholding, for instance, crossed sectarian boundaries in so complex a manner that it is impossible to discover a coherent monolithic ruling body characteristic of an ancien regime.

What does it mean to state that patronage dominated Irish political culture? Lecky claimed British ministers used patronage to gain support at Westminster. More recent historians claim viceroys simply bought support in the Irish Commons; parliamentary leaders, they argue, were no more than venal jobbers. Connolly counters by outlining the effects of personal honor, commitment to issues, patriotism, and parliamentary oratory. McNally clarifies the functional complexity of patronage by framing (and answering) the question, who distributed patronage?

The sources—army, church, judiciary, revenue service, government posts, pensions, and titles—were all in different hands, so patronage was difficult for the Dublin government. Judicious viceregal patronage could reward parliamentary supporters and defuse opposition, but parliamentary support for all measures could not be taken for granted.

When parliament collapsed in 1692, protestant leaders conducted parliamentary business independently, passing the way for the managers. Then consolidation of revenue patronage empowered the great parliamentary managers William Cavendish and Henry Boyle, complicating government use of patronage while the relationship between viceroys and parliamentary undertakers evolved. The system was fluid and improvisational; it worked, except when Westminster and the viceroys promoted measures that called for resistance: campaigns to repeal the *Sacrocnentale Test* in 1719 and 1733, and the affair of Wood's halfpence.

The House of Lords was divided between the so-called Irish and English interests; Tory bishops were replaced with Whig bishops, who supported the government by bringing in English candidates for government and church positions, a struggle McNally calls it more serious than significant. McNally demonstrates how the term "Patriot" was variously used to indicate anyone who desired to improve the country, or one concerned with specific political issues (the religious establishment, relations with Britain, and the rights of the Irish parliament), or a member of the opposition. Initially a term of opprobrium, over the course of the century it was adopted in a positive sense. Still, it is a mistake to confl ate this movement with the romantic nationalism of the succeeding age. After the
Williamite settlement Protestants called themselves "the English in Ireland," their rights the rights of "free-born Englishmen." But the English considered them Irish (a term they reserved for Catholics). So began the reconstruction of the term in a positive, protestant light. Their political focus shifted to the historical rights of the Irish parliament. Irish Protestants accepted dependence upon the crown, but not subjection to the Westminster parliament. McNally's account of Irish political history is detailed, lucid, and sure.—Kevin Berland


Jacob Cooke worried in his 1982 biography of Alexander Hamilton that "The notion that Hamilton was [Adam] Smith's disciple dies hard." But Cooke's concern has been addressed with force and frequency by, among others, Forrest McDonald, Shannon C. Stimson, and the editors of the Hamilton papers. Peter McNamara provides an additional and intricate twist to the story by emphasizing Hamilton's conception of "statesmanship." Despite whatever agreements Hamilton had with Smith—such as belief in the benefits of the division of labor and the uses of new machinery—the key difference was that Smith was a "theorizer" for whom passive government was necessary in order that the natural laws of economics could work their magic, while Hamilton, suspicious of "theory," relied on real world occurrences and the experiences of political figures such as Frenchman Jacques Necker. Hamilton's take on history suggested an important role for government in creating and maintaining a strong nation in tandem with a sound economy. At the same time, the pejorative "mercantilist" label, frequently used against Hamilton, is, McNamara persuades, unsuitable. Rather, Hamilton is more in line with an historical trajectory leading to the later tenets of Keynesian economics.

The first half of the book is an elaboration of Smith's theories as revealed in his lectures and two major works—The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations; the second half is a study of Hamilton's "political economy" as presented in his famous messages to the Congress on public credit, the bank, and manufacturing. Throughout, contrasts emerge: Hamilton emphasizes statecraft, Smith theory. Smith "appears to make modern liberty a product of history itself." In Hamilton's view, modern liberty "was the result of a project, conceived by philosophers and put into practice by enlightened statesmen"(52). Smith believed that self-interest was the chief motive of individuals and, left alone in a "system of natural liberty," would bring progress; Hamilton sensed that self-interest was but one factor motivating human action and that it required guidance. Smith, like Jefferson, saw agriculture as the primary economic activity and as a morally superior way of life; Hamilton sought to promote a much more complex, multifaceted, and modern economy. Smith urged that public debts be retired; Hamilton believed that a national debt, properly managed, could be a "national blessing" and "a spur to industry." (letter to Robert Morris, April 30,1781). Smith warned against the establishment of banks for "public spirited purposes"; Hamilton intended to use the national bank precisely for public purposes. Most fundamentally, Smith implied that motives of individual self-interest, unrestrained by government, could lead to progress and much-prized "virtue"; Hamilton, like Hume (and Madison), "viewed progress as something of a two-edged sword" (141), incapable of assuring a virtuous society; for Hamilton, effective and robust constitutional government, not the "invisible hand," was crucial to the workings of modern republicanism.

McNamara approves of Hamilton's modernity, so it is curious that he limits his title to "the Foundation of the Commercial Republic." Hamilton had advanced beyond the notion of the United States as simply a "commercial" republic by the time of his "Report on Manufactures," and McNamara makes that explicit when he summarizes the Hamiltonian program as "aimed to create a diverse, vigorous, and modern society." (142). Also curious is McNamara's throwaway line at the very end of his book, suggesting that Hamilton would recoil at "the entitlement state" and be stunned at the range of government activities in our own day (150). Maybe. But certainly more than